Judgment M.Y.Eqbal, J. 1. This appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the judgment dated 28.6.91 passed by a learned Single Judge in F.A. No. 553/73(R), whereby the learned Judge has allowed the appeal in part and dismissed the suit in question of Schedule B property. 2. The plaintiff-appellant instituted Title Suit No. 50/67 for declaration of his title in respect of the lands described in Schedules A and B of the plaint and also for a decree for confirmation of possession and in the alternative for recovery of possession of the said properties. 3. The plaintiffs case in brief is that one Peer Mohammad, the deceased father of the plaintiff and Dil Mohammad were the full brothers and they were the raiyats in respect of the land of Khata No. 121 of village Argora fully described in Schedule A of the plaint and their names were recorded in the survey records of right. The plaintiffs further case is that his uncle Dil Mohammad was recorded in respect of Sikmi Khata No. 11 of the said village and those lands have been described in Schedule B of the plaint. The plaintiffs further case is that his father and uncle died leaving behind the plaintiff as their only heir who succeeded and came in possession of the entire Schedules A and B properties. It is stated that Peer Mohammad and Dil mohammad gave schedule B land to the defendants for cultivation on their behalf and he was cultivating the land as Adhbataidar. After vesting the plaintiff filed a petition for mutation of his name in respect of the entire suit land. The defendant filed objection and claimed both these land as purchaser. However, the Additional Collector passed order fixing the rent of Schedule A land in the name of the plaintiff and of Schedule B land in the name of the defendants. The plaintiffs case is that the order passed by the Additional Collector in respect of Schedule B land is absolutely illegal and against the law. It is further stated that taking advantage of the order passed by the Additional Collector the defendants started claiming Schedule B land and also trying to dispossess the plaintiff from Schedule A land. The plaintiffs case is that the order passed by the Additional Collector in respect of Schedule B land is absolutely illegal and against the law. It is further stated that taking advantage of the order passed by the Additional Collector the defendants started claiming Schedule B land and also trying to dispossess the plaintiff from Schedule A land. The defendants contested the suit by filing written statement denying and disputing the relationship between the plaintiff and the recorded tenant, Dil Mohammad and further denied that the plaintiff ever came in possession of Schedule A and B lands. The defendants further case is that the suit lands have been sold to the defendants in 1949 and on the basis of purchase, the defendants have been continuing possession of the entire Schedule A and B land at their own right and thereby they perfected their title by adverse possession. It is further stated by the defendants that they had constructed a house on plot No. 2040 and have dug a well and living there for more than the statutory period of 12 years. 4. The trial Court framed the following issues for consideration: 1. Has the plaintiff any cause of action for the suit? 2. Is the suit barred by limitation and adverse possession? 3. Is the suit under-valued and beyond the jurisdiction of this Court? 4. Has plaintiff any right, title or interest in the suit lands and is he entitled to a decree as claimed? 5. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?" 5. The trial Court, after consideration of the entire evidence, both oral and documentary adduced by the parties, came to a finding that the plaintiff satisfactorily proved his title and possession over the suit land and the defendants did not derive any title over the same. The trial Court further held that the possession of the defendants over the suit land was permissive and would be deemed to be the possession of the plaintiff. The suit was accordingly decreed in respect of the suit lands consisting of Schedules A and B. 6. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the trial Court, the defendants preferred First Appeal No. 553/73(R). The learned Single Judge, after hearing the parties, allowed the appeal in part so far Schedule B land is concerned. The suit was accordingly decreed in respect of the suit lands consisting of Schedules A and B. 6. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the trial Court, the defendants preferred First Appeal No. 553/73(R). The learned Single Judge, after hearing the parties, allowed the appeal in part so far Schedule B land is concerned. The learned Judge held that the plaintiff has not been able to prove his title in respect of the lands described in Schedule B of the plaint. The learned Judge further held that the plaintiff has also not been able to prove that the defendants were put in permissive possession of the said Schedule B land. The learned Judge further held that there is nothing on record to prove that the sikmi raiyati interest was heritable or transferable and no evidence was led to that effect. 7. Mr. Debi Prasad, learned Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, assailed the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge as being illegal and contrary to the evidence on record. Learned Counsel submitted that the learned Single Judge has committed error of law in not acting upon the admission made by the defendants that they were adhbataidars in respect of Schedule B land and, therefore, they cannot dispute the title of the persons who were given the lands in Adhbataidar. Learned Counsel further submitted that the learned Judge further erred in law in holding that the appellant has failed to prove that the defendants were in permissive possession and the finding is contrary to the admitted documents namely, Exts. 3/a and 3/b. Learned Counsel further submitted that the plaintiff-appellant amended the plaint by introducing the fact that Sikmi right is heritable and transferable but the learned single Judge has committed error of record in holding that no such amendment petition was filed. 