Honble SINGH, J.–Heard Shri Rajendra Vyas, Additional Advocate General, Shri M.S. Singhvi, counsel for Shri B.L. Shishodia, Advocate and Shri Ladu Ram Toshniwal contemner who appeared in person. (2). This proceeding under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was initiated against Shri Ladu Ram Toshniwal, contemner, on a reference made by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge No.1, Chittorgarh. (3). The facts of the case may be briefly summarised as below: (4). There is an ancient historical Fort in District Chittorgarh. The said Fort is being look after by Archeological Department, Survey of India. According to the contemner Ladu Ram, a society known as "Chittor Durg Vikas Parishad was created at the instance of the then Collector, Chittorgarh. The said society started collecting Rs.20/-per visitor, Rs.20/-per tempo, Rs.25/-per jeep/car, Rs.50/-per mini-bus and Rs.100/-per foreign-visitor, with effect from 27.1.1997, at the barrier near `Navlakha Bhandar . The contemner Ladu Ram and three other persons,namely. Chand Mal Garg, Advocate, Chittorgarh, Chandra Prakash Kumawat resident of Chittorgarh and Khumraj Mal Kumawat,Advocate, Chittorgarh filed a Civil Suit in the court of Civil Judge (JD), Chittorgarh after obtaining permission of the court under Section 80(2) of the Civil Procedure Code and an application under Order 39 rules 1 and 2 was also, filed. The Civil Suit was registered at S.No.80/1997 and the application for temporary injunction was registered at S.No.80/1997. The reply of the application for temporary injunction was filed on behalf of defendants No.3, 4, 5 and 6. In reply, it was admitted by defendants no.3, 4, 5 and 6 that the society in the name of `Chittor Durg Vikas Parishad was created and was registered and it was decided that voluntary contributions from the visitors be collected and the amount of contributions should be utilized for better maintenance of Chittorgarh Fort and historical monuments situated therein and the activities of the said society were in public interest. The application for temporary injunction was dismissed by Shri Shivcharanji Bhushan, R.J.S., Civil Judge(JD), Chittorgarh by or-der dated 22.7.97. An appeal against the order dated 22.7.97 was filed in the court of the Additional District & Sessions Judge No.1, Chittorgarh. Shri Ladu Ram Toshniwal, the contemner filed written arguments running in as many as four typed pages in the court of the Additional District & Sessions Judge No.1 Chittorgarh. He personally appeared on the date of hearing. An appeal against the order dated 22.7.97 was filed in the court of the Additional District & Sessions Judge No.1, Chittorgarh. Shri Ladu Ram Toshniwal, the contemner filed written arguments running in as many as four typed pages in the court of the Additional District & Sessions Judge No.1 Chittorgarh. He personally appeared on the date of hearing. After going through the contents of the written arguments filed by Shri Ladu Ram Toshniwal on 28.1.98 and considering the application, dated 20.2.98 filed by Shri Bhanwar Lal Advocate, the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge No.1, Chittorgarh, made a reference under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act to this Court on 18.3.1998. In the reference, the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge No.1 has stated that Shri Bhanwar Lal, Advocate is the counsel for the defendants no. 6,7 and 8. The learned Additional District Judge No.1 has further stated that in the written arguments submitted by Shri Ladu Ram, allegations have been made against Shri Shivcharan Bhushan, Civil Judge (JD), Chittorgarh as well as against Shri Bhanwar Lal, Advocate who is counsel for the defendants No.6,7 and 8. In para no.6 of the reference, the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge No.1 has referred to those portions of the written arguments