NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY v. RAMA DEVI — 1999 DIGILAW 134 (HP)

JUDGMENT D. Raju, C. J.—The above appeal has been filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against the award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Shimla dated 7.8.1991 in MACC No. ll-S/2 of 1990, whereunder the Tribunal below has awarded a total compensation of Rs. 1,35,600/- on account of the death of one Sh. Brij Lal, who died as a result of an accident, which occurred at 9.30 p.m. on 4.9.1989, involving the truck No. HYX-553 belonging to one Sh. Surander Pal insured with the appellant-insurance company. The total compensation awarded was apportioned in the ratio of Rs. 80,000/- in favour of the wife of the deceased, by name, Smt. Rama Devi and Rs. 55,600/- in favour of the mother of the deceased, by name, Smt. Roop Dassi. 2. Respondents No. 1 and 2, the claimants before the Tribunal below, stated in their claim petition that the deceased Brij Lal, who was employed as a Conductor with Truck No. 2259 and earning Rs. 800/- per month in addition to being paid Rs. 10/- as diet money, travelled in the ill-fated truck HYX-553 carrying certain damaged parts of his truck HPS 2259 for repair/replacement by paying some amount for the transport of himself as also the spare parts from a place called Khegsu. The truck in which he was travelling was driven in a rash and negligent manner on account of which it gone off the road and fallen down in a Nallaha resulting in the death of Brij Lal. Consequently, the claim petition came to be made for a sum of Rs.4 lacs. The deceased was said to be 20 years old when he died. 3. The owner of the vehicle, the first respondent before the Tribunal and the third respondent in this Court remained ex parte and did not contest the claim before the Tribunal and it is only the insurance company the appellant herein who contested the same. After trial and on a consideration of the materials placed on record, the Tribunal below held that the accident has occurred on account of the rash and negligent driving of the truck by its driver and the deceased died on account of the said accident, that the total loss of future income to the appellants was Rs. 1,29,600/- and a further sum of Rs. 1,29,600/- and a further sum of Rs. 6,000 could be awarded for the loss of love and affection and mental shock, in all a compensation of Rs. 1,35,600/- and that it was brought on evidence that the deceased was carrying damaged parts of the truck in which he was employed as a Conductor on payment of Rs. 300/- as fare and freight charges to the driver of the truck No. HYX-553 in question and, therefore, the deceased cannot be said to be an unauthorised or gratuitous passenger in the truck involved in the accident. Applying the ratio of a decision of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.(Mrs.) Usha Rani, 1989 (2) S.L.C. 313, the appellant-insurance company was held liable to pay the compensation awarded to the claimants. As to the question raised and the issue framed whether the truck in question was being driven in violation of the Motor Vehicles Rules, since neither any evidence was produced in respect of the same nor it was pursued and argued, it was held that the insurance company failed to prove such a claim. The Tribunal below also held that the deceased was not an unauthorised or gratuitous passenger and the insurance company failed to substantiate such a plea. Aggrieved, the insurance company has filed the above appeal. 4. Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant-insurance company strenuously contended by placing strong reliance upon the decisions reported in AIR 1999 S.C. 589 (Smt. Mallawwa etc. v Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and others; 1992 A.C.J. 1 (National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Dundamma and others and 1992 A.C.J. 918 Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Iraxvwa and others, that notwithstanding the fact that the accident occurred after the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, came into force with effect from 1.7.1989 but inasmuch as it was prior to 14.11.1994, the date on which the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994, (Central Act 54 of 1994) came into force, the insurance Company cannot be made liable for the compensation awarded in respect of the death of Brij Lal in a goods vehicle and that the ratio of the deicision reported in AIR 1999 S.C. 589 (supra) would still be applicable to the case on hand in construing the provisions of 1988 Act prior to its amendment by Central Act No. 54 of 1994. Per contra, Mr. Per contra, Mr. Devinder Ghosh, learned Counsel appearing for respondents No. 1 and 2 while adopting the reasoning of the Tribunal below contended that 1988 Act, unlike the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, rendered liable the insurance company even in respect of the claims involved in this case and that, therefore, there are no merits in the appeal. Having regard to the general issue of importance involved and raised in this case and its possible impact on similar cases, which may come up before this Court, we made an appeal to counsel normally appearing in such cases, if they so desire, to address on the issue with a particular request to Mr. Deepak Gupta, learned Counsel, who used to appear both for the claimants as well as for the owners of the vehicles and Insurance Companies, at times. Mr. Deepak Gupta hot only accepted our request to assist the Court but appears to have made a considerable study of the decisions rendered at various points of time by different High Courts till the matter came to be adjudicated in AIR 1999 S.C. 589 (supra). The learned Counsel really assisted the Court by placing before us for our consideration the possible views for either of the stand taken by contesting parties in this case. 5. Though a volume of case law has been brought to our notice, we consider it unnecessary to advert to the entirety of it except some of the decisions rendered under the old Act which really gone into the scheme underlying Sections 94 and 95 of the 1939 Act, which to sme extent correspond to Sections 146 and 147 of the 1988 Act for the reason that they may to some extent help to understand and deal with the submissions now made before us, on the scope and extent of the provisions contained in the new Act. 6. 