M. C. JAIN, J. By means of this Habeas Corpus Petition the petitioner has challenged the detention order dated 30th January, 1999 passed against him by respondent No. 2 (District Magistrate, Bulandshahr) under Section 3 (2) of Na tional Security Act, 1980 and his continued detention thereunder. 2. Affidavit-and counter affidavits have been exchanged between the parties. 3. We have heard Sri R. B. Singhal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Mahendra Pratap learned, A. G. A. for the respondents. We have also carefully gone through the record. 4. The grounds of detention are an nexed as Annexure 8 to the writ petition. They state that on 3-12- 1998 Sri Sanjeev Kumar Bisaria, S. D. O. , Electricity Department, Jahangirabad along with other employees of the Department, namely, Sri K. S. ChaudhChaudhari, S. D. C. , Sri Vinod Kumar Sharma, R. D. C. and Sri Rajendra Singh, Patrolman had been car rying salary of the employees amounting to Rs 5,89,773. 60 P together with certain records from State Bank of India, Bulandshahr through Departmental Jeep No. U. P. P. 03804 which was being driven by the departmental Driver Dharm Singh. When the jeep reached on Pucca road near village Jatwai at about 12. 45 p. m. , a blue coloured Maruti Van No. DL 84-C/b 3411 came from backside and overtook the jeep. Four miscreants alighted from the van with country made pistols and surrounded the jeep. On the point of pistols and creat ing atmosphere of terror they snatched away the bag containing the money together with records. On resistance they assaulted Sri Sanjeev Kumar Bisaria, S. D. O. and made away with the cash in question and records towards Shikarpur Road. On the report of Sri Sanjeev Kumar Bisaria a case Crime No. 296 of 1998 under Section 394, I. P. C. was registered at P. S. Jahangirabad. The complainant was also subjected to medical examination. 5. The grounds further state that on 5-12-1998 the Station Officer of Police Station, Jahangirabad along with other police personnel, informant Sri Sanjeev Kumar Bisaria and the witness Sri K. S. Chaudhari reached Bhaipur Doraha at about 12. 45 p. m. and started checking the passing vehicles. A van was seen coming from the side of Anoopshahar at fast speed but the driver of the same, on spotting the police, tried to turn it back. 45 p. m. and started checking the passing vehicles. A van was seen coming from the side of Anoopshahar at fast speed but the driver of the same, on spotting the police, tried to turn it back. The informant and the witness Sri K. S. Chaudhari iden tified that van as having been used in the incident of robbery of 3-12-1998. When the police tried to intercept the van, the occupants thereof opened fire but luckily nobody was hurt. Ultimately, the Maruti Van was surrounded and intercepted. The present petitioner and Riyaz alias Raj were the occupants of the van and they were arrested who were recognised by the informant and the witness Sri K. S. Chaud hari that they participated in the robbery in question. A firearm with an empty cartridge in its barrel together with two live cartridges came to be recovered from Riyaz alias Raj and an illicit knife was recovered from the present petitioner. From the Maruti van in question bearing Registration No. DL 4-C/b 3411 certain documents were recovered from under the seat which had also been robbed along with the cash of Rs. 5,89,773. 60 p. on 3-12-1998. It is also stated in the grounds that the present petitioner and Riyaz alias Raj confessed their participation in the rob bery in question of 3-12-1998. About the subsequent incident of 5-12-1998 Case Crime No. 297 of 1998 under Section 307, I. P. C. No. 298 of 1998 under Section 25 of the Arms Act and No. 299 of 1998 under Section 25/4 of the Arms Act were registered. 6. According to the grounds, on 5-12-1998 itself the present petitioner got recovered a sum of Rs. 89,300 at about 4. 30 p. m. from his residence at P. H. C. Pahasu, as part of the looted money. Rs. 50,000 came to be recovered at the instance of Riyaz alias Raj as his part of the booty, Names of certain other persons, namely, Mahesh Giri and Shakeel were allegedly disclosed by the present petitioner and Riyaz alias Raj as the other participants of the robbery. Ram Bhool and Veeru came to be disclosed as the conspirators. Dharm Singh Driver of the jeep of the Electricity Department also figured as one of the conspirators. Rs. 50,000 were recovered from Shakeel. Es. 30,000 were recovered from Dharam Singh Driver of the jeep and Rs. Ram Bhool and Veeru came to be disclosed as the conspirators. Dharm Singh Driver of the jeep of the Electricity Department also figured as one of the conspirators. Rs. 50,000 were recovered from Shakeel. Es. 30,000 were recovered from Dharam Singh Driver of the jeep and Rs. 15,000/were recovered from yet another conspirator. Rs. 15,000 were also recovered from Mahesh Giri. 7. It is further mentioned in the grounds of detention that as a part of the organized activity the petitioner with his associates ararmed with firearms, com mitted this highway robbery. It created an atmosphere of terror and insecurity, ad versely affecting the public order. The employees of the Electricity Department could also not get their salary and a sense of insecurity prevailed amongst them. Steps had to be taken to maintain public order. 