which in his opinion are contemptuous. The learned Additional District & Sessions Judge No.1, Chittorgarh has further stated in the reference that the contents of the written arguments were published by Ladu Ram before submitting them in the court and the conduct of Shri Ladu Ram was neither bonafide nor protected-by Section 6(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. In view of the conclusion arrived at by him, the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge No.l, Chittorgarh has prayed that action be taken against Shri Ladu Ram under Section 5(2)(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act. (5). After the receipt of the reference made by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge No.1, Chittorgarh, the reference was submitted before Honble the Chief Justice for orders. On 5.4.98, Honble the Chief Justice directed that the reference be listed before the regular bench. On 15.4.1998, the reference and the connected papers were listed before the Division Bench. The Division Bench passed the following order: ``Heard. On 5.4.98, Honble the Chief Justice directed that the reference be listed before the regular bench. On 15.4.1998, the reference and the connected papers were listed before the Division Bench. The Division Bench passed the following order: ``Heard. Issue notice to contemner Ladu Ram Toshniwal to show cause as to why he should not be punished for criminal contempt under Sec.15 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 on the basis of reference made by Additional District & Sessions Judge No-1, Chittorgarh. ADJ No.1, Chittorgarh is directed to ensure service of show cause notice upon contemner Ladu Ram. Notice is made returnable within four weeks from today. Office is also directed to furnish a complete copy of the reference along with materials sent by ADJ No.1, Chittorgarh under Sec.15 of the Contempt of Courts Act to Addl. Advocate General Mr.K.L.Jasmatiya within two weeks from today. (6). It appears that Ladu Ram,the contemner, addressed an application to the Registrar General of this Court on 3.8.98 praying that the reference made by the Additional District & Sessions Judge No.1, Chittorgarh be rejected. That application is on record of this case. (7). The attendance of the contemner could not be secured by issue of notice. Consequently, bailable warrant of arrest were ordered to be issued by order dated 2.7.98. On 23.8.99, Ladu Ram appeared in person. He prayed for an adjournment so that he may engage a counsel of his choice. On 13.9.99, Ladu Ram submitted an application stating that he tenders an apology. The learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the apology was not sincere and bonafide. Shri Ladu Ram again prayed for an adjournment and last opportunity was given to him for engaging a counsel and the case was adjourned to 6.10.99. On 6.10.99, when the case was taken up for hearing, Ladu Ram appeared in person without any counsel. The arguments of both the parties were heard and the judgment was reserved. (8). Shri Ladu Ram again prayed for an adjournment and last opportunity was given to him for engaging a counsel and the case was adjourned to 6.10.99. On 6.10.99, when the case was taken up for hearing, Ladu Ram appeared in person without any counsel. The arguments of both the parties were heard and the judgment was reserved. (8). In this case, three questions arise for determination, (1) Whether Shri Ladu Ram has committed the contempt of the court of Civil Judge (JD), Chittorgarh by making allegations against the Civil Judge in the written arguments filed on 28.1.98, (2) Whether the apology tendered by Ladu Ram is bonafide and sincere and (3) In case Shri Ladu Ram is found guilty of committing contempt of the court of Civil Judge (JD) Chittorgarh and the apology tendered by him is not found to be bonafide, and sincere, what punishment should be