JUDGMENT D. Raju, C. J.—The above second appeal has been filed by the plaintiff in Civil Suit No. 250 of 1988 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Kullu. The plaintiff-appellant died and his legal representatives have been brought on record by an order dated 5.11.1996. The plaintiff has filed a suit for declaration that in terms of the Will dated 19.7.1978 executed by the deceased Surat Ram alias Surtu, limited rights were conferred upon the defendants, Smt. Budhi and Smt. Dharmi Devi and that after re-marriage or death of the said defendants, the suit properties in all comprising of five items is to revert to the plaintiff and the plaintiff is entitled to inherit the same and as such the plaintiff is not bound by the aforesaid mutation claimed to be wrongly and illegally attested by the revenue officer on the basis of inheritance in favour of the defendants, alleged to be, behind the back of the plaintiff and that the defendants have no right to claim themselves to be the absolute owners of the suit property, with consequential relief for permanent injunction restraining them from claiming to be the absolute owners or from in any manner encumbering the property or denying the rights of the plaintiff, under the Will. 2. The case of the plaintiff is that Surat Ram alias Surtu was the real brother of the plaintiff and defendants Budhi (since dead) and Smt. Dharmi Devi are his widows, that the deceased Surat Ram executed a Will dated 19.7.1978 giving certain limited rights of possession and enjoyment of the property in question with remainder and ultimate rights to the plaintiff and that he died on 17.11.1981 without any male or female issue. The plaintiff also claimed that he had been maintaining the deceased and rendering services to him and it is only in recognition of the same, the Will came to be executed providing that in case the testator died without any issue, his wives, the defendants would hold the suit property for their maintenance and entitled to take the usufructs, of the entire suit property till their life time or the re-marriages, as the case may be, and in case of birth of any issue, such issue would be entitled to ultimately inherit the property and the defendants would not get anything and in case of re-marriage or death of the defendants as well as the absence of any issues the entire property would revert to the plaintiff and the plaintiff would be entitled to inherit the same. According to the plaintiff, though limited rights were conferred on the defendants and they are not entitled to claim to be absolute owners or to alienate the property in any manner, after the death of Surat Ram though the plaintiff produced the said Will before the Revenue Officer, the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Kullu wrongly and illegally, ignoring the said registered Will attested mutation No. 1906 of Phati Vashishat on 30.12.1982 and mutation No. 2857 of Phati Prini on 16.7.1988, which, according to the plaintiff, is against law and facts, in favour of the defendants and the claim of the plaintiff that mutation should not have been attested on the basis of inheritance in the teeth of the registered Will of the deceased whereunder only limited interest, according to the plaintiff, has been conferred upon the defendants. Further, the allegation on behalf of the plaintiff, as necessitating the filing of the suit is that since 11.11.1988 the defendants have started asserting absolute onwership in respect of the properties to defeat the terms of the Will and the rights of the plaintiff said to have been given under the Will. 3. During the pendency of the suit, the 1st defendant Smt. Budhi appears to have died and therefore, the plaintiff claims that he has become entitled to recover the possession of half share held by her in terms of the Will. 3. During the pendency of the suit, the 1st defendant Smt. Budhi appears to have died and therefore, the plaintiff claims that he has become entitled to recover the possession of half share held by her in terms of the Will. While that be the claim of the plaintiff, one Neel Chand, who has been substituted in the place of the 1st defendant as the legal representative asserted claim of ownership on the basis of a Will said to have been executed by Smt. Budhi in his favour and according to the plaintiff since the said Smt. Budhi had no absolute title in respect of the suit land, she was not competent to execute the Will in favour of Neel Chand and that in any event the so-called Will said to have been executed is a forged and fictitious one and not executed by Smt. Budhi. The plaintiff claimed to be entitled to recover possession of the half share of the suit land. The plaint was also accordingly got amended bringing on record the above subsequent developments and an amended plaint was also said to have been filed on 28.8.1991 4. The defendants filed a joint written statement dated 4.9.1991 contending by way of preliminary objection that the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on the basis of a faked Will dated 19.7.1978, that even if the land is to revert to the plaintiff in terms of the so-called Will, which claim itself is disputed by the defendants, the suit at any rate could not be filed during the life time of 2nd defendant Smt. Dharmi Devi, who is admitted by the plaintiff himself to be a widow of the deceased Surat Ram. The other preliminary objection raised was on the ground that even if the Will propounded by the plaintiff is proved to have been executed by the testator, since the property has been given to defendant No. 2 and Smt. Budhi Devi, widows of Surtu and the same had been in their possession, by virtue of the provision of Hindu Succession Act, both the widows have become absolute owners of the property notwithstanding the stipulation in the Will providing for any such reversion and such stipulation is not binding on the defendants and the suit cannot be maintained for that reason also. The two widows who have acquired full rights are said to be entitled to deal with the same as absolute owners, in the manner they liked. Yet another objection raised was that the Will propounded by the plantiff was a forged and fictitious one and the testator Surat Ram was always looked after and served by the