Vaidya, J. This contempt case arises out of Writ Petition No. 799 of 1967 and Writ Appeal No. 40 of 1967 filed inter alios by the petitioner against the Union of India and the State of Andhra Pradesh and others. The writ petition was filed for an appropriate writ order or direction directing the Union of India and the State of Andhra Pradesh to treat the post of Sub-Engineer of the erstwhile State of Hyderabad as equivalent to the post of Assistant Engineer of Andhra and to integrate the services of Sub-Engineers of Telangana Region and Assistant Engineers of Andhra Region and to hold that the action taken by the Government of Andhra Pradesh in regularising with retrospective effect by relaxing the normal rules the temporary appointments made in the erstwhile Andhra State to the post of Assistant Engineers and by promotion from the next lower category of officers, is not binding on the petitioner. This writ petition was filed on 20th April, 1967 and along with the writ petition a C.M.P. No. 3770 of 1967 was filed for the grant of ad interim injunction against the State Government and its subordinates from reverting the petitioners (Executive Engineers). The interim injunction order was made on 25th April, 1967 restraining the State Government from reverting the petitioners. The memo of appearance was filed by the Government Pleader on 27th April, 1967 and ad interim injunction order issued by the High Court was communicated by the Counsel for the petitioners in the writ petition to the respondents in the contempt application by letters which were received by them on 28th April, 1967. The second respondent i.e., the Chief Engineer (General) had issued an order of reversion on 26th April, 1967. That order of reversion was communicated to the petitioner by the 4th respondent on 1st May, 1967. According to the petitioner, this communication of the reversion order constitutes contempt of Court inasmuch as it was in disobedience of ad interim injunction order granted by the High Court on 25th April, 1967. It is necessary to continue the narration of facts as other incidents also have been relied upon by the petitioner, which according to him, constitute contempt of Court. It is necessary to continue the narration of facts as other incidents also have been relied upon by the petitioner, which according to him, constitute contempt of Court. After the ad interim injunction was granted, certain persons who were being affected by the order, filed an application for impleading them as parties and also C.M.P. No. 4202 of 1967 for vacating the interim order. Great stress is laid upon the fact by the petitioner that no application was filed by the Government for vacating the interim order. The two applications (both by the third parties) came up for hearing before the vacation Judge who on 9th May, 1967 ordered notice in the impleaded petition and vacated the interim injunction order. The order of the learned Judge runs thus: “I see no grounds for continuing the interim injunction granted already. Interim injunction is vacated. The petition for injunction is dismissed.” Between 9th May, 1967 and 15th May, 1967 nothing was done by either parties to this contempt petition. On 15th May, 1967 the petitioners in the writ petition filed Writ Appeal No. 40 of 1967 aggrieved by the order vacating the injunction. This Writ Appeal was filed after giving notice to the Government Pleader. On the very same day on which the writ appeal was filed, the petitioner received a telephonic message from the 4th respondent that he should hand over charge as the injunction had been vacated. The petitioner on receipt of this message, took the stand that he had been advised not to hand over charge as such action on his part would defeat the very purpose of his writ appeal. He expressed his readiness to comply with the orders which this Court would pronounce in his writ appeal. This writ appeal came up for admission on 16th May, 1967 before our learned brother Sambasiva Rao, J., but he ordered it to be posted before another learned Judge. On 23rd May, 1967 this writ appeal came up before one of us (Vaidya, J.) and it was adjourned on a. request by the petitioner. It came up again on 30th May, 1967 when it was ordered to be posted before a Bench on 12th June, 1967. On 12th June, 1967 again it was ordered to be posted before us on 13th June, 1967. It came up again on 30th May, 1967 when it was ordered to be posted before a Bench on 12th June, 1967. On 12th June, 1967 again it was ordered to be posted before us on 13th June, 1967. We passed the following order on the Writ Appeal: “After having heard the learned Advocate for the appellants and the Principal Government Pleader on behalf of the Government, we consider that in the circumstances a just and convenient order to make would be that such of the appellants as have been relieved from their present posts by this date, will not get any interim relief but must await the final decisions in the Writ Petition. But so far as such of the appellants as have not been relieved so far, they shall not be disturbed and the status quo shall be maintained till the disposal of the Writ Petitions. These Writ Appeals are allowed to this extent.” During the pendency of the Writ Appeal, a telephonic message was sent to the petitioner by the 4th respondent, which we have already mentioned. On 