imposed on him. Question No.1: (9). The allegation against Ladu Ram is that in his written arguments filed by him on 28.1.98 he made contemptuous statements about the conduct of the subordinate court. In para no.1 of the written statement, following allegation was made by Ladu Ram against the Civil Judge(JD), Chittorgarh: ^^mDr izkFkZuk i= Vh-vkbZ-dk fu.kZ; fnukad 22-8-97 tks fd Jheku~ U;k;ky; ds eftLVªsV lkgc Jh fkopj.kth Hkw"k.k us izkFkZuk i= ds lkFk o kiFk i= ds lkFk yxs gq, nLrkost vkSj dFkuksa ds foijhr xyr vkSj >wBs rdksZa ls ifjiw.kZ Hkz"V ls kadkLin gksdj fu.kZ; fn;k gSA---------- ----------vkSj U;kf;d izfØ;k dks U;k;ky; ds Jheku~ fkopj.kth Hkw"k.k us oS/kkfud rF;ks dks NksM+dj izfrokfn;ksa ds ,oa ftyk/khk egksn; fpRrkSM+x<+ Jh lat; eYgks=k ,oa vU; vfHkHkkodksa ds xyr rdZ Hkz"Vrk ij o xyr rF;ksa ij LokFkZ j[k dj QSlyk fn;k gSA ftuds fuEu dkj.k gSA** (10). After making above mentioned allegations, Ladu Ram proceeded to give reasons. In para nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5, the facts as well as the legal position as was un-derstood by the contemner was stated. After making above mentioned allegations, Ladu Ram proceeded to give reasons. In para nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5, the facts as well as the legal position as was un-derstood by the contemner was stated. In para no.5 of the written arguments following statement was made against the Civil Judge(JD),Chittorgarh:- ^^bl lkjs fookn esa Jh U;k;ky; ds tt egksn;th us oS/kkfud rF;ksa dks cyr rdZ nsdj Hkz"Vrk ,oa dkuwu dh fgTtk dh gSA U;k; iz.kkyh dh e[kksy dh gSA ifjiw.kZ :i ls Hkz"Vkpkj dh laKk dk LiU/k gSA tSlk fd fnukad 14-1-97 dks izfroknh la-7 us tks Jh gjdyky fpiM fpRrkSM+x<+ dk iwathifr gS vkSj fpRrkSM+x<+ esa o fdls ij dkQh HkwekfQ;k dk dke o O;kikj djrk vk jgk gSA tks fd bl laLFkk esa eq[; :i ls ftyk dysDVj ,oa ftyk iqfyl vf/kdkjh ls Hkz"V d`R;ksa ls fyiVk gqvk gSA ftlds izek.k bl okn esa izLrqr djus dh vko;drk ugha gS fdUrq mlus Hkh bl okn dks Hkz"Vrk dk iSlk nsdj okfn;ksa dks euk ys ;k tt dks euk ys ,slh ?kks"k.kk,a djrk vk;k gSA ------mDr okn esa fnukad 4-7-97 o 17-7-97 izfroknh i{k ds bZkkjs ij rkjh[k isfk;ka nh xbZA og Hkh Hkz"V rF; ls kdkLin gSA --------bu lkjh ifLFkfr;ksa dk dkuwu o fu;eksa ds vk/kkj dk U;k;ky; ds tt egksn;th Jh fkopj.kth Hkw"k.k us oS/kkfud jhfr uhfr dks NksM+dj Hkz"Vrk ls izfrokfn;ksa ds bZkkjs ij j[kj[kko ysu nsu djus ds fjokt dks dj ;g xyr QSlyk fn;k gSA blesa dbZ ckrsa ,slh gS ftUgs cgl esa dguk mfpr ugha gSA** (11). In para no.6 of the written arguments, following statement was made by Shri Ladu Ram: ^^fd vxj bl okn esa fd;s tk jgs fØehuy vkWQsal dks Hkh tt egksn;th us xyr izHkko esa vkdj /;ku ugha fn;k -------bl MdSrfxjh dks izkRlkgu] izyksHku vkSj U;kf;d d`R; dks ,d lkbZM NksM+dj Ny Hkjk vkSj rF;ksa ls foijhr xyr QSlyk fn;k gSA bl izdkj ds Jh fkopj.kth Hkw"k.k ds fo:) jktLFkku mPp U;k;ky; esa e; izek.k ds fkdk;r izLrqr dh xbZ gS ftldh dk;Zokgh tqnkxkuk vkSj vfHk;kstd Jh Hkaojyky fllksfn;k tks U;k;ky; ds U;k;k/khkksa dks Ny diV] >wBh rdZ vkSj yksHku nsdj xyr QSlyk djkus dk vkfn jgk gSA ,sls dbZ rdZ o lcwr ge yksxksa ds ikl gS tks bl okn esa gesa isk djus dh vko;drk ugha gSA ;g Hkh Hkaoj yky fllksfn;k gj le; ,MoksdsV :Yl ds foijhr viuh xyr rdksZ dks nsdj U;k;ky; ds le{k U;k; ls xqejkg djkrk vk;k gSA ----------ftlls Hkh ;g lkQ Li"V gS fd ;g QSlyk Hkz"Vkpkj ds vkaxu esa [ksyrk gqvk fuoZ= fn;k x;k gSA** (12). In his application dated 3.8.98 addressed to the Registrar General Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, Shri Ladu Ram Toshniwal tried to justify his conduct. In para. no.5 of, the application, Ladu Ram made following observations against the Additional District & Sessions Judge No.1, Chittorgarh: ^^mDr vkosnu Jh Hkaoj yky fllksfn;k vf/koDrk dk jksc jcko ls xzflr gksdj ;g vihy izkFkZuk i= vki ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; isk fd;k gS ------,slh fLFkfr esa Hk;xzLr