JUDGMENT 1. - The instant writ petition has been filed for quashing of the land acquisition proceedings initiated by Section 4 Notifications dated 12-3-87 under the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (hereinafter called "the Act, 1953"); and dated 4-8-87 under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called "the Act, 1894") and Section 6 Declaration dated 27-11-87 under the Act, 1894 as well as the proceedings subsequent thereto. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioners claim to be in actual physical possession of the land measuring 14,575 square yards in Churu city situated adjacent to the Government P. K. Bagla Higher Secondary School, Churu. Regarding the title of the said land, there has been some dispute between the petitioners and Balmukund Bagla Charitable Trust, Churu. The Trust wanted to dispossess the petitioners from the land in dispute but could not succeed. There had, also, been attempts to dispossess the petitioners by the Government under the provisions of the Rajasthan Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1964 (hereafter called "the Act, 1964"), on the ground that the Trust had handed over the land to the Government for the purpose of making a playground for the said school but that attempt also tailed as the Statutory Authority, vide order dated 27-12-85, held that the provisions of the Act of 1964 were not attracted as it was not a public land. The appeal preferred by the State Government against the said judgment/order dated 27- 12.85 is said to be pending before the learned District Judge, Churu. The Government issued a Notification under Section 4 of the Act, 1953 in respect of the land in dispute and the same was published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated 26-3- 87 (Annexure-2). No proceedings were taken in pursuance of the said Section 4 Notification, however, the said Notification stood superseded by another Notification under Section 4 of the Act, 1894, which was published in the local news papers on 19-10-87 (Annexure-3). Petitioners alleged that Section 4 Notification was not published in the gazette nor its wide publicity was given in the local area. The substance of the Declaration under Section 6 was published on 27-11-87 in the local news papers and it also provided that as the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Act had been resorted to, the provisions of Section 5-A . stood dispensed with. The substance of the Declaration under Section 6 was published on 27-11-87 in the local news papers and it also provided that as the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Act had been resorted to, the provisions of Section 5-A . stood dispensed with. Petitioners received a notice under Section 9 to file their reply regarding the valuation of the land, which they filed on 10- 3-88 and 21-3-88. There is further disputed question of fact whether the possession over the land had been taken by the Authority after resorting to urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Act, or whether the petitioners forcibly took possession after the possession had been taken by the Government invoking the extraordinary power. 3. The writ petition has been filed on the following grounds : "(1) That no valid notice under Section 4 required by the Land Acquisition Act was ever issued by the State Government. The Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 stood repealed with effect from 24th September, 1984. Thereafter Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act ceased to be a law. The Notification Ex. 2 dated 12-3-87 published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated 26-3-87 is therefore a nullity in the eye of law and acquisition proceedings cannot be taken under the said Notice. Moreover, this Notice was specifically superseded vide Notice Ex. 3 published in Kesari Weekly published from Churu dated 19th October, 1987. The Notice dated 12-3-87 cannot be relied upon by the State Government for the purpose of acquisition proceedings of the land in dispute. (2) That notice dated 4-8-87 published in Kesari dated 19-10-87 Ex. 2 was not published in the Rajasthan Gazette nor was it published in two daily news papers in circulation at Churu. This notice was not published in any daily news paper. Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended by the 1984. Amendment, requires that the notice under Section 4 (1) should be published in the official gazette and two daily news papers in circulation in area. The Collector also did not comply with the provisions of Section 4. He did not issue any public notice under Section 4 published in Churu Kesari. Thus there was no valid notice under Section 4 and in the absence of valid notice under Section 4, no valid declaration under Section 6 can be issued by the State Government. The Collector also did not comply with the provisions of Section 4. He did not issue any public notice under Section 4 published in Churu Kesari. Thus there was no valid notice under Section 4 and in the absence of valid notice under Section 4, no valid declaration under Section 6 can be issued by the State Government. (3) That there is no valid declaration under Section 6 also. A declaration under Section 6 is required to be published in the official gazette as directed by sub-section (2) of Section 6. Declaration under Section 6 has been published only in a weekly news paper Yuvak published from Churu. It has not been published in the Rajasthan Gazette. (4) That in the notice Exs. 5 and 6, there is a reference to the Notification dated 30-10-87 