JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, A.C.J. 1. Petitioner Pitamber Nayak's election and continuance as a member of Bhandaripokhari Panchayat Samiti within the local limits of Bhadrak revenue district was questioned by Nara Narayan Jena (opp. party No. 2) before the learned District Judge, Balasore in Election Misc. Case No. 2 of 1997 u/s 45-B of the Orissa Panchayat Samiti Act, 1959 (in short, the 'Act'). Initially petitioner and opposite party No. 2 were elected as members of the Panchayat Samiti. Subsequently Pitamber Nayak was elected as Chairman of the said Panchayat Samiti. Nara Narayan Jena filed an election petition as aforesaid for a declaration that Pitamber Nayak was disqualified to be a member and his membership should cease on two grounds. namely (i) he was convicted in a criminal case and the conviction was in force by the time the nomination was filed: and (ii) he being a member of a Co-operative Society had failed to pay arrear accrued dues to that society continuously for more than a decade. 2. Pitamber resisted the claim on the ground that the application u/s 45-B of the Act was misconceived. The said provision, according to him, related to post-election disqualifications as enumerated in Sub-section (2) of Section 45, and the alleged disqualification related to Sub-section (1) which relates to pre-election disqualifications and such question can be only raised in an election petition filed u/s 44-A before the Election Commissioner. In any event the conviction alleged was for causing simple hurt punishable u/s 323 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, 'IPC'), and it does not amount to an offence involving moral turpitude. In any event there has been acquittal directed by the appellate Court. Further there was no arrear accrued dues to be discharged, and he was not liable to pay any amount to the society and no notice was served on him claiming payment of alleged arrear accrued dues. 3. Learned District Judge held that the application u/s 45-B was maintainable. The plea which was raised relating to the forum and nature of dispute was set at rest by this Court in OJC No. 14555 of 1997. The learned District Judge held that the conviction which attracts disqualification u/s 45(1)(h) is one where the offence involves moral turpitude, and an offence punishable u/s 323, IPC does not involve moral turpitude. The plea which was raised relating to the forum and nature of dispute was set at rest by this Court in OJC No. 14555 of 1997. The learned District Judge held that the conviction which attracts disqualification u/s 45(1)(h) is one where the offence involves moral turpitude, and an offence punishable u/s 323, IPC does not involve moral turpitude. In any event since petitioner was acquitted in appeal he was not disqualified. 4. Though during hearing of the writ application, the learned counsel appearing for Nara Narayan submitted that correctness of the view was not mooted before this Court as ultimately the learned District Judge has founded Pitamber to be disqualified. But the relevant factor is the position relating to conviction as on the date of filing of nomination, and therefore the view is indefensible. 5. The plea is clearly untenable in view of what has been stated by the apex Court in Vidya Charan Shukla Vs. Purshottam Lal Kaushik. At paragraph 34 it has been observed that acquittal of the appellant before the decision of the election petition has retrospective effect and thereby the disqualification becomes non-existent on the date of scrutiny of nomination. Acquittal by the appellate Court has the effect of wiping out the effect of conviction. In any event that question is of academic value, as the offence alleged to have been committed u/s 323, IPC does not involve moral turpitude. 6. The expression 'moral turpitude' has not been defined. It means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It implies baseness, depravity wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. It is an act which is contrary to what a person owes to a fellow person or to society in general. The expression 'moral turpitude' as observed by the apex Court in Pawan Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and another, and in Allahabad Bank and Another Vs. Deepak Kumar Bhola, means - '"Moral turpitude is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection showing depravity.'" The expression has been more elaborately explained by the Allahabad High Court in Baleshwar Singh Vs. District Magistrate and Collector, Banaras and Others, where it was observed as follows : "The expression 'moral turpitude' is not defined anywhere. District Magistrate and Collector, Banaras and Others, where it was observed as follows : "The expression 'moral turpitude' is not defined anywhere. But it means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It implies depravity and wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. Every false statement made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so if it discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of any private and social duty which a person owes to his fellowmen or to the society in general. If therefore the individual charged with a certain conduct owes a duty, either to another individual or to the society in general, to act in a specific manner or not to so act and he still acts contrary to it and does so knowingly, his conduct must be held to be due to vileness and depravity. It will be contrary to accepted customary rule and duty between man and man". In our opinion the aforesaid observations correctly spell out the true meaning of the expression 'moral turpitude'. 