ORDER 1. This revision is preferred by the Board of Management of a Registered Education Society named Shri Veerabhadreshwar Education Society, Humnabad of Bidar District (hereinafter referred to as the management') challenging the judgment dated 29-9-1997 of the learned II Additional District Judge-cum-the Educational Appellate Tribunal at Gulbarga ('the Tribunal' for short) pronounced in appeal in KPEA No. 13 of 1994 of respondent 1-B.S. Shirol (hereinafter referred to as 'the delinquent') allowing the same and setting aside the order dated 11-4-1989 of the management which was made dismissing the delinquent from the service as Principal of its S.B.C. Arts and S.V. Commerce College (in short 'the College'). 2. The petitioner-society is a registered Educational Society. It has been running certain educational institutes including the said college. The Private Educational Institutions run under the auspices of the Society were governed by the provisions of the Karnataka Private Educational Institutions (Discipline and Control) Act, 1975 ('the Act of 1975' for short) insofar as the service conditions of its employees were concerned. The delinquent was initially appointed by management in the said College as a lecturer and subsequently he came to be appointed as Principal of the College somewhere in August 1979. While he was serving as its Principal he was found to have indulged in commission of certain misconduct. Therefore, an Enquiry Committee was constituted by the management and the domestic enquiry was initiated against him. The said Enquiry Committee ('E.C.' for short) comprised of 5 members namely: (1) V.B. Agadi, Presiding Officer, (2) Kishan Rao, Member, (3) S.A.W. Qamar, Member, (4) R.S. Bharashetty, (5) M.R. Segi, Member. The said V.B. Agadi, was the Chairman of the Committee. In all the following 6 charges of misconduct were framed against the delinquent by the E.C. and the charge memo dated 28-01-1988 was served on him. "That you in the capacity of the employee of the management of the S.B.C. Arts and S.V. Commerce College, Humnabad holding the post of the Principal, S.B.C. Arts and S.V. Commerce College, Humnabad has committed the acts of misappropriation of the college and society funds as shown below: (1) You have collected two months salary from the staff members of the degree college amounting Rs. 1,24,000-00 on 28-5-1986, but you have not accounted the same properly. You have furnished the false statements of the said account on 4-5-1986, 28-5-1986 and 2-6-1986. 1,24,000-00 on 28-5-1986, but you have not accounted the same properly. You have furnished the false statements of the said account on 4-5-1986, 28-5-1986 and 2-6-1986. The statements furnished by you are not correct. The xerox copy of the said statements are furnished herewith for your reference. From the above it reveals that you have misappropriated and misutilised the college and society funds for your own purpose. (2) That during the year 1985-86 you have made a false and bogus entries in the cash book by debiting false amount in the name of the management, thereby bringing down the cash balance in hand. The details of the same are given as under. (a) On 23-7-1985 you have falsely debited a sum of Rs. 11,000-00 in the name of the management at page No. 37 of the cash book by doing so you have brought down and reduced the cash balance in hand amounting Rs. 13,329-54. (b) On 16-9-1985 you have drawn the cash of Rs. 23,348-00 from the college account vide S.B. A/c No. 2544 through Cheque No. SB/B: 533560. In order to reduce the cash balance in hand, you have falsely debited Rs. 10,000-00 in the name of the management vide CBF No. 78. (c) On 24-9-1985 you have falsely debited a sum of Rs. 8,000-00 in cash book at CBF No. 85 in the name of the management. Thereby you have reduced the cash balance of Rs. 8,287-49. (d) On 31-3-1986 there was a cash balance of Rs. 32,277-17 in hand vide CBF No. 157 in spite of having the said amount in hand, you have again unnecessarily and with an ulterior motive drawn the amount of Rs, 38,023-30 through Cheque No. 381343 from the College A/c No. 2741 and debited a sum of Rs. 28,500-00 in the name of the management. The above debits made by you in cash book in the name of the management are bogus and done only to bring down the cash balance and misappropriate the funds of the college. In the result you have misappropriated and misutilised the college funds for your own purpose by debiting the false entries in the name of the management. (e) On 14-10-1985 you have debited an amount of Rs. In the result you have misappropriated and misutilised the college funds for your own purpose by debiting the false entries in the name of the management. (e) On 14-10-1985 you have debited an amount of Rs. 12,500-00 in the name of Shri B.S. Shirol on account of hand loan and this debit has been made by you to bring down the cash in hand. You had no authority to debit the cash in hand to the hand loan account without the permission and sanction of the management. By doing so you have misutilised and misappropriated the college funds for your own benefit and purpose. (f) On 19-10-1985 you have debited a sum of Rs. 1,400-00 in cash book as hand loan to Shri B.S. Shirol, thereby you have reduced the cash balance to the extent. You had no authority to debit the said amount as hand loan to Shri B.S. Shirol without the sanction of the management. In this way you have misutilised and misappropriated the college funds for your own private and personal purpose. (g) On 19-4-1985 you have been entrusted a cheque bearing No. SB/8; 534942 for Rs. 24,000-00 to be encashed from the S.B.H. A/c No. 2363 and you have encashed it but not accounted in the college account as the cheque leaf was given to you for college purpose. You have misappropriated the said amount of Rs. 24,000-00 for your own personal purpose. (h) That there was a cash balance of Rs. 7,277-57 with you on 13-7-1986 vide CBF No. 37 you were placed under suspension with effect from 13-7-1986 and asked to handover the charge to Shri D.M. Nandi. You had handed the charge but failed to handover the cash balance of Rs. 7,277-57 to