Honble SHETHNA, J.–The petitioner-Satram Das Gehri Mal Jewellers Pvt. Limited, Udaipur has filed this petition through Manohar Lal Mehta, who is one of the Directors of the petitioner company and challenged the impugned notice/order dated 29.4.98 (Annex.7) whereby the Municipal Commissioner, Udaipur-respondent no.2 ordered the petitioner to remove the construction on the site within 48 hours from the receipt of the notice failing which the same will be removed at the costs and consequences of the petitioner. (2). As per the averments made in para 3 of the petition, it is stated that the petitioner applied for permission to construct a new building by demolishing the existing building of on a plot of land situated near Chetak Cinema, Udaipur by an application dated 29.1.98 and deposited the requisite fees prescribed by the Municipal Council, Udaipur and obtained a receipt of Rs. 1,050/-which is produced at Annex.2. However, the petitioner has not annexed the application dated 29.1.98 along with the petition. (3). It is stated in para 4 of the petition that the permission to construct a new building in place of old building along with the requisite site plan for approval of the Municipal Council, Udaipur was also submitted. Instead of annexing the site plan along with the petition, it has been stated in para 4 that, ``The site plan shall be kept ready for the perusal of this Honble Court at the time of hearing of the writ petition. (4). It appears from the averments made in para 5 of the petition that the predecessor-in-title of the petitioner had earlier applied for similar permission on 25.1.97 and also deposited the requisite fee for raising construction by demolishing the old building. The matter was referred to the Senior Town Planner by the Municipal Council, Udaipur who considered the site plan and gave its opinion in positive with some modifications to the Municipal Council, Udaipur. (5). According to the petitioner, one such application was submitted for required decision within thirty days and if it is not granted then it is deemed to have been granted under Sec. 170(8) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (for short ``the Act) in view of Sec. 170 (8) of the Act, the sanction for such plan deemed to have been granted. However, after stepping in the shoes of its predecessor, the petitioner applied before the Municipal Council, Udaipur on 27.1.98 and by way of reminder dated 26.3.98 that though the application for grant of permission was submitted by it on 29.1.98 together with all other necessary documents and fee, no decision was taken by the Municipal Council, Udaipur so far. Therefore, the said decision may be communicated to the petitioner forth with, failing which the provisions of Sec.170(8) of the Act will apply and it will be presumed that a deemed sanction has been granted in favour of the petitioner. Photostat copy of the reminder dated 26.3.98 (Annex.5). (6). It appears that on receiving the application dated 29.1.98 from the petitioner, the Municipal Council, Udaipur referred the matter to the Senior Town Planner on 3.2.98 who by his letter dated 20.4.98 informed the Municipal Council, Udaipur that if the permission is granted in terms of his earlier letter dated 2.7.97, he will have no objection. (Annex.6). (7). It is alleged in the petition by the petitioner that instead of acting on the opinion of the Senior Town Planner in granting necessary permission to the petitioner as laid down under Sec.170 of the Act, no permission was granted even after expiry of thirty days after the application, therefore, the petitioner was obliged to submit a reminder/notice dated 26.3.98 (Annex.5). The same was received on that very day i.e. 26.3.98 by the Municipal Commissioner. As provided under Sec. 170(8) of the Act, if no decision is taken within fifteen days, then it means that the deemed permission is granted. The last date was 10.4.98 for taking such decision by the Municipal Council but as no decision was taken or communicated to the petitioner by that time, the petitioner started with the construction. However, within 19 days thereof i.e on 29.4.98, the petitioner has been served with the impugned notice from the Commissioner, Municipal Council,Udaipur (Annex.7) calling upon the petitioner to remove the construction from the site failing which the construction shall be removed at the costs and consequences of the petitioner. This has been challenged by the petitioner by way of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. (8). This petition was filed on 4.5.98 before this Court and on the next day i.e. on 5.5.98, notice was ordered to be issued to the respondents making it returnable within two weeks. This has been challenged by the petitioner by way of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. (8). This petition was filed on 4.5.98 before this Court and on the next day i.e. on 5.5.98, notice was ordered to be issued to the respondents making it returnable within two weeks. Till then, the respondents were restrained from demolishing any construction made by the petitioner. On 22.5.1998, the interim order was extended till 27.5.98. On 27.5.98, it was ordered to be put up in the second week of July and till then the interim order was extended. It appears that some how or the other, the respondents were not served, therefore, on 15.7.98 fresh notice