17th May, 1967 the petitioner addressed a letter to the 1st respondent bringing to his notice that the writ appeal was pending. He also informed the 1st respondent that he was under legal advice and asked to maintain status quo by remaining in his position pending disposal of the Writ Appeal by the High Court. He stated: “In view of this and especially in view of the legal advice I am unable to comply with any orders disturbing status quo till the matter is finally heard and adjudicated upon by the Hon’ble High Court.” In reply to the aforesaid letter of the petitioner, the 4th respondent on 22nd May forwarded to him a copy of letter in which Sri Kodandaramiah, Executive Engineer was directed to assume charge as per the proceedings of 26th April, 1967 While forwarding the copy, the petitioner was instructed to hand over charge of the Division to Sri Kodandaramiah, Executive Engineer as already advised by telephonic message, dated 15th May, 1967. On 27th May, 1967 the 4th respondent issued a Memo. 2023/ESG/2535/1 enclosing therewith a copy of respondent No. 3’s letter No. Rc. On 27th May, 1967 the 4th respondent issued a Memo. 2023/ESG/2535/1 enclosing therewith a copy of respondent No. 3’s letter No. Rc. B. 2/673/67-81, dated 27th May, 1967 in which the petitioner was informed that he was deemed to have been relieved as Executive Engineer with effect from 22nd May, 1967 afternoon, the day on which Sri Kodandaramiah assumed charge of the Division. He was asked to hand over charge to Sri Kodandaramiah and that the petitioner should not operate the cash book nor the cheque books of the Division any further. The D.O. letter referred to in the abovesaid letter stated that the Chief Engineer (Civil) in whose unit the two other Executive Engineers (under reversion) were working issued orders to the effect that if the Executive Engineers concerned do not give over charge, they would be deemed to have been relieved of the Division charge. It was suggested in that letter to the 4th respondent that he may also issue suitable similar orders in respect of the petitioner and Sri V. Seshachari and see that the relief is brought about by 29th May, 1967 afternoon. The D.O. letter went on to say: “The action of both the Executive Engineers in refusing to hand over charge of the Division in response to orders issued by superior officers is considered as amounting to disobedience of orders. You may please call for the explanation of the Executive Engineers for their lapse and submit it to this office for necessary further action.” On 30th May, 1967 the petitioner’s advocate wrote to the 1st Respondent. After incorporating the facts of both the writ petition and the writ appeal, and the various letters received by the petitioner, the letter stated: “That you and your subordinates are compelling my clients by every possible measure to hand over charge. In view of my client’s reluctance to hand over charge on the ground of the appeal being pending and becoming infructuous in case of handing over charge, you and your subordinates have threatened to take coercive steps, with a view to compel my clients not to pursue the appeal pending. This act of yours and your subordinates also is undue interference in the administration of justice, constituting the contempt of Court. This act of yours and your subordinates also is undue interference in the administration of justice, constituting the contempt of Court. That my clients are prepared to abide by any orders passed by the Hon’ble High Court but until the passage of the orders, they are constrained to function in the present positions of Executive Engineers. Therefore, you and your subordinates are required not to precipitate the handing over of charge or to launch any like action prejudicing my client’s rights which would interfere with their right to pursue the writ appeal, failing which my clients would be compelled to initiate contempt of Court proceedings against you and your subordinates....” But by proceedings Rc. B2/673/67-87, dated 30th May, 1967 the third respondent directed that the petitioner be placed under suspension with immediate effect in public interest. It directed the 4th respondent to relieve the petitioner forth with and remain in additional charge of the Division till a substitute Executive Engineer posted joined duty. The petitioner contends that the second respondent and his subordinates were compelling and coercing him to give up the adjudication of the validity of reversion and the right to injunction agitated in Writ Appeal No. 40 of 1967 about which the second respondent and his subordinates were aware. It was further alleged that the respondents were not entitled to do away with the petitioner’s statutory right of preferring a Writ Appeal “by coercing, compelling and intimidating the petitioner to obey orders having the effect of preventing him from getting a matter adjudicated to which he was and is legally entitled”. The course of action taken by the respondents was intended to pose a fait accompli before this Court and prevent this Court from adjudicating the matter. It was therefore alleged that right from the date when the writ appeal was preferred upto 30th May, 1967 endeavours were made by the respondents to prevent an adjudication on merits by asking the petitioner to hand over charge. The order of suspension was to prevent