7. The learned District Judge observed that there was non-payment of arrear accrued dues. It is petitioner's case that an order was passed by the Additional C.E.O.-cum-Arbitrator in Dispute Case No. 3977 of 1979, and an award was made. The same is foundation for treating the petitioner to be a defaulter. But against the award, petitioner has made an application for review bearing Case No. 14 of 1983-84. An Execution Proceeding No. 2275 of 1983-84 has been initiated. Petitioner's stand that the amount was not accrued due was not accepted. The stand has been reiterated by the learned counsel for petitioner. According to him, for some period there was an order of stay operating and though the said order was not continued, yet no finality has been reached in the matter. 8. At this juncture it is necessary to take note of the decision of this Court in Manoranjan Sahoo Vs. Chandra Kumar Purohit and Others, to which reference was made by the learned counsel for petitioner as well as opposite party No. 2. Same related to the true import of the expression 'failed to pay amount due' as appearing in Section 28(3-a) of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1962 (in short, the 'Co-operative Act'). 9. Chandra Kumar Purohit and Others, to which reference was made by the learned counsel for petitioner as well as opposite party No. 2. Same related to the true import of the expression 'failed to pay amount due' as appearing in Section 28(3-a) of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1962 (in short, the 'Co-operative Act'). 9. Fate of this case hangs on interpretation of expression 'any arrear of any kind accrued due'. In Manoranjan Sahoo's case (supra) meaning of the word 'due' as appearing in Section 28(3-a) of the Co-operative Act was considered. The said provision reads as follows: "28. Society to have a committee : xxx xxx xxx (3-a) A representative of a society or a body corporate shall not be eligible for being chosen or for continuing as a member or President of the Committee of any other society in cases where the society or the body corporate which he represents - (i) has failed to pay any amount due in cash or in kind to the society or any other society on account of any loan or otherwise within three months from the date of notice by such society for payment of such dues; or (ii) ceases from the membership of the society, or (iii) is ordered to be wound up or dissolved." The pivotal expression in that case was 'has failed to pay any amount due' within three months from the date of notice by such society for payment of such dues. According to the petitioner, mere demand and non-payment would not bring in application of the default clause, so as to attract a disqualification. Reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Gobind Ch. Panda Vs. Darsan Ch. Rout and Others which related to a case under the Orissa Grama Panchayat Act, 1964 (in short, 'G.P. Act'). Reliance was also placed on a decision of this Court in Mahendar Prasad Rout Vs. The Election Officer and Others where the language used was 'accrued due'. The learned District Judge made a distinction between 'accrued due' a 'due' and held that use of the expression 'accrued' made the difference as 'accrued' obviously would involve quantification. Reliance was also placed on a decision of this Court in Mahendar Prasad Rout Vs. The Election Officer and Others where the language used was 'accrued due'. The learned District Judge made a distinction between 'accrued due' a 'due' and held that use of the expression 'accrued' made the difference as 'accrued' obviously would involve quantification. The learned District Judge was of the view that the Orissa Co-operative Societies Rules, 1965 (in short, the 'Rules') define 'default' to mean adjudicated dues, and if the Legislature wanted that it was the only adjudicated dues which were relevant for the purpose of disqualification, it could have used the words 'defaulted dues' instead of using 'arrear dues'. 10. It is to be noticed that the Co-operative Act does not refer to 'arrear dues'. It deals with failure to pay any amount 'due'. 