P. K. JAIN, J. ( 1 ) HEARD Sri Bharat Ji Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the revisionist and Sri S. P. Kesharwani, learned Standing Counsel for the department. Since arguments have been heard at length, the revision is being finally disposed of at the admission stage. ( 2 ) THE revisionist claims to be a public limited company incorporated under the Indian companies Act, 1956. Pursuant to certain notification issued under Section 4-A of the U. P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 issued by the State Government promising certain industries to grant exemption from payment of tax for a period of six years, the revisionist applied for grant of exemption under Section 4-A of the Act. The Divisional Level Committee, Meerut, by its order dated August 12, 1991 granted eligibility certificate to the revisionist exempting it from payment of sales tax for a period of 5 years from the date of first sale which according to the revisionist is march 28, 1990, though the date of starting of production was March 25, 1990. Thereafter on learning that the site where unit of the revisionist existed fell within the jurisdiction of the Dadri tehsil, the revisionist obtained necessary certificate from Tehsildar, Dadri Tehsil. The revisionist was entitled for exemption for a period of six years. Since the eligibility certificate was for 5 years, the revisionist filed an application the before Divisional Level Committee, meerut, for modifying the exemption certificate granted earlier, and the Divisional Level committee, Meerut, modified the exemption certificate by order dated April 28, 1994. Thereafter, the Commissioner of Trade Tax received a report dated August 12, 1994 said to have been submitted by Sub-divisional Magistrate, Ghaziabad, on presumption that the site of the unit of revisionist falls within Ghaziabad Tehsil, the Commissioner of Trade Tax initiated proceeding under Section 4-A (3) of the Act for modification of the eligibility certificate, and ultimately modified the eligibility certificate granted by the Divisional Level Committee, Meerut. The matter went up to Tribunal which directed the Commissioner, Trade Tax, U. P. , by order dated september 24, 1997, to pass an order de novo. The Commissioner of Trade Tax again passed an order dated November 10, 1997 whereby exemption of six years was reduced to five years. The matter went up to Tribunal which directed the Commissioner, Trade Tax, U. P. , by order dated september 24, 1997, to pass an order de novo. The Commissioner of Trade Tax again passed an order dated November 10, 1997 whereby exemption of six years was reduced to five years. ( 3 ) IN the meantime, the assessment for the assessment year 1995-96 was completed by the assessing authority by order dated April 30, 1997. Since, by that time order dated January 8, 1996 by the Commissioner of Trade Tax passed under Section 4-A (3) of the Act was in existence and was served upon the revisionist on February 6, 1996, tax up to February 6, 1996 was assessed by the assessing authority in view of the Government Notification dated April 26, 1994 read with Circular Nos. (94-95)-92-252 dated May 26, 1995 and 18/262 dated May 26, 1995. That after the final order was passed by the Commissioner of Trade Tax, U. P. , Lucknow, on November 10, 1997, the assessing authority issued a demand order dated January 6, 1998 by which a demand of Rs. 99,25,725 was raised which pertains to the tax levied and not waived off on the sales of the product between the period February 6, 1996 to March 27, 1996. In view of the aforesaid two circulars the revisionist was entitled for remission (waiver off interest up to november 10, 1997) or up to March 27, 1996 when the period of six years had expired which was prior to the passing of the final order under Section 4-A (3) of the Act, when the demand order for the said amount was served upon the revisionist. He filed an appeal under Section 9 of the U. P. Trade Tax Act before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Trade Tax, Ghaziabad. An objection with regard to the maintainability of the appeal was raised by the department. Arguments were heard on March 20, 1998, March 21, 1998 and March 28, 1998, On March 31, 1998, the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) passed an order holding that appeal was maintainable and the order granting stay against realisation of 72 per cent of the disputed tax was passed. However, ultimately with the change of the presiding officer, the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appeal against demand notice/order was not maintainable. However, ultimately with the change of the presiding officer, the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appeal against demand notice/order was not maintainable. The appeal filed before Trade Tax Tribunal was also dismissed. Hence, this revision. ( 4 ) THE sole question raised by Sri Bharat Ji Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the revisionist is that no review of order dated March 31, 1998 was permissible. He has strenuously argued that once the question with regard to the maintainability of the appeal was decided by the deputy Commissioner (Appeals), with change of opinion, the successor in the office of Deputy commissioner (Appeals) was not justified in dismissing the appeal on the ground that the appeal was not maintainable. Sri Kesharwani, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the department, however, submits that demand notice is not an order. The appeal under Section 9 of the Act was not maintainable and in any case, the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) in exercise of powers under Section 22 of the Act can correct the error committed by his predecessor and thus he was entitled to