8. On the other hand, Mr. V. Shivnath, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, submitted that admittedly one Chhagua Oraon was the raiyat in respect of Schedule B land which is evident from Ext. 2, the record of right and in the remarks column of Ext, 2 the plaintiffs ancestor was shown as Sikmi Dakhalkar. 8. On the other hand, Mr. V. Shivnath, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, submitted that admittedly one Chhagua Oraon was the raiyat in respect of Schedule B land which is evident from Ext. 2, the record of right and in the remarks column of Ext, 2 the plaintiffs ancestor was shown as Sikmi Dakhalkar. According to the learned Counsel, therefore, admittedly the plaintiffs ancestor was under raiyat and in absence of any pleading and evidence that Sikmi right is heritable and transferable, the claim of the plaintiff for declaration of his title in respect of Sikmi land is not maintainable. In this connection, learned Counsel relied upon a decision in the case of Johan Oraon V/s. Sitaram Sao 1963 BLJR 623. Learned Counsel further submitted that even if such amendment petition was filed by the plaintiff, no evidence was led to the effect that Sikmi right was heritable. Learned Single Judge, therefore, rightly disallowed the relief of the plaintiff so far as Schedule B land is concerned. Learned Counsel also relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Chain Kar and Ors. V/s. Dinabandhu Satapathy and Ors. -- . 9. Before appreciating the rival contentions of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, it would be useful to look into the findings recorded by the trial Court and appellate Court. So far as Schedule A land is concerned, in view of the concurrent findings arrived at by the two Court and also in view of the fact that no cross-objection has been filed by in defendants-respondents, I do not find any reason to interfere with the said finding of fact. So far as Schedule B land is concerned, the defendants, in support of their Case, filed a so called sale-deed alleged to have been executed in the year 1949 by the original raiyat Chhugua Oraon and Dil Mohammad. This document was not admitted into evidence and it was simply marked X for identification. The trial Court, after perusal of the said document, came to a finding that in the so-called unregistered sale-deed none of the properties described in Schedule of the plaint tally with the properties described in the said document. The trial Court found that even the sikmi plot shown in the plaint has not been mentioned in the said document. The trial Court, after perusal of the said document, came to a finding that in the so-called unregistered sale-deed none of the properties described in Schedule of the plaint tally with the properties described in the said document. The trial Court found that even the sikmi plot shown in the plaint has not been mentioned in the said document. The trial Court, further found that although this document describes settlement deed but the defendants have made out a case that they purchased the said property by the said document. The trial Court further held that although the plaintiff filed amendment petition pleading custom of heritability of sikmi land but there is nothing new in the amendment petition because the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded that after death of his father and uncle he came in possession of both the lands of Schedules A and B. The trial Court finally came to a finding that the defendants did not acquire or derive any title in respect of the suit land by virtue of unregistered deed which was marked X for identification. 10. The learned Single Judge, on the question of validity of the sale-deed of the year 1949 marked X for identification came to the following finding: So far as the defendants claim on the basis of the purported sale executed in the year 1949 is concerned, as noticed hereinbefore, the pleadings of the defendant in this regard is not sufficient. The defendant, however, produced an unregistered deed dated 11.12.1949. The said deed was not validly proved, inasmuch as, D.W. 2 merely stated that he knew Debi Lal Tayeed, who is since dead. He further stated that Chunku had put the thumb mark in his presence and Debi Lal scribed the document and Mahabir Munshi signed for Chunku. This witness did not say anything about the L.T.I, which was allegedly put thereupon by Dil Mohammad. The said deed was allegedly executed by both Chunku and Dil mohammad jointly. 11. The learned Single Judge, on the question of title in respect of Schedule B land, came to the following finding: It cannot, therefore, he said that the plaintiff has been able to prove his title in respect of land described in Schedule-B of the plaint. However, from Exts. 3/a and 3/b as mentioned hereinbefore, it will be evident that the defendant had all along been claiming himself to be adhbataidar of the plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest. However, from Exts. 3/a and 3/b as mentioned hereinbefore, it will be evident that the defendant had all along been claiming himself to be adhbataidar of the plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest. His claim as adhbataidar was rejected and in objection No. 1038 (Ext. 3/b), he was found to be in possession on behalf of the defendant thereof on receipt of wages. It is also evident in view of the aforementioned Ext. 3/b, that the defendant had been in permissive possession of the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff in respect of the suit land as Mazdoor and not in his own right. The defendant never questioned the said findings before any forum. He, therefore, would be deemed to have accepted the said position. It is also worthwhile to notice that before the revenue authorities, except in the mutation proceeding (Ext. 4), the defendant-appellant never claimed his right on the basis of the purported deed of sale-dated 11.12.1949. 