Judgment Aftab Alam, J. 1. These two petitions are filed by the same petitioner who was a member of the Superior Judicial Service of this State. In C.W.J.C. No. 7935 of 1998 he seeks to question the High Courts decision not to allow him to continue in service beyond the age of 58 years and in C.W.J.C. No. 7967/98 hetries to assail the High Courts decision not to give him promotion to the Super Time Scale of pay while he was still in service. In these two writ petitions he prays for a direction to be given the Super Time Scale of pay from 9.5.1996, the date from which officers junior to him were given that scale as well as a direction to be allowed the benefit of the extension of age of retirement from 58 years to 60 years in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court in All India Judges Association & Ors. V/s. The Union of India & Ors. A.I.R. 1993 SC 2493. 2. The petitioner, whose date of birth is 16.12.1940 joined the Subordinate Judicial Service of the State w.e.f. 23.9.1965 as a Munsif on probation and was confirmed on that post w.e.f. 7.6.1970. He was promoted in the rank of Subordinate Judge w.e.f. 14.10.1977 and was confirmed on the post pf Subordinate Judge w.e.f. 1.3.1979. He was promoted to the Superior Judicial Service w.e.f. 1.10.1985 and was confirmed in that service w.e.f. 1.2.1988. The petitioner was appointed as District & Sessions Judge by order, dated 28.11.1993 and was given promotion to the Selection Grade w.e.f. 1.12.1999. The matter of his promotion, along with some other officers, in the Super Time Scale of pay in the cadre of Bihar Superior Judicial Service was considered by the Standing Committee of this Court in its meeting, dated 24.8.1996. On a consideration of the entire records of service of the concerned officers, four among them were given promotion to the Super Time Scale of pay while the petitioner, along with two others, was found unfit for being given the promotion. The petitioner made a representation against the decision not to give him promotion to the Super Time Scale of pay. His representation, after being duly considered, was turned down by the Standing Committee in its meeting held on 19 & 20.2.1997. 3. The petitioner made a representation against the decision not to give him promotion to the Super Time Scale of pay. His representation, after being duly considered, was turned down by the Standing Committee in its meeting held on 19 & 20.2.1997. 3. Later, on November 20, 1997 an Evaluation Committee consisting of 9 Honble Judges of this Court, constituted by the Honble the Chief Justice in terms of the Supreme Court decision in the case of All India Judges Association (supra) considered the cases of a number of Judicial Officers, the petitioner being one of them, who were to complete shortly 58 years of age. On a consideration of their entire service records, 8 officers were found suitable for being extended the benefit of increase of the age of retirement from 58 years to 60 years while in the case of 9 others, including the present petitioner, it was found on the basis of their service records that their further continuance in service would not be in public interest and they did not have the potential for continued useful service. They were accordingly denied extension of the age of retirement from 58 to 60 years and the petitioner was thus left to retire on completion of the age of 58 years and the intimation in that regard was given to him by the Registrar General of this Court by his memo no.14389, dated 27.11.1997. 4. Mr. Madan Mohan Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in both the writ petitions assailed the decision of the High Court not to allow him to continue in service beyond the age of 58 years on the following grounds : (i) The High Court had no jurisdiction to refuse extension in service. The grant or denial of extension of service could only be made by the Governor of Bihar who was the appointing authority, under Article 235 of the Constitution. The High Court could not make recommendation to the Government and a final decision on that recommendation could only be taken by the Government. (ii) The impugned decision was taken by the High Court without taking into consideration a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Rajat Baran Roy V/s. State of West Bengal & ors., A.I.R. 1999 SC 1661. The High Court could not make recommendation to the Government and a final decision on that recommendation could only be taken by the Government. (ii) The impugned decision was taken by the High Court without taking into consideration a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Rajat Baran Roy V/s. State of West Bengal & ors., A.I.R. 1999 SC 1661. Neither the Constitution nor the Service Code provided for any review or assessment of the service records of an officer for determining his age of retirement. (iii) The impugned decision by the High Court was vitiated by malafide in law because the decision was arrived at by taking into consideration some materials adverse to the petitioner and by keeping out of consideration, other materials favourable to him. (iv) The impugned decision by the High Court was arrived at by taking into consideration some adverse materials which were never communicated to the petitioner. (v) The service record of the petitioner was so good that no reasonable person would have taken the decision not to extend his age of retirement. The decision of the High Court was, therefore, also unreasonable and arbitrary. (vi) The impugned decision by the High Court was arrived at in violation of the principle of natural justice, namely, audi alteram partem. 5. Similarly the decision of the High Court not to give promotion to the petitioner to the Super Time Scale of pay was assailed on the same grounds as enumerated at serial nos. 3 to 6 above. 6. On hearing Mr. Madan Mohan Prasad at some length, I am unable to find any substance or merit in any of the grounds as enumerated above. The first two grounds are quite misconceived and these overlook the fact that under the statutory rules governing the petitioners service the normal age of retirement is 58 years and the extension in the age of retirement upto 60 years is made available only in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of All India Judges Association (supra). However, the extension in the age of retirement is subject to certain, conditions laid down in the same judgment which requires the High Court to screen every Judicial Officer reaching the age of 58 years for that purpose. However, the extension in the age of retirement is subject to certain, conditions laid down in the same judgment which requires the High Court to screen every Judicial Officer reaching the age of 58 years for that purpose. It is thus obvious that in case the High Court did not find an officer suitable for being allowed the extension in the age of retirement, as in the case of the present petitioner, he would retire, without requiring anything more, on attaining the age of 58 years under the statutory, rules governing the service. 7. Further, the decision in Rajat Baran Roy (supra) was given in an altogether different set of statutory rules as in force in the State of West Bengal and the decision in that case has no application to the Judicial Officers in this State. 8. As regards the grounds enumerated at serial nos. 3, 4 and 5 above I am unable to find any substance or merit in those grounds either. On a careful consideration of the writ petitions and the counter affidavit bringing on record the relevant materials from the service record of the petitioner I am unable to hold that the High Courts decision not to give super time scale of pay to the petitioner and not to allow him to continue in service beyond 58 years of age either suffered from malafide in law or could be said to be perverse, unreasonable or arbitrary. It may be noted here that this court is not sitting in appeal over the assessment made by the High Court on its administrative side concerning the petitioners suitability for being given the promotion to the super time scale of pay or concerning his fitness for being retained in service beyond the age of 58 years. No irregularity could be pointed out to us in the decision making process which would warrant an interference by this court in this matter. 9. As regards the last point regarding the violation of a principle of natural justice I find that to be equally without substance. It is well established that while considering an officer for grant of promotion to a selection post or for extension of the age of retirement in terms of the Supreme Court judgment it is not needed to give him a show cause or allow him an opportunity of oral hearing etc. 10. It is well established that while considering an officer for grant of promotion to a selection post or for extension of the age of retirement in terms of the Supreme Court judgment it is not needed to give him a show cause or allow him an opportunity of oral hearing etc. 10. In the result, I find that the two writ petitions filed by the petitioner are devoid of any substance or merit and no relief can be granted to the petitioner by this Court. These two writ petitions are accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of the case, without any costs. Shiva Kirti Singh, J. 11 I agree.