JUDGMENT : P.K. Tripathy, J. - This Civil Revision has been filed by the appellant in Title Appeal No. 17 of 1996 as against the order dated 22.2.1997 passed by the District Judge, Mayurbhanj. That appeal having been filed 3 years 9 days after the final decree, learned District Judge by the impugned order rejected the application filed u/s 5 read with Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Hence this revision. 2. Opp. party No. 1 filed a suit for partition vide Title Suit No. 8/75 of 1982/80 which was decreed ex parte as against the present petitioner. He preferred appeal and ultimately Title Appeal No. 375/83, was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court on 17.7.1990 confirming that ex parte decree. Thereafter, application for final decree was filed on 7.12.1992, order was passed and on 8.2.1993 the final decree was drawn, signed and sealed. Relevant portions of the decree is quoted as hereunder : "The suit coming on 7th day of December, 1992 for final disposal before Sri B. N. Mishra, L.L.B., Subordinate Judge, Baripada in the presence of Sri H. K. Dash, Sri S. K. Senapati, Advocates for the plaintiff and Sri B. K. Barik and Sri S. K. Sahu, Advocates for Defendant No. 1 Sri A. K. Hotta, Sri S. N. Panda, Advocates for the defendant No. 2 and Sri K. Singh and Sri P. K. Basa, Advocates for the defendant Nos. 3 and 4, this Court doth order that the report prepared and signed by the Civil Court Commissioner appointed. in pursuance of the order contained in the preliminary decree in this suit dated 11th day of March, 1983 do stand confirmed. The report and badar and trace prepared and signed by the Civil Court Commissioner is accepted and the same do part of the final decree and is decreed that the property specified in the Schedule hereunto annexed be allotted according to the said report." After the aforesaid decree, opp. party No. 1 instituted execution proceeding. Petitioner filed objections under Order 21, Rule 22, CPC and Section 47, C.P.C. vide M.J.C. No. 39 of 1995 challenging executability of the decree. That application was also rejected. Thereafter petitioner filed the aforesaid Title Appeal No. 17/96 challenging the final decree on various grounds including the ground of inequitability in allotment of share and non-allotment of a house/room in his favour out of the suit property. That application was also rejected. Thereafter petitioner filed the aforesaid Title Appeal No. 17/96 challenging the final decree on various grounds including the ground of inequitability in allotment of share and non-allotment of a house/room in his favour out of the suit property. Since the appeal was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, as already indicated above, petitioner filed an application u/s 5 read with Section 14 of the Limitation Act with the prayer to condone the delay and the same was rejected on merit. These are admitted facts existing in record and not controverted by the counsel appearing for the parties. 3. Learned District Judge rejected the application Under Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act on the grounds that petitioner after having exhausted the forums in the execution proceeding, has filed the appeal and the ground of prosecuting in another forum due to wrong advice of Lawyer is not a bona fide ground. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. J.R. Dash contends that when petitioner was advised to contest in execution proceeding instead of filing of an appeal against the final decree, he being a rustic villager, could not file the appeal in time and this aspect was not all properly considered by learned District Judge in view of the provision in Section 14 of the Limitation Act. He argues that when substantial right of the petitioner has been effected by depriving him of a legitimate share and that aspect he challenges in the appeal, learned District Judge should have taken a liberal view in the matter relating to condonation of delay and exercised the discretion in favour of the petitioner and allowed the application u/s 5 read with Section 14 of the Limitation Act. He further submits that this Court exercising its discretion should set aside the impugned order and condoned the delay and direct the appellate Court to admit and hear the appeal, may be within a specified period. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff/respondent, Mr. S.K. Padhi advances argument opposing to the aforesaid submissions made on behalf of the petitioner. He further submits that this Court exercising its discretion should set aside the impugned order and condoned the delay and direct the appellate Court to admit and hear the appeal, may be within a specified period. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff/respondent, Mr. S.K. Padhi advances argument opposing to the aforesaid submissions made on behalf of the petitioner. He argues that when the petitioner has not been able to satisfy in record about bona fide in committing the delay or prosecuting the other cases in good faith, discretion vested with the Court should not be granted to him because discretion is to be granted on equitable grounds and equity is not available in favour of the petitioner. He supports the impugned order and states that a litigation which has come to an end after 26 years from the date of its intimation need not be given a new lease of life on the flimsy ground advanced by the petitioner. He further contends that when sufficient opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for filing objection to the Civil Court Commissioners' report regarding partition and when petitioner not only was present but also participated in the final decree proceeding and when the decree was made final and all his objections have been negatived his conduct in not filing the appeal for over three years is sufficient to reject the petition for condonation of delay. Apart from that, he argues, petitioner did not prove in record that he was wrongly advised inasmuch as affidavit of the concerned lawyer was not filed. Accordingly, he prays to dismiss the Civil Revision. 