him. Inspite of the notices of the management for remittance, you have retained the said cash balance with you till 21-10-1986. In this way you have temporarily misutilised and misappropriated the college funds for your own personal benefit. (3) That you have retained heavy cash balance with you in spite of having no authority. You were required to remit the cash balance in the bank but failed to do so in order to temporarily misutilise the college funds for your own purpose. The details of the same are given as below: (1) On 16-7-1985 there was a cash balance of Rs. 12,855-39. You were required to remit the cash balance in the bank but failed to do so in order to temporarily misutilise the college funds for your own purpose. The details of the same are given as below: (1) On 16-7-1985 there was a cash balance of Rs. 12,855-39. (2) On 22-7-1985 there was a cash balance of Rs. 13,329-54. (3) On 23-9-1985 there was a cash balance of Rs. 8,287-49. (4) On 30-3-1986 there was a cash balance of Rs. 32,277-17. (5) On 31-3-1986 there was a cash balance of Rs. 6,669-87. (6) On 2-6-1986 there was a cash balance of Rs. 13,909-27. (7) On 28-6-1986 there was a cash balance of Rs. 12,777-27. (8) On 10-7-1986 there was a cash balance of Rs. 12,767-17. (4) That you have been entrusted the construction work of the college building and you have been advanced the following amount for the said purpose: Rs. (a) 1979-80 5,478-62 (b) 1980-81 1,47,719-45 (c) 1981-82 55,936-00 (d) 1982-83 38,475-65 (e) 1983-84 60,605-00 1[1,08,214-72] but so far you have not accounted the same and you have not produced the account books. In this way you have committed the breach of trust and caused considerable loss to the institution, and you have committed illegal acts of commissions and omissions, and have misappropriated and misutilised the college and society funds under your control as the Principal of SBC Arts and S.V. Commerce College, Humnabad, for your own personal use and benefit. (5) That you during your tenure as Principal of the College have amassed huge property disproportionate to your known income i.e., had constructed the well furnished house in the locality of Housing Co-operative Society, Humnabad and also you own two plots at Gulbarga. Similarly you have acquired a house at Dharwad, you have had also bank deposits in State Bank of India, and State Bank of Hyderabad, during the said period. (6) That you have agreed to furnish the correct accounts of both the colleges i.e., degree and junior college within three days on 12-6-1986. But you failed to do so. However, on 7th July, 1986 you have executed an agreement in favour of the President of the society acknowledging and admitting the misappropriation of the college funds approximately to the tune of Rs. 2,06,000-00 in the presence of Shri B.D. Jadhav, Asst. Executive Engineer, National Highway, Sub-Division, Humnabad and Shri Suresh Patil, Advocate, Humnabad. But you failed to do so. However, on 7th July, 1986 you have executed an agreement in favour of the President of the society acknowledging and admitting the misappropriation of the college funds approximately to the tune of Rs. 2,06,000-00 in the presence of Shri B.D. Jadhav, Asst. Executive Engineer, National Highway, Sub-Division, Humnabad and Shri Suresh Patil, Advocate, Humnabad. Further, you have also promised to furnish the detail account within fifteen days. You have made correspondence to the management and the other higher authorities attributing false and baseless aspersions against the members of managing committee and thereby you have behaved improperly and thereby committed misbehaviour with superior authority. You have sent a false complaint to the Director of Collegiate Education against the President, and other members of the management alleging so many false things and thereby you have committed misbehaviour and misconduct with your superior authority. Therefore you are hereby required to explain the above, failing which it will be deemed that you have no explanation for the same leading to presume us that you have committed the criminal breach of trust and misappropriation. Your explanation must reach to the undersigned within 20 days from the date of receipt of this charge memo. Please note that the relevant cash book extract xerox copies are furnished to you with the charge memo. Enquiry Committee Members Sd/-" 3. In response to the direction contained in the aforesaid charge memo, the delinquent sent his reply at Ex. P. 2, dated 13-9-1998 furnishing his explanation to the said charges. Then, the formal enquiry proceeding was held against him by the E.C. The delinquent was given the option to engage an Advocate of his choice as his Counsel to defend him in the enquiry proceeding. But, he did not chose to engage any Counsel for him. At the enquiry the evidence for the Disciplinary Authority (D.A.) i.e., was adduced before the E.C. in proof of the said charges against delinquent. In all 8 witnesses were examined as P.Ws. 1 to 8 and the documentary evidence consisting of Ex. P. 1 to P. 44, was brought on record for the D.A. The witnesses examined were P.W. 1-Hanumashetty and P.W. 2-Vishwanath Manappa, both clerks of the said college; P.W. 3-B.V. Heggavi, I Division Clerk who was working as Accountant in the said college; and P.W. 4-S.S. Yelawar and K.M. May-agiri, both lecturers of the college. P. 1 to P. 44, was brought on record for the D.A. The witnesses examined were P.W. 1-Hanumashetty and P.W. 2-Vishwanath Manappa, both clerks of the said college; P.W. 3-B.V. Heggavi, I Division Clerk who was working as Accountant in the said college; and P.W. 4-S.S. Yelawar and K.M. May-agiri, both lecturers of the college. P.W. 6-Suresh Patil was a member of the Managing Committee, P.W. 7-Dayanand was the in charge Principal of the college and P.W. 8- Ashok was a peon of the college. 4. The delinquent personally participated in the enquiry proceeding before the E.C. After the evidence for D.A. was concluded he gave his evidence as D.W. 1 before it. Though there is a bald statement in his evidence that documents marked as Exs. (a) to (i) were produced by him with the list, the same were neither relied on by him before the Tribunal nor before this Court. No other witness was examined by him to corroborate his oral evidence. 