JUDGMENT R.L. Khurana, J.—The Himachal Pradesh Tourism Development Corporation Ltd., hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, was running a Hotel under the name and style of "Hotel Wild Flower Hall" at Charrabra about 13 Kms. away from Shimla. During the period 11.7.1992 to 10.7.1993 the plaintiff had insured the hotel building, huts, furniture, fixture and fittings etc. with the defendant Insurance Company for a sum of Rs. 80,00,00/- (eighty lacs), that is, Rs. 70 lacs for building and Rs. 10 lacs for furniture, fixture and fittings etc. 2. A devastating fire broke out on the evening of 4.3.1993 and in such fire the hotel of the plaintiff was completely destroyed. A claim for such loss was lodged by the plaintiff with the defendant. One Shri Umesh Kumar Sood, Surveyor and loss Assessor, Shimla was appointed by the defendant to carry out the preliminary survey of the loss due to fire. The Surveyor submitted his preliminary survey report dated 8.3.1993. On the receipt of such preliminary survey report, the defendant, appointed Messrs Mehta and Padamsey, Surveyors (Pvt.) Ltd., New Delhi, to carry out the survey and to assess the loss and damage. Vide report dated 8.7.1993, the Surveyors .after allowing 75% depreciation on the buildings and 50% depreciation on furniture, fixtures etc., assessed the total loss at Rs. 40,50,000/-, that is Rs. 34,50,000/- in respect of the buildings and Rs. 6,00,000/-in respect of furniture, fixture etc. The assessment of the loss by the Surveyors was accepted by the plaintiff. 3. The defendant took note of the fact that a new block known as "Conference Hair was added by the plaintiff in March, 1992 at a cost of about Rs. 35 lacs. This new block was not affected by the fire. The defendant, therefore, took the position that the plaintiff had under valued the buildings and under Rule 10, Part-I, Section-1, Sheet-2 of All India Fire Tariff, the insurance policy could not be taken out regarding a part of the building and as such the non-inclusion of the Conference Hall while taking out the insurance was against the basic principles of the contract as well as All India Fire Tariff Rules and Regulations. Therefore, the defendant reduced the loss in proportion to the undervaluation of the buildings and paid a sum of Rs. 29,89,062/- on 7.3.1994 to the plaintiff. Therefore, the defendant reduced the loss in proportion to the undervaluation of the buildings and paid a sum of Rs. 29,89,062/- on 7.3.1994 to the plaintiff. Such amount was accepted by the plaintiff under protest and without prejudice to its rights to seek legal remedy in respect of the claim. The plaintiff further called upon the defendant to refer the dispute to Arbitration in terms of the arbitration clause contained in the insurance policy. 4. The plaintiff nominated Shri K.C. Sood, the then Secretary Law to the Government of Himachal Pradesh as its Arbitrator, while the defendant appointed Shri G.S. Narang, its retired Assistant Commercial Manager is Arbitrator. The two arbitrators in turn appointed Justice R.N. Aggarwal (Retd.) as the Umpire. 5. The following claims were raised by the plaintiff before the Arbitrators:— 1. Outstanding amount of the claim as assessed by the Surveyors Rs. 10,60,938/- 2. Interest @ 18% per annum on the above amount from 1.8.1994 till date of payment. 3. Interest @ 18% per annum on the sum of Rs. 29,89,062/- from 23.6.1993 to 9.3.1994. 4. Datnages for harassment and other financial loss due to non-payment of the amount as at Sr. No. 1 above. Rs. 6,00,000/- 5. Cost of litigation. 6. In raising the above claims, it was averred by the plaintiff that the property of the hotel was insured with the defendant in the year 1986-87 for Rs. 80 lacs and such property continued to be insured thereafter from year to year without any change till the year 1992-93. No part of the property was either added to or excluded from the original proposal. The plaintiff as such disputed the legality of the deduction of Rs. 10,60,938/- from the assessed loss of Rs. 40,50,000/-. 7. The defendant resisted the claim. It was averred that the claim was not competent before the arbitrators inasmuch as the entire claim of the plaintiff stood settled in full and paid. Having received the payment, the plaintiff was estopped from raising any fresh claim. It was further pleaded that plaintiff was guilty of suppression of material facts. The defendant admitted the insurance and pleaded that insurance policy covered the entire buildings including the Conference Hall and since the Conference Hall was not affected by fire, deduction to the extent of Rs. 10,60,938/- was rightly made from the total loss assessed. 8. It was further pleaded that plaintiff was guilty of suppression of material facts. The defendant admitted the insurance and pleaded that insurance policy covered the entire buildings including the Conference Hall and since the Conference Hall was not affected by fire, deduction to the extent of Rs. 10,60,938/- was rightly made from the total loss assessed. 8. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the arbitrators:— (i) Whether the respondent has settled the claim of the Claimant in full and final, as claimed? OPR (ii) Whether the claimant/Corporation is estopped from claiming the amount in dispute? OPR (iii) Whether the claimant/Corporation has misled the respondent, if so to what effect? OPR (iv) Whether the claimant /Corporation is entitled to the claim, subject-matter of dispute, if so to what extent? OPC (v) Whether the claimant/Corporation is entitled to interest, if so, on what amount and at what rate? OPC (vi) Whether the claimant/Corporation is entitled to damages, if so, to what extent? OPC. 9. There was a difference of opinion between the arbitrators. Shri K.C. Sood, the arbitrator appointed by the plaintiff, passed an award of Rs. 10,60,938/- in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant alongwith interest at the rate of 18% per annum with effect from 1.8.1994. He also awarded interest at the said rate on the amount of Rs. 29,89,062/- in favour of the plaintiff from 23.6.1993 to 9.3.1994. Parties were ordered to bear their own costs. 10. Shri G.S. Narang, the arbitrator appointed by the defendant, however, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not entitled to any amount since the claim was rightly reduced to Rs. 29,89,062/ - by the defendant by application of average clause since the newly added "Conference Hall" was a part and parcel of the main hotel building. He, therefore, dismissed the reference. 11. Due to the difference of opinion between the two arbitrators, the dispute came up before the learned Umpire. Opportunities were given to the parties by the learned Umpire to produce fresh evidence. The parties led evidence before the learned Umpire. He, therefore, dismissed the reference. 11. Due to the difference of opinion between the two arbitrators, the dispute came up before the learned Umpire. Opportunities were given to the parties by the learned Umpire to produce fresh evidence. The parties led evidence before the learned Umpire. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and having gone through the record of the case, the learned Umpire agreed with the findings of Shri K.C. Sood, arbitrator appointed by the plaintiff and made his award dated 17.7,1997 in the following terms in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant :— "Consequently, I make an Award of Rs. 10,60,938/- in favour of the Claimant Corporation and against the Respondent Company. I further Award Interest at 18% per annum on the amount of Rs. 29,89,062/- from 8th July, 1993 to 7th March, 1994 and further award interest at 18% per annum on the amount of Rs. 10,60,938/- from 1.8.1994 till the date of the payment of this amount by the respondent Company or decree, whichever is earlier. The parties are left to bear their own costs." 12. The award dated 17.7.1997 of the learned Umpire has been filed in this Court for being made the rule of the Court. Notices of the award having been filed in the court, were issued to the parties. While no objections have been preferred by the plaintiff to the award being made the rule of the Court, objections under Section 30/ 33, Arbitration Act, 1940 (for short: the Act), being OMP No. 46 of 1998 have been preferred by the defendant to such award being made the rule of the Court. 13. In assailing the award, the defendant has averred that the learned Umpire has misconducted the proceedings on the following grounds:— (a) The learned Umpire failed to take note of the fact that the claim of the plaintiff stood legally settled and paid. The plaintiff was, thus, estopped from raising a fresh claim; (b) The learned Umpire failed to take into consideration the material on the record showing that "Conference Hail" was a part and parcel of the insured property; (c) The reasoning given by the learned Umpire are erroneous and not based on evidence coming on record; and (d) There is no clause in the insurance policy for the grant of interest. Therefore, the learned Umpire has erred in allowing interest. Therefore, the learned Umpire has erred in allowing interest. Even the rate at which interest has been allowed is against cannons of law. 14. The defendant while resisting the objections, pleaded that there has been no misconduct on the part of the learned Umpire. The award is a detailed and speaking one and the same is required to be made the rule of the Court. 15. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed on 9.6.1998:— 1. Whether the Umpire has misconducted himself and the proceedings, as alleged? OPO. 2. Relief. 16. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. My findings on the above issues are as follows:— ISSUE No. 1 : 17. At the very out set it may be stated that all the objections raised to the award by the defendant, pertain to the findings as to the merits of the case as recorded by the learned Umpire. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the court to interefere with the award of the arbitrator is a limited one. The adjudication of the arbitrator is generally binding between the parties and it is not open to the court to attempt to probe the mental process by which the arbitrator has reached his conclusion. Award of an arbitrator can be set aside by a court only on the grounds enumerated under Section 30 of the Act. It is not open to the Court to re-assess the evidence to find whether the arbitrator has committed any error to decide the question of adequacy of evidence and the court cannot sit on the conclusion of the arbitrator by re-examination and re-appreciating the evidence considered by the arbitrator. The arbitrator is a creature of the agreement itself and, therefore, is duty bound to enfore the terms of the agreement and cannot adjudicate a matter beyond the agreement itself. If the arbitrator adjudicates a claim of a contractor with reference to the clauses of the agreement itself whereby the agreement gets engrafted into the award, it will be open to the court to examine those claims of the agreement and find out the correctness of the conclusions of the arbitrator with reference to those clauses. (See : State of U.P. v. Ram Nath International Construction (P) Ltd., (1996) 1 SCC 18). 18. (See : State of U.P. v. Ram Nath International Construction (P) Ltd., (1996) 1 SCC 18). 18. In the present case the arbitrators and the Umpire were required to construe the contract of insurance. The specific question involved was whether the new block, known as "Conference Hall" constitute a part and parcel of the property insured. The Umpire upon consideration of the material placed before him concluded that such "Conference Hall" did not constitute a pan and parcel of the insured property and accordingly held that the deduction of Rs. 10,60,938/- from the estimated loss was illegal. 19. In Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board v. R.J. Shah and Company (J.T. 1999 (3) SC 151), it has been held that when the arbitrator is required to construe a contract then merely because another view may be possible the court would not be justified in construing the contract in a different manner and then to set aside the award by observing the arbitrator has exceeded the jurisdiction in making the award. 20. In the case before the Supreme Court, the dispute before the arbitrators related to the interpretation of the terms of the contract. The said contract was being read by the parties differently. It was observed in paragraph-24 of the judgment as under:— "In order to determine whether the arbitrator has acted in excess of jurisdiction what has to be seen is whether the claimant could raise a particular dispute or claim before an arbitrator. If the answer is in the affirmative then it is clear that the arbitrator would have the jurisdiction to deal with such claim. On the other hand, if the arbitration clause or a specific term in the contract or the law does not permit or give the arbitrator the power to decide or to adjudicate on a dispute raised by the claimant or there is specific bar to the raising of a particular dispute or claim then any decision given by the arbitrator in respect thereof would clearly be in excess of jurisdiction. In order to find out whether the arbitrator has acted in excess of jurisdiction, the court may have to look into some documents including the contract as well as the reference of the dispute made to the arbitrators limited for the purpose of seeking whether the arbitrator has the jurisdiction to decide the claim made in the arbitration proceedings." 21. In order to find out whether the arbitrator has acted in excess of jurisdiction, the court may have to look into some documents including the contract as well as the reference of the dispute made to the arbitrators limited for the purpose of seeking whether the arbitrator has the jurisdiction to decide the claim made in the arbitration proceedings." 21. The Supreme Court held that since the arbitrators were clearly called upon to construe or interpret the terms of the contract, the decision thereon, even if it be erroneous, could not be said to be without jurisdiction. It could also not be said that the award showed that there was an error of jurisdiction even though there may have been an error in the exercise of jurisdiction by the arbitrators. 