8. The grounds of detention also state that the petitioner was attempting to get bailed out and there was every apprehen sion that on coming out of jail he would again indulge in like serious offences af fecting public order and would also at tempt to destroy the evidence. 9. It was on the aforesaid grounds that the detention order was passed by respon dent No. 2 against the petitioner. 10. The first contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that he has falsely been implicated in the case of rob bery in question. He made reference to the telegram dated 5-12-1998 of 9. 30 a. m. al legedly sent by his brother to the District Magistrate, Bulandshahr (Annexure 2 to the petition) that the petitioner had been arrested by the police on 3-12-1998 at 7 p. m. He also made reference to a Message allegedly faxed to Human Rights Commis sion on 5-12-1998 in this behalf (Annexure-3 to the writ petition ). Suffice it to say in this regard that while hearing the Habeas Corpus Petition this Court does not sit in appeal qua detention order passed by the detaining authority. The said documents may or may not be relevant at the trial, but they are not germane for the decision of the writ petition. Suffice it to say in this regard that while hearing the Habeas Corpus Petition this Court does not sit in appeal qua detention order passed by the detaining authority. The said documents may or may not be relevant at the trial, but they are not germane for the decision of the writ petition. The Apex Court has held in the case of Kanuji S. Zala v. State of Gujarat and others, JT 1999 (4) S. C. 448, that what is required to be con sidered in such case is whether there was credible material before the detaining authority on the basis of which a reasonable inference could have been drawn as regards the adverse effect on the maintenance of public order as defined by the Act. It is also well settled that whether the material was sufficient or not is not for the Courts to decide by applying and objec tive test as it is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. We, therefore, reject the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that he has been falsely implicated for the simple reason that it cannot be considered in the present proceedings. 11. The next argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the deten tion order has been passed by respondent No. 2 on the basis of solitary incident. The legal position is settled that an order of detention can be passed on one solitary act. Whether a single act is sufficient or not to sustain an order of detention depends upon the gravity and the nature of the act having regard to the fact whether the act is organized act or a manifestation of or ganized activities. We may refer to the case of Attorney General of India v. Amratlal Prajivandas, AIR 1994 SC 2179 , wherein it has categorically been ruled that it is beyond dispute that the order of detention can be passed upon a single act. The test is whether the act is such that it gives rise to an inference that the person would con tinue to indulge in similar prejudicial activities. It cannot be stated as a principle that one single act cannot constitute the basis for detention. Consequently, there is no merit in the argument that the detention order is based on solitary incident. 12. It cannot be stated as a principle that one single act cannot constitute the basis for detention. Consequently, there is no merit in the argument that the detention order is based on solitary incident. 12. It has next been argued for the petitioner that he had no criminal antece dents whatsoever. In reality, it is another way of saying that the detention order is based on solitary incident. Learned coun sel for the petitioner has cited the case of Fitrat Raza Khan v. State of UP, AIR 1982 SC 146 , wherein it was held that past con duct or antecedent history of a person can properly be taken into account to make the detention order. It does not conversely follow from this ruling that no detention order can be passed if the person con cerned has no objectionable antecedents. Each case has to be decided on its own facts. Therefore, this argument also does not impress us that the petitioner had no criminal antecedents. 13. The last argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that at the best the incident forming the basis of the deten tion order against the petitioner could be a law and order problem, but not at all a matter relating to public order. He has cited a number of authorities to advance his point. We may briefly refer to them. 14. lnthecnseof Wasi Uddin Ahmed District Magistrate, Aligarh and others, AIR 1981 SC 216, it was observed that the true distinction between the concepts of law and order and public order lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act but upon the degree and extent of its reach upon the society. There can be no quarrel with this proposition. Reference has then been made to the case of Anil Kumar Singh v. State of U. P. , 1985 Cri. L. J. 1648 (All ). It says that if a relevant document is in exist ence on the date of detention order