but the declaration published in the Yuvak is dated 21-11-87. No other declaration under Section 6 has been published. Therefore, there is no valid declaration under Section 6 and the proceedings for acquisition are illegal and void. No notice under Section 6 could be issued. (5) That in the absence of the valid Notifications under Sections 4 and 6, no notice under Section 9 could be issued and the acquisition proceedings taken under Section 9 for taking possession are absolutely without jurisdiction and void. (6) That a perusal of the declarations made in Section 6 and the order passed by the Land Acquisition officer will show that there is no genuine purpose for the acquisition of the land. The proceedings taken for evicting the petitioners from the land through the Estate officer and subsequently these proceedings clearly show that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act are being utilised only for the purpose of evicting the petitioners from the land and there is no genuine need for the acquisition." 4. Respondents No. 1 and 2 have submitted their reply. Respondents No. 3 and 4 filed an application for impleadment and got themselves impleaded as they had not been arrayed as respondents by the petitioners, and thereafter they have also filed the reply. 5. I have considered the rival submissions made by the parties and it is desirable to decide the issues ground-wise.Ground No. 1:- 6. It has been urged that the Act, 1953 stood repelled with effect from 24-9-84 and the said Act ceased to be effective. 5. I have considered the rival submissions made by the parties and it is desirable to decide the issues ground-wise.Ground No. 1:- 6. It has been urged that the Act, 1953 stood repelled with effect from 24-9-84 and the said Act ceased to be effective. Therefore, the Notification under Section 4 of the Act, 1953 dated 12-3- 87 published in the gazette on 26-3-87, was a nullity. As the said Notification stood superseded by another notification issued under the Act, 1894 and the said notification specifically provides that it supersedes the said notification under the 1953 Act, the ground taken by the petitioners is untenable as there is no legal bar in issuing a fresh notification under Section 4 of the Act superseding the earlier one and abandoning the proceedings under the same. 7. In Raghunath v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1988 SC 1615 , the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : "It appears that between the date of withdrawal of the earlier writ petition (namely, 23rd August, 1983) and the issue of the second declaration under Section 6 (namely, 4-4-1985), the Government had issued a fresh notification under Section 4 for the acquisition of certain lands. The lands in the two notifications under Section 4 do not completely overlap but it appears that some fields are common in both. No declaration under Section 6 appears to have been issued in furtherance of the second notification under Section 4 when the High Court heard the matter. Learned counsel for the petitioner points out that, at least in respect of such of the lands comprised in the Section 4 notification dated 22-6-1982 as are also covered by the subsequent notification under Section 4, it is legitimate to infer that the State Government has superseded the earlier notification by the latter one. This contention is clearly well founded. We would, therefore, like to make it clear that in respect of the lands covered by the first notification under Section 4 which are also covered by or comprised in, the second notification under Section 4, further proceedings regarding acquisition should be taken, in accordance with law, only in pursuance of the latter notification and the proceedings initiated in respect of such lands by the first notification dated 22-8-1982 should be deemed to have been superseded." 8. The said judgment was considered and affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. v. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) (1990) 1 SCC 59 . Thus, the first ground is untenable and is based on ill-advice.Ground No. 2:- 9. The allegation made therein is that Section 4 Notification has not been published in the official gazette and, therefore, the proceedings, without the required publication, are void. The legal issue raised by the petitioners is full of substance as no proceedings under the Act, 1894 can be initiated without publishing Notification under Section 4 in the official gazette. 10. In Khoob Chand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1074 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that as the Act provides for compulsory acquisition and deprive a person of his property, the provisions of the statute must be construed strictly. Similarly, in Narendrajeet Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1971 SC 306 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: "Any notification which is the first step towards depriving a man of his property must be strictly construed and Courts ought not to tolerate any lapse on the part of the acquiring Authority in the issue of such notification if it be of a serious nature." 11. Similar view was reiterated in Navinderjit Singh v. State of U. P., AIR 1973 SC 552 . 12. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mahendra Lai Jaini v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 1019 , while examining the requirement of publication of notification in the official Gazette under the provisions of the Indian Forests Act, 1927, has categorically held as under : "Now, a notification under Section 4 of the Act is required to be published in the Gazette and unless it is so published, it is of no effect." 