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1999 DIGILAW 132 (SC)

Datla Krishnam Raju v. Excise Sub-inspector, Kowtalam, A. P.

1999-02-03

G.B.PATTANAIK, S.RAJENDRA BABU

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(1) THE appellant has been convicted under Section 34(a) of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act (for short "the Act") for having been found in possession of arrack beyond the permissible limit under Section 18 (sic 14) of the said Act. The Magistrate as well as the learned Sessions Judge in appeal and the High Court in revision have concurrently come to the conclusion that the appellant was in possession of the intoxicant in question. Mrs Amareswari, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, however, relying upon the two Single-Judge judgments of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Boya Urukondamma v. State of A.P. and Mohd. Ghousuddin v. State of A.P. contends that mere possession will not constitute an offence under Section 34(a) and the prosecution must establish that such possession was either for import, export, transport or manufacture. The two Single-Judge decisions undoubtedly, support the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant but in the impugned judgment the Division Bench of the High Court has reversed the decision of the aforesaid two Single-Judge Bench decisions and has come to the conclusion that possession beyond the prescribed limit would constitute an offence under Section 34(a) of the Act. Having examined the provisions of Section 34(a) and Section 34(h) and the special language used therein the conclusion is that mere possession beyond the prescribed limit will constitute an offence and therefore the conclusion of the High Court cannot be found fault with. In view of the finding of the forums below that the appellant was found in possession of the intoxicants beyond the prescribed limit it must be held that he has committed offence under Section 34(a) of the Act. Once conviction is under Section 34(a) of the Act, the statute prescribes a minimum punishment of six months. The learned counsel for the appellant states that the occurrence itself is of the year 1989 and the appellant has already undergone the sentence for a period of 45 days and taking into account the fact that the two earlier decisions were operating it would not be necessary to direct the appellant to surrender for serving the balance period of sentence. We are persuaded to accept this contention, particularly, when more than ten years have elapsed since the date of occurrence and, therefore, the sentence is reduced to the period already undergone i.e. to the extent of 45 days and with a fine of Rs 5000, failing which the appellant shall undergo imprisonment for a period of five months. The fine should be paid within five months. We make it clear that we are reducing the sentence in this case in view of the special facts and circumstances of the present case. The appeal is, thus, disposed of.