rectify the mistakes. Therefore, there is no error in the order passed by the Deputy commissioner (Appeals) dismissing the appeal on the ground that it was not maintainable. Thus, the following two questions arise for determination in this revision : (1) Whether after considering the objections raised by the department regarding maintainability of the appeal the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) passed an order holding that the appeal was maintainable his successor in office on the ground of change of opinion can review the order passed by his predecessor, and thus dismiss the appeal ? (2) Whether a demand notice/order is an order under Section 9 of the Trade Tax Act against which an appeal is maintainable ? ( 5 ) FOR the revisionist copy of the order sheet of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) has been filed with the supplementary affidavit which is annexure S. A.-5. Perusal of the order sheet shows that appeal was originally registered as defective appeal which was listed for hearing on March 20, 1998 and was partly heard on that date. On March 21, 1998, the department raised objections in writing about maintainability of the appeal and hearing was adjourned to March 28, 1998. Perusal of the order sheet shows that appeal was originally registered as defective appeal which was listed for hearing on March 20, 1998 and was partly heard on that date. On March 21, 1998, the department raised objections in writing about maintainability of the appeal and hearing was adjourned to March 28, 1998. Counter-objections were filed by the revisionist on March 28, 1998, On 31st March, 1998 an order was passed after hearing the parties holding that the appeal was maintainable and the appeal was registered, and stay was granted on April 16, 1998, In the circumstances the question which arise for determination is whether at subsequent stage with the change of presiding officer and change of opinion the order passed on March 31, 1998 can be reviewed and can be undone by the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals ). Shri Bharat Ji Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel for the revisionist, submits that once a question about maintainability of the appeal was raised at the preliminary stage and it was disposed of after hearing the parties at length, such a question cannot be reagitated at the subsequent stage of the same proceeding. The submission of Sri agrawal is that if the Department felt aggrieved against the order, it could have filed an appeal or in the alternative. if ultimately the appeal was allowed and the department felt aggrieved, the order passed at the preliminary stage regarding objection about the maintainability of the appeal could also have been challenged in appeal against the final order. The submission is that at a subsequent stage of proceeding the same authority could not have reviewed its earlier order holding that appeal was maintainable. Shri Kesharwani learned Standing Counsel has referred to provision of Section 22 of the Trade Tax Act and has vehemently argued that such powers of rectification are vested with the authority concerned to rectify the mistake. Section 22 (1) of the uttar Pradesh Trade Tax Act reads as follows : "22. Rectification of mistakes.-- (1) Any officer or authority, or the Tribunal or the High Court may, on its own motion or on the application of dealer or any other interested person rectify any mistake in any order passed by him or it under this Act apparent on the record within three years from the date of the order sought to be rectified : provided. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Provided. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 6 ) FROM bare perusal of Section 22 (1) of the U. P. Trade Tax Act, it is quite evident that the authority concerned or the Tribunal or the High Court may rectify any mistake in any order passed by it under the Act which is apparent on the face of record. The question of law which has once been decided, even though erroneously after lengthy arguments, and taking a wrong view of law is not an error apparent on the face of record. Such an error cannot be rectified under section 22 of the U. P. Trade Tax Act. Therefore, the submission of Sri Kesharwani that the deputy Commissioner (Appeals) had the powers of rectifying the mistake in the present case under Section 22 (1) of the Act has no merit. ( 7 ) SRI Kesharwani, then has relied upon certain decisions of the apex Court. The first decision is rendered in Raja Jagdambika Pratap Narain Singh v. Central Board of Direct Taxes [1975] 100 itr 698 ; 1975 UPTC 564. On careful examination of the decision, I find that it is not applicable to the facts of the case and it nowhere holds that if a question of law has been decided as a preliminary point in a particular proceeding then at subsequent stage of the same proceeding the court or an authority has jurisdiction to review the same. On the other hand, the apex Court held that, "it is doubtful if the Central Board can exercise any judicial power and direct the refund. Nor there is a statutory duty cast on it to consider the applications for refund and so a writ of mandamus could not be issued from the court. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the court has full jurisdiction when there is a statutory duty". Nor there is a statutory duty cast on it to consider the applications for refund and so a writ of mandamus could not be issued from the court. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the court has full jurisdiction when there is a statutory duty". Shri Kesharwani has however, referred to the following observations of the court, "even so, it is always open to the State, where the justice of the case demands reconsideration of the levy of tax illegally imposed, to view the situation from an equitable standpoint and direct the refund wholly or in part". ( 8 ) THE above observations of the court do not help the learned Standing Counsel, since powers of the Government or the State are different from the powers of judicial authority or an authority under same enactment. ( 9 ) SHRI Kesharwani had then relied upon the decision rendered in Distributors (Baroda) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India [1985] 155 ITR 120 ; AIR 1985 SC 1585 . It was a case in which the Supreme court was exercising powers under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court has wide powers under Article 141 of the Constitution and in exercise of such powers it can review its own decisions and can overrule the earlier decisions rendered on a question of law. The court had held that "ordinarily the decision given by a Bench of the Supreme Court should not be overturned because it is essential that there should be continuity and consistency in the judicial decisions and law should be certain and definite. It is almost as important that the law should be settled permanently as that it should be settled correctly. But there may be circumstances where public interest demands that the previous decision be reviewed and reconsidered. The doctrine of stare decisis should not deter the court from overruling an earlier decision, if it is satisfied that such a decision is manifestly wrong or proceeds upon a mistaken assumption in regard to the existence or continuance of a statutory provision or is contrary to another decision of the court", The authorities under the Trade Tax Act do not have powers as the Supreme Court has under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. There being no provision under the U. P. Trade Tax Act to review or revise its own orders at a subsequent stage of the same proceeding, in my view, the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Sales Tax, was not competent to have dismissed the appeal on the ground of its non-maintainability when his predecessor in office had already decided the point in favour of the revisionist and had held that appeal was maintainable. ( 10 ) SHRI Bharat Ji Agrawal has drawn the attention of the court to the decision of this Court rendered by a Division Bench in Ram Sewak Hari Om Brick Kiln v. Sales Tax Officer, Mainpuri [1974] 33 STC 453 ; 1972 UPTC 670. That was a case in which the appeals were not accompanied by proof of payment of admitted tax. The appeals were registered as defective. The petitioner then filed certified copy of his application to the Sales Tax Officer for adjustment of the admitted tax. The appellate authority accepted the petitioners contention that he was entitled to adjustment of the refund against the admitted tax. An order was passed declaring the appeal in order. Thereafter the Sales Tax Officer again agitated the question before the appellate authority that the petitioners appeals were not competent for want of deposit of admitted tax. Opportunity was given to the Sales Tax Officer to show cause but none was shown and the appeals were competent. In the meantime, there was amendment which validated the levy of the tax on sales of bricks at 7 per cent. At the time of final hearing of the appeals again the same objection was raised and the appellate authority rejected the appeals on the ground that in view of the amendment in the law, the petitioner was no longer entitled to the refund and, as such, his appeals were defective. The court in the aforesaid circumstances held that "the appeals once having been rejected as defective were subsequently held to be in order by a specific order of the appellate authority. The effect of that order was that the appellate authority had accepted the plea of the petitioner that, in the circumstances of the case, the admitted tax due from the petitioner should be deemed to have been paid. The appeals having been admitted they could not be held to be not maintainable as a result of the subsequent change in law". The appeals having been admitted they could not be held to be not maintainable as a result of the subsequent change in law". The court had referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Lakshmiratan Engineering Works Ltd. v. Assistant commissioner (Judicial) I, Sales Tax, Kanpur [1968] 21 STC 154, where the apex Court held that "the question whether the appeal is entertainable or not is to be decided when the appeal is first taken up for hearing. Once the appeals were admitted as proper appeals they could not be dismissed on the ground that by reason of a subsequent change in law the petitioner was not entitled to the refund claimed by him". In the instant case before this Court there is no change of law but change of opinion which has persuaded the learned Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) to hold that the appeal was not maintainable, and consequently he dismissed the appeal. This in my opinion was not permissible when question of maintainability had been disposed of after hearing both the parties. ( 11 ) IT is well-settled that the principles analogous to principle of res judicata are applicable to proceedings before a Tribunal or an authority under any law. It is also well-settled that such a principle is applicable to different stages of the same proceeding. In case, at an earlier stage in a proceeding the substantial question is raised by a party and is decided by the authority, in the same proceeding at a subsequent stage, the same question cannot be allowed to be raised. The reason is that there should be finality to the decisions made by an authority at an earlier stage of the proceeding. It was held by the honourable Supreme Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Smt. Deorajin Debi AIR 1960 SC 941 , that : "principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings". It was further held that "an interlocutory order which had not been appealed from either because no appeal lay or even though an appeal lay an appeal was not taken could be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order". On this ground also, in my view, the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) had no authority to review the earlier order passed by his predecessor in the office. ( 12 ) THIS takes us to the second question raised by learned Standing Counsel. He vehemently argued that notice of demand is not an order. Therefore, no appeal lies against the notice of demand under Section 9 of the U. P. Trade Tax Act. Section 9 (1) reads as follows : "9. Appeal.