5. On conclusion of the enquiry proceeding, the E.C. prepared its report dated 13-9-1988 holding all the aforesaid charges proved against delinquent on the basis of the said evidentiary material. On receipt of that report of E.C., a meeting of the petitioner-Managing Committee was convened on 1-12-1988 and the management at this meeting resolved to dismiss the delinquent from service as Principal of its said college. 6. After the said dismissal order was served on the delinquent, he gave his representation dated 17-12-1988 to the Directorate of Collegiate Education complaining that he had been illegally discharged from service since the requisite prior permission of the said Directorate was not obtained by the management. Then, a letter dated 17-12-1988 was addressed by the Directorate of Collegiate Education to the Management stating that dismissal of the delinquent by it without prior permission of the said Educational Authority was not valid and, therefore, the same not be approved by the Department. Thereafter, the said order dated 1-12-1988 terminating the delinquent from the service was withdrawn by the management and he was reinstated as Principal of the college. Subsequently, a fresh termination order dated 11-4-1989 was passed by the management and was served on delinquent. Since then, he is out of his service under the management. 7. Thereafter, the said order dated 1-12-1988 terminating the delinquent from the service was withdrawn by the management and he was reinstated as Principal of the college. Subsequently, a fresh termination order dated 11-4-1989 was passed by the management and was served on delinquent. Since then, he is out of his service under the management. 7. The said final termination order dated 11-4-1989 was challenged by the delinquent in the first instance, before the Educational Appellate Tribunal at Bidar in EAT No. 2 of 1989. When the said EAT No. 2 of 1989 was pending the delinquent filed a petition in CP No. 354 of 1994 before this Court seeking transfer of his appeal from the said Tribunal at Bidar to the Educational Appellate Tribunal at Gulbarga, which petition came to be allowed by this Court. Then, the matter was transferred from Bidar Tribunal to the Tribunal at Gulbarga where it came to be renumbered as KPEA 13 of 1994. 8. Admittedly, the parties did not chose to lead any further evidence in appeal before the Tribunal. Though an application stated to have been made by the management seeking permission to lead additional evidence was allowed by it, no such evidence was adduced. The resultant position was that both parties remained contended with their respective evidence that was recorded by the E.C. in its Enquiry Proceeding. 9. On consideration of the material on record, the Tribunal arrived at the conclusion that the impugned termination order dated 11-4-1989 was vitiated by these so-called illegalities.- (1) for non-conduct of fresh enquiry from the beginning against delinquent after withdrawal by the management of its earlier termination order dated 1-12-1988 in response to the Department's letter dated 17-12-1988; (2) for non-supply of the copy of the Enquiry Report to the delinquent enabling him to present his case against proposed punishment; and (3) lack of sufficient evidence in proof of charges against delinquent. 10. Therefore, the impugned judgment setting aside the management's order dated 11-4-1989 dismissing the delinquent from his service, has been passed by the Tribunal with further direction to reinstate him in service with all consequential monetary benefits. Therefore, the impugned judgment setting aside the management's aforesaid order dismissing the delinquent from service has been passed by the Tribunal with all consequential monetary benefits. 11. This revision was in the first instance listed to hear on its maintainability. Therefore, the impugned judgment setting aside the management's aforesaid order dismissing the delinquent from service has been passed by the Tribunal with all consequential monetary benefits. 11. This revision was in the first instance listed to hear on its maintainability. When the matter was taken up for hearing, the learned Counsel for both parties submitted that the final arguments on the petition itself may be heard and it may be disposed of oh its merits and they did not press the point of maintainability of revision for consideration. Accordingly, the petition itself was taken up for final hearing and disposal. 12. Let me first advert to the preliminary objections raised and canvassed by the learned Counsel for delinquent, Mr. Raya Reddy. As indicated there is no dispute about the position that the Karnataka Private Educational Institutions (Discipline and Control) Rules, 1978 (referred to as 'the Rules of 1978') framed by the Government of Karnataka in exercise of power conferred by Sections 3 and 15 of the Act of 1975, were applicable to the private educational institutions run by the petitioner-society. Chapter III of these rules deal with the nature of penalties and the manner in which action by the Disciplinary Authority of the management of private educational institutions could be initiated against its employees. Rule 17 provides that the Board of Management or any other authority empowered by general or special order may institute disciplinary proceeding against any employee. Rule 17 lays down the detailed procedure for the disciplinary authority for imposing major penalties against an employee while Rule 16 provides for procedure for imposing minor penalties. The penalty of dismissal of an employee is a major penalty. Mr. Raya Reddy's contention was that the composition of the committee for enquiry constituted by the management in the instant case was not in accordance with sub-rule (2) of Rule 17 and, therefore, it was not a" legally constituted committee with the result its proceeding and enquiry report were vitiated and the impugned termination order passed by the management based thereon is per se illegal. His another