(1) THE only question which arises in this appeal is that land which was dedicated to the deity before the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (for short "the Act") was enacted would fall within the purview of Section 6(1)(i) of the said Act if the proceeds or income from the said land are not being used exclusively for the benefit of the deity. (2) THE facts briefly stated are that the land in question originally belonged to the Singha family of the Paikpara Raj. Some of the property belonging to this family was dedicated to Sree Sree Iswar Radha Ballav Jiew Thakur, with which we are concerned in the present appeal. It appears that amongst the members of the family dispute arose pertaining to the manner in which the property belonging to the family was to be partitioned. Reference was first made to one Arthur Phillips to act as an arbitrator and give his award. Subsequently, Sir R.C. Mitter was appointed as an arbitrator by order dated 9-5-1892 passed in a suit which was pending between the parties. The terms of reference to the said arbitrator included the question as to which were the properties which belonged to debuttar and were, therefore, not liable to be partitioned. The arbitrator Sir R.C. Mitter gave his award and included in Schedule A-1 list of debuttar properties which, in terms of his award, were not liable for partition as the same had been dedicated to Sree Sree Iswar Radha Ballav Jiew Thakur. The said award, which also dealt with the properties which could be partitioned, was then made the rule of the court. (3) WITH the promulgation of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, all the estates stood vested in the State Government by virtue of Section 4 of the said Act. Section 6 deals with the rights of intermediaries to retain certain lands. It is not in dispute that as per the definition of the word "intermediary" occurring in Section 2(i), the shebaits were intermediaries within the meaning of the said Act. Section 6(1), inter alia, provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 4 and 5 an intermediary shall be entitled to retain with effect from the date of vesting certain lands. We are here concerned with clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 6 which reads as follows: "6. Section 6(1), inter alia, provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 4 and 5 an intermediary shall be entitled to retain with effect from the date of vesting certain lands. We are here concerned with clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 6 which reads as follows: "6. (1)(i) where the intermediary is a corporation or an institution established exclusively for a religious or a charitable purpose or both, or is a person holding under a trust or an endowment or other legal obligation exclusively for a purpose which is charitable or religious or both land held in khas by such corporation or institution, or person, for such purpose including land held by any person, not being a tenant, by leave or licence of such corporation or institution or person." (4) SUB-SECTION (2) of Section 6 stipulates that an intermediary who is entitled to retain possession of any land under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to hold such land directly under the State from the date of vesting as a tenant, subject to such terms as may be prescribed. From the reading of Sections 4 and 6 together, it is clear that with the promulgation of the said Act, the rights of intermediaries in the estates came to an end and the said estates vested in the State Government. Section 6(l)(i) read with sub-section (2) of Section 6 provides that in the case of those intermediaries which hold land exclusively for religious or charitable purposes and the land is held in khas then the said intermediaries would continue to remain in possession of the said land but they would be regarded as tenants under the State Government though they would not be liable to pay any rent. (5) IT is not in dispute that some of the land of the debuttar was not khas land and the same had been given to tenants. In the present case, we are not concerned with the said land which had been tenanted. With regard to khas land after orders were passed by the State Government, on representation having been filed by the respondents, the name of the deity in respect of the said land was included in the records of rights which were finally prepared and published under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. With regard to khas land after orders were passed by the State Government, on representation having been filed by the respondents, the name of the deity in respect of the said land was included in the records of rights which were finally prepared and published under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. This record was prepared pursuant to a letter dated 7-8-1962 written by the Settlement Officer, Malda informing the Common Manager of debuttar estate that the Government had decided to allow the estate to retain the khas land under Section 6(1) of the Act. (6) THE dispute, which has given rise to the present appeal, arose when on or about 29-10-1968 the Settlement Officer, Murshidabad started proceedings against the respondents and after giving notice he came to the conclusion that a substantial portion of the income derived from the khas land was spent for purposes other than religious or charitable and, therefore, the debuttar was not entitled to get the benefit of Section 6(1)(i) of the Act but was entitled to get the benefit of Section l6(1)(b)(vi) of the said Act. (7) THE said decision of the Settlement Officer was challenged by the respondents by filing a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court. A Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the said petition but on appeal the Division Bench allowed the same and quashed the order which had been passed against the respondents by the Settlement Officer, Murshidabad. Hence, this appeal by special leave. (8) IT was submitted by Shri Tapas Chandra Ray, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that inasmuch as a major portion of the income from the property held by the deity was not used for religious or charitable purposes, therefore on a correct interpretation of Section 6(l)(i) the said property could not be regarded as being exclusively held for religious or charitable purposes. This being so, it was contended. Section 6(1)(i) had no application and the Division Bench was in error in quashing the order of the Settlement Officer. Learned Senior Counsel also sought to contend that the endowment was illusory as was evident from the fact that most of the income of the debuttar was being used for non-religious purposes. (9) WE will first deal with the second contention. We find that the endowment was made in favour of the deity before 1892 with reference to specific land. Learned Senior Counsel also sought to contend that the endowment was illusory as was evident from the fact that most of the income of the debuttar was being used for non-religious purposes. (9) WE will first deal with the second contention. We find that the endowment was made in favour of the deity before 1892 with reference to specific land. It is thereafter when dispute arose amongst the members of the family that an arbitrator was appointed in a partition suit and Sir R.C. Mitter gave his award in which he came to the conclusion that the land in question belonged exclusively to the deity. The said award was made the rule of the court. The effect of this is that this endowment in favour of the deity must be regarded as genuine and not illusory for if it was not genuine then the arbitrator would have considered this property for partition amongst the members of the family. The categorical finding being that this debuttar was an impartible estate as it had been endowed in favour of the deity, it is now not open to the appellants to contend to the contrary. (10) AS far as the applicability of Section 6(1)(i) of the Act is concerned, a plain reading of the said sub-clause shows that if the property is held exclusively for religious or charitable purposes or both, then the said sub-clause will apply. In order to determine whether the property is held exclusively for religious or charitable purposes, what has to be seen is the terms of the trust deed or other documents by which the institution was established. That exercise need not be gone into in the present case for the simple reason that the aforesaid award of Sir R.C. Mitter clearly establishes that the property in question was meant to be used exclusively for religious or charitable purposes. The mere fact that the trustees or the shebaits may not be utilising the income for the purpose for which it was meant to be used, cannot detract from the fact that the debuttar was established wholly and exclusively for religious or charitable purposes. This being so, the provisions of Section 6(1 )(i) were clearly attracted and the High Court was, therefore, right in allowing the appeal and quashing the order of the Settlement Officer. (11) FOR the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in this appeal. This being so, the provisions of Section 6(1 )(i) were clearly attracted and the High Court was, therefore, right in allowing the appeal and quashing the order of the Settlement Officer. (11) FOR the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in this appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed with costs.