Honniah, J.- The appellant Gavisiddappa has been convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for the murder of his wife Shivalingavva on the 7th January, 1965 in Survey No. 36 of Kukonapalli village. He has also been convicted under section 309, Indian Penal Code. But in view of the life sentence passed against the appellant under section 302. Indian Penal Code, the famed Sessions Judge passed no order of sentence for the offence under section 309, Indian Penal Code. The appellant has been convicted by the Sessions Judge, Raichur, on his plea of guilty. The case against the appellant was that he murdered his wife and thereafter attempted to commit sucide by stabbing himself. His plea, as recorded, is as follows; "Guilty. It is true that I killed my wife. She was immoral. Having seen her in an act of adultery with my own eyes, I killed her. Then I stabbed myself." The appellant has preferred this appeal through the Superintendent of Central Jail, Bellary, against the said conviction and. sentence. Mr. Devaraj, the learned Counsel, who appeared for the appellant in this Court as amicus curiae, at our request, has urged that the conviction of the appellant is illegal on the grounds: (1) that the statement made by the appellant is not an unequivocal admission of the fact that he committed the murder of his wife to make him liable under section 302 Indian Penal Code, as at best the statement amounted to a plea that he killed his wife on grave and sudden provocation when he found her in the act of co-habiting with another person, and (2) that the learned Judge should not have accepted the plea of guilty and based, a conviction against the appellant in a serious case like this in which an accused has been charged for murder. In order to appreciate these contentions raised by Mr. Devaraj, it is necessary to quote the brief judgment of the learned Sessions Judge. It reads thus: "The accused pleads guilty to the charges levelled against him. He has stated that he killed his wife as she was leading an immoral life. Then in regard to suicide he has stated that he got himself struck in the heat of the moment. I, therefore, hold him guilty of murder and as well as guilty Under section 309, Indian Penal Code. He has stated that he killed his wife as she was leading an immoral life. Then in regard to suicide he has stated that he got himself struck in the heat of the moment. I, therefore, hold him guilty of murder and as well as guilty Under section 309, Indian Penal Code. The accused impressed me as straightforward, person and it may be that his wife was infidel to him. No husband, kills his wife for the sake of fun. As such I am inclined to pass lesser punishment provided for under section 302, Indian Penal Code. I felt Tike taking some action under section 401, Criminal Procedure Code, in respect of the accused but since I did not find any material in the record of this case, to show that the deceased was disloyal and as such I leave this matter of commutation to the Jail Committee. I, therefore, proceed to pass the following Order.-The accused is guilty under section 302, Indian Penal Code. [ therefore sentence him to undergo life imprisonment. In view of the life sentence passed by me against the accused under section 302, Indian Penal Code, I pass no order of sentence under section 309, Indian Penal Code. Mangalsutra and nose-ring to be returned to the accused. The other properties being valueless, are ordered to be destroyed under section 517, Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Sessions Judge has not at all noticed the entire plea of the appellant. The most important circumstance pleaded by the appellant has been omitted. The plea of the appellant that he committed the murder of bis wife on grave and sudden provocation when he found her cohabiting with another person, if had been noticed by the learned Sessions Judge, in all probability, he would not have convicted the appellant under section 302, Indian Penal Code. His failure to notice it undoubtedly has resulted in miscarriage of justice and in the conviction of the appellant. Under section 271 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, an accused person may be convicted on his plea of guilty. It is, however, a settled practice not to accept the plea of guilty in a murder case unless the Court is satisfied that the accused knew exactly what was implied by his plea of guilty and its effect. The causing of death of another person will not necessarily be a murder. It is, however, a settled practice not to accept the plea of guilty in a murder case unless the Court is satisfied that the accused knew exactly what was implied by his plea of guilty and its effect. The causing of death of another person will not necessarily be a murder. It will amount to murder, if it is done with the particular knowledge or intention stated in section 300, Indian Penal Code. Even though death may have been caused, it may, in certain circumstances, amount