related objection levelled against the enquiry committee was that the delinquent had imputed bad faith against some of these members and, therefore, their existence on the committee was not warranted and the same has resulted in prejudice to the delinquent. Elaborating his argument Mr. His another related objection levelled against the enquiry committee was that the delinquent had imputed bad faith against some of these members and, therefore, their existence on the committee was not warranted and the same has resulted in prejudice to the delinquent. Elaborating his argument Mr. Raya Reddy argued that in view of the allegation made by delinquent in his reply to Ex. P. 2 given to charge memo, that he had no faith in all members of the enquiry committee as he has given complaints to the police, Government and other authorities against them, the management was required to constitute a fresh committee instead of allowing the same committee to proceed with the enquiry. 13. Mr. Chidanandayya, learned Counsel for management, countered the argument of Mr. Raya Reddy on the ground that the delinquent having participated in the enquiry held by the enquiry committee and he having not raised any objections before the Tribunal against either the composition of the said committee or the good faith of its members, he is precluded on the principle of waiver from raising this objection before this Court in revision. Reliance was placed by him on a decision of Supreme Court in case of Manak Lal v Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi and Others. 14. I bestowed anxious consideration on the aforesaid objections raised for the delinquent by his learned Counsel. Of course in his reply Ex. P. 2, it was stated by him that he had no faith in all members of the committee since he had made complaints against them to the police and other authorities. But, the fact remains, as contended by Chidanandayya he did not pursue this ground to its logical end and, on the other hand, he participated actively in the enquiry before the enquiry committee without pursuing this objection either by staying away from the enquiry in protest or by deposing to the specific material in support of the same before the committee. Nextly, he has also given up this objection as a ground of appeal against the impugned order of the management before the Tribunal. Nor was it urged by him before the Tribunal for its consideration. Nextly, he has also given up this objection as a ground of appeal against the impugned order of the management before the Tribunal. Nor was it urged by him before the Tribunal for its consideration. On the other hand the Tribunal having regard to the relevant aspects of the proceedings has observed in its impugned judgment that the enquiry held by the committee against delinquent did not suffer from any infirmity, whatever, and that the same was quite fair and impartial. The Supreme Court in Manaklal, supra, in similar circumstances has said: "The next question which is to be considered is whether it was open to appellant to take this objection for the first time before the High Court. In other words, has he or has he not waived his objection to the presence of Shri Chhangani in the Tribunal? Shri Daphatary does not seriously contest the position that the objection could have been effectively waived. The alleged, bias in a member of the Tribunal does not render the proceedings invalid if it is shown that the objection against the presence of the member in question had not been taken by the party even though the party knew about the circumstances giving rise to the allegations about the alleged bias and was aware of his right to challenge the presence of the member in the Tribunal. It is true the waiver cannot always and in every case be inferred merely from the failure of the party to take objection. Waiver can be inferred only if and after it is shown that the party knew about the relevant facts and aware of his right to take the objection in question. As Sir John Romilly, M.R., has observed in Vyvlyan v Vyviyan (1861)30 Beav 65 : 54 E.R. 813 waiver or acquiescence, like election, resupposes that the person to be bound is fully cognizant of his rights and, that being so, he neglects to enforce them, or chooses one benefit instead of another, either, but not both of which he might claim". Again at para 9 the Supreme Court proceeded to observe: "Since we have no doubt that the appellant knew the material facts and must be deemed to have been conscious of his legal rights in the matter, his failure to take the present plea at the earlier stage of the proceedings creates an effective bar of waiver against him". Again at para 9 the Supreme Court proceeded to observe: "Since we have no doubt that the appellant knew the material facts and must be deemed to have been conscious of his legal rights in the matter, his failure to take the present plea at the earlier stage of the proceedings creates an effective bar of waiver against him". Therefore, in the light of the aforementioned facts and the above proposition enunciated by Supreme Court and in view of unacceptable request of delinquent in Ex. P. 2 that only a Government Official could be appointed for the purpose of enquiry, I find that he is precluded and estopped at this stage of the proceedings from challenging the validity of the enquiry committee and questioning the good faith of its members. 