6. The question relating to the extent of liability of the insurer in respect of the claims made on account of the death of the owner of goods carried in a goods vehicle before it came to be finally decided under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 by their Lordships of the apex Court in the decision reported in AIR 1999 S.C. 589 (supra) was the subject matter of a myriad of views expressed by different High Courts taking, at times different views by some Courts, depending upon or placing emphasis on some or the other of the facts to justify the view taken in a given case. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana, even in the beginning, has taken the view that a passenger, be he the owner of the goods in a truck or the goods vehicle if involved in an accident either dies or suffers injury the insurance company was not liable for such claims. Several High Courts have been following this line of reasoning with some exceptions in some individual cases, as indicated earlier, depending upon the fact situation presented in such cases. In some of the cases, it was held that if a person in a goods vehicles was in the capacity of an employee or in pursuance of a contract of employment even with the hirer or owner of the goods, such person would be covered by the insurance policy so as to render the insurance company liable in respect of the claims arising out of the injury or death of such person. In some of the other decisions if the factum of the payment by way of hire was proved, it was found to satisfy the requirements of the provisions contained in Section 95 pertaining to passengers carried for hire or reward or such owner of the goods travelling in the goods vehicle along with the goods being held to satisfy the requirements of a hirer of the goods vehicle making it liable and to saddle the insurance company with liability. In yet another line of cases some of the High Courts held that the contract of employment envisaged in Section 95 would take within its fold the employees of the hirer/owner of the goods also. In yet another line of cases some of the High Courts held that the contract of employment envisaged in Section 95 would take within its fold the employees of the hirer/owner of the goods also. It is in the teeth of such uncertainty among the views held by different High Courts and at times different views held in some of the same High Courts at different points of time, the issue came up for consideration before the apex Court in the decision reported in AIR 1999 S.C. 589 (supra). 7. So far as the position of law under the 1939 Act is concerned, in respect of the extent, if any of the liability of the insurer pertaining to the claims arising out of the death of the owner of the goods carried in a goods vehicle, the last word, as on date, must be considered to have been stated in the decision reported in AIR 1999 S.C. 589 (supra) and the other decisions of the High Courts taking a contra view or giving a reason directly opposed to the ratio of the said decision of the apex Court cannot be given any weight or credence or force. Therefore, it becomes necessary to advert to the ratio of the decision in AIR 1999 S.C. 589 (supra) though a case arising under 1939 Act since, according to the learned Counsel for the appellant in this case, the provisions in the 1988 Act also did not effect any change in this regard till the amending Central Act 54 of 1994 came into force and that the ratio of the said decision would be applicable to construe to the provisions of 1988 Act in the present case also. Their Lordships of the apex Court have dealt with a batch of cases in rendering the said decision. Mr. K.D Sood went to the extent of pointing out from paragraph 3 of the judgment that the appeal dealt with therein related to an accident which occurred on 6.11.1990 after the 1988 Act came into force to impress upon us for the claim that the ratio of the decision would apply to the cases under the 1988 Act also prior to its amendment in 1994 by the amending Act 54 of 1994. Even at the out set, it needs to be pointed out that we cannot readily accept such a submission in view of the observations specifically made in paragraph 13 of the judgment wherein it has been observed, "the 1939 Act is now replaced by the 1988 Act. Section 147 which corresponds to old Section 95 has been substantially altered by the Legislature. Therefore, the above interpretation of Section 95 of the 1939 Act will govern the cases which have arisen under the 1939 Act." Consequently, the decision in AIR 1999 S.C. 589, requires to be noticed to understand the ratio of the decision and the reasons which weighed with their Lordships of the apex Court to come to such a conclusion and the scheme underlying Sections 94 and 95 of the 1939 Act as also the language of those provisions to appreciate the stand taken now for the appellant-insurance company that the language of Sections 146 and 147 of the 1988 Act prior to its amendment in 1994 by the Central Act 54 of 1994 was not in any manner different to render a different approach in the construction of Sections 146 and 147 of the 1988 Act or to take a different view on the scope of these provisions in the 1988 Act prior to its amendment, so far at any rate as to the claims for compensation arising out of the death of the owner of the goods found travelling at the time of accident along with its goods in the goods vehicle. 