12. However, the learned Single Judge finally concluded his finding in paragraphs 58 and 59 of the judgment, which reads as follows: 58. The order of the L.R.D.C. in the case for grant of Basgit Parcha in favour of the defendant (Ext. 3) also does not stand in his way as it was found that the defendant was not a privileged person. No material has been brought on record to show that the defendant in the said proceeding claimed himself to be a tenant of the plaintiff. The plaintiff in the plaint has also not raised any plea of estoppel as against the defendant either in the pleading or in the evidence. As the defendant has been able to prove possession over the building for along time and his possessing having been admitted by the witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiff, no decree can be passed in relation thereto. Even assuming that defendant has not been able to prove that he has acquired an indefeasible title in relation thereto, he is entitled to continue in possession thereof on the basis of his possessory title, as the plaintiff has neither been able to prove either his title or possession in relation thereto. The disruption of the said house premises can be found at from the Municipal receipts viz. holding No. 1111 of Ward No. IIIC of Ranchi Municipality. 59. In view of my findings aforementioned, this appeal is allowed in part and to the extent mentioned hereinbefore. The disruption of the said house premises can be found at from the Municipal receipts viz. holding No. 1111 of Ward No. IIIC of Ranchi Municipality. 59. In view of my findings aforementioned, this appeal is allowed in part and to the extent mentioned hereinbefore. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall pay and bear their own costs of this appeal. 13. From perusal of the finding quoted hereinabove, it is evident that the learned Single Judge has affirmed the finding of the trial Court that the defendant-respondent had been in permissive possession of the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-interest in respect of the suit land as Masdoor/Adhbataidar and not in his own right. In spite of the above finding the learned Single Judge has held that the defendant is entitled to continue possession thereof on the basis of his possessory title. The learned Single Judge has also committed error of record in sofaras it held that there is no pleading to the effect that Sikmi interest is heritable and transferable nor any petition for amendment of plaint was filed by the plaintiff. As a matter of fact an amendment petition was filed by the plaintiff and the trial Court considered the said petition and recorded a finding in his judgment that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded that after the death of his father and uncle he came in possession of both the lands of Schedules A and B. 14. It is well settled that the plaintiff who proved his prior possession is entitled to get decree for recovery of possession as against the defendants who have no title in the suit land. In the case of Srinath Singh V/s. Kali Bhawani Prasad -- , a Division Bench of this Court following the law laid down by the apex Court in the case of Nair Service Society Limited V/s. K.C. Alexandar -- , held as under: In view of the aforesaid decisions, it is evident that the plaintiffs who have proved their prior possession are entitled to get decree for recovery of possession as against the defendants who have no title in the suit lands. It may be that after the vesting of the Estate the title in the suit land vested in the State but the matter is between plaintiffs on the one hand and the State on the other. It may be that after the vesting of the Estate the title in the suit land vested in the State but the matter is between plaintiffs on the one hand and the State on the other. If the State would have come forward to resist the title and possession of the plaintiffs, plaintiffs would not have been entitled to restoration of possession. But so far as the defendants are concerned, they have got no right to interfere with the possession of the plaintiffs. 14. In the case of Thakur Sha V/s. Sheo Pujan Prasad 1982 BBCJ 288 , a Bench of this Court considering a similar question has been that in order to maintain a plea of adverse possession, it must be stated that a party had ever asserted any hostile title against the real owner or that a dispute with regard to ownership and possession had ever arisen. It is well settled that adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and plea is required at the least to show when possession become adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. 15. As noticed above, there is a concurrent finding of both the Courts that the defendant was cultivating the lands as Adhbataidar and he was in permissive possession. It is, therefore, evident that the defendant was not claiming hostile title to the suit land. In that view of the matter, the learned Single Judge is not correct in law in holding that the defendant is entitled to continue possession on the basis of his possessory title. 16. For the reason aforesaid, this appeal is allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is restored. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.