1221 Defaulter' as defined in the Rules means any society against which or any person against whom a decree or order u/s 103 has been obtained and included such person or persons against whom proceedings u/s 90 are taken. The word 'due' means immediately payable in its common signification, or a debt contracted but payable in future. (Per Gibson, J. Irish Land Commission v. Messereene : (1904) 2 T.R. 513 Darling, J. said, "I think, in legal sense, that money only can be said to be 'due' which may be recovered by action". That which a man is under no legal obligation to repay, for whatever reason is in my opinion no longer money 'due', in Hibernian Bank v. Yourrell: (1919) 1 T.R. 310. A debt or other obligation is due when it is legally enforceable, i.e., when the creditor has a right to demand payment and to enforce collection. It means presently payable. It connotes an existing obligation. The word 'due' is capable of various meanings. The word 'due' as an adjective is stated to mean (1) that is owing or payable as a debt due (substantive), (2) that which is due, a debt, (3) that which is due by any one, (4) a legal charge, toll, tribute, fee or the like (See Shorter Oxford English Dictionary). In Wharton's Law Lexicon its meaning is stated to be "anything owing. That which one contracts to pay or perform to another, that which law or justice requires to be paid or done. In Wharton's Law Lexicon its meaning is stated to be "anything owing. That which one contracts to pay or perform to another, that which law or justice requires to be paid or done. It should be observed that a debt is said to be 'due' the instant that it has existence as a debt; it may be payable at a future time." In Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition Volume 13 (West Publishing Co.) various shades of meaning of the word 'due' are given. Some of them are given here. The word 'due' is only equivalent to 'payable'. The word 'due' considered by itself has many definitions. Bouvier defines as in its first and broadest sense as that which is just and proper and in another and least general sense, as 'what ought to be paid; that may be demanded'. In its primary sense means 'owing'. At times it signifies a simple indebtedness without reference to the time of payment. At other times it shows that the day of payment or tender is passed. 11. Reference to a Full Bench decision of this Court in Mohendra Prasad's case (supra) is necessary. Govind Chandra Panda's case (supra) related to a dispute relating to G.P. Act. The language used there is "any arrear of any kind accrued due". The expression "any arrear of any kind accrued due" has been used in Section 25( 1 )(1) of the Orissa Grama Panchayat Act and Section 45(l)(m-l) of the Act. The provisions read as follows : Section 25(1)(1) of the G.P. Act : "25. Disqualification for membership of Grama Panchayat - (1) A person shall be disqualified for being elected or nominated as a Sarpanch or any other member of the Grama Panchayat constituted under this Act, if he - (a) to (k) xxx xxx . xxx (1) being a member of a Co-operative Society, has failed to pay any arrear of any kind accrued due by him to such society before filing of the nomination paper in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the Rules made thereunder: Provided that in respect of such arrears a bill or a notice has been duly served upon him and the time, if any, specified therein has expired; or xxx xxx xxx." Section 45 (l)(m-l) of the Act : "45. Disqualification for becoming a member and continuing as member - (1) A person shall not be eligible to stand for election under Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 16 if he- (a) to (m) xxx xxx xxx (m-1) being a member of any Society registered under the Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1951 has failed to pay any arrears of any kind accrued due by him to such society for a continuous period of two years or more; or xxx xxx xxx." As has been observed by this Court in Mohendra Prasad's case (supra) the disqualification arises when the dispute relating to arrear has been quantified and the quantified arrear remains unpaid in spite of notice duly served on the debtor candidate. There is dispute about service of notice, and it is stated that a review application has been filed alleging non-service and in the said case for some period stay was granted. What would be the effect of order in review application is not to be gauged at this stage. It is stated by the learned counsel for petitioner that if the review succeeds, it has to be ultimately held that there was no liability. 12. There would not have been any difficulty had the order of stay been continued. The question is whether the due has been adjudicated and quantified. Merely because a review application has been filed, it cannot be said that there has been no quantification of the due. It is to be noted that the order of stay which was operating has been vacated. That being the position, we are in agreement with the learned District Judge that there was an adjudicated and quantified arrear remaining unpaid. The writ application is, therefore, without any merit and is dismissed, but without any order as to costs. P.C. Naik, J. I Agree. Final Result : Dismissed