8. In AIR 1999 S.C. 589, while approving the decision of a Full Bench of the Orissa High Court reported in 1994 Ace C.J. 138 (New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kanchan Bewa ) and disapproving the view of the Rajasthan High Court reported in 1985 A.C.J. 762 (Santra Bai and others v. Prahlad and others), after adverting to the view expressed in the earlier decision reported in AIR 1977 S.C. 1735, it was observed as hereunder: "8. Again turning back to proviso (ii), we find that it in clear terms restricted the scope of the main provision by confining its application to that vehicle which is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. Again turning back to proviso (ii), we find that it in clear terms restricted the scope of the main provision by confining its application to that vehicle which is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. In the first intance, the vehicle had to be a vehicle of that class in which passengers were carried. If that was not the intention of the Legislature, it would not have used the phraseology "the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried" and would have simply provided that "except where passengers are carried for hire or reward.....”So also the compulsory coverage was not intended for all passengers and, therefore, it was provided that "passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment." Thus, the confirement of the operation of the main provision was in respect of vehicles and also passengers. And that was consistent with the English Law on which Section 95 was based. 9. As stated earlier, Section 95 was amended by Act 56 of 1969. Clause (b) was substituted by a new Clause. The relevant part read as under: "(b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)— (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place." The proviso remained as it was. The object of the legislature in making that amendment was to cover the risk in respect of passengers of public service vehicles. The Legislature, therefore, made a special provision in sub-clause (ii) of clause (b), leaving the rest of sub-section (1) including the proviso as it was. If this background is kept in mind, it becomes apparent that the Legislature did not want to make any change in the position of law except to provide specifically for covering risk to passengers of public service vehicles. If this background is kept in mind, it becomes apparent that the Legislature did not want to make any change in the position of law except to provide specifically for covering risk to passengers of public service vehicles. We quote below the amended clause (b) for ready reference: "(b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)— (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place : Provided that a policy shall not be required— (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmens Compensation act, 1923 (8 of 1923), in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee— (a) engaged in driving vehicle, or (b) if it is a public service vehicle, engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or (c) if it is a goods vehicle, being carried in the vehicle, or (ii) except where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which a claim arises, or (iii) to cover any contractual liability. Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by, or to have arisen out of, the use of a vehicle in a public place notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged was not in a public place at the time of the accident, if the act or omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place/7 Though apparently, it looked as if the Legislature by introducing two sub-clauses in clause (b) had tried to make a distinction between passengers and non-passengers, that was not really so. Though the proviso appeared after sub-clause (ii) of clause (b), it really remained a proviso to the earlier clause (b) which after the amendment became clause (b)(i). Neither the object of introducing sub-clause (ii) in clause (b) nor the language of the proviso indicate that the proviso was to act as a proviso to sub-clause (ii) also. Even earlier, the passengers of a public service vehicle were required to be covered compulsorily as they answered the description of passengers carried for hire or reward. The only effect of making a special provision for passengers of a public service vehicle was that proviso (ii) thereafter remained applicable to vehicles other than public service vehicles. 10. For the purposes of Section 95, ordinarily a vehicle could have been regarded as a vehicle in which pasengers have carried if the vehicle was of that class. Keeping in mind the classification of vehicles, by the Act, the requirement of registration with particulars including the class to which it belonged, requirement of obtaining a permit for using the vehicle for different purposes and compulsory coverage of insurance risk, it would not be proper to consider a goods vehicle as a passenger vehicle on the basis of a single use or use on some stray occasions of that vehicle for carrying passengers for hire or reward. For the purpose of construing a provision like proviso (ii) to Section 95 (l)(b), the correct test to determine whether a passenger was carried for hire or reward, would be whether there has been systematic carrying of passengers. For the purpose of construing a provision like proviso (ii) to Section 95 (l)(b), the correct test to determine whether