15. Let me now deal with the Tribunal's finding that the order of dismissal passed by the management against delinquent does not sustain in law for want of fresh enquiry proceeding from its inception by the enquiry committee after its earlier order dated [1-12-1998] was withdrawn by it in view of the Education Department's said letter dated 17-12-1988. Under this letter the management was informed by the Department that its action of dismissal of delinquent cannot be accepted for want of prior approval of the Director of Collegiate Education, in view of Rule 8 of Grant-in-Aid Code Rules. Rule 8 is extracted by the Tribunal at para 18 of its judgment. It envisages that non-teaching staff of private educational institution whose appointment have been approved by the Department of Collegiate Education cannot be removed from service/dismissed/retrenched/suspended without prior approval of the Directorate of Collegiate Education. The case of management is that in order to comply with the requirement of this Rule 8 on receipt of Department's letter dated [17-12-1998], its earlier order dated 1-12-1988 dismissing the delinquent from service was withdrawn. Thereafter, the entire record relating to the enquiry and proposed punishment against delinquent was submitted to the Department seeking its prior approval for the said punishment. Then the requisite approval was given by the Director of Collegiate Education and then the fresh order dated 11-4-1989 was passed by the management dismissing the delinquent. Mr. Thereafter, the entire record relating to the enquiry and proposed punishment against delinquent was submitted to the Department seeking its prior approval for the said punishment. Then the requisite approval was given by the Director of Collegiate Education and then the fresh order dated 11-4-1989 was passed by the management dismissing the delinquent. Mr. Chidanandayya argued that this was sufficient compliance of Rule 8 on the part of the management and there was no need for it whatever to commence its enquiry proceeding afresh from its beginning as it would have been an empty formality which was not required by any rule of the Grant-in-Aid Code or any other rule or principle of natural justice. Mr. Raya Reddy was not able to invite the Court's attention to any such rule either. I find sufficient force and weight in the contention of Mr. Chidanandayya Obviously, the management on receiving the Department's letter dated 17-12-1988 was justified in proceeding from the stage at which necessary steps were required to be taken by it for obtaining prior approval of the concerned authority. By so doing no prejudice is shown to have been caused in any manner to the delinquent. Therefore, the Tribunal is patently erroneous in its opinion that after the said letter was received by the management, it should have conducted its enquiry against delinquent from the beginning over again. 16. Now turning to the validity or otherwise of the Tribunal's finding that the failure on the part of the management to supply copy of the enquiry report to the delinquent and calling upon him to submit his say in the matter of proposed punishment, was a vital illegality which in itself is sufficient to strike down the management's impugned order of dismissal against delinquent. Substantiating this contention Mr. Raya Reddy invoked the aid of sub-rules (12) and (13) of Rule 17 of the Rules of 1978. They are extracted below: "17..... (12) If the Board of Management having regard its findings on the charges is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (vi) to (ix) of Rules 10 and 19 should be imposed, it shall, furnish to the employee, a copy of the report of the enquiry committee and a statement of its findings, if any. (12) If the Board of Management having regard its findings on the charges is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (vi) to (ix) of Rules 10 and 19 should be imposed, it shall, furnish to the employee, a copy of the report of the enquiry committee and a statement of its findings, if any. (13) The Board of Management shall consider the representation, if any, made by the employee in response to the notice and determine what penalty, if any, should be imposed on the employee and pass appropriate orders in the case". A plain reading of sub-rules (12) and (13) of Rule 17 makes it manifest that it embodies a principle of natural justice which was contained in unamended sub-article (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. But this requirement under Article 311(2) of the Constitution was dispensed with by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976. The main source of power for all the delegated authorities to frame rules relating to disciplinary proceedings and imposition of penalties on their employees is traceable to Article 311. After the said amendment was effected in Article 311 of the Constitution various High Courts and the Supreme Court had taken the view that the non-supply of enquiry report by the disciplinary authority to its delinquent employee and issue of second show-cause notice is not fatal to its any order imposing major penalty on him. This legal view became the subject of review of the Supreme Court in Union of India v Mohamed Ramzan Khan. On consideration of all the relevant legal aspects of the matter, the Supreme Court has expounded the legal position as follows: "13. Several pronouncements of this Court dealing with Article 311(2) of the Constitution have laid down the test of natural justice in the matter of meeting the charges. This Court on one occasion has stated that two phases of the inquiry contemplated under Article 311(2) prior to the 42nd amendment were judicial. That perhaps was a little stretching the position. Even if it does not become a judicial proceeding, there can be no dispute that it is a quasi-judicial one. There is a charge and a denial followed by an inquiry at which evidence is led and assessment of the material before conclusion is reached. These facets do make the matter quasi-judicial and attract the principles of natural justice. Even if it does not become a judicial proceeding, there can be no dispute that it is a quasi-judicial one. There is a charge and a denial followed by an inquiry at which evidence is led and assessment of the material before conclusion is reached. These facets do make the matter quasi-judicial and attract the principles of natural justice. As this Court rightly pointed out in the Gujarat case State of Gujarat Vs. R.G. Teredesai and Another, AIR 1969 SC 1294 , the disciplinary authority is very often influenced by the conclusions of the Inquiry Officer and even by the recommendations relating to the nature of punishment to be inflicted. With the Forty-second Amendment, the Delinquent Officer is not associated with the disciplinary inquiry beyond the recording of evidence and the submissions made on the basis of