defendants, who were his wives and the plaintiff never served him and on the other hand, he was actually not in good terms with the testator Surat Ram alias Surtu, who was in his last days not in a sound disposing state of mind. The execution said to have been made of the Will by Surat Ram alias Surtu by putting his signatures instead of thumb impression itself, according to the defendants, will belie the truth about the Will. The defendants also contended that the suit has not been properly valued for the purposes of Court fee and jurisdiction and that inasmuch as the two widows/defendants became full owners of the suit property, the mutation attested by the Revenue Officer is quite in accordance with law on the basis of inheritance. It was also urged that the 1st defendant Smt. Budhi in assertion of her right as absolute owner validly executed a Will in favour of Neel Chand and the same is also binding on all and the plaintiff could not claim any right to possess qua the share of the deceased 1st defendant. A replication to the written statement was said to have been filed reiterating the averments and stand taken in the plaint. 5. On the abvoe claims and counter-claims, the suit came to be tried and the learned trial Judge, on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, by his judgment and decree dated 3.6.1992 decreed the suit by declaring that in accordance with the terms of the Will dated 19.7.1978 executed by Surat Ram alias Surtu, marked as Ex. PA, limited rights alone have been conferred on defendant No.2 Dharmi Devi till her life time and after he remarriage or death, half share in the land in the suit would revert to the plaintiff, who was declared entitled to inherit the same and that the plaintiff was not bound by the mutation wrongly and illegally attested by the Revenue Officer on the basis of the inheritance. A permanent injunction restraining the 2nd defendant from claiming herself as absolute owner of the suit property or from alienating, disposing, selling, gifting or encumbering the same in any manner was also granted. The plaintiffs suit was also decreed for possession of the half share held by deceased 1st defendant Budhi Devi in the suit properties (items (a) to (e). In granting such decree, the learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that the Will executed by late Surat Ram alias Surtu was a valid Will and, therefore, the succession in respect of the property should be in accordance with the said Will marked as Ex. PA and not by way of inheritance under the Hindu Succession Act. The learned trial Judge also held that the Will said to have been executed by the 1st defendant Smt. Budhi Devi on 27.9.1990 in favour of Neel Chand marked as Ex. DW-4/A was shrouded by suspicious circumstances and has not been either satisfactorily explained by the propounded Neel Chand or proved and that, therefore, it is not a valid Will. In the light of the above findings, it was also held that the 1st defendant wife, who has been given along with the other wife an equal share in the properties in lieu of maintenance got her interest enlarged and became the absolute owner of her share notwithstanding the creation of the limited estate by the testator Surat Ram under the Will Ex. PA. But, at the same time since the said Budhi Devi died and the Will said to have been executed by her has been held to be a not valid one, the plaintiff was held to be entitled to succeed to the said half share in the property, as heir of her husband. PA. But, at the same time since the said Budhi Devi died and the Will said to have been executed by her has been held to be a not valid one, the plaintiff was held to be entitled to succeed to the said half share in the property, as heir of her husband. So far as the 2nd defendant Smt. Dharami Devi is concerned, the learned trial Judge was of the view that during the life time of the first wife there could not have been a valid marriage of late Surat Ram with Dharami Devi and notwithstanding the admission in the plaint by the plaintiff of the 2nd defendant being also one of the widows of late Surat Ram it constituted no estoppel, in law, for him to question the status of the 2nd defendant and in the absence of positive proof and the inference drawn by the Court that the marriage with the 2nd Defendant, if at all, could have been only during the year 1974-75, after the Hindu Marriage Act, and therefore the 2nd Defendant-wife cannot get the status of a legally-wedded wife of late Surat Ram and, therefore, she cannot become full owner of the half share of the suit property and if at all under the Will, she had only a life interest till date of her re-marriage or death and ultimately her share is also to revert to the plaintiff in terms of the Will. 6. Aggrieved the defendants filed Civil Appeal No. 43/92. It may be pointed out at this stage itself that the respondent/plaintiff in the said appeal has neither preferred any independent appeal nor preferred any cross-objection against the adverse findings and the limited relief granted. The learned First Appellate Judge after considering the respective claims of the parties on either side came to the conclusion that the Will executed by late Surat Ram alias Surtu on 19.7.1978 was a duly executed Will of late Surat Ram and the findings of the learned trial Judge in this regard was confirmed. The learned First Appellate Judge also held that in the light of the provisions contained in Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the limited estate created under the Will, in recognition of the pre-existing right of maintenance from the estate of the husband, got enlarged into an absolute estate in their favour. The learned First Appellate Judge also held that in the light of the provisions contained in Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the limited estate created under the Will, in recognition of the pre-existing right of maintenance from the estate of the husband, got enlarged into an absolute estate in their favour. As for the finding recorded by the trial Judge about the invalidity of the marriage of the 2nd defendant Dharmi Devi, the learned First Appellate Judge chose to differ from the said finding, for more than one reason, including the reason assigned that the plaintiff himself