13. The judgment in Mahendra Lai Jaini (supra) was relied upon by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Collector (District Magistrate), Allahabad v. Raja Ram Jaiswal, AIR 1985 SC 1622 , wherein the Court held as under:- "Assuming that a notification in the official Gazette is a formal expression of the decision of the Government, the decision of the Government is hardly relevant unless it takes the concrete shape and form by publication in the official Gazette. Where a decision of the Government to be effective and valid, has to be notified in the Government Gazette, the decision itself does not become effective unless a notification in the official Gazette follows." 14. A Division Bench of this Court, in Anil Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1998 Raj 202 , placing reliance upon a large number of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held that publication in the local news papers of the substance of Section 4 Notification or Declaration under Section 6 is of no consequence unless the same is being published in the official gazette first. 15. However, here the factual position seems to be different as the petitioners themselves had filed an application for amendment of the writ petition contending therein that Section 4 Notification and the Declaration under Section 6 had been published in the official gazette and they were not aware of it and, therefore, they may be allowed to amend the writ petition annexing the said notification and Declaration and the same be quashed. The said application was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 5-9-95 and that order has become final. While dismissing the said application, this Court observed as under : " .............Now in 1995, after seven years of the institution of the writ petition, application for amendment has been filed stating that the petitioners were not aware of notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and they came to know only in 1995, they therefore, seek to amend the petition to include their challenge to the notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. In view of the fact that news paper cuttings of publication of this notification have been annexed rightly in 1988 and the submission that the petitioners only came to know in the year 1995 is false on the face of it. The application for amendment is hopelessly belated and is dismissed........." 16. In view of the application filed by the petitioners for amendment, this ground has no legs to stand; it rather shows that petitioners did not approach this Court with clean hands and have suppressed the material facts and obtained the interim order. This Court has already recorded the finding of facts that these averments are false. However, this aspect shall be dealt with at a later stage.Ground No. 3. 4 and 5:- 17. This Court has already recorded the finding of facts that these averments are false. However, this aspect shall be dealt with at a later stage.Ground No. 3. 4 and 5:- 17. In these grounds, petitioners have alleged that Section 6 Declaration has not been published in the gazette and, therefore, the land acquisition proceedings vitiate. In view of the contention raised by the petitioners in their application for amendment, referred to above, these grounds are baseless and not worth considering.Ground No. 6 : 18. In this ground, the petitioners have alleged that the notification has been issued under Section 4 with mala fide intention just to dispossess the petitioners as the respondents had met their water-loo in the proceedings under the Act of 1964 and, thus, the proceedings are colourable exercise of power and stand vitiated. 19. In Broen v. Amulgamated Engineering Unit, (1971) Q.B. 175, at p. 190 , it has been observed as under : "...........The statutory body must be guided by relevant consideration and not by irrelevant. If the decision is influenced by extraneous consideration, which it ought not to have taken into account, then the decision cannot stand. No matter that the statutory body may have acted in good faith : nevertheless the decision will be set-aside." 20. The is no manner of doubt that the public authorities and the Government are bound to act reasonably and fairly and each action of such authorities must pass the test of reasonableness and whenever action taken is found to be lacking bona fide and made in colourable exercise of the power, the Court should not hesitate to strike down such unfair and unjust proceedings. (Vide Hansraj H. Jain v. State of Maharashtra, (1993) 3 SCC 634 ) . 21. In fact the order of the State or State in strumentality would stand vitiated if it lacks bona fides as it would only be a case of colourable exercise of power. In State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1980 SC 319 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the issue of legal malice which is just different from the concept of personal vice. The Court observed as under: "When the custodian of power is influenced in its exercise by considerations outside those for promotion of which the power is vested, the Court calls it a colourable exercise and is undeceived by illusion. The Court observed as under: "When the custodian of power is influenced in its exercise by considerations outside those for promotion of which the power is vested, the Court calls it a colourable exercise and is undeceived by illusion. In a broad, blurred sense, Benjamin Disraeli was not off the mark even in law when he stated : 'I repeat ........ that all power is a trust that, from the people, also springs, and all must exist,' Fraud on power voids the order if it is not exercised bona fide for the end designed. Fraud in this contest is not equal to moral turpitude and embraces all cases in which the action impugned is to affect some object which is beyond the purpose and intent to the power, whether this be malice-laden or even benign. If the purpose is corrupt the resultant act is bad. If considerations, foreign to the scope of the power or extraneous to the statute, enter the verdict or impels the action mala fides or fraud on power vitiates the........... official act." 22. It is, thus, well settled that the minimum and bare requirement of Rule of Law is that every action of the State should be free from arbitrariness as denial of the "administrative fairness is constitutional anathema." Article 14 of the Constitution of India strikes in arbitrariness in such action and ensures reasonableness and fairness. (Vide E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 ; Maneka Sanjay Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 ; Rammana D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 ; Raja Ram Jaiswal ( AIR 1985 SC 1622 ) (supra) and Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi, AIR 1991 SC 537 ) . 23. The issue of "malus animus" was considered in Tara Chand Khatri v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1977 SC 567 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court would be justified in refusing to carry on investigation into the allegation of mala fides, if necessary particulars of the charge making out a prima facie case are not given in the writ petition and burden of establishing mala fide lies very heavily on the person who alleges it and there must be sufficient material to establish 'malus animus.' 24. Similarly, in E. P. Royappa (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under : "Secondly, we must not also overlook that the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it....... The Court would, therefore, be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. Such is the judicial perspective in evaluating charges of unworthy conduct against ministers and others, not because of any special status.......... but because otherwise, functioning effectively would become difficult in a democracy." 25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 65 ; and Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosain, AIR 1987 SC 294 ; has made similar observations. 26. In M. Shankarnarayana v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1993 SC 763 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the Court may "draw a reasonable inference of mala fide from the facts pleaded and establish. But such inference must be based on factual matrix and such factual matrix cannot remain in the realm of institution, surmise or conjecture." 27. In N. K. Singh v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 98 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that "The inference of mala fides should be drawn by reading in between the lines and taking into account the attendant circumstances." 28. There has to be very strong and convincing evidence to establish the allegations of mala fides. The presumption is in favour of the bona fides of the order unless contradicted by acceptable material. (Vide State of U. P. v. Dr. V. N. Prasad, 1995 (Suppl.) 2 SCC 151 ; Arvind Dattatraya Dhande v. State of Maharashtra (1997) 6 SCC 169 ; and Utkal University v. Dr. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi, (1999) 2 SCC 193 . 29. In an identical case, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Land Acquisition Collector v. Durga Pada Mukherjee, AIR 1990 SC 1678 , has held as under:- ' "Learned counsel for the respondents urged that they were really entitled to a finding of mala fides on the part of the State Government but we find ourselves unable to agree with him. The burden, as he concedes, was squarely on the respondents to prove colourable exercise of power...... The burden, as he concedes, was squarely on the respondents to prove colourable exercise of power...... and we do not think that the same could be said to have been discharged by a mere allegation in that behalf which has been denied by the State." 30. Same view had been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Abdul Hussain Tayabali v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1968 SC 432 . 31. The respondents No. 3 and 4 got themselves impleaded by making an application for impleadment. Petitioners did not implead them nor any authority or person has been impleaded by name. It is settled proposition of law that allegations of mala fide cannot be considered unless a person, against whom the allegations are made, is impleaded by name for the reasons that the said person must be given an opportunity to meet the accusation. (Vide J. M. Banawalikar v. Municipal Corporation, Delhi, AIR 1996 SC 326 ; State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma, 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 222 ; I. K. Mishra v. Union of India (1997) 6 SCC 228 , and All India State Bank officers Federation v. Union of India (1996) 8 JT (SC) 550) . 