a passenger was carried for hire or reward, would be whether there has been systematic carrying of passengers. Only if the vehicle is so used then that vehicle can be said to be a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward. The High Courts have expressed divergent views on the question whether a passenger can be said to have been carried for hire or reward when he travels in goods vehicle either on payment of fare or along with his goods. It is not necessary to refer to those decisions which were cited at the Bar as we find that all the relevant aspects were not taken into consideration while expressing one view of the other. We may only refer to the decision of the Orissa High Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kanchan Bewa, 1994 Ace. CJ 138, where Hansaria, J. speaking for the Full Bench observed as under:— "18.The aforesaid is not enough to take any view as to whether goods vehicle can or cannot come within the fold of proviso (ii) with which we are concerned. Our primary reason for differing, with respect, with Rajasthan Full Bench is that, allowing goods vehicle to be taken within the fold of proviso (ii) would introduce uncertainties in law as that would depend upon various factors to which we shall advert; the result would be that the law would cease to be certain which it has to be at least in a case of the present nature. We have said so because reference to the definition of goods vehicle shows that the first part of it does not deal with carrying of passengers. It is the second part which speaks about the same and that too when the vehicle is used for such a purpose. The word use has been defined in Chambers English Dictionary in its intransitive sense to mean to be accustomed; (to,; used chiefly in the past tense); to be in the habit of so doing; to resort. Reference to the meaning of this word, as given in Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, would show that even one user may amount to use or it may be that for a thing being said to be used, it has to be employed habitually. Reference to the meaning of this word, as given in Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, would show that even one user may amount to use or it may be that for a thing being said to be used, it has to be employed habitually. 19. Being concerned with a beneficial legislation like the one at hand, we would have normally preferred liberal interpretation, but the question is whether, without any extra premium having been paid, the owner of a goods vehicle can claim indemnification from the insurer just because once in a year the goods vehicle had carried a passenger for hire or reward along with the goods. This would perhaps robe the third proviso dealing with coverage of contractual liability lame... 22. Thus, to find out whether an insurer would be liable to indemnify an owner of a goods vehicle in a case of the present nature, the mere fact that the passenger was carried for hire or reward would not be enough; it shall have to be found out as to whether he was the owner of the goods, or an employee of such an owner, and then whether there were more than six persons in all in the goods vehicle and whether the goods vehicle was being habitually used to carry passengers. The position would thus become very uncertain and would vary from case to case. Production of such result would not be conducive to the advancement of the object sought to be achieved by requiring a compulsory insurance policy. 23. There is another aspect of the matter which had led us to differ from the Full Bench decision of Rajasthan High Court. The same is what finds place in sub-section (2) of Section 95.That sub-section specifies the limits of liability and clause (a) deals with goods vehicle; and in so far as the person travelling in goods vehicle is concerned, it has confined the liability to the employees only. This is an indicator, and almost a sure indicator, of the fact that legislature did not have in mind carrying of either the hirer of the vehicle or his employee in the goods vehicle, otherwise, clause (a) would have provided a limit of liability regarding such persons also." 11. Though, the conclusion was arrived at after taking into consideration the Orissa Motor Vehicle Rules, in our opinion the said view is correct, even otherwise also. Though, the conclusion was arrived at after taking into consideration the Orissa Motor Vehicle Rules, in our opinion the said view is correct, even otherwise also. In view of what we have said, the" contrary view expressed by other High Court has to be regarded as incorrect. 12. We will now consider whether the decision of this Court in Pushpabais case (AIR 1977 SC 1735) (supra) requires re-consideration. That was a case of a passenger travelling in a motor car. He was not travelling for hire or reward. The vehicle was neither a public service vehicle nor a goods vehicle, but it was a different class of vehicle. It was in that context that this Court made the following observation in paragraphs 21 and 22 : “.....The plea that the words third party are wide enough to cover all persons except the person and the insurer is negatived as the insurance cover is not available to the passengers is made clear by the proviso to sub-section which provides that a policy shall not be required: "(ii) except where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by a reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employement, to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to person being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which a claim arises." (22) Therefore it is not required that a policy of insurance should cover risk to the passengers who are not carried for hire or reward. As under Section 95 the risk to a passenger in a vehicle who is not carried for hire or reward is not required to be insured the plea of the counsel for the insurance company will have to be accepted and the insurance company held not liable under the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act." What was held in that case is, with respect, consistent with our interpretation of Section 95 as it stood before and after its Amendment by Act 56 of 1969." 