Judgment S.K.Katriar, J. 1. Heard Mr. D.K. Sinha for the petitioner, Mr. Chitranjan Sinha for the respondent-Reserve Bank of India, and Mr. Navin Sinha. 2. I would first like to deal with the intervention application filed by investor, represented by Mr. Navin Sinha, Advocate. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the intervention application is allowed, and the intervenor is allowed to be added as respondent No. 8. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Reserve Bank of India has issued the impugned orders dated 15.7.97 (Annexure-7), and dated 20.10.97 (Annexure-19), whereby restrictions have been placed on the working of the petitioner-company. In his submission, the petitioner has by the aforesaid order dated 15.7.97 (Annexure-7), been prohibited from accepting instalments from the diverse investors, and has also been prohibited from making payments to them. By the aforesaid order dated 27.1.1998 (Annexure-20), the aforesaid order contained in Annexure-7 has been modified, and the petitioner has been permitted to make payments to the investors, but the prohibition not to collect instalments from the investors continues: 4. Mr. Chitranjan Sinha, learned Counsel for the respondent-Bank, submits, that the impugned orders have been passed in the best interest of the investors, and after having taken into account the entire conspectus of facts. 5. Having considered the rival submissions, this writ petition has to be dismissed. This Court is of the view that this writ petition basically relates to administrative issues which are normally immune from judicial review ability. This Court is also reminded of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in England in the case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. V/s. Wednesbury Corporation reported in 1947 (2) All ELR 680. thereby Lord Greene, Speaking for the Court, held that statutory bodies vested by the Parliament with the duties and functions should be allowed to function freely, and the Court will be entitled to interfere only on account of bad faith, dishonestly, unreasonableness, attention given to extraneous matters, disregard of Public Policy, etc So the same was to be added in India the grounds available under the Constitution. The present petitioner has riot attempted at all td make out a case within any of these Exceptions. The following portion of the judgment occurring at pages 682 and 683 of the Report illumine the position. The present petitioner has riot attempted at all td make out a case within any of these Exceptions. The following portion of the judgment occurring at pages 682 and 683 of the Report illumine the position. The contention of the authority, in my opinion, is based on a misconception of the effect of the Act in granting this discretionary power to local authorities. The Court must always remember, first, that the Act deals, not with a judicial act, but with an executive act; secondly, that the conditions which under the exercise of that executive act, may be imposed are in terms put within the discretion of the local authority without limitation; and thirdly, that the statute provides no appeal from the decision of the local authority. What, then, is the power of the Courts? The Courts can only interfere with an act of an executive authority if it be shown that the authority have contravened the law. It is for those who assert that the local authority have contravened the law to establish that proposition. On the face of it, a condition of this kind is perfectly lawful. It is not to be assumed prima facie that responsible bodies like local authorities will exceed their powers, and the Court, whenever it is alleged that the local authority have contravened the law, must not substitute itself for the local authority. It is only concerned with seeing whether or not the proposition is made good. When an executive discretion is entrusted by Parliament to a local authority, what purport to be an exercise of that discretion can only be challenged in the Courts in a very limited class of cases. It must always be remembered that the Court is not a Court of appeal. The law recognizes certain principles, on which the discretion must be exercised, but within the four corners of those principles, the discretion is an absolute one and cannot be questioned in any Court of law. What, then, are those, principles? They are perfectly well understood. The exercise of such a discretion must be a real exercise of the discretion. If, in the statute conferring the discretion, there is to be found, expressly or by implication, matters to which the authority exercising the discretion ought to have regard, then, in exercising the discretion, they must have regard to those matters. They are perfectly well understood. The exercise of such a discretion must be a real exercise of the discretion. If, in the statute conferring the discretion, there is to be found, expressly or by implication, matters to which the authority exercising the discretion ought to have regard, then, in exercising the discretion, they must have regard to those matters. Conversely, if the nature of the subject-matter and the general interpretation of the Act make it clear that certain matters would not be germane to the matter in question, they must disregard those matters. Expressions have been used in cases where the powers of local authorities came, to be considered relating to the sort of thing that may give rise to interference by the Court. Bad faith, dishonesty-those, of course, standby themselves-unreasonableness, attention given to extraneous circumstances, disregard of Public Policy, and things like that have all been referred to as being matters which are relevant for consideration, hi the present case, we have heard a great deal about the meaning of the word "unreasonable". It is true the discretion , must be exercised reasonably. What does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology commonly use in relation to the exercise of statutory discretions often use the word, "unreasonable" in a rather comprehensive sense. It is frequently used as a general discretion of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to the matter that he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting "unreasonably". Similarly, you may have something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority. Warrington, L.J., I think it was, gave the example of the red-headed teacher, dismissed because she had red hair. That is unreasonable in one sense, In another sense, it is taking into onside ration ex tyrannous matters. It is so unreasonable that it might almost be described as being done in bad faith. In fact, all these things largely fall under one head. 5.1. That is unreasonable in one sense, In another sense, it is taking into onside ration ex tyrannous matters. It is so unreasonable that it might almost be described as being done in bad faith. In fact, all these things largely fall under one head. 5.1. I may add, for the sake of completion of the record that the aforesaid enunciation of law has become classical in legal literature, and has come to be known as Wednesbury reasonableness, and has been followed by the Indian Courts at times without number, the latest Judgment being of the Supreme Court and is reported in 1994 (6) SCC 651 Tata Celiular V/s. Union of India. 5.2. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am convinced that the Reserve Bank of India, a statutory body invested by the Parliament with the powers of control and supervision in the present context, has properly exercised the powers in controlling the affairs of the petitioner-company and in the interests of the investors. In the absence of any plea of bad faith and the like and/or violation of the constitutional norms, I uphold the impugned orders. 6. Learned Counsel for the newly-added respondent submits that he has filed an application for winding up of the petitioner-company in this Court, which has been registered as Company Petition No. 7 of 1999. The petitioner has preferred the present petition, but is evading appearance in the winding-up petition. Mr. O.K. Sinha, with his usual fairness, undertakes that he shall appear forthwith in Company Petition No. 7/1999. 7. In such circumstances, the writ petition is dismissed, and the impugned orders dated 15.7.1997 (Annexure-7) and dated 20.10.1997 (Annexure-20) are hereby upheld. The writ petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.