has admitted such relationship even in the plaint and her status as one of the widows was upheld and her rights were recognised accordingly and a declaration was also made that both Smt. Budhi and the appellant Dharmi Devi became absolute owners of the suit property to the extent of their respective half share each. On the above conclusions arrived at by the learned First Appellate Judge, it was held that no part of the suit property could or would revert to the plaintiff-respondent either upon the death of Smt. Budhi or upon the re-marriage or death of Smt. Budhi Devi. So far as the Will propounded by Neel Chand said to have been executed by Smt. Budhi Devi, is concerned, the learned First Appellate Judge declined to record any finding inasmuch as the rights of succession, if any, to the share of Smt. Budhi Devi in respect of her half share could not be decided effectively by declaring the rights of the plaintiff alone in the absence of his sister Smt. Nanki Devi, who is an heir of the same class as a party to the proceedings and that, therefore, the issue in this regard has been left open for appropriate adjudication in a proper and separate proceedings by the parties concerned. With reference to the right to possession also, it was held that since Smt. Budhi had become absolute owner in possession by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act and the plaintiff could not claim any benefit under the Will propounded by him and marked as Ex. PA, the same would hold good for the share of Smt. Dharmi Devi also and, therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief in respect of possession. PA, the same would hold good for the share of Smt. Dharmi Devi also and, therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief in respect of possession. The relief in this regard came to be denied to the plaintiff also for the reason that the plaintiff has not filed the suit for recovery of possession of the share of Smt. Budhi Devi on the basis of any succession and because the claim was only in respect of the Will, which did not enure to his benefit in any manner and that inasmuch as under the Will also both the widows were to hold the suit property jointly even if such widows were not declared as absolute owners, it is only after the death or re-marriage of both the widows only the cause of action under the Will could arise for the plaintiff and as long as the 2nd defendant Dharmi Devi is alive or does not re-marry, she is entitled to hold the entire suit property of Surat Ram alias Surtu and the claim for recovery of possession cannot be countenanced even in respect of the share of Smt. Budhi Devi. This is, in my view by way of an additional reason and not the only reason. On the above findings recorded by the learned First Appellate Judge, the appeal was allowed and the suit filed by the plaintiff came to be dismissed. Hence, the above second appeal. 7. Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned Counsel appearing Vice-Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant while elaborating the substantial questions of law formulated in the appeal vehemently contended that the Courts below were in error in holding that Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act applied to the case on hand and not Section 14(2) of the said Act and, for that reason therefore, the plaintiff could not be held to have acquired any rights under the Will Ex. PA. Argued the learned Counsel further that in view of the fact that the execution and validity of the Will Ex. PA has been proved and Smt. Dharmi Devi being not, according to the appellant, the legally-wedded wife of Surat Ram and the Will propounded and marked as Ex. DW-4/A has been not proved, the suit of the plaintiff deserves to be decreed. The learned Counsel also tried to impress upon the point that the Courts below mis-construed the evidence on record particularly Ex. DW-4/A has been not proved, the suit of the plaintiff deserves to be decreed. The learned Counsel also tried to impress upon the point that the Courts below mis-construed the evidence on record particularly Ex. PA, the Will dated 19.7.1978. 8. Per contra, Mr. K.S. Patyal, learned Counsel argued, when the matter was heard on 1.1.1999, while adopting the reasonings of the learned First Appellate Judge, that the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Judge does not call for any interference and that the sound reasons assigned therein in support thereof, which were quite in accordance with law, are also unassailable. Both the learned Counsel appearing on either side invited my attention to the relevant portions of the judgments of the Courts below in support of their respective stand. Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned Counsel, in addition thereto placed reliance upon the decisions reported in 1968; All. L.J. 683; AIR 1981 All 42; AIR 1971 SC 745, AIR 1977 Punjab and Haryana 341; AIR 1978 S.C. 1051; AIR 1995 Madras 248 and 1994 (2) S.C.C. 511. 9. In 1968 All. L.J. 683, Shrimati Lila Gupta v. Laxmi Narain and others, a Division Bench of the said High Court held that inasmuch as the proviso to Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is in imperative terms and is mandatory in nature, the marriage contracted in contravention of the proviso to Section 15 would not be merely Voidable but on the other hand, void ab initio, and would not be dependent upon obtaining a declaratory decree of nullity of the marriage in terms of Section 11 of the said Act. In AIR 1971 SC 745, Mst Karmi v. Amru and others, it has been held that where only life estate is conferred on widow under the Will, she cannot claim to have become absolute owner under the Act and her granddaughter cannot, therefore, claim any title to the property on the basis of Will executed in her favour of the widow. It may be pointed out at this stage that as could be seen from the judgment itself there is no consideration of the claim in this case with reference to the relative scope of Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act. It may be pointed out at this stage that as could be seen from the judgment itself there is no consideration of the claim in this case with reference to the relative scope of Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act. In