9. Since Mr. Since Mr. Deepak Gupta submitted that, the nature of interpretation to be placed upon Section 147 would to a great extent depend upon the construction to be made of Section 95, as amended by Central Act 56 of 1969 and that if Section 95(1) is to be construed as the main and the proviso thereto was meant to exempt only the class or category of cases excluded therein, the changes effected even before Central Act 54 of 1994 in the 1988 Act would be of some significance and not otherwise, it has to be seen as to what was the scope of Section 95(1) vis-a-vis the proviso thereto in the 1939 Act, as amended by Central Act 56 of 1969. This aspect also, in our view, has been dealt with by their Lordships of the apex Court in AIR 1999 S.C. 589, and it is not given to us to view those provisions in a different manner, in view of the binding nature of the law declared therein, which is as follows: "7.....What is important to be noted is that the legislature, after providing generally in Clause (b) of sub-section (1) in wide terms so as to include any person and every motor vehicle within its sweep, carved out certain exception by adding a proviso to that Clause. By proviso (ii), it restricted the generality of the main provision by confining the requirement to cases where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. In absence of the proviso the main provision would have included all classes of vehicles including goods vehicles and all passengers whether carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment or otherwise. That is the reason why there is a reference to different classes of vehicles in proviso (i). It refers to vehicle , public service vehicle and goods vehicle. The words any person in the main provision would have included the employee of the person insured, and therefore, an exception was made by enacting proviso (i) so as to restrict liability of the insurer in respect of his employees. It refers to vehicle , public service vehicle and goods vehicle. The words any person in the main provision would have included the employee of the person insured, and therefore, an exception was made by enacting proviso (i) so as to restrict liability of the insurer in respect of his employees. Both these exceptions were made as the legislature did not what to widen the liability of the insurer and the insured by making it more than what it was under the English Act, upon which Section 95 was based. As rightly pointed out by this Court in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. M/s. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co., AIR 1977 S.C. 1735. The requirement of compulsory coverage was limited then. We quote below what this Court has stated in that behalf: "19. As Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as amended by Act 56 of 1969 is based on the English Act it is useful to refer to that. Neither the Road Traffic Act, 1960, or the earlier 1930 Act required users of motor vehicles to be insured in respect of liability for death or bodily injury to passengers in the vehicle being used except a vehicle in which passengers were carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. In fact sub-section 203(4) of the 1960 Act provided that the policy shall not be required to cover liability in respect of death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon, or entering or getting on to or alighting from, the vehicle at the time of occurrence of the event out of which the claims arise. The provisions of the English Act being explicit the risk to passengers is not covered by the insurance policy. The provisions under the English Road Traffic Act, 1960 were introduced by the amendment of Section 95 of the Indian Motor Vehicles Act. The law as regards general exclusion of passengers is stated in Halsburys Laws of England. Third Edition, Vol. The provisions of the English Act being explicit the risk to passengers is not covered by the insurance policy. The provisions under the English Road Traffic Act, 1960 were introduced by the amendment of Section 95 of the Indian Motor Vehicles Act. The law as regards general exclusion of passengers is stated in Halsburys Laws of England. Third Edition, Vol. 22, at p. 368 para 765 (755) as follows:— "Subject to certain exceptions a policy is not required to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to, a person being carried in or upon, or entering or getting into or alighting from, the vehicle at the time of occurrence of the event out of which the claim arises." 20. It is unnecessary to refer to the subsequent development of the English Law and as the subsequent changes have not been adopted in the Indian statute. Suffice it to say that the Motor Vehicles (Passenger Insurance) Act, 1971 made insurance cover for passenger liability compulsory by repealing paragraph (a) and the proviso of sub-section 203(4). But this Act was repealed by Road Traffic Act, 1972 though under Section 145 of 1972 Act the coming into force of the provisions of Act 1971 covering passenger liability was delayed under (upto) December 1, 1972. (Vide Binghams Motor Claims Case, 7th Ed. p.704). 