and the same is not considered the detention order becomes invalid. It has no relevance in the present case because the detaining authority has based his subjective satisfac tion on all the relevant facts documents and circumstances. Another authority relied upon for the petitioner is Ghan-shyam Bhagat v. State and another, 1986 A. L. J. 31. It was a case of kidnapping. It has no relevance in the present case because the detaining authority has based his subjective satisfac tion on all the relevant facts documents and circumstances. Another authority relied upon for the petitioner is Ghan-shyam Bhagat v. State and another, 1986 A. L. J. 31. It was a case of kidnapping. As said earlier, the present case has to be judged on its own facts and there can be no ques tion of importing any parity on the basis of detention order which was passed owing to an incident of kidnapping. The facts of another cited case Rajiv Sharma v. State of U. P. and others, 1986 A. L. J. 415, also stood on different footing because in that case of robbery there was no recovery. The subjec tive satisfaction in the present case having been arrived at by the detaining authority on existent grounds, the case of Gur Box Singh Bakshi v. State of U. P, 1986 All. L. J. 542 Lucknow Bench, also has no applica tion. The other rulings relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are Anant v. State of Maharashtra and another, AIR 1987 SC 137 , Gulab Mehra v. State of U. P, AIR 1987sc2332;anandprakash\. State of U. P AIR199qsc 516; Ant aryami State of Orissa, 1992 Cri. L. J. 1910; Surya Prakash Sharma v. State of UP, 1995 All. L. J. 777 and Sri Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh v. Srim. M. Mehta, JT1995 (4) S. C. 215. On going through them too, we find that they are with varied facts and cannot be helpful to the present petitioner. The basic thing is that the detention order has to be considered in the light and facts of the present case to ascertain whether the was credible material before the detaining authority on the basis of which reasonable inference could be drawn regarding ad verse effect on the maintenance of public order without entering into the sufficiency thereof. 15. When the present case is ex amined in the above right perspective, it is apparent that the allegation was that the petitioner participated in a daring broad day light armed robbery at a public place and looted cash of Rs. 5,89,773. 60 p. belonging to the Electricity Department which was being carried by the officials of the said Department for disbursement of salary of its employees. 5,89,773. 60 p. belonging to the Electricity Department which was being carried by the officials of the said Department for disbursement of salary of its employees. The informant Sri Sanjeev Kumar Bisaria was injured also when he offered resistance. The allegation was further there that before being ap prehended on 5-12-1998 the police, firing was resorted too by the petitioner and his companions on the police party. To cap it all; seizable sum of Rs. 89,300 forming part ot looted money was allegedly recovered from the petitioner on 5-12-1998. The greed for money knows no limits. The inci dent was an organized act which may be termed as manifestation of organized ac tivities. Having regard to the nature of the act no fault can be found with the subjec tive satisfaction formed by the detaining authority that there could be repetition of the same, adversely affecting the public order in case the petitioner was to be out of jail. The Supreme Court has held in the case of Smt. Kamlabaiv. Commissioner of Police, Nagpur, JT 1993 (3) S. C. 666, that catching hold of S. I. and threatening him in a public place has nexus to public order. In another case of veermani v. State oft. N. , 1994 SCC (Cri) 482, the facts were that a police party had been constituted for ap prehending the detenu and when the police party proceeded to apprehend him he and his associates made and attack. The act was held by the Supreme Court to be prejudicial to maintenance of public order. Testing the facts of the present case, it had sufficient potential adversely affect ing the public order. It goes without saying that the interests of the society are paramount to the individual interests. 16. We are of the opinion that there was credible material before the detaining authority to pass the impugned detention order against the petitioner as the acts of armed robbery of huge public money at a public place in board daylight on 3-12-1998 and attacking the police party on 5-12-1998 at the time of apprehension had the sparks prejudicial to maintenance of public order. The detention order has been passed by the detaining authority forming subjective satisfaction with full applica tion of mind on the relevant facts and circumstances. 17. For the reasons mentioned above, the challenge to the detention order is wholly unmerited. The detention order has been passed by the detaining authority forming subjective satisfaction with full applica tion of mind on the relevant facts and circumstances. 17. For the reasons mentioned above, the challenge to the detention order is wholly unmerited. The petition is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed. .