the petitioner from getting the matter adjudicated by Court of law. The petitioner was suspended with a view “to induce me to forego the assistance of the Courts and therefore his action amounts to contempt of Court. The other respondents have acquiesced in his actions and they are also guilty of contempt of Court. The petitioner was suspended with a view “to induce me to forego the assistance of the Courts and therefore his action amounts to contempt of Court. The other respondents have acquiesced in his actions and they are also guilty of contempt of Court. This apart, it is a clear interference with my claim for redress from the Hon’ble High Court for the grievance that I have against the State..........The 2nd respondent’s action in suspending me at a time when the Writ Appeal was pending in the Court could only be to put pressure on me to withdraw my Writ Appeal or face the consequences of disciplinary action. This amounted to contempt of Court”. This is the second count of contempt of Court. The third count arises on the allegation of the petitioner that the order of this Court dated 13th June, 1967 was not obeyed by the respondents. The petitioner’s contention is that he was not relieved of his post till 29th May, 1967 though it was stated in the Memo, of 27th May, 1967 that the petitioner should be deemed to have been relieved of his duties from 22nd May, 1967 afternoon, the date on which Sri Kodandaramiah assumed charge of the Division. The letter of 27th May, 1967 shows that till that date the petitioner had not handed over charge and that he was operating cash book and cheque books of the Division, because he was asked to hand over charge on that date to Sri Kondandaramiah and further he was asked not to operate the cash book or the cheque books of the Division. The D.O. letter of the Chief Engineer, dated 27th May, 1967 a copy of which was attached to respondent-4’s memo, dated 27th May, 1967 further shows that the petitioner’s relief was to be brought about by the 4th respondent by 29th May, 1967 afternoon. By the order of the suspension, dated 30th May, 1967 the 4th respondent was directed to relieve the petitioner forthwith and remain in additional charge of the Division till a substitute Executive Engineer joined duty. All these clearly show that the petitioner was relieved of the charge only by virtue of the order of suspension dated 30th May, 1967. By the order of the suspension, dated 30th May, 1967 the 4th respondent was directed to relieve the petitioner forthwith and remain in additional charge of the Division till a substitute Executive Engineer joined duty. All these clearly show that the petitioner was relieved of the charge only by virtue of the order of suspension dated 30th May, 1967. It is contended by the petitioner that the order of suspension being illegal and void ab initio, the respondents failed to obey the orders of this High Court, dated 13th June, 1967 by persisting in keeping the petitioner under suspension. Furthermore, the second respondent chose to issue show cause notice on 18th June, 1967, which according to the petitioner, is a gravest contempt of this Court. The contempt of Court charge is levelled against the respondents on two grounds: first, failure to obey the orders of this Court, dated 25th April, 1967 and 13th June, 1967 and second, pressurise the petitioner to withdraw his writ petition and writ appeal or otherwise not press for it. As far as the disobedience of the orders, dated 25th April, 1967 is concerned, it has to be seen that the order of interim injunction was communicated to the respondents for the first time on 28th April, 1967, prior to which date the order of reversion had already been issued i.e., on 26th April, 1967. There can therefore be no contempt by the issue of the order dated 26th April, 1967. The petitioner’s complaint is the communication of the order, on 1st May, 1967 to the petitioner amounts to contempt. There is some dispute about the date on which this order was communicated to the petitioner. No doubt it has been admitted in the counter-affidavit that this communication was on 1st May, 1967 but the endorsement forwarding a copy of the reversion proceedings, dated 26th April, 1967, was shown to us. That copy is signed by the Superintendent on 29th April, 1967 and does nut bear the signature of the 4th respondent. Evidently the Superintending Engineer could not have signed it on 1st May, 1967 when the Superintendent has signed it as ‘true copy’ on 29th April, 1967. It is not therefore definitely known as to the date on which the endorsement was signed by the 4th respondent. Further, this was only a communication of the order of reversion. Evidently the Superintending Engineer could not have signed it on 1st May, 1967 when the Superintendent has signed it as ‘true copy’ on 29th April, 1967. It is not therefore definitely known as to the date on which the endorsement was signed by the 4th respondent. Further, this was only a communication of the order of reversion. It was not followed up with any order directing the petitioner to hand over charge to Sri Kodandaramiah the person mentioned in the reversion proceedings. Those orders were passed only on 15th May, 1967, i.e., after the injunction order was vacated by this Court on 9th May, 1967. In the counter-affidavit it has been stated that no proceedings