AIR 1977 Punjab and Haryana 341, Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. Harpal Singh and others, a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court had an occasion to deal with the rights of the limited owner vis-a-vis Section 14(1) and (2) of the Hindu Succession Act and it was observed therein that Section 14(2) makes it clear that a restricted estate created by Will, gift, decree, award or any other instrument, prior to the commencement of the Act shall not be enlarged into full ownership under sub-section (1) and that a restricted estate can be created in favour of a female even after coming into force of the Act and that if a case falls within the provisions of sub-section (2) then sub-section (1) will not apply and consequently, in each case it has to be determined in what circumstances sub-section (2) will apply. It was also observed therein that if a female acquires the property for the first time by means of a gift, Will, award, decree or any other document, or an order of a court, which prescribes a limited estate in such property, then sub-section (2) of Section 14 will apply and she would get only a restricted estate. In AIR 1978 SC 1051, G. Appaswami Chettiar and another v. R. Sarangapani Chettiar and others, it was held that when a daughter was given a life estate under the Will of her father, Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act will apply and her life estate would not be enlarged into an absolute estate. It is necessary to point out at this stage to appreciate the ratio of the said decision that the legatee daughter therein was a married daughter and after the limited rights, the remainder was also given to sons and grand-children preferentially to her male heirs and if they are not available to the husband of the said daughter and thereafter, his Putra Pouthra Santhathies permanently from generation to generation. In AIR 1985 Madras 248, A. Venkataramanv. In AIR 1985 Madras 248, A. Venkataramanv. S. Rajalakshmi and others, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court has applied the above-referred two decisions and in dealing with a limited estate granted in favour of the daughters, particularly, the daughter who was found to be not a destitute, it was held that Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act alone will apply. A careful scrutiny and analysis of the above judgments will go to show that the beneficiary in the decisions noticed above the female concerned was a person who got the properties by way of limited grant not in recognition of any pre-existing right for maintenance. In the decision reported in 1994 (2) SCC 511, Gumpha (Smt) and others v. Jaibai, two learned Judges of the apex Court while construing Section 14(1) and (2) with Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act held that the expression "acquired.... in lieu of maintenance or arrears or maintenance" in sub-section (1) of Section 14 is to be confined to acquisition not covered by sub-section (2) and right of maintenance given under a Will would be covered by sub-section (2), as it is not a pre-existing right. The learned Judges appear to have been greatly influenced by the fact that the testamentary disposition of the property came into effect only after 1956, the testator in that case having died in 1958 though the Will as such was executed in 1941. In my view, these judgments relied upon for the appellants are not the last or final word on the subject. 10. In AIR 1996 S.C. 1697, C. Masilamani Mudaliar and others v. The Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami and others, a Bench consisting of three of their Lordships of the apex Court had an occasion to deal with the relative scope of Sections 14(1) and 14(2) in the context of a Will. While reviewing the entire law on the subject and the principles laid down from time to time by the apex Court, starting from the leading decision reported in AIR 1977 SC 1944, Tulasamma v. V. Sesha Reddi, including the decision reported in (1994) 2 S.C.C. 511, it has been held that if the limited right conferred was in recognition of a pre-existing right to maintenance of a female Hindu, Section 14(1) alone will apply. It was observed in this regard by their Lordships as follows: "25. It was observed in this regard by their Lordships as follows: "25. It is true that Section 30 of the Act and the relevant provisions of the Act relating to the execution of the Wills need to be given full effect and the right to disposition of a Hindu male derives full measure thereunder. But, the right to equality removing handicaps and discrimination against a Hindu female by reason of operation of existing law should be in conformity with the right to equality enshrined in the Constitution and the Personal Law also needs to be in conformity with the contitutional goal. Harmonious interpretation, therefore, is required to be adopted in giving effect to the relevant provisions consistent with the constitutional animation to remove gender-based dis-crimination in matters of marriage, succession, etc. Cognizant to these Constitutional goals, Hindu Marriage Act, Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, Hindu Succession Act, etc. have been brought on statute removing the impediments which stood in the way under the Sastric law, Explanation-I to Section 14(1) gives wide amplitude to the acquisition of property in the widest terms. It is merely illustrative and not exhaustive. The only condition precedent is whether Hindu female has a pre-existing right under the Personal Law or any other law to hold the property or the right to property. Any instrument, document, device, etc. under which Hindu female came to possess the property-movable or immovable-in recognition of her pre-existing right, though such instrument, document or device is worded with a restrictive estate, which received the colour or pre-existing restrictive estate possession by a Hindu female, the operation of subsection (1) of Section 14 read with Explanation I, remove the fetters and the limited right blossoms into an absolute right. 