the material to assist the Inquiry Officer to come to his conclusions. In case his conclusions are kept away from the Delinquent Officer and the Inquiry Officer submits his conclusions with or without recommendation as to punishment, the delinquent is precluded from knowing the contents thereto although such material is used against him by the disciplinary authority. The report is an adverse material if the Inquiry Officer records a finding of guilt and proposes a punishment so far as the delinquent is concerned. In a quasi-judicial matter, if the delinquent is being deprived of knowledge of the material against him though the same is made available to the punishing authority in the matter of reaching his conclusion, rules of natural justice would be affected". Again at para 15 it has enunciated the law thus: "15. Deletion of the second opportunity from the scheme of Article 311(2) of the Constitution has nothing to do with providing of a copy of the report to the delinquent in the matter of making his representation. Even though the second stage of the inquiry in Article 311(2) has been abolished by amendment, the delinquent is still entitled to represent against the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer holding that the charges or some of the charges are established and holding the delinquent guilty of such charges. Even though the second stage of the inquiry in Article 311(2) has been abolished by amendment, the delinquent is still entitled to represent against the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer holding that the charges or some of the charges are established and holding the delinquent guilty of such charges. For doing away with the effect of the enquiry report or to meet the recommendation of the Inquiry Officer in the matter of imposition of punishment, furnishing a copy of the report becomes necessary and to have the proceeding completed by using some material behind the back of the delinquent is a position not countenanced by fair procedure. While by law application of natural justice could be totally ruled out or truncated, nothing has been done here which could be taken as keeping natural justice out of the proceedings and the series of pronouncements of this Court making rules of natural justice applicable to such an inquiry are not affected by the 42nd amendment. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that supply of a copy of the inquiry report along with recommendations, if any, in the matter of proposed punishment to be inflicted would be within the rules of natural justice and the delinquent would, therefore, be entitled to the supply of a copy thereof. The Forty-Second Amendment has not brought about any change in this position". Then it proceeds to lay down the pertinent rule in para 17; "17. There have been several decisions in different High Courts, which, following the Forty-Second Amendment, have taken the view that it is no longer necessary to furnish a copy of the inquiry report to Delinquent Officers. Even on some occasions this Court has taken that view. Since we have reached a different conclusion the judgment in the different High Courts taking the contrary view must be taken to be no longer laying down good law. We have not been shown any decision of a coordinate or a larger Bench of this Court taking this view. Therefore, the conclusion to the contrary reached by any two-Judge Bench in this Court will also no longer be taken to be laying down good law, but this shall have prospective application and no punishment imposed shall be open to challenge on this ground". 17. Therefore, the conclusion to the contrary reached by any two-Judge Bench in this Court will also no longer be taken to be laying down good law, but this shall have prospective application and no punishment imposed shall be open to challenge on this ground". 17. Thus it is made explicitly clear by the Supreme Court in Mohamed Ramzan Khan's case, supra, that though the legal necessity of supply of enquiry report and second show-cause notice to the delinquent was dispensed with by amendment of sub-article (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution yet this need being in the nature of a fundamental principle of natural justice its compliance was must before any major punishment was imposed by the management on its employee, but then the law so laid down by it will operate prospectively and that any punishment imposed on the delinquent prior to the date of its judgment i.e., 20-11-1990, shall not be open to challenge on this count. This legal position is subsequently affirmed by a Constitutional Bench of Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v B. Karunakar. At para 7 of its judgment, referring to the decision in Mohamed Ramzan Khan's case, supra, Supreme Court has stated: "Since the said decision made the law expressively prospective in operation the law laid down there will apply only to those orders of punishment which are passed by the disciplinary authority after 20th November, 1990. xxx xxx xxx No order of punishment passed before that date would be challengeable on the ground that there was a failure to furnish the inquiry report to the delinquent employee". Elucidating on the effect of the settled legal position, the Supreme Court further proceeded to observe at para 8 of its judgment: The need to make the law laid down in Mohamed Ramzan Khan's case, supra, prospective in operation requires no emphasis. As pointed out above, in view of the unsettled position of the law on the subject the authorities/managements all over the country had proceeded on the basis that there was no need to furnish a copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer to the delinquent employee, and innumerable employees have been punished without giving them the copies of the report. In some of the cases, the orders of punishment have long since become final while other cases are pending in Courts at different stages. In some of the cases, the orders of punishment have long since become final while other cases are pending in Courts at different stages. In many of the cases, the misconduct has been grave and