were taken for effecting the reversion of the petitioner or taking over charge from him after the order of injunction was passed by this Court. It was only after the order of injunction was vacated that the respondents took proceedings for relieving the petitioner and taking over charge from him. We are therefore of the opinion that by issue of the endorsement, dated 1st May, 1967 no contempt of Court has been committed. As regards disobedience of the order, dated 13th June, 1967, it is seen that the petitioner was relieved on 30th May, 1967 by issuing order of suspension against him. The petitioner has raised the question that as the order of suspension was illegal and void, it was the duty of the respondents to restore him to his post in view of the final orders in Writ Appeal by this Court on 13th June, 1967. Our order stated that such of the appellants who had been relieved from the present post by the date of the order, will not get interim relief, but must await final decision in the writ petition. In view of this order, there was no question of the respondents restoring the petitioner to his previous post. As far as the respondents were concerned, the petitioner was deemed to have been relieved on 22nd May, 1967, when Sri Kodandaramiah assumed charge although the charge was not actually handed over by the petitioner. At any rate the petitioner was relieved on 30th May, 1967 when the order of suspension was passed against him. As far as the respondents were concerned, the petitioner was deemed to have been relieved on 22nd May, 1967, when Sri Kodandaramiah assumed charge although the charge was not actually handed over by the petitioner. At any rate the petitioner was relieved on 30th May, 1967 when the order of suspension was passed against him. It was stated in the counter-affidavit that the respondents obtained the opinion of the learned Principal Government Pleader and he advised that our order dated 13th June, 1967 applied not only to those persons who had actually been relieved but also the persons who were deemed to have been relieved. In any event by the date our final order was made on 13th June, 1967, the petitioner was not holding the post and had been relieved of the same. It cannot, therefore, be stated that there was any disobedience by the respondents of our order, dated 13th June, 1967 and the question of contempt does not arise at all. The learned Counsel for the petitioner very strenuously argued that the order of suspension was illegal and void; but it is not necessary to consider that argument in the view we have taken of the matter. It is now well settled that any conduct by which the course of justice is perverted, either by a party or a stranger, is a contempt; thus the use of threats, by letter or otherwise, to a party while his suit is pending; or abusing a party in letters to persons likely to be witnesses in the cause, have been held to be contempt (Oswald’s Contempt of Court, 3rd Edition, page 87). The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon Pratap Singh v. Gurbaksh Singh1. The facts of that case were: the respondent in the two appeals before the Supreme Court was a Forester in the Punjab Forest Department. Pratap Singh, the appellant in one appeal was at the relevant time, Chief Conservator of Forests, Punjab, Bachan Singh, the appellant in the other appeal was Divisional Forest Officer, Amritsar. On the allegation that there was a short supply of timber by the respondent, the State Government directed the Chief Conservator of Forests to recover 10 per cent of the loss from the respondent. On the allegation that there was a short supply of timber by the respondent, the State Government directed the Chief Conservator of Forests to recover 10 per cent of the loss from the respondent. The respondents then instituted a suit in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar for adeclaration that the order of recovery made against him was void and without effect. When the summons in the suit was served on the State Government, the Under Secretary to the State Government in the Forest and Animal Husbandry Department, sent a memorandum to the Chief Conservator of Forests in which the attention of the latter was drawn to a circular letter issued by the Chief Secretary. That letter while stating that the question of Government servants having recourse to courts of law in matters arising out of their employment or conditions of service has been engaging the attention of Government for sometime and it was considerednecessary to lay down that "in the matter of grievances arising out of a Government servant’s employment or conditions of service the proper course is to seek redress from the appropriate departmental and governmental authorities. Any attempt by a Government servant to seek a decision on such issues in a Court of law (even in cases where such a remedy is legally admissible) without first exhausting the normal official channels of redress, can only be regarded as contrary to official propriety and subversive of good discipline and may well justify the initiation of disciplinary action against the Government servant". The Under-Secretary in the memorandum said that as the respondent had not exhausted all the departmental remedies before going to a Court of law, he had rendered himself liable to disciplinary action as per the