to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. It may amount to grievous hurt and sometimes it may even amount to simple hurt. The natural sequence of accepting the plea of guilty in a capital charge will normally mean the sentence of death. It is, therefore, desirable that the Court should not ordinarily exercise its power under section 271 of the Code of Criminal Procedure unless it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused understood the effect of his plea of guilty and that plea amounted to a plea of guilty to the murder charge. Our attention has been drawn to various reported cases in which it has been held that the plea of guilty in a case of murder should not be accepted. For instance in Netai Luskar v. Queen Empress1, it was held that the accused’s statement represented as a whole did not amount to a plea of guilty to a charge of murder since it was coupled with an explanatory statement that the accused had killed his wife under grave and sudden provocation and therefore a full trial was ordered. In Byrica (Prisoner) v. The Government2, the facts were that a prisoner accused of murder when the charge was read over to him in the Sessions Court stated: “Intending to cause his death I cut off his neck and intentionally caused his death” He was then examined by the Sessions Judge and confessed that he killed the deceased. He was thereupon convicted by the Judge, without assessors being called, and sentenced to death on his own plea of guilty. Therein it was held by the Chief Court: “The plea was not one of guilty. He was thereupon convicted by the Judge, without assessors being called, and sentenced to death on his own plea of guilty. Therein it was held by the Chief Court: “The plea was not one of guilty. The admission of a few facts though they may amount to and constitute the offence technically known as murder is not by itself sufficient to be regarded as a plea of guilty such as would deprive the accused of the right of trial. The rules of Criminal Procedure are very clearly laid down in sections 271 and 272 of the Code (Act X of 1822). The case was clearly one in which the prisoner had not pleaded. The Judge ought therefore to have followed the course of proceeding to the trial with the help of assessors. His omission to do so resulted in the prisoner’s conviction without a trial and without his plea of guilty or in other words his admission that he committed the offence.” In Queen Empress v. Bhadu3, it was held that in capital cases where there is any doubt as to whether an accused person fully understands the meaning and effect of a plea of guilty it is advisable for the Court to take evidence and not to convict solely on the plea of the accused. In Rukkapujary v. Government of Mysore4, it was pointed out that a conviction of murder is so very serious that it is generally recognised that if an accused person pleads guilty to a charge of murder, nevertheless a plea of not guilty should be entered for him in order that all the evidence in the case may be before the Court and that it may be fully threshed out. In Government v. Venkataramana5, the 2nd, 3rd and 4th accused had been convicted of murder on their plea of guilty. They had simply admitted, what they knew regarding the death of one Sanna Rama and left it to the Court to decide whether they were guilty of murder and what punishment they deserved. Their Lordships held on those facts that the accused should, therefore, be deemed to have pleaded not guilty and their conviction and their plea of guilty must be set aside and they must be ordered to be retried. Their Lordships held on those facts that the accused should, therefore, be deemed to have pleaded not guilty and their conviction and their plea of guilty must be set aside and they must be ordered to be retried. In Emperor v. Chinia Bhika Koli6, it was held that it is not in accordance with the usual practice to accept a plea of guilty in a case where the natural sequence would be a sentence of death. In Dalli v. Emperor7, it was pointed out that in a case of murder it has long been the practice not to accept the plea of guilty. After all murder is a mixed question of fact and law and unless the Court is perfectly satisfied that the accused knew exactly what was necessarily implied by his plea of guilty, the case should be tried. In Lahori v. Emperor1, the facts were that the accused was undoubtedly a man of very considerable intelligence, and having beyond question jailed a woman, made a few hours later, on the same day, a perfectly clear statement about the facts, and later, on the day after the crime, gave to a Magistrate of the first class the must clear and convincing account of the whole occurrence, and stated as a preliminary to it that he knew that he could be convicted on his own statement. Before the Sessions Judge he agreed that he had made the two statements referred to above, and he pleaded guilty and said he killed the woman with the chopper produced and the reason for killing her was jealousy. The accused