was ordered to be issued and interim order was continued till then. It appears that on being served, the respondents no.2. and 3 filed an application through their learned counsel Mr. Dinesh Maheshwari to restrain the petitioner from raising any construction on the land in question. A copy of the same was supplied to the learned counsel Mr. Joshi for the petitioner. On 4.9.98, it was ordered to be put up after two weeks. On 8.10.98, it was once again ordered to be put up on 12.10.98. On 12.10.98, it was ordered to be put up on 15.10.98 then on 16.10.98 and then on 22.10.98. (9). On 22.10.98, my learned brother Honble Dr. B.S. Chauhan , J. ordered to list this matter for final hearing on 27.10.98. Meanwhile, it was made clear that if the construction was raised then it will be subject to the decision of this writ petition. There after on 27.10.98, the matter was adjourned at the request of Mr. Maheshwari for three weeks for the purpose of filing the reply. Then on 1.12.98, it was adjourned oon 8.12.98. On 8.12.98, it was adjourned for three weeks as Mr. Joshi wanted to file rejoinder. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned from time to time to on 14.1.99, 27.1.99, 15.2.99, 3.3.99, 30.3.99, 21.4.99, 3.5.99, 17.5.99. On 5.7.99 at the request of the learned counsels for the parties, it was ordered to put up on 16.7.99 and it was ordered that till then the petitioner shall not proceed further with any construction. On 22.7.99, an application was filed by Mr. On 5.7.99 at the request of the learned counsels for the parties, it was ordered to put up on 16.7.99 and it was ordered that till then the petitioner shall not proceed further with any construction. On 22.7.99, an application was filed by Mr. Maheshwari, learned counsel for respondents no.2 and 3 that inspite of the interim order passed by this Court on 5.7.99, the petitioner was continuing with further construction and also completed the same. Learned Counsel Mr. Joshi for the petitioner stated that before the Courts order was served upon the petitioner, except the iron gate, the construction was completed and the said gate was only fitted after the Courts order. Both the learned counsels for the parties produced photographs in support of their contention. Thereafter the matter was kept on 23.7.99 at the request of the learned counsel for the parties. On 23.7.99, it was kept on 29.7.99. On 29.7.99, due to personal reasons of Mr. Joshi, it was ordered to be put up today i.e on 10.8.99. Accordingly, today this matter was heard at great length. (10). Learned counsel Mr. Joshi for the petitioner vehemently submitted that the application for grant of permission to raise construction was submitted on 27.1.98 by the petitioner to the Municipal Council, Udaipur which was received on 29.1.98 by the respondent Municipal Council as per the receipt at Annex.2. But the same was not considered within one month as provided under Section 170(8) of the Act. Thereupon, a reminder/notice was sent by the petitioner to the Municipal Council, Udaipur on 26.3.98. The same was received on the same day i.e. on 26.3.98 and no decision was taken within 15 days as provided under Sec. 170 (8) of the Act, therefore, permission was deemed to have been granted to the petitioner and accordingly ,the petitioner started the construction. He, therefore, submitted that the impugned notice dated 29.4.98 submitted after the expiry of the aforesaid period is bad in law and is liable to be set aside. He further submitted that if the application of the petitioner dated 27.1.98 was defective then the Municipality could have given directions under Sec. 170(6) (c) or under Sec. 170 (7) (b) of the Act not to proceed further with the work by calling further particulars in the matter. He further submitted that if the application of the petitioner dated 27.1.98 was defective then the Municipality could have given directions under Sec. 170(6) (c) or under Sec. 170 (7) (b) of the Act not to proceed further with the work by calling further particulars in the matter. He submitted that the application was complete, therefore, the Municipality called for the opinion from the Senior Town Planner. He further submitted that 30 days time provided under Sec. 170 (8) of the Act could have been extended if the action was taken by the Municipality under Sec. 170 (6) or under Sec. 170 (7) of the Act. (11). In support of his submission, Mr. Joshi has relied upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Sachhiddanand Sharma vs. Jaipur Development Authority (1). He submitted that this court was considering the provisions under Jaipur Development Act, 1982 which are parimateria to the present Sec. 170 (8) of the Municipality Act. In that judgment, it has been held that if the petitioner is not communicated within specified time, then it is presumed that deemed permission has been granted. Mr. Joshi further submitted that relying upon this judgment, the learned Single Judge of this Court (Honble Shri Mohd. Yamin, J. ) on 28.7.98 decided the writ petition no. 1193/98 (2), which was arising out of the Municipality Act and this very provision under Sec. 170(8) of the Act was under consideration. Mr. Joshi has further relied upon another unreported judgment of Honble Mr. P.K. Palli, J. (as he then was) dated 7.9.95 in writ petition no. 2340/95 (3). The same was arising out of the Urban