instructions contained in the Circular letter. On receipt of this memorandum the appellant Pratap Singh directed that the respondent should be proceeded with and a copy of the proceedings recorded and orders passed in the case should be forwarded to him. On receipt of the said orders the Conservator of Forests, South Circle, passed an order appointing Bachan Singh the appellant in the other appeal to hold enquiry against the respondent. Bachan Singh drew up a charge-sheet against the respondent and asked him to submit an explanation in writing. On receipt of the said orders the Conservator of Forests, South Circle, passed an order appointing Bachan Singh the appellant in the other appeal to hold enquiry against the respondent. Bachan Singh drew up a charge-sheet against the respondent and asked him to submit an explanation in writing. On this, the respondent made an application to the High Court to the effect that the two appellants have committed contempt of Court punishable under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. The allegation was that the appellants were interfering with the legal right of the respondent to seek redress in a Court of law and also were exerting pressure upon him with the intent of restraining him from pressing his suit. This, according to him, amounted to an obstruction with the judicial process and interfered with the course of justice in respect of the suit which was then pending. The Supreme Court at the end of para. 9 of the judgment has said: We have to consider in this case a somewhat different problem, namely, the action taken against the respondent during a pending litigation, as though going to a Court of law before exhausting departmental remedies must in all cases be visited with punishment.” (Italics are ours). It was further observed at the end of para. 10. “The action taken in this case against the respondent by way of a proceeding against him can, in our opinion, have only one tendency namely, the tendency to coerce the respondent and force him to withdraw his suit or otherwise not press it. If that be the clear and unmistakable tendency of the proceedings taken against the respondent, then there can be no doubt that in law the appellants have been guilty of contempt of Court, even though they were merely carrying out the instructions contained in the circular letter.” From the decision of the Supreme Court it is clear that disciplinary action was taken against the respondent before the Supreme Court for having filed a suit in alleged violation of the Government circular. The Supreme Court therefore reached the conclusion that the action taken against the respondent had the only tendency to coerce the respondent and force him to withdraw his suit or otherwise not press for it, and therefore it was contempt of Court. The Supreme Court therefore reached the conclusion that the action taken against the respondent had the only tendency to coerce the respondent and force him to withdraw his suit or otherwise not press for it, and therefore it was contempt of Court. In Gurcharan Dass v. State of Rajasthan1, the Supreme Court was considering a case where action was taken against the petitioner before the Supreme Court. When his petition under section 527, Criminal Procedure Code, was pending in the Supreme Court, the petitioner was served with a notice and a charge-sheet to show cause why he should not be proceeded against for breach of rule 8 of the All India Services (Conduct Rules), 1954 because he had communicated directly or indirectly official documents and information to Government servants and other persons to whom he was not authorised to communicate such documents/information. The State Government appended to the charge, two appendices giving details of 31 and 16 documents respectively which were said to have been so communicated by the petitioner to his counsel and others named as non-petitioners in a writ petition which he had filed in the High Court of Rajasthan and which he subsequently withdrew before filing the application under section 527, Criminal Procedure Code before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in view of these facts observed: “There could be no question in the present case that by charging the petitioner with proceedings of a different kind there was, if not direct, at least indirect pressure brought upon him in the prosecution of his petition for transfer. ......If the petitioner was guilty of any lapse under the Services (Conduct) Rules or even guilty of an offence the action to which he would be otherwise subject could wait till the present proceedings had terminated and there was really no reason to hurry with a charge against the petitioner which charge would have put him under duress of some kind. Such a course of action is to be deprecated........” From this case also it is evident that no action was contemplated against the petitioner therein prior to his filing of the petition under section 527, Criminal Procedure Code. It is also to be seen that the petitioner had filed a writ petition in the High Court of Rajasthan which he withdrew and then filed the petition under section 527, Criminal Procedure Code. It is also to be seen that the petitioner had filed a writ petition in the High Court of Rajasthan which he withdrew and then filed the petition under section 527, Criminal Procedure