in others the denial on the part of the management to furnish the report would ultimately proved to be no more than a technical mistake. To reopen all the disciplinary proceedings now would result in grave prejudice to administration which will far outweigh the benefit to the employees concerned. Both administrative reality and public interests do not, therefore, require that the orders of punishment passed prior to the decision in Mohamed Ramzan Khan's ease, supra, without furnishing the report of the Inquiry Officer should be disturbed and the disciplinary proceedings which gave rise to the said orders should be reopened on that account". Therefore, in view of the settled legal position as propounded by the Supreme Court the order of termination in the instant case which was passed by management prior to the cut-off date 20th November, 1990 it is not open for the delinquent to challenge the legality of the impugned order on the ground of non-supply of enquiry report as required by sub-rules (12) and (13) of Rule 17 of the Rules 1970. In that view of the matter the Tribunal has clearly erred in law in taking a contrary view in this behalf. 18. The last premises on the basis of which the impugned order was held by the Tribunal liable to be set aside was, in its own words: "But the documents collected and the evidence placed on record before the enquiry committee were not sufficient to hold that the appellant was responsible for misappropriation of funds of the respondent 1". To support this observation the Tribunal has proceeded to examine the report of one of the committee members striking divergent note of finding although he too concurred with all the other members of the enquiry committee that all charges against the delinquent have been proved. After referring to that report of the Member of Enquiry Committee the Tribunal further observes: "The report of the Members of the Managing Committee goes to show that there was any allegation nor evidence, to ascertain how much construction work was done and verification of the college building so far constructed and actual amount misappropriated". After referring to that report of the Member of Enquiry Committee the Tribunal further observes: "The report of the Members of the Managing Committee goes to show that there was any allegation nor evidence, to ascertain how much construction work was done and verification of the college building so far constructed and actual amount misappropriated". With this observation the Tribunal concluded that all charges against delinquent cannot be held proved. It need be stated at once that the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction in consideration of the aspect if the finding of the disciplinary authority that all the aforesaid charges against delinquent are proved is supported by sufficient evidence or not. It is basically a wrong approach on the part of the Tribunal since the law in this regard is well-settled that the question of sufficiency or otherwise of the evidence in support of the charges let in on record in a domestic enquiry proceeding against a delinquent employee is beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny vide Union of India and Another v B.C. Chaturvedi and Union of India and Others v Upendra Singh. The ambit of Tribunal's enquiry as regards proof or no proof of any charge levelled against the delinquent was restricted to find if any charge is held proved by the disciplinary authority without any evidence in support thereof. In other words if there is some substantive evidence found on record in support of the charge it was not open to the Tribunal to proceed to evaluate the credibility or otherwise of that evidence to find for itself whether the charge against the delinquent could be held to have been proved or not. So, then, what was required of the Tribunal was to see whether or not some such evidence was placed on record by the disciplinary authority during the enquiry conducted against delinquent in proof of the charges levelled against him, which the Tribunal has failed to do. Therefore, this Court for itself had to advert its attention on this significant aspect of the matter. 19. I was taken by the learned Counsel on both sides through the entire evidence of the parties recorded by the enquiry committee during its enquiry bearing on the charges levelled against the delinquent. I am satisfied that there is considerable substantive evidence in support of these charges. 20. 19. I was taken by the learned Counsel on both sides through the entire evidence of the parties recorded by the enquiry committee during its enquiry bearing on the charges levelled against the delinquent. I am satisfied that there is considerable substantive evidence in support of these charges. 20. As indicated, all the charges against delinquent, excepting Charge No. 5, pertain to various amounts of the College allegedly found misappropriated by him abusing his power as the Principal of the College. Charge No. 5 relates to the allegation of he having amassed huge property disproportionate to his known sources of income. I am satisfied that there is considerable substantive evidence in support of these charges. As an illustration suffice it to refer to the evidence relating to Charge Nos. 1 and 2. The accusation in Charge No. 1 is that on 28-5-1986 the delinquent collected the total amount of Rs. 1,24,000/- towards 2 months salary of the college staff and failed to account properly for the same and that he furnished the false statements in respect thereof on 4-5-1986, 28-5-1986 and 2-6-1986; and thereby he misutilised the said amount of the society. P.Ws. 1 to 5 and 8 have deposed in support of this charge. The documents at Exs. P. 24 to P. 37 are brought on record to corroborate their evidence. Of them, P.W. 3 is the most important and competent witness who was admittedly working as Accountant of the college during the relevant period. Ex. P. 24, dated 28-5-1986, Ex. P. 25, dated 4-5-1986 and Ex. P. 26, dated 2-6-1986 i.e., the accounts statements prepared and furnished by the delinquent to the management respecting collection of the said amount on 28-5-1986 by him out of the salaries of the College staff. They are the undisputed statements of the delinquent. P.W. 3 has testified to this fact. His testimony has gone unchallenged on record. The delinquent himself (D.W. 1) has not refuted this evidence while deposing before the E.C. nor has he placed sufficient and satisfactory material on record giving a satisfactory account of the said amount and the refund thereof, if any. Therefore, it cannot be stated that there is no evidence in support of Charge No. 1. As such the Tribunal's finding to this effect is baseless. 