32. Further, petitioners have not pleaded their case properly. Neither there are proper allegations nor any evidence has been placed on record in their support. A party is under a legal obligation to plead and prove its case by adducing sufficient evidence in support of the allegations/averments. (vide Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1988 SC 2181 ; Larsen and Toubro v. State of Gujarat (1998) 4 SCC 387 ; National Building Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan (1998) 7 SCC 66 ; and Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani (1999) 1 SCC 141 ) . 33. Making oral submission putting reliance on the documents (Annexure. R/ 3) filed by the respondents showing that the Trust had agreed to hand-over the building after constructing it to the Government school if the land is acquired by the State under the Act of 1984, does not meet the requirement of law. 34. Thus, all the grounds taken by the petitioners are preposterous. The petition is totally misconceived. R/ 3) filed by the respondents showing that the Trust had agreed to hand-over the building after constructing it to the Government school if the land is acquired by the State under the Act of 1984, does not meet the requirement of law. 34. Thus, all the grounds taken by the petitioners are preposterous. The petition is totally misconceived. Petitioners may be the "persons interested" or "persons aggrieved", they may have a legitimate right to claim the compensation but that issue is to be decided by the Statutory Authorities while exercising their powers under Section 18 or 32 of the Act, 1894. Petitioners obtained the interim order from this Court by suppressing the material facts. Their conduct cannot be approved as they had been bent upon to assert the factum that Notification under Section 4 and Declaration under Section 6 of the Act, 1894, had never been published in the official gazette and said averments have already been found by this Court to be false. Thus, it is evident from their conduct that they have not approached this Court with clean hands, which every litigant is expected to do. It is settled proposition of law that when a person approaches the Court of Equity in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article. 226 of the Constitution, he should approach the Court not only with clean hands but with clean mind, clean heart and clean objective also. (Vide The Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 852 ; and K. R. Srinivas v. R. M. Premchand, (1994) 6 SCC 620 ) . Thus, there should be no suppression of material facts by the litigants. 35. In G. Narainswamy Reddy v. Government of Karnataka, AIR 1991 SC 1726 , the Apex Court observed as under : "It is well settled in law that the relief under Article 136 of the Constitution is discretionary and a petitioner who approaches this Court for such relief must come with frank and full disclosure of facts. If he fails to do so and suppresses material facts, his application is liable to be dismissed." 36. In Welcome Hotel v. State of andhra Pradesh, (1983) 4 SCC, 575 , the Apex Court held that if a party obtained an interim order by misleading the Court, it would be disentitled for any relief in equity jurisdiction. If he fails to do so and suppresses material facts, his application is liable to be dismissed." 36. In Welcome Hotel v. State of andhra Pradesh, (1983) 4 SCC, 575 , the Apex Court held that if a party obtained an interim order by misleading the Court, it would be disentitled for any relief in equity jurisdiction. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Naraindas v. Government of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 1252 , has held as under : "Now, there can be no doubt that if a wrong or misleading statement is deliberately and wilfully made by a party to a litigation with a view to obtain a favourable order, it would prejudice or interfere with the due process of judicial proceeding and, thus, amounts to contempt of Court." 37. Similar view has subsequently been reiterated by the Apex Court in the Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M/s. M. P. Khair Industries, AIR 1980 SC 946 ; and Delhi Development Authority v. Skippers Construction (1995) 3 SCC 507 . 38. Thus, "abuse of process of the Court calculated to hamper the due course of judicial proceeding or orderly administration of justice" is a contempt of Court and if the instant case is examined in the light of judgments referred to above, petitioner can be held guilty of contempt of Court as they had obtained the interim order by misleading the Court contending that Notification under Section 4 and Declaration under Section 6 had not been published in the official gazette. 39. There can be no quarrel on the legal proposition that no party can suffer by the action of the l Court. The maxim "Actus Curie neminem gravabit" is applicable in such a case, which means that the act of the Curt shall prejudice no one. When the High Court is exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralised. The institution of litigation by a party should not be permitted to confer an unfair advantage on the party responsible for it. When the High Court is exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralised. The institution of litigation by a party should not be permitted to confer an unfair advantage on the party responsible for it. (Vide Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Income-tax officer, AIR 1980 SC 656 ; Ram Krishna Verma v. State of U. P., AIR 1992 SC 1888 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v. M. V. Vyavsaya and Co., (1997) 1 SCC 156 ; and Smt. Rampati Jayaswal v. State of U. P., AIR 1997 All 170 ) . 40. In view of the above the petition is dismissed with costs which is quantified at Rs. 10,000 (Rs. ten thousand only). The interim order stands vacated.Petition dismissed. *******