26. As held by this Court, if the acquisition of the property attracts sub-section (1) of Section 14, sub-section (2) does not come into play. If the acquisition is for the first time, without any vestige of pre-existing right under the instrument, document of device etc. then sub-section (2) of Section 14 gets attracted. Sub-section (2) being in the nature of an exception, it does not engulf and wipe out the operation of sub-section (1). Sub-section (2) of Section 14 independently operates in its own sphere. then sub-section (2) of Section 14 gets attracted. Sub-section (2) being in the nature of an exception, it does not engulf and wipe out the operation of sub-section (1). Sub-section (2) of Section 14 independently operates in its own sphere. The right to disposition of property by a Hindu under Section 30 is required to be understood in this perspective and if any attempt is made to put restriction upon the property possessed by a Hindu female under an instrument, document or device, though executed after the Act had come into force, it must be interpreted in light of the facts and circumstances in each case and to construe whether Hindu female acquired or possessed the property in recognition of her pre-existing right or she gets the rights for the first time under the instrument without any vestige or pre-existing right. If the answer is in the positive, sub-section (1) of Section 14 gets attracted. Thus construed, both sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14 will be given their full play without rendering either as otiose or aids as means of avoidance." While adverting to the decision in 1994 (2) SCC 511, which was rendered as noticed earlier by the two learned Judges of the Apex Court, it has been observed as follows: "In Gumphas case, (1994) 2 SCC 511 (supra) though the Will was executed in 1941 and the executor died in 1958 after the Act had come into force, the concept of limited right in lieu of maintenance was very much in the mind of the executor when Will was executed in 1941 but after the Act came into force the Will became operative. The restrictive covenant would have enlarged it into an absolute estate, but unfortuately the Bench had put a restrictive interpretation which in our considered view does not appear to be sound in law." In the light of the above, the judgment reported in (1994) 2 SCC 511, has to be eschewed from the consideration by me in view of the decision of the larger Bench clarifying and declaring the correct position as also by the overwhelming weight of the authority of the decision of the Apex Court in any number of other decisions. As a matter of fact, in AIR 1996 SC 172 Mangat Mai (dead) and another v. Smt Punni Devi (dead) and others, the entire essentials of the law on the subject has been meticulously analysed and restated with clarity and certainty which admits of no controversy that life interest given in lieu of right to maintenance would inevitably bloom into full ownership by virtue of Section 14(1). It was observed therein as follows: "18. Maintenance, as we see it, necessarily must encompass a provision for residence. Maintenance is given so that the lady can live in the manner, more or less, to which she was accustomed. The concept of maintenance must, therefore, include provision for food and clothing and the like and take into account the basic need of a roof over the head. Provision for residence may be made either by giving a lump sum in money, or property in lieu thereof. It may also be made by providing for the course of the ladys life, a residence and money for other necessary expenditure. Where provision is made in this manner, by giving a life interest in property for the purpose of residence, that provision is made in lieu of a pre-existing right to maintenance and the Hindu lady acquires far more than the vestige of title which is deemed sufficient to attract Section 14(1). 19. We are supported in the view that we take by Mullas Hindu Law (Sixteenth Edition) which sets out the position in law prior to the Act. The Manager of a Joint Mitakshara family is under a legal obligation to maintain all male members of the family, their wives and their children. On the death of any one of the male member, he is bound to maintain his widow and his children. The obligation to maintain these persons arises from the fact that the Manager is in possession of the family property (para 543). An heir is legally bound to provide, out of the estate which descends to him, maintenance for those persons whom the late proprietor was legally or morally bound to maintain (para 544). A wife is entitled to be maintained by her husband whether he possesses property or not. When a man with his eyes open marries a girl accustomed to a certain style of living he undertakes the obligation of maintaining her in that style (Para 554). A wife is entitled to be maintained by her husband whether he possesses property or not. When a man with his eyes open marries a girl accustomed to a certain style of living he undertakes the obligation of maintaining her in that style (Para 554). A widow who does not succeed to the estate of her husband as his heir is entitled to maintenance out of his separate property as well as out of property in which he was a coparcener at the time of his death (para 559). A Hindu widow is, in the absence of special circumstances, entitled to reside in the family dwelling house in which she lived with her husband (para 562). The maintenance to be allowed to a widow should be such an amount as will enable her to live consistently with her position as a widow, with the same degree of comfort and reasonable luxury as she had in her husbands house, unless there are circumstances which affect, one way or the other, her mode of living there. In determining the amount of maintenance the Court should have regard, inter alia, to the provision and status of the deceased husband and of the widow and the reasonable wants of the widow, including not only the ordinary expenses of living, but what she might reasonably expend for religious and other duties incidental to her status, in life (para 566). Where an undivided family consists of two or more males, related as a father and son or otherwise, and one of them dies leaving a widow she is entitled to reside in the family dwelling house in which she lived with her husband. If the house is sold by the surviving coparceners without necessity, the sale does not affect her right, and the purchaser cannot evict her untill another suitable residence is found for her (para 573). A widow who is entitled to maintenance may sue, inter alia, for a charge on a specific portion of her husbands estate for her maintenance and residence (para 579). 