21. Sections 95(a) and 95(b)(l) of the Motor Vehicles Act adopted the provisions of the English Road Traffic Act, 1960 and excluded the liability of the insurance company regarding the risk to the passengers. Section 95 provides that a policy of insurance must be a policy which insures the persons against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of death or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. Section 95 provides that a policy of insurance must be a policy which insures the persons against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of death or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. The plea that the words third party are wide enough to cover all persons except the person and the insurer is negatived as the insurance cover is not available to the passengers is made clear by the proviso to sub-section which provides that a policy shall not be required: "(ii) except where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by a reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which a claim arises.” 10. Having regard to this categorical pronouncement made, the submission of Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Counsel for the appellant-insurance company for a different interpretation by merely relying upon paragraphs 23 to 29 of the decision of the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court reported in 1992 (1) ACJ 1 (National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Dundamma and others) does not merit our acceptance. Similarly, the learned Counsel for the insurance company cannot draw any further support to sustain his stand by relying upon the Division Bench judgment of the Karnataka High Court reported in 1992 (2) ACJ 918 (Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Irawwa and others) which appears to have proceeded merely on the view earlier taken by the very same High Court in 1992 (1) ACJ 1 (supra). It will be of interest to notice that this decision in 1992(2) ACJ 918, was also the subject matter of the batch of appeals before the Supreme Court in the decision reported in AIR 1999 S.C. 589 (Vide the reference given in the foot note of the report of the case number in the High Court of Karnataka and facts stated in para 3 of the report). Irrespective of the ultimate view taken by the Karnataka High Court, in those decisions about the liability of the insurance company, as a principle of law the reasoning and observations contained therein which run contradictory to those found expressed by their Lordships of the apex Court, cannot command either for our consideration or for being countenanced in our hands. 11. So far as the provisions of the 1988 Act are concerned, Section 146 provided the necessity for taking a policy of Insurance complying with the requirements of Chapter XI, for any motor vehicle before being used in a public place against third party risks also, and the main object of the provisions in the Chapter, as in the case of similar provisions in the 1939 Act is to ensure that third parties who had to suffer due to the user of the motor vehicle should be in a position to effectively recover the damages suffered by them and the same should not depend upon the financial condition of the driver/user/owner of the vehicle. Section 147 reads as follows: “147. Section 147 reads as follows: “147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability.—(1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which— (a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer; and (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)— (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place : Provided that a policy shall not be required : (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising-out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee— (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or (b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or (ii) to cover any contractual liability. Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by or to have arisen out of, the use of a vehicle in a public place notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged was not in a public place at the time of the accident, if the act or omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place. (2) Subject to the proviso to sub-section (1), a policy of insurance referred to in sub-section (1) shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any accident, upto the following limits, namely:— (a) save as provided in clause (b) the amount of liability incurred; (b) in respect of damage to any property of a third party, a limit of rupees six thousand: Provided that any policy of insurance issued with any limited liability and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall continue to be effective for a period of four months after such commencement or till the date of expiry of such policy whichever is earlier. (3) A policy shall be of no effect for the purposes of this Chapter unless and until there is issued by the insurer in favour of the person by whom the policy is effected a certificate of insurance in the prescribed form and containing the prescribed particulars of any condition subject to which the policy is issued and of any other prescribed manner; and different forms, particulars and matters may be prescribed in different cases. (4) Where a cover note issued by the insurer under the provisions of this Chapter or the rules made thereunder is not followed by a policy of insurance within the prescribed time, the insurer shall, within seven days of the expiry of the period of the validity of the cover note, notify the fact to the registering authority in whose records the vehicle to which the cover note relates has been registered or to such other authority as the State Government may prescribe. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, an insurer issuing a policy of insurance under this section shall be liable to indemnify the person or classes of persons specified in the policy in respect of any liability which the policy purports to cover in the case of that person or those classes of persons." 12. Though the general pattern of Section 95 of the 1939 Act and Section 147 of the 1988 Act appeard to be similar, with the amendment introduced by the Central Act 54 of 1994 with effect from 14.11.1984, substituting the words "injury to any person including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle", for the words "injury to any person", there can be no dispute or even scope for any controversy as to the need for a policy of insurance mandated by the Act (Act policy) covering against any liability which may be incurred in respect of the death or bodily injury of the owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle. But, inasmuch as the accident in question in this case out of which the present claim arose occurred on 4.9.1989, it becomes necessary to consider the scope of the provisions contained in Section 147(1), as it stood prior to the amendments introduced with effect from 14.11.1994. Though as indicated earlier Section 147(1) of the 1988 Act, is almost similar to Section 95 of the 1939 Act as it stood at the time of the repeal of the 1939 Act and introduction of the 1988 Act, there is a specific and conspicuous change in the 1988 Act, in that, no such provision as contained in the form of Section 95(l)(b) proviso (ii) was engrafted in Section 147(1) of the 1988 Act. The said omission cannot be considered to be either of no significance or importance being a conscious omission and not an act of mere casus omissus. Both Mr. Deepak Gupta and Mr. K.D. Sood though would submit, as it has been observed in some decisions of the High Courts that the second proviso to sub-section (l)(b) of 1995 declared only what was obvious even otherwise, such a stand cannot be accepted to be correct in the light of the decisions of the apex Court reported in AIR 1977 SC 1735 (supra) as well as AIR 1999 S.C. 589 (supra). Before adverting to this aspect further, it would be appropriate to ascertain the legislative intent, if there is any indication, in this regard. Before adverting to this aspect further, it would be appropriate to ascertain the legislative intent, if there is any indication, in this regard. It is well settled that whenever any change in the law is brought about by the Legislature, either by introducing a new provision by way of amendment/substitution or by repeal and re-enactment of an entire Act, the Legislature must be deemed to be alive to and had been aware of the interpretation placed upon the earlier existed provisions, and the change by way of amendment/substitution/repeal and reenactment was made in the light of and fully conscious of the prevailing state of law. The 1988 Act, is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to motor vehicles. So far as Section 147 is concerned, the statement of objects and reasons as found stated in the AIR Manual (5th Edn.) is stated to be as follows: "Clause 147 lays down the requirements of the policies and the limit of liability in respect of passengers and persons other than passengers in relation to passenger vehicle and goods carriages." 13. The statement of objects and reasons, adduced at the time of piloting the Bill, as it seem to be, is found published in some of the books which among other things, while stating that the proposed legislation (1988 Act), is meant to provide for some of the important matters illustrates such as ..." (j) provisions for payment of compensation by the insurer to be extent of actual liability to the victims of motor accidents, irrespective of the class of vehicles...(Vide Law relating to Motor Vehicles in India: by Eastern Book Company 1992 Edn. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by the very same publishers and Motor Vehicles Manual—containing Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Rules etc., 1995 Edn. published by the Universal Book Traders). All these would, in our view, go to legitimately infer the intention of the Legislature in effecting certain changes in Section 147(1) of the 1988 Act compared to the provisions contained in Section 95(1) of the 1939 Act. That apart, even in the decision reported in AIR 1977 SC 1735 (supra)—in paragraph 21, their Lordships of the apex Court observed as follows: "... That apart, even in the decision reported in AIR 1977 SC 1735 (supra)—in paragraph 21, their Lordships of the apex Court observed as follows: "... .The plea that the words third party’ are wide enough to cover all persons except the person and insurer is negatived as the insurance cover is not available to the passengers is made clear by the proviso to sub-section which provides that a policy shall not be required: (ii) except where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by a reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which a claim arises." 