Improvement Trust Act. (12). As against that, learned counsel Mr. Maheshwari for the respondents No. 2 and 3 vehemently submitted that there was no question of deemed permission being granted to the petitioner as the application of the petitioner itself was defective. He also very much criticised the conduct of the petitioner in raising the construction and completing the same inspite of the interim order passed against it. He further submitted that the construction put up by the petitioner is admittedly against the bye laws and the plan submitted by the petitioner. The parking place has been reduced in the basement for the purpose of shops. He further submitted that the construction put up by the petitioner is admittedly against the bye laws and the plan submitted by the petitioner. The parking place has been reduced in the basement for the purpose of shops. He, therefore, submitted that this Court should not only dismiss the petition but order demolition of the building constructed by the petitioner. He also submitted that on 22.10.1998 this Court had already made it clear that the construction will be subject to the result of the writ petition. (13). Sec. 170 of the Act is relating to erection of buildings. Under Sec. 170 (1) (a) before beginning within the limits of the Municipality to erect a new building or a new part of a building, the person intending so to erect or re-erect shall give notice of his intention to the Board. Similarly, under Sec. 170(1) (b) of the Act, to re-erect or make a material alteration in the building or to erect or re-erect any projection portion of a building in respect of which the board is empowered by Sec. 166 to enforce a removal or set-back and similarly, under Sec. 170 (1) (d) of the Act, before beginning within the limits of the Municipality to make or enlarge a well, the person intending so to erect or re-erect or make or enlarge shall give notice of his intention to the board. The pleadings in the present petition is to the effect that the petitioner applied for permission to construct a new building by demolishing the existing building situated on a plot of near Chetak Cinema, Udaipur on 27.1.98. However, for the reasons best known to he petitioner the copy of the said application was not annexed. However, the same is annexed by the respondent Municipal Council along with its reply at Annex. R/1. The said application is not dated 29.1.98 but it is 27.1.98. It is true that it was received on 29.1.98. Be that as it may. (14). First of all, in my opinion, without such application on the record, this petition was not at all maintainable. Merely because it was brought on the record by the respondents along with its reply it would not change the picture. It is true that it was received on 29.1.98. Be that as it may. (14). First of all, in my opinion, without such application on the record, this petition was not at all maintainable. Merely because it was brought on the record by the respondents along with its reply it would not change the picture. Even a bare look at the application shows that it was applied under Sec. 170 (1) (b) of the Act and not under Sec. 170 (1) (a) of the Act because it is for iquZ% fuekZ.k (re-erection) and not for fuekZ.k (new building). If this application was annexed with the petition, then perhaps this Court would have straightway dismissed the writ petition. The petitioner obtained only an order of stay against demolition and never got permission from this Court while issuing notice on 5.5.98 to raise the construction or complete the same. It may be stated that 15 days time was to be otherwise over on 10.4.98 and when the notice dated 29.4.98 was served upon the petitioner for demolition of construction, not only the old structure was demolished but new structure was already constructed and sizeable construction was done at the site and under the guise of the interim order of this Court, the petitioner not only continued the construction but completed the same so that a circumstance can be used in its favour that now lakhs of rupees have been spent for the construction of the building and the construction of the said building is over, therefore, the impugned notice may be quashed or the said building may not be ordered to be demolished. (15). In a recent judgment of Honble Supreme Court, The Apex Court bench comprised of Justice S.B. Majumdar and D.P. Wadhwa while upholding the judgment of the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court which had ordered cancellation of a municipality decision to allow M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. to construct the underground shopping complex on the ground that it was illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional has observed that, ``In December 1994, a Supreme Court Bench headed by the then Chief Justice A.M. Ahmadi, had allowed the builder to ``construct a underground shopping complex by raising its own funds without collecting any additional funds from individuals or concerns to whom the promise of allotment is made. On the strength of the interim order from the Apex Court, the builder had invested Rs. 3.52 crore in the complex built in four blocks. It appears from the newspaper report of the Times of India, Delhi Edition dated 29.7.99 that Honble Justice Wadhwa, speaking for the Bench said that ``allowing the builder to construct the complex, the