20. The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1959, was enacted to amend and codify the law relating to adoptions and maintenance among Hindus, and it defines maintenance in Section 3(d) to include (i) in all cases, provision for food, clothing, residence, aducation and medical attendance and treatment. (Emphasis supplied) 21. 20. The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1959, was enacted to amend and codify the law relating to adoptions and maintenance among Hindus, and it defines maintenance in Section 3(d) to include (i) in all cases, provision for food, clothing, residence, aducation and medical attendance and treatment. (Emphasis supplied) 21. Under the Award provision was made, in lieu of Sukh Devis pre-existing right to maintenance, of money and interest for life in the Bidasar property. Sukh Devi, therefore, acquired limited ownership rights in the Bidasar property in recognition of her pre-existing right to maintenance. Upon the coming into force of the Act the limited rights acquired by Sukh Devi in 1934 blossomed into full ownership of the Bidasar property and she became entitled to sell its "nohra". In our view, therefore, the High Court was in error in the view that it took." In (1998) SCC 314 (Raghuvar Singh and others v. Gulab Singh and others), Dr. A.S. Anand, J. as his Lordship then was, had an occasion to review the principles governing the right of maintenance of a Hindu female for the purposes of applying Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and after a great indepth analysis of the topic his Lordship held as hereunder : "23. Thus, we find that there is enough authority for the proposition that the right to maintenance of a Hindu female is a pre-existing right, which existed in the Hindu law long before the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946 came into force and is not a creation of those statutes, which only recognized that position. In the words of Fazal All, J. in Tulasamma case (SCC p. 135, para 62) "(1) The Hindu females right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity, but is a tengible right against property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law and has been strongly stressed even by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a right against property and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has the property, the female has the legal right to be maintained therefrom. Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a right against property and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has the property, the female has the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If a charge is created for the maintenance of a female, the said right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate, even without charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring or recognising such a right does not confer any new title but merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing right." 24. Accordingly, we hold that the right to maintenance of a Hindu female flows from the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the wife and that right in the case of a widow is "a pre-existing right", which existed under the Shastric Hindu Law long before the passing of the 1937 or the 1946 Acts. Those Acts merely recognized the position as was existing under the Shastric Hindu Law and gave it a "statutory" backing. Where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her husband, she has a right to be maintained out of it and she is entitled to retain the possession of that property in lieu of her right to maintenance. 25. Explaining the meaning of the expression "possessed" as used by the Legislature in Section 14(1) of the 1956 Act in Tulasamma case, this Court held (SCC p. 136 para 62) "(6) the words possessed by used by the Legislature in Section 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include the state of owing a property even though the owner is not in acutal or physical possession of the same. Thus, where a widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but had not been given actual possession under a final decree, the property would be deemed to be possessed by her and by force of Section 14(1), she would get absolute interest in the property. It is equally well settled that the possession of the widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the Section does not contemplate the possession of any rank trespasser without any right or title". (Emphasis supplied) 26. It is equally well settled that the possession of the widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the Section does not contemplate the possession of any rank trespasser without any right or title". (Emphasis supplied) 26. It is by force of Section 14(1) of the Act that the widows limited interest gets automatically enlarged into an absolute right notwithstanding any restriction placed under the document or the instrument. So far as sub-section (2) of Section 14 is concerned, it applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts, etc. which create an independent or a new title in favour of the female for the first time. It has no application to, cases where the instrument/document either declares or recognizes or confirms her share in the property or her "pre-existing right to maintenance" out of that property. As held in Tulasamrna case sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own, without interfering with the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act. 29. We have referred to the relevant clauses of the Will as also clauses (1) and (2) of the compromise decree in an earlier part of this judgment. A careful reading of the Will that the testator clearly declared his intention to the effect that the "right and control" over the suit property shall vest in Raghuvar Singh after the demise of the testator and his wife and that during the life time of either of them, the "right, control and ownership" of the property would remain with the