-- (1) Any dealer or other person aggrieved by an order made by the assessing authority, other than an order mentioned in Section 10-A or Sub-section (6) of Section 13-A, may, within thirty days from the date of service of the copy of the order, appeal to such authority as may be prescribed. Provided that where the disputed amount of tax, fee or penalty does not exceed one thousand rupees, the appellant may, at his option, request the appellate authority in writing for summary disposal of his appeal, whereupon the appellate authority may decide the appeal accordingly. (1 -A) The manner and procedure of summary disposal of appeal shall be such as may be prescribed. (1 -A) The manner and procedure of summary disposal of appeal shall be such as may be prescribed. (1-B) No appeal against an assessment order under this Act shall be entertained unless the appellant has furnished satisfactory proof of the payment of not less than- (a) the amount of tax or fee due under this Act on the turnover of sale or purchases, as the case may be, admitted by the appellant in the returns filed by him or at any stage in any proceedings under this Act, whichever is greater, where all the returns for the assessment year have been filed, or (b) the amount of tax or fee due under this Act on the turnover of sales or purchases, as the case may be, admitted by the appellant in the returns, if any, filed by him or at any stage in any proceedings under this Act, or twenty per cent of the amount of tax or fee assessed, whichever is greater, where some of the returns for the assessment year have not been filed or no return has been filed for such year : provided that the appellate authority may, for special and adequate reasons to be recorded in writing, waive or relax the requirement of clause (b) in so far as it relates to deposit of twenty per cent of the amount of tax or fee assessed". Thus, the appeal lies against an order passed by an assessing authority. The question is whether the notice of demand is an order. The expression "order" has not been defined under the U. P. Trade Tax Act. The dictionary meaning of the expression order is a command to do a certain thing. In Black Law Dictionary, it has been defined as follows : "a mandate, precept, a command or direction authoritatively given". ( 13 ) LOOKED into the light of the above meaning of term "order" a notice of demand is a command or direction to deposit the amount of tax assessed. Rule 45 of the Rules framed under the U. P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 provides that as soon as the assessment has been made, the Trade tax Officer shall send to the dealer a notice in "form XI, together with a copy of the assessment order free of charge and the dealer shall pay tax so assessed within the time and in manner specified in the notice. Clauses 3, 4 and 5 are the form of notice as contained in form XI, relevant for the purpose, read as below : "3. This tax/balance shall be paid by you within thirty days of the receipt of this notice. 4. The tax shall be paid by you within the period mentioned above and in the manner prescribed in Rule 48 failing which the amount will be recovered as if it were an arrear of land revenue and you will also be liable to prosecution under Section 14 of the Act and to be dealt with under section 15-A of the Act. 5. If the tax payable in terms of this Demand Notice remains unpaid for six months after the expiry of the time specified as above, you shall, in consequence of such non-payment, be further liable to pay simple interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum which shall run on the amount then remaining due from the date of expiry of the time specified in para 3 and shall be added to the amount of tax and be deemed for all purposes to be part of the tax. A copy of the assessment order is attached. Place : date : seal : trade Tax Officer. " ( 14 ) BY Clause 3 of the notice a direction is given to the assessee to the effect that tax or the balance of the tax shall be paid by him within thirty days of the receipt of the notice. Clause 4 of the notice gives a further direction that in case the tax is not paid within the period mentioned in clause 3 of the notice, amount will be recovered as arrears of land revenue and the assessee may be liable to prosecution as Section 14 of the Act and penalty under Section 15-A of the Act. A further direction in Clause 5 of the notice is that in case of default in payment of the tax in terms of the demand notice, if the amount remains unpaid for six months after expiry of the time specified in the notice, the assessee shall be liable to pay simple interest at the rate of 18. per cent per annum. per cent per annum. This clearly shows that the notice directing the dealer/assessee to deposit the amount of tax found to be due or the outstanding balance is a command or a direction authoritatively given. Thus, the notice is an order within the meaning of