Code. Evidently before filing the writ petition and the petition under section 527, Criminal Procedure Code, it was necessary for the petitioner to disclose some of the documents to his counsel. The action taken against him was on the face of it intended to indirectly put pressure to withdraw his petition. It is in these circumstances that the Supreme Court held that such a course would have resulted in obstruction of administration of justice. Vijai Pratap Singh v. Ajit Prasad1, was a case where the petitioner had filed a suit in the Court of the City Munsiff, Azamgarh to set aside the election for membership of Prarambhik (Primary) Congress Committee of Tarwa in the District of Azamgarh. After the suit was filed, the respondents therein who were President and General Secretary of the U.P. Congress Committee and the General Secretary of the District Congress Committee, Azamgarh, took action against the petitioner in view of the resolution of the Congress Working Committee. The Working Committee of the Indian National Congress had resolved that any member of the Congress who instituted a suit or other proceedings in law Courts against any Congress Committee or official was liable to summary removal from the membership of the Congress by order of the Provincial Congress Committee concerned. The respondents in view of the above resolution took action against the petitioner and removed him from the rolls of the Congress. It was in this context that it was held that the action of the contemners directly interfered with the course of judicial proceedings “inasmuch as they did not merely amount to a threat to the petitioner to withdraw his suit, but were actually meant to non-suit him by expelling him from the Congress organisation and thus removing the very bed-rock on which stood the edifice of the petitioner’s claim.” Again in this case also action was taken against the petitioner because of his filing a suit against the Congress Committee. Further, the petitioner was removed from the rolls of the Congress which non-suited him. The Allahabad High Court therefore held that such an action on the part of the contemners obstructed the administration of justice and therefore they were liable for contempt. Further, the petitioner was removed from the rolls of the Congress which non-suited him. The Allahabad High Court therefore held that such an action on the part of the contemners obstructed the administration of justice and therefore they were liable for contempt. Reliance was also placed on a Division Bench case of this High Court in D.J. Shield v. N.Ramesam2, where contempt was categorised as (1) contempt in respect of orders of Court; (2) contempt by letters or pamphlets addressed to the Judge who is to decide the case with the intention either by threats or flattery or bribery to influence his decisions and (3) constructive contempt depending upon the inference of an intention to obstruct the course of justice. It was also observed: “If public officers of responsibility act in such manner as to obstruct, the course of justice or disobey to implement the orders of Court, for such acts will undermine the prestige of Courts and set a bad example to the public”. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relying on the decisions mentioned above, argues that the action taken by the respondents against the petitioner from 15th May, 1967 to 30th May, 1967 was clearly with the intention of pressurising him to withdraw his writ appeal and the writ petition. He brought to our notice especiall the dates on which the various communications were addressed to the petitioner. The Writ Appeal was to come up for admission on 16th May, 1967 and one day prior to that, a telephonic message was sent to the petitioner that he should hand over charge . Further the petitioner was instructed to hand over charge on 22nd May, 1967 knowing full well that the Writ Appeal had been adjourned to 23rd May, 1967. After the adjournment of Writ Appeal on 23rd May, 1967 and its posting on 30th May, 1967 a further communication was sent on 27th May, 1967 in which it was specifically stated that it should be seen that the petitioner hands over charge before 29th May, 1967. When the Writ Appeal was adjourned on 30th May, 1967. the order of suspension was passed on the very same day by the second respondent. When the Writ Appeal was adjourned on 30th May, 1967. the order of suspension was passed on the very same day by the second respondent. According to the petitioner, the dates on which the various letters were issued are significant and clearly show that they wanted to relieve the petitioner before the Writ Appeal was heard so that he may not get any relief in the Writ Appeal. It would have been better if the second, third and 4th respondents had deferred action after knowing that the Writ Appeal had been pending especially when no action had been taken against the petitioner between 9th May, 1967 when the injunction was vacated and 16th May, 1967 when the writ appeal was to come up for admission. But it will have to be seen whether the respondents had intended to pressurise the petitioner in giving up his writ appeal or writ petition. It cannot be said that by relieving the petitioner of his post or suspending him, any pressure for withdrawing his writ petition was intended, because his being relieved from the