14. This and paragraph 22 of the said decision has also been quoted in the decision reported in AIR 1999 SC 589 (supra). As noticed earlier, in the latest pronouncement in AIR 1999 SC 589 (supra), particularly paragraphs 7, 10 and 12, the same view is found expressed after, elaborate consideration. Consequently, the omission to have a similar provision like the proviso (ii) to Section 95(l)(b) of the 1939 Act, in Section 147(1) of the 1988 Act, is deliberate is also with a definite purpose and object and, therefore, as observed by their Lordships of the apex Court in AIR 1999 SC 589 (supra) (paragraph 7), in the absence of the proviso (ii) the main provision would have included all classes of vehicles including goods vehicles and all passengers whether carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment or otherwise. Even the main provision Section 95(l)(b) of the 1939 Act, which is almost identical in substance and on all vital aspects of the stipulation contained in this respect, in Section 147(l)(b) of the 1988 Act. Even the main provision Section 95(l)(b) of the 1939 Act, which is almost identical in substance and on all vital aspects of the stipulation contained in this respect, in Section 147(l)(b) of the 1988 Act. Therefore, inevitably the main provision in Section 147(l)(b) of the 1988 Act, itself would, on account of wide terms of language used therein would sufficiently include within its sweep "any person" and every motor "vehicles." The provisions contained in Section 147(1) as a whole would also disclose that reference has been made to different classes of vehicles and is used in different context for different purpose but Section 147(l)(b) use the word "vehicle", which will mean and include, by virtue of the definition contained in Section 2(28) of the 1988 Act also all class or category of vehicles. In our view, therefore, even in the absence of the amendments introduced by Central Act 54 of 1994 with effect from 14.11.1994, the provisions contained in Section 147(1) of the Act are by themselves sufficient to oblige the coverage of risk to passengers who are not carried for hire or reward even in a goods vehicle and, consequently will take within it the liability in respect of the owner of goods also found traveling with his goods at the time of accident, culminating in the claim for compensation in a given case. The insurance should cover risks to such third parties also. 15. It requires next to be considered as to whether the submission made for the appellants that since it is only by Central Act 54 of 1994 the claims relating to the death of or bodily injury to the owner of the goods or his authorised representative concerned in the vehicle, are obliged to be covered in the policy to be taken under and for the purposes of the Act, the same must be considered not to be the subject matter of Section 147(l)(b) prior to 14.11.1994, is correct, for that reason. In our view, the inclusive manner of the language used by engrafting the amendment introduced by way of substitution, would go to show that the specification regarding the owner of the goods and his authorised representative is mere clarificatory in nature and not by way of adding anything new for the first time which is already not covered in the existing provisions. What was implicit otherwise in the new Act came to be made explicit by 1994 amendment. This will be obvious from the fact that the words "injury to any person" which are wide and all comprehensive so as to include all class or category or kinds of persons, was already there. Apparently, to place the matter clear and beyond any doubt or controversy, in view of the on going perennial litigation in this regard, and area of doubts cast upon the scope of the provisions by the interpretation placed by different courts in different manner, that the Parliament should have thought it necessary to set right the matter, to make it beyond the pale of controversy, and it is for that reason only instead of addition by way of any illustration, an inclusive form or frame of language has been adopted also in engrafting the amendment in this regard. Therefore, in our view the fact that the amendment was made in 1994, only cannot be pressed into service for supporting a plea that but for the amendment the claims or risks in respect of the death of or bodily injury to the owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle, were not covered prior to such amendment within the scope of the provisions of Section 147(l)(b) of the 1988 Act. We, therefore, see no merit, in the said contention on behalf of the insurance company. 16. Our attention has also been brought to the decision reported in 1998(3) SCC 744 (Amrit Lal Sood and another v. Kaushalya Devi Thapar and others) wherein the claim under the 1939 Act came to be considered at the instance of a gratuitous passenger in a Car who suffered injuries on account of the accident and was hospitalised. Taking into account the fact that, admittedly, in that case the insurance policy was a "comprehensive policy" wherein the insurance company as part of the terms and conditions undertook to indemnify the insured, in the event of an accident caused by or arising out of the use of the motor car against all sums including claimants costs and expenses which the insured shall become legally liable to pay, it was held by the apex court that the expression any person", would undoubtedly include an occupant of the Car who is gratuitously travelling in the Car, besides others covered by the insurance policy. The decision rendered by us in this case is even without going into the nature of insurance policy whether it is a comprehensive policy or otherwise, and only proceeding on the basis of the Act policy obligated to be taken compulsorily by a person who uses or causes his motor vehicle, in a public place. In a case covered by a comprehensive policy for covering risks other than those obliged to be covered under the Act compulsorily, such cases and claims arising thereunder can be and have got to be adjudicated with reference to the obligations and liabilities undertaken by the insurer under the policy concerned in that case. 17. For all the reasons stated above, we see no merit in the challenge made to the award. Though the Tribunal below has not considered all these aspects and proceeded to decide the matter on the basis of a decision rendered under the 1939 Act, the award is sustained for the reasons assigned by us. The appeal, therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed. No costs. Interim order shall stand vacated. Appeal dismissed.