survivor. This position emerges quite clearly from the vernacular portion of the Will which has been referred to in an earlier part of the judgment. This position emerges quite clearly from the vernacular portion of the Will which has been referred to in an earlier part of the judgment. A free English translation of that vernacular portion would read: “.....Till such time as myself and my wife remain alive and till then we shall have full right, control and ownership of the entire property but after the death of both of us, all those moveble and immovable properties which vest in myself and my wife would devolve on Raghubar Singh like they vest in us." It is thus clear from a reading of the above portion of the Will that Manraj Singh and Janak Dulari were to retain all their rights and control over the property as owners thereof till their death and all those rights which they had over the suit property, were to later on devolve upon Raghubar Singh after their death. Raghubar Singh was to acquire only such rights and control over the suit property, which the testator and his wife Smt. Janak Dulari themselves had in respect of the suit property during their lifetime. It is an admitted case of the parties that Smt. Janak Dulari had the possession and control of the suit property after the death of her husband and in terms of the Will, that right and control was by virtue of the recognition of her ownership of the suit property. Even if it be assumed for the sake of argument, (though the intention of the testator was clearly otherwise) that the right which Smt. Janak Dulari had under the Will, was to remain in possession of the property during her life time, her limited estate ripened into full ownership by virtue of the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. Admittedly, she had continued to remain in possession of the property till her death in 1969, long after the coming into force of the Act in 1956. Admittedly, she had continued to remain in possession of the property till her death in 1969, long after the coming into force of the Act in 1956. On a proper construction of the Will, we hold that the use of the expression till myself along with my wife are alive, we shall have full control over all our property, moveable and immovable as owners unmistakably shows that the rights which Smt. Janak Dulari was declared to possess during her lifetime were the same as those of the testator himself and that she was to remain in full control over all the property, moveable and immovable during her lifetime as an owner of the property. After the death of her husband, she continued to remain in possession of the suit property as its owner and she had full right and control over the same. Clause 1 of the compromise deed filed in the suit filed by Manpher Singh which reads: ".....per terms of Will dated 23.7.1946 executed by Manraj in favour of Raghubar Singh, Mst. Janak Dulari will remain in ownership and possession." (Emphasis ours) lends support to the interpretation which we have placed on the Will. It recognises her right to remain in ownership and possession of the suit property. The terms of the Will and compromise decree thus unmistakably show that Smt. Janak Dulari had the ownership and possession of the suit property till her death and (even if it be assumed to be her limited estate, for the sake of argument) it ripened into full ownership by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act. 30. The impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court suffers from a misconception about the nature of the pre-existing right of a Hindu widow. The opinion of the learned Single Judge that there could be no preexisting right vesting in Smt, Janak Dulari because of the non-applicability of the 1937 Act in Rewa State is clearly erroneous. Her right to maintenance existed under the Shastric Hindu law and was not created by the 1937 or 1946 Act. Those Acts merely gave statutory backing to her existing rights. 31. The High Court also fell in error in holding that the case of Smt. Janak Dulari was covered by Section 14(2) of the Act and not by Section 14(1) of the Act. Those Acts merely gave statutory backing to her existing rights. 31. The High Court also fell in error in holding that the case of Smt. Janak Dulari was covered by Section 14(2) of the Act and not by Section 14(1) of the Act. The Will as already noticed, declared and the compromise decree recognised the right of Smt. Janak Dulari as an owner in possession of the suit property with all the rights and control over it. The compromise decree did not create any independent or new title in her favour for the first time. Sub-section (2) of Section 14, thus has no application to her case. By virtue of sub-section (1) of Section 14, the limited interest (even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that Smt. Janak Dulari had only a limited interest in the property of which she was in possession as an owner) automatically got enlarged into an absolute one, her case was clearly covered by Section 14(1) of the Act." 11. As observed in AIR 1996 SC 172 (supra), the Courts did not intend to mean that the object of Section 14 was to extinguish only "limited estate of widows estate" under the Hindu law and that when the language such as "some kind of title" and "any vestige of title" is used, it was only to convey that the provisions of Section 14(1) are not attracted in the case of a Hindu woman, who is in possession of property only as a trespasser or without any right thereto. The Will in question relied upon even by the plaintiff admits of no doubt that the possession and control of the suit property has been given and vested with the widows, whom the testator admitted in the Will itself to be his wives and the said devise was in recognition of property of her husband but also of the indisputable pre-existing right not only to be in possession of the pre-existing right to be maintained out of the estate and the entitlement to retain the possession of the property in lieu of such right of maintenance. In the light of the principles laid down in such categorical terms by the decision reported in AIR 1996 SC 1697 and (1998) 6 SCC 314, it cannot any longer be legitimately contended that in all cases where the right given was under