gksdj Jh Hkaoj yky fllksfl;k ds ncko ls ;g izkFkZuk i= vki mPp U;k;ky; esa U;k;ky; voekuuk dh dk;Zokgh gsrq izLrqr fd;k gS og xyr gSA** (13). In para no.6 of his application, Shri Ladu Ram Toshniwal made following observation against the Civil Judge (JD), Chittorgarh: ^^bu lkjs jsdkMZ esa Jh U;k;ky; ds tt lkgc Jh fkopj.kth Hkw"k.k us vius fu.kZ; esa dkQh xyrh;k dh gSaA O;fDrikjh nkok ekudj lkoZtfud fgr dks xkS.k dj viuk fu.kZ; fn;k gS vfu;ferrk ml fu.kZ; esa tkucw>dj rdZ nsdj jsdkMZ esa isk fd;s x;s nLrkostksa dk ftØ dks fNikdj fu.kZ; nsus esa tks xyrh dh gSA [kqys okrkoj.k U;k;ky; ds ckgj ifjlj esa vgkrs esa tks kadk mRiUu gqbZ gS og Hkz"Vkpkj dh kadk dks mtkxj djrk gSA** (14). In para no. In para no. 7 of the application, Shri Ladu Ram made following observations against the Civil Judge (JD), Chittorgarh: **------ewy okn ,oa Vh-vkbZ-nj[okLr dh vafre cgl gks tkus ds ckn fnukad 4-7-97 vkSj 17-7-97 ,oa 21-7-97 dh iskh;ksa ij rkjh[ksa iskh;sa cnykbZ xbZA bu iskh;ksa dks cnykus esa izfroknh ,MoksdsV Jh Hkaojyky fllksfn;k ds }kjk vfu;ferrvksa ls U;k;k/khksa ls jksc nckr ds lkFk j[kj[kko dk fjokt dh LFkkiuk djus gsrq ,oa U;kf;d izfØ;k ,oa U;k;ky; dk bUgksaus xyr fu.kZ; djkus ds fopkjks ls ;g fu.kZ; gqvk gSA** (15). The learned Additional Advocate General has submitted that the statements contained in the written arguments dated 28.1.98 and the application dated 3.8.98 are contemptuous and calculated to bring the court of the Civil Judge (JD) and the court of the Additional District & Sessions Judge No.1, Chittorgarh into dis-repute. It is further submitted by him that Shri Ladu Ram Toshniwal, the contemner has cast reflections on the honesty and integrity of the subordinate courts and thereby committed criminal contempt of court of the courts of Additional District & Sessions Judge No.l, Chittorgarh and Civil Judge (JD), Chittorgarh. (16). Shri Ladu Ram Toshniwal, the contemner, submitted that he did not in-tend to commit any contempt of the subordinate courts and that his action was prompted by the motive to serve the public purpose of obtaining the temporary injunction illegal activities of the Chittor Durg Vikas Parishad. (17). In Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha vs. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Anr. (1), the Assistant Registrar of the Co-operative Societies by his order da-ted 15.5.1964 decided the dispute under Section 48 of the Act, upholding the contention of the Bank and making the appellant Jugal Kishore liable for the amount in dispute. An appeal was preferred by Thakur Jugal Kishore to the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies against the order passed by the Assistant Registrar, who was made respondent no.2 in the appeal. One of the grounds of appeal runs as under: ``For that the order of respondent No.2 is mala fide inasmuch as after receiving the order of transfer he singled out this case out of so many for disposal before making over charge and used double standard in judging the charges against the defendants Nos.1 and 2. One of the grounds of appeal runs as under: ``For that the order of respondent No.2 is mala fide inasmuch as after receiving the order of transfer he singled out this case out of so many for disposal before making over charge and used double standard in judging the charges against the defendants Nos.1 and 2. It is prayed that it should be declared that the order of the Assistant Registrar is without jurisdiction, illegal and mala fide and heavy costs should be awarded making respondent No.2 responsible mainly for such costs. (18). The Honble Supreme Court, after considering the words used by the contemner, observed: ``There can be no doubt that the words used in this case in the grounds of appeal clearly amounted to contempt of Court provided the Assistant Registrar was a court and the Contempt of courts Act was applicable to the facts of the case. The