post of Executive Engineer or being suspended, would not have affected the writ petition in any manner. It may be said that the petitioner’s handing over charge before the writ appeal might have affected the decision in the writ appeal, but it cannot be said that this Court had no jurisdiction to pass an order restoring the petitioner to his post if this Court thought that it was a fit case for ordering such a reinstatement. To find out the intention of the respondents, it is necessary to consider the counter-affidavits filed by the second respondent. It is also to be noted that the respondents had not taken any action against the petitioner during the pendency of the injunction petition. Further, the action taken by the respondents, was sot because the petitioner had filed the writ petition or writ appeal but it was in furtherance of an order of reversion which had already been passed by the second respondent. There was nothing illegal in the second respondent asking the petitioner to hand over charge of his post during the pendency of the writ appeal especially when an interim injunction was granted and this Court thought fit to vacate the same. There was nothing illegal in the second respondent asking the petitioner to hand over charge of his post during the pendency of the writ appeal especially when an interim injunction was granted and this Court thought fit to vacate the same. The second respondent in his counter-affidavit has stated: “If it was possible or proper and convenient, the Government, the 1st respondent and the other three respondents would have let things alone between 9th May, 1967 and 13th June, 1967 or even later, and would have been willing to retain junior men in senior emergency posts merely because these junior men went to Court with writ petitions in which the ex parte injunction once granted was readily vacated, and would have penalised senior men who did not go to Court by reverting them from senior posts to junior posts, but this seemed so unjust, unfair and inequitable that, at a time when there was no prevailing order of injunction of this Honourable Court, the respondents decided that not junior men but senior men should be retained in the senior emergency posts, and that junior emergency Executive Engineers should be reverted on the principle the last to be the first to be reverted from it. The implementation of the order of reversion, dated 26th April, 1967 was general objective and, impartial and was not based on any petty regional or personal prejudice.” This statement on oath clearly shows the intention behind the action taken by the 2nd respondent and his subordinates to take over the charge from the petitioner. In view of this statement it cannot be said that the respondents ever intended to put pressure on the petitioner to withdraw his writ appeal. It may be that handing over charge would have been a factor against the petitioner in his writ appeal, but that would not have completely non-suited him in his writ appeal. As Stated already this Court could have ordered reinstatement if necessary facts were brought before it. Action taken by respondents in taking over charge from the petitioner does not amount to contempt of Court. As regards the suspension order, it was clearly by way of disciplinary action because of the refusal of the petitioner to hand over charge in spite of repeated orders for the same. Action taken by respondents in taking over charge from the petitioner does not amount to contempt of Court. As regards the suspension order, it was clearly by way of disciplinary action because of the refusal of the petitioner to hand over charge in spite of repeated orders for the same. If the respondents were to allow to continue the petitioner in the post it would have meant that they were encouraging indiscipline, stubbornness and disobedience of superior officers. Further, it would have resulted in disadvantage to those persons who readily obeyed the orders of the superiors and vacated their posts. In this aspect of the matter, we consider that the order of suspension was not intended directly or indirectly to obstruct the administration of justice. From the affidavit and the documents produced before us, it seems that the 1st respondent who is the Secretary to Government, has not at all taken any action in the matter. It is stated in the affidavit of the petitioner that he acquiesced, in the action taken by the second respondent and therefore is guilty of contempt of Court. As already stated, all the orders in the instant case have been passed by the second and third respondents after a policy decision had been taken by the Government. It was for the second respondent to implement the decision of the Government. No doubt the 1st respondent had been made award of the injunction order passed by this Court and also that the Writ Appeal was pending and certain action was contemplated by the second respondent; but it was not necessary for the 1st respondent to intervene and give any instructions to the second respondent in the matter. In our opinion the 1st respondent is not at all responsible for any of the actions taken by the second, third and fourth respondents. In the result we hold that the respondents are not guilty of contempt of Court and the petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. K.N.R. ----- Petition dismissed.