21. Dealing with Charge No. 2, it is sub-divided into 8 split charges under sub-head 2(a) to (h). Therefore, it cannot be stated that there is no evidence in support of Charge No. 1. As such the Tribunal's finding to this effect is baseless. 21. Dealing with Charge No. 2, it is sub-divided into 8 split charges under sub-head 2(a) to (h). The allegation in Charge No. 2(a) is that on 23-7-1985 the delinquent falsely debited a sum of Rs. 11,000/- in the name of the management at page No. 37 of the Cash Book and by so doing he brought down and reduced the cash balance in hand at Rs. 13,329.54. To substantiate this charge there is the evidence of P.W. 3 coupled with documentary evidence at Ex. P. 3 and Ex. P. 4. Ex. P. 3 is the relevant entry in the Cash Book of the College Accounts contained at its page No. 37, and Ex. P. 4 dated 23-7-1985 is the voucher for Rs. 11,000/- signed by delinquent at Ex. P. 4(a) showing repayment of the said amount to the management. P.W. 3 has spoken to the entries in Ex. P. 3 and Ex. P. 4. The authenticity of Ex. P. 3 and Ex. P. 4 is not disputed by the delinquent. Thus, this evidence held by the Disciplinary Authority as providing sufficient proof of Charge No. 2(a) cannot be stated as no evidence on record. Similarly, there is the undisputed evidence of P.W. 3 in support of Charge No. 2(b) which is fortified by the unimpeachable documentary evidence comprising Ex. P. 6-cash voucher for Rs. 10,000/- dated 16-9-1986 of the delinquent under his signature at Ex. P. 6(a). Corresponding relevant entry at Ex. P. 5 in the Cash Book is also signed by him. Likewise, P.W. 3 has deposed in support of Charge No. 2(c) stating that Ex. P. 8 is the debit voucher dated 24-9-1985 of the delinquent containing his signature at Ex. P. 8(a) with the relevant entries at Ex, P. 7 in the Cash Book make under his signature at Ex. P. 7(a) showing false debit of Rs. 8,000/-. So also, P.W. 3 has spoken to Charge No. 2(d). It is in his unimpeachable evidence that Ex. P. 10-cash voucher dated 31-3-1986 for Rs. 28,500/- is of the delinquent with the corresponding entry at Ex. P. 9 in the Cash Book made under delinquent's signature at Ex. P. 9(a) in page 157 thereof. 8,000/-. So also, P.W. 3 has spoken to Charge No. 2(d). It is in his unimpeachable evidence that Ex. P. 10-cash voucher dated 31-3-1986 for Rs. 28,500/- is of the delinquent with the corresponding entry at Ex. P. 9 in the Cash Book made under delinquent's signature at Ex. P. 9(a) in page 157 thereof. P.W. 3 has further stated supporting Charge No. 2(e) that Ex. P. 12-payment voucher dated 14-10-1985 bearing delinquent's signature at Ex. P. 12(a) was issued by him debiting an amount of Rs. 12,500/- and making relevant entries at Ex. P. 11 in the Cash Book under his signature at P. ll(a) in page 97 thereof. He (P.W. 3) has also deposed that Ex. P. 14-cash voucher for Rs. 1,400/- is of delinquent which bears his signatures at P. 14(a) and (b) and the corresponding entries in relation thereto are made at Ex. P. 13 in the Cash Book which bears the delinquent's signature at P. 13(a). Similarly, P.W. 3 has given evidence in support of Charge No. 2(f). Besides, in support of Charge No. 2(g) he has stated that Ex. P. 15 is the counterfoil of the cheque for Rs. 24,000/- bearing the signature of delinquent in respect of which no credit entry was made in the Cash Book and the same was not accounted for by the delinquent. As regards Charge No. 2(h) relating to temporary misappropriation of Rs. 7,277.57 P.W. 3 has deposed to this alleged fact with reference to relevant entries at Ex. P. 15 in page 37 of the Cash Book bearing delinquent's signature at Ex. P. 15(a) showing the cash balance of the said amount as on 13-7-1986 which amount was admittedly retained by him till 21-10-1986. It is further in the evidence of P.W. 3 that as Accountant of the College whatever entries were made by him in the Cash Book the same were made under the instructions of the delinquent who was College Principal. Nothing material information is elicited from P.W. 3's cross-examination throwing any shadow of doubt in his testimony. Nor the same is satisfactorily rebutted by D.W. 1 in his evidence. Therefore, we find ample evidence brought on record for the D.A. during the Enquiry in support of charges levelled against delinquent. Nothing material information is elicited from P.W. 3's cross-examination throwing any shadow of doubt in his testimony. Nor the same is satisfactorily rebutted by D.W. 1 in his evidence. Therefore, we find ample evidence brought on record for the D.A. during the Enquiry in support of charges levelled against delinquent. In that view of the material on record, the observation of the Tribunal that there was no evidence in support of these charges against delinquent is wholly arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, the findings of the Tribunal against the validity of the impugned order of dismissal made by the management are patently erroneous and unsustainable. 22. For the reasons stated and discussed above, I find that the impugned judgment of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside and the management's order of termination dated 11-4-1989 passed against delinquent is a valid and unassailable order which is entitled to be confirmed. 23. Hence, for the reasons aforesaid, the revision is allowed. The impugned judgment dated 29-9-1997 of the Tribunal made in KPEA No. 13 of 1994 is set aside and the order of dismissal dated 11-4-1989 passed by the management against respondent 1 is confirmed and upheld. 24. Parties to bear their own costs.