elaborated in his petition of appeal to the High Court, the statement he had made before the Sessions Judge to the effect that he had killed the woman out of jealousy. That document gave rise to the bare possibility that the accused might be able to put forward some ground for the application of section 304 of the Indian Penal Code. That document gave rise to the bare possibility that the accused might be able to put forward some ground for the application of section 304 of the Indian Penal Code. It was held that though there was before the Sessions Judge enough material to make him perfectly confident as to the guilt of the accused, yet in view of the contents of his petition of appeal to the High Court, the safer and better course would be to return the case to the Sessions Judge with a direction to him to put accused up for trial again, to take his plea, and whether that be guilty or not guilty to hear the whole of the evidence in relation to the case. In Hasaruddin Mohommad v. Emperor2, it was ruled that the trial of an accused person does not necessarily end if he pleads guilty but evidence may and should be taken in cases of murder as if the plea had been one of not guilty and case decided upon the whole of the evidence including the accused’s plea.‘It is nor in accordance with the usual practice a plea of guilty in a case where the natural sequence would be a sentence of death. In Achar Sanghar v. Emperor3, it was held that under section 271 if an accused person pleads guilty he may be convicted upon his plea. But there are cases in which this course is not advisable. Evidence should be taken where the crime on. the face of it appears to have been murder. In Viswanath v. King Emperor4, it was pointed out that although under section 271 (2), Criminal Procedure Code, an accused may be convicted on his plea of guilty, it is desirable that a Court should not accept his plea of guilty in a murder case unless it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused understood the effect of his plea. In re, Sundararaju5, it was held that it was necessary for the Judge to take evidence even though the accused pleaded guilty in grave offences like murder. Some more decisions were cited at the Bar, which in effect lay down the same principle as enunciated in the cases cited above and therefore it is unnecessary to refer to them. In re, Sundararaju5, it was held that it was necessary for the Judge to take evidence even though the accused pleaded guilty in grave offences like murder. Some more decisions were cited at the Bar, which in effect lay down the same principle as enunciated in the cases cited above and therefore it is unnecessary to refer to them. The above decisions are clear authority for the position that where the accused pleads guilty to a charge of murder and the Judge is satisfied that the accused understands fully the implications of his plea, then the plea must be recorded. After recording the plea, it is open to the Judge either to convict or not to convict the accused upon that plea, and as a matter of practice it is desirable to proceed with the trial as if the plea was one of not guilty, lest the evidence may disclose that the facts proved do not, in law, constitute an offence of murder but some lesser offence. We are told that in England, where the Court does not think it expedient in the interest of the accused, to convict him upon his own confession, for example, where the charge is one of murder, the usual procedure is to advise him to withdraw his plea of guilty and to plead not guilty. In the instant case the expression ‘I killed’ did not amount to an admission of having committed murder. The expression “I killed my wife” is coupled with other statements showing beyond doubt that the accused did not intend to admit facts which amount in the eye of the law to murder. The simple question that arises on the facts of this case is whether killing is equivalent and tantamount to murder. Most certainly it is not, otherwise, culpable homicide not amounting to murder would be an unmeaning expression. - If, to a plea of guilty, the accused happens to add some statement which seems so to qualify the plea as to raise doubts whether it is not, in substance, a plea of not guilty, the Court may take all into account in order to decide the nature of the plea. - If, to a plea of guilty, the accused happens to add some statement which seems so to qualify the plea as to raise doubts whether it is not, in substance, a plea of not guilty, the Court may take all into account in order to decide the nature of the plea. We desire to observe that we cannot too strongly impress upon the Sessions Judge that in a cage under section 302, Indian Penal Code it is not desirable to accept a plea of guilty and bring the trial to an end thereon. Following the rulings of the various Courts cited above, we set aside the conviction and sentence passed against the accused and direct that the accused be retried. S.V.S. ----- Conviction set aside; retrial ordered.