22. Following the above ratio, in the present case as well, it cannot be said that the award of the Umpire is bad or without jurisdiction since the Umpire was called upon to construe and interpret the terms of the contract of insurance whether the "Conference Hall" constituted a part and parcel of the insured property. Even if such conclusions of the Umpire may be taken as erroneous, the same cannot be interfered with by this court under Section 30/33 of the Act. 23. Replying upon clause-11 of the insurance policy, a contention was raised on behalf of the defendant that under the terms of the said clause, the Umpire was required to sit alongwith the Arbitrators at each hearing and to preside over such meetings. The Umpire, in the present case, was never associated during the proceedings held by the arbitrators. Therefore, there is a legal infirmity in the conduct of the proceedings and as such the award is liable to be set aside on this short ground alone. The Umpire, in the present case, was never associated during the proceedings held by the arbitrators. Therefore, there is a legal infirmity in the conduct of the proceedings and as such the award is liable to be set aside on this short ground alone. Clause-11 of the Insurance Policy reads:— "If any difference shall arise as to the quantum to be paid under this policy (liability being otherwise admitted) such difference shall idependently of all other questions be referred to the decision of an arbitrator to be appointed in writing by the parties in difference, or if they cannot agree upon a single arbitrator, to the decision of two disinterested persons as arbitrators of whom one shall be appointed in writing by each of the parties within two calender months after having been required so to do in writing by the other party in accordance with the provision of the Arbitration Act, 1940, as amended from time to time and for the time being in force. In case either party shall refuse or fail to appoint arbitrator within two calendsr months after receipt of notice in writing requiring an appointment, the other party shall be at liberty to appoint sole arbitrator and in case of disagreement between the arbitrators, the difference shall be referred to the decision of an umpire who shall have been appointed by them in writing before entering on the reference and who shall sit with the arbitrators and preside at their meetings." 24. Admittedly, the objection sought to be raised during the course of hearing, has not been raised by the defendant in the objection petition preferred under Section 30/33 of the Act. The question, therefore, arising for consideration is whether an oral objection raised for the first time in the court be taken cognizance of and especially when the period of limitation prescribed for objections under Section 30/33 of the Act has expired? 25. The learned Counsel for the defendant in support of his contention has placed reliance on the decision of a learned Single Judge of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench at Delhi) in Messrs Himalaya Finance & Construction Co. v. Lakha Singh and others (1965 P.L.R. 1254), wherein it was held that objections filed to the award under Section 30/33 of the Act could be allowed even after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act. 26. v. Lakha Singh and others (1965 P.L.R. 1254), wherein it was held that objections filed to the award under Section 30/33 of the Act could be allowed even after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act. 26. Be it stated that the ratio relied upon by the learned Counsel for the defendant was not followed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in a subsequent case in Jagan Nath v. Des Raj and others (AIR 1985 P & H 115). It was held that the permission to amend the objections preferred under Section 30/33 of the Act cannot be granted after the expiry of period of limitation, since such a course if allowed it would transgress the salutary rule of limitation prescribed under the statute. 27. A Division Bench of this Court also in M/s. Ansal Properties and Industries Ltd. v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board (1997 (3) Sim. L.C. 176) also did not allow a contention to be raised during the hearing which contention was not raised in the objections preferred under Section 30/33 of the Act on the ground of limitation. 28. Therefore, the defendant cannot be permitted to urge that since the Umpire did not sit alongwith the arbitrators during the arbitral proceedings, there has been a contravention of clause 11 of the insurance policy leading to a legal infirmity in the conduct of the proceedings. 29. It has been next contended on behalf of the defendant that the umpire has misconducted himself and the proceedings by allowing interest at the rate of 18% per annum. There exists no stipulation in the insurance policy with regard to the payment of interest. Nor there was any evidence before the umpire justifying the grant to interest at the rate of 18% per annum. It was contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to any interest. Alternatively, it was contended that the rate of interest could not have been allowed at a rate higher than the one stipualted under Section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the defendant on the decision of the Supreme Court in The United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v M/s. M.K.J. Corporation, (AIR 1997 SC 408), wherein interest was allowed at the rate of 12% per annum as against the rate of 18% per annum allowed by the National Consumer Redressal Commission. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the defendant on the decision of the Supreme Court in The United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v M/s. M.K.J. Corporation, (AIR 1997 SC 408), wherein interest was allowed at the rate of 12% per annum as against the rate of 18% per annum allowed by the National Consumer Redressal Commission. 30. There is no dispute that the umpire has the power to grant interest. It is also admitted that there is no term in the insurance policy with regard to payment of interest. It is equally admitted that there is no prohibition also in such insurance policy with regard to the grant of interest. 31. The Supreme Court in Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa and others v. G.C. Roy (AIR 1992 SC 732), had held that where the agreement between the parties does not prohibit grant of interest and where a party claims interest and that dispute (alongwith the claim for principal amount or independently) is referred to the arbitrator, he shall have the power to award interest for the reason that in such a case it must be persumed that interest was an implied term of the agreement between the parties and, therefore, when the parties refer all their disputes or refer the dispute as to interest as such to the arbitrator, he shall have the power to award interest. 32. In the present case interest at the rate of 18% per annum was specifically claimed by the plaintiff before the arbitrators and umpire. Therefore, the dispute as to interest was a term referred to the arbitrators/umpire. While awarding interest at the rate of 18% per annum, admittedly, no reasons therefor have been recorded by the umpire. 33. It is now well settled that an award can neither be remitted nor set aside merely on the ground that it does not contain reasons in support of the conclusions or decisions reached on it except where the arbitration agreement or the deed of submission requires him to give reasons. The arbitrators or the umpire is under no obligation to give reasons in support of the decision reached by him unless the arbitration agreement or in the deed of submissions he is required to do so. The arbitrators or the umpire is under no obligation to give reasons in support of the decision reached by him unless the arbitration agreement or in the deed of submissions he is required to do so. The arbitrator or the umpire shall have to give reasons also where the court has directed in any order such as the one made under Section 21 or Section 34 of the Act that reasons should be given or where the statute governing the arbitration requires him to do so. (See: Raipur Development Authority v. Chokhamal Contractors, (1989 (2) SCC 721). 34. Clause-11 of the insurance policy, which relates to reference of dispute to arbitration, does not stipulate for recording of reasons by the arbitrators/umpire in support of the conclusions arrived at by them/him. Neither there is any order of the court directing recording of reasons nor there is any statutory provision in this regard. 35. Therefore, in the absence of an obligation for the recording of reasons by the umpire in support of his conclusions, it cannot be said that the umpire has mis-conducted either himself or the proceedings. 36. As stated above, the question of interest was specifically referred to arbitrators/umpire. The umpire has come to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to interest at the rate of 18% per annum. Since this court while deciding the objections under Section 30/ 33 of the Act does not sit in appeal against the award, it is no part of the province of this court to enter into the merits and/or demerits of the dispute. 37. It is, therefore, held that the learned umpire has mis-conducted neither himself nor the proceedings. The issue is accordingly decided against the defendant/objector. RELIEF : 38. As a result, the objections filed by the defendant, being OMP No. 46 of 1998, are dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Civil Suit No. 69/97 : 39. Consequent upon the dismissal of the objections preferred by the defendant, the award dated 17.7.1997 filed by the umpire is made the rule of the court and a decree in terms thereof is passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. The plaintiff shall further be entitled to future interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the amount of Rs. 10,60,938/- from the date of the decree till the date of payment thereof. The plaintiff shall further be entitled to future interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the amount of Rs. 10,60,938/- from the date of the decree till the date of payment thereof. Parties to bear their own costs. Order accordingly.