6. Condonation of the delay has been sought for by the petitioner Under Sections 5 and 15 of the Limitation Act for preferring the appeal beyond the period of limitation. So far as Section 14 of the Limitation Act is concerned, regarding exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction, it reads as quoted below : "14. 6. Condonation of the delay has been sought for by the petitioner Under Sections 5 and 15 of the Limitation Act for preferring the appeal beyond the period of limitation. So far as Section 14 of the Limitation Act is concerned, regarding exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction, it reads as quoted below : "14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction - (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 2 of Order 23 of the provisions of Sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the Court under Rule 1 of that Order, where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the Court or other cause of a like nature. Explanation - for the purpose of this Section,- (a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which the proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted; (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding; (c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction." It appears from the language used in the statute that Sub- sections (1) and (3) relates to suit and Sub-section (2) relates to applications for computing the period of limitation by excluding the time during which plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence and in good faith another civil proceeding or appeal or revision relating to the same matter in issue in a Court which for defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature is unable to entertain it. So it is clear from the language used in Section 14 that it applies only in causes of any "suit" or "application". Section 2 of the Limitation Act defines the terms "application" and "suit". Relevant portion from Section 2 is quoted as hereunder :" "2. Definitions - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires- (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) "application includes a petition. (c) to (k)xxx xxx xxx (1) "Suit" does not include an appeal or application. (m) & (n) xxx xxx xxx" Above quoted definition, makes it clear that unless the context otherwise requires a 'suit' does not include an appeal or application. Appeal memo also does not come within the meaning of the term 'application'. Thus, Section 14 of the Limitation Act has no applicability to an appeal for computing and excluding the period spent in prosecuting another civil proceeding. 7. However, if in the application for condonation of delay filed u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, appellant in advancing sufficient cause for condonation of delay advances the ground of cause which is normally available u/s 14 of the Limitation Act, then that ground/ cause may be examined and considered to find if such ground justify existence of sufficient cause. Such appreciation of facts and circumstance should be made notwithstanding the position of law that Section 14 of the Limitation Act has no applicability while computing the period of limitation in an appeal. Such appreciation of facts and circumstance should be made notwithstanding the position of law that Section 14 of the Limitation Act has no applicability while computing the period of limitation in an appeal. That is so, because scope of Section 8 is far wider and different from Section 14. Thus any ground or cause advanced as sufficient cause can be considered while considering an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. 8. A graphic picture of the facts and circumstances as narrated above needs no further discussion to record a finding that petitioner has not existence of sufficient cause for condonation of delay be it u/s 5 or Section 14 of the Limitation Act. No explanation is forthcoming from the side of the petitioner as to why affidavit of the counsel was not filed on whose advice the petitioner did not file an appeal and pursued the litigations in the execution forum. Even such an affidavit is not filed in this forum too. As rightly contended by Mr. Padhi that any plea advanced by a party without substantiating the same should not be accepted on its face value when the matter is serious and appeal has been filed after a delay of three years. 9. It is true that while considering an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act on any grounds advanced thereon a liberal approach should be made provided it is stated in that application and proved through materials on record that the applicant was diligent all throughout and the delay which occurred was actually beyond his control. In this case, as stated above, even in the application u/s 5 (read with Section 14) of the Limitation Act, petitioner is deficient in his expression in explaining the details of the delay from the period from which the limitation should have been counted. Therefore, this Court does not find any reason to invoke the discretion in favour of the petitioners for condonation of unexplained delay. Hence, there is no reason to interfere with the impugned order. Accordingly, this Civil Revision is dismissed. No cost. All interim orders, passed stand vacated. Final Result : Dismissed