municipality has certainly given public interest a go by and commented strongly against the interim order of the court. The Bench said that an underground shopping complex at Aminuddaula Park, near the busy Aminabad market would put an additional burden on the locality. (16). In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court has also observed that the primary concern of the court is to eliminate the negative impact the underground complex will have no environmental conditions in the area and the congestion that will aggravate on account of increased traffic and people visiting the shopping complex. (17). Under the circumstances, the Honble Supreme Court observed that, ``There is no alternative but to dismantle the whole structure and restore the park to its original condition leaving a portion constructed for parking. (An attempt was made to get the copy of this judgment of the Apex Court on internet but it was said that atleast for a period of one month, it would not be available even on the internet. In absence of the copy of judgment of the Apex Court in the above case available to this Court, I have to rely upon the authentic news published in the Times of India which is a reliable daily newspaper.) (18). Coming to the facts of this case, the way in which the petitioner started construction and continued to construct the same and not only that almost completed the same inspite of the interim orders of this Court speaks volumes about the conduct of the petitioner. The place at which the petitioner has put up the multi-storey building is a thickly populated area of Udaipur i.e. Chetak Cinema Circle. The petitioner has also converted the parking place into shops and now it is claimed that the same may be compounded and if it is not compounded, then the petitioner will remove the same at its own costs. (19). When there was no permission granted in the case and particularly when the petitioner was already informed about the correspondence dt. 20.3.98 (Annex. (19). When there was no permission granted in the case and particularly when the petitioner was already informed about the correspondence dt. 20.3.98 (Annex. 6A) with the Senior Town Planner then, it cannot be said that either the Municipality neglected or committed any omission in deciding the application of the petitioner. Therefore, there is no question of deeming permission arises in this case. (20). The person who has misused the earlier courts order of stay against demolition and thereafter at his own risk continued further construction and completed the same inspite of the subsequent clear direction of the Court dated 5.7.99 not to proceed with construction, such person cannot now claim equity in his favour and pray that he may be permitted to compound and his construction be not demolished. If it is permitted then it will amount to give a premium to the dishonesty of a dishonest person. If the Court permits in this case then others will also be tempted to indulge in this type of activity. Traffic problem is acute every where and it is more at `Chetak Circle" Udaipur. In absence of parking place in the building, it may lead to traffic chaos at the particular place and people at large will suffer for no fault of them. (21). Mr. Maheshwari was very much right in submitting that right from the beginning the intention of the petitioner was not honest and the construction itself was against the plan and the application dated 27.1.98 (Annex. R/1) itself was defective, therefore, no question of deemed permission or compounding arises in this case. He submits that now it does not lie good in the mouth of the petitioner to plead equity in its favour, who has misused and openly flouted the order of the Court and completed construction at his own risk. He, therefore, submitted that the Court should order the petitioner to pull down the construction or the municipality be permitted to demolish it. (22). I fully agree with the submission made by Mr. Maheshwari. He, therefore, submitted that the Court should order the petitioner to pull down the construction or the municipality be permitted to demolish it. (22). I fully agree with the submission made by Mr. Maheshwari. This is a case where first of all the petitioner intelligently not annexed the copy of the application dated 27.1.98 seeking permission to construct under Sec. 170 (1) (b) of the Act and by making false statement on the oath that he made an application for new construction i.e. under Sec. 170 (1) (a) of the Act obtain order of notice and stay against demolition by misleading the Court and though subsequently it was made clear by the Court on 22.10.98 that further construction will be subject to the result of the petition, still it proceeded with the construction and also almost completed the same, inspite of the order passed by this Court later on 5.7.99 restraining it from proceeding further with the construction and that too against the plan and at the cost of the public at large. Therefore, such person is not entitled to claim any equity and relief in his favour from this Court. (23). In view of the above discussion, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Stay granted earlier stands vacated forthwith. The petitioner shall pull down the construction at its own costs, failing which the Municipality will be at liberty to pull down construction, forthwith.