a Will it is only Section 14(2) of the Act that applied. The learned trial Judge has chosen to return a finding that the marriage of the 2nd defendant Smt. Dharmi Devi was invalid as her marriage, according to the learned trial Judge, could have been if at all contracted or solemnised only during the year 1974-75, after the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and that too during the life time of the first wife. In my view, the learned First Appellate Judge was right in his finding to the contra and justified in reversing the factual finding recorded by the learned trial Judge in this regard, for more than one reason. The learned trial Judge could not have in spite of the very admission of the plaintiff himself in the plaint gone behind the pleadings to decide the question at the time of hearing and rendering judgment as though it is merely a question law only, little realising that the legal question has to be decided only in the light of the facts specifically pleaded and proved. There was no pleading in the plaint about the possible date of marriage or the same having been solemnised or contracted in contravention of any provision of law, with appropriate liberty and opportunity to the concerned party defendants to meet the same with all materials and the parties cannot be taken by surprise by throwing an issue of law for consideration which very much depended upon necessary proof of facts, particularly without the basic facts having been specifically pleaded and proved, all the more so, when such issue had the effect of defeating the substantial property rights of the parties affected thereby. In addition thereto, the plaintiff who seeks to derive and claim as well as assert rights under a Will executed by Surat Ram alias Surtu which not only recognised but refers to both the defendants as his own wives, cannot afford to and it is not open or given to such a person like the plaintiff to claim any rights de hors the other portions of the Will where rights are conferred on the wives on a particular factual basis. All the more so, when the said Will itself was shown to have been executed to the knowledge of the plaintiff and he never questioned the status of the second defendant as the wife of the deceased Surat Ram alias Surtu at any time before and even till the date of the filing of the plaint, wherein also such status has even been admitted by him. Consequently, in my view, the status of the 2nd defendant as the wife of late Shri Surat Ram is a fact very admitted not only by her husband but also by the plaintiff initially and, therefore, does not constitute an issue over which there could be any dispute or controversy raised for adjudication in the proceedings in this case. On that view of the matter, the 2nd defendant also has in my view as the grantee of the limited estate indisputably only in recognition of her pre-existing right of maintenance as the wife of late Surat Ram, got her limited right enlarged in the same manner as the estate of the deceased 1st defendant wife got enlarged as an Absolute estate/right under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 12. Even that apart, it is an indisputable fact on record that the 2nd defendant Dharmi Devi was got married by the brother of the plaintiff late Surat Ram only because 1st wife did not beget any children and the tenor and terms of the Will as also the evidence on record disclose that the 2nd defendant also lived after such marriage suits late Surat Ram as faithful wife to her husband late Surat Ram. If that be the position, her right to maintenance in law cannot, in any way, be defeated and when specifically acknowledged to be so by the very husband too, as in this case, all the more it could not be defeated at all by any one else and the limited interest or right given in the property in her favour must be held to be also only in recognition of her such pre-existing right to maintenance. The decision in (1996) 5 SCC 458, Lacmappa and others v. Balaiua Kom Tirkappa Chavdi (Smt), may also be adverted to in this connection. It was observed therein by their Lordships of the apex court that even in a case where there was only moral obligation though not a legal obligation to maintain a female, but if in acknowledgment of that moral obligation, a document has been executed to provide for her maintenance by giving any limited right in a property, the moral obligation gets fructified into a legal obligation and satisfied the requirements of Section 14(1) of the Act. In AIR 1965 SC 1970, Amireddi Raja Gopala Rao and others v. Amireddi Sitharamamma and others, a Constitution Bench of the apex Court while dealing with an appeal filed against the decision of the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in AIR 1961 AP 131, held that even a married woman, who left her husband and lived with her paramour as his permanently kept concubine could claim the status of an Avaruddhastree by remaining faithful to her paramour and becoming thereby entitled to claim maintenance from the estate of the paramour as long as she preserved her sexual fidelity to him. If this be the right of maintenance recognised, in law, even to a concubine, I feel to see how the right of maintenance, which was available to the 2nd defendant Smt. Dharmi Devi as the admitted wife of late Surat Ram which has been conceded even under a document relied upon by the plaintiff could be defeated by merely projecting a claim and that too a belated claim, after initial concession made by the plaintiff himself, that her marriage was a void marriage and, therefore, she had no right of maintenance or to contend that the limited estate granted in her favour will not attract Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. 13. 13. For all the reasons stated above, the learned First Appellate Judge, in my view, has rightly directed the dismissal of the suit filed by the plaintiff in the teeth of the above conclusion of mine also. There is no need, in my view, for considering the submissions made by the learned Counsel about the point as to whether the devise under the Will was such, which has to go by survivorship to one or the other widow or not. The second appeal, therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed. No costs. Appeal dismissed. -