Section 9 of the U. P. Trade Tax Act and an appeal lies against the same. ( 15 ) SHRI Bharat Ji Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the revisionist has drawn attention of this Court to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Jajmau International Tanners v. Trade Tax Officer reported in 1998 UPTC 936 wherein this Court held that "in reference to the demand of Rs. 2,90,034 plus interest, the assessee has a clear cut remedy as an appeal under section 9 of the U. P. Trade Tax Act, 1948". ( 16 ) EVEN though the question whether a notice of demand is an order within the meaning of section 9 of the U. P. Trade Tax Act, was not specifically determined by the court, yet it was held that against demand the assessee has a clear cut remedy of an appeal under Section 9 of the U. P. Trade Tax Act. ( 17 ) SRI Kesharwani, learned Standing Counsel has, however, made a reference to two decisions, viz. decision in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Dwarika Das and Co. [1980] 45 STC 352 (All.) ; 1980 UPTC 123 and Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P. v. Swadeshi Cotton Mills Ltd. Kanpur [1972] 29 STC 342 (All. ). On the strength of these two decisions, it is vehemently argued that notice of demand is not an order within the meaning of Section 9 of the U. P. Trade Tax Act. ( 18 ) IN the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Dwarika Das and Co. [1980] 45 STC 352 (All.); 1980 UPTC 123, the question before the court was whether a recovery certificate issued by the assessing authority is an order and if an appeal lies against the same. The court held that recovery certificate is neither a formal expression of a decision nor a command or mandate ; as such, it cannot be considered to be an order. The analogy that it is in the nature of execution proceeding, is not applicable. The court held that recovery certificate is neither a formal expression of a decision nor a command or mandate ; as such, it cannot be considered to be an order. The analogy that it is in the nature of execution proceeding, is not applicable. ( 19 ) IN my view, the letter of request sent by the Trade Tax Officer to the Collector to realise the arrears as land revenue is not an order but only a request or information for making the recovery of amount due as arrears of land revenue and such a certificate cannot be equated with notice of demand in form No. XI. ( 20 ) THE other decision rendered in Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P. v. Swadeshi Cotton Mills ltd. [1972] 29 STC 342 (All.) is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. One of the questions that arose for determination before this Court was whether the notice of demand sent during the pendency of the writ petition was valid notice of demand. It appears from the facts of that case that the assessee disputed the rate of tax payable by him in a writ petition before the high Court which was admitted and an interim stay order was granted. During the pendency of the writ petition department served a notice of demand on the assessee requiring it to pay outstanding amount within 16 days. In the notice it was also stated that the recovery of the demand would remain stayed till the disposal of the writ petition and that the payment of tax should be made in accordance with the order of the court, if any, effecting the amount of tax. Eventually, the writ petition was dismissed. In these circumstances the above question arose for determination and the court held that the notice of demand was a valid notice of demand. It held that it could not be said that on account of the rate of tax having been challenged in the writ petition, the amount of tax on the assessee was not crystallised liability when the notice of demand was served on it. The notice did not suffer from any uncertainty. ( 21 ) THEREFORE, the decisions referred to by the Standing Counsel are of no help to the respondent. The notice did not suffer from any uncertainty. ( 21 ) THEREFORE, the decisions referred to by the Standing Counsel are of no help to the respondent. There could not be doubt that right of appeal is not an inherent right but a creation of the legislature and unless there is specific provision under the law providing for an appeal against an order, no appeal can be entertained against such an order. Shri Kesharwani has, however, submitted that the demand raised by the department was crystallised by the assessment order and nothing remains to be decided. Shri Bharat Ji Agrawal however, submits that the dispute was whether the exemption under the eligibility certificate was available up to February 6, 1996 or up to March 27, 1996. The claim of the revisionist before the authorities below was that the revisionist was entitled to remission up to March 27, 1996 when the period of six years had expired. In my view, that is a question which shall be determined by the Deputy Commissioner of Appeals while hearing the appeal on merit and is not within the scope of the present revision. Sri Kesharwani then argues that a writ on the question of remission is pending before this honourable court. That in my view cannot affect the maintainability of the appeal. Shri kesharwani has also referred to Rules 67 and 68 of the U. P. Trade Tax Rules, 1948, but in my view, these Rules have no relevancy so far as the controversy in hand in concerned. ( 22 ) IN view of the above discussions, I am of the view that the order passed by the Deputy commissioner (Appeals) holding that the appeal was not maintainable and confirmed by the trade Tax Tribunal cannot be sustained. ( 23 ) THE revision is, therefore, allowed. Impugned orders are set aside and the Deputy commissioner of Appeals is directed to dispose of the appeal on merit in accordance with law. .