Assistant Registrar was charged with having acted mala fide is that he had singled out the case of the appellant out of many for disposal and used a double standard in his adjudication against the appellant and Jagannath Jha clearly meaning thereby that the Assistant Registrar had fallen from the path of rectitude and had gone out of his way in taking up and disposing of the case of the appellant out of many which were-pending before him and which he could not possibly have completed because of his imminent transfer. According to Halsburys Laws of England (Third Edition Vol.8) at p.7: ``Any act done or writing published which is calculated to bring a court or a Judge into, contempt, or to lower his authority, or to interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the court, is a contempt of court. Any episode in the administration of justice may, however, be publicly or privately criticised, provided that the criticism is fair and temperate and made in good faith. The absence of any intention to refer to a court is a material point in favour of a person alleged to be in contempt. We can find nothing exculpatory in the reply to show cause notice filed by the appellant before the Patna High Court. There he sought to justify his complaint made in his grounds of appeal. The criticism of the Assistant Registrar was neither fair nor temperate nor made in good faith. We can find nothing exculpatory in the reply to show cause notice filed by the appellant before the Patna High Court. There he sought to justify his complaint made in his grounds of appeal. The criticism of the Assistant Registrar was neither fair nor temperate nor made in good faith. The obvious aim of the appellant in formulating his ground of appeal in the way it was done was to show that the Assistant Registrar had acted in a manner which was contrary to judicial probity and that he should therefore be penalised in costs. (19). In the same case, the Honble Supreme Court laid down the law in the following words:- ``Generally speaking any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard or to interfere with or prejudice party litigants or their witnesses during their litigation" amounts to contempt of court: see Oswald on Contempts page 6. In order that courts should be able to dispense justice without fear or favour, affection or ill-will, it is essential that litigants who resort to courts should so conduct themselves as not to bring the authority and the administration of law into disrespect or disregard. Neither should they exceed the limits of fair criticism or use language casting aspersions on the probity of the courts or questioning the bona fides of their judgments. This applies equally to all Judges and all litigants irrespective of the status of the Judges, i.e, whether he occupies one of the highest judicial offices in the land or is the presiding officer of a court of very limited jurisdiction. It is in the interests of justice and administration of law that litigants should show the same respect to a court, no matter whether it is highest in the land or whether it is one of inferior jurisdiction only. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 does not define contempt or courts and in the interest of justice any conduct of the kind mentioned above towards any person who can be called a court should be amenable to the jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. (20). In Mohd. Zahir Khan vs. Vijai Singh & Ors. (2), the contemner had made, contemptuous observations against the Honble Judges of the Supreme Court. (20). In Mohd. Zahir Khan vs. Vijai Singh & Ors. (2), the contemner had made, contemptuous observations against the Honble Judges of the Supreme Court. In his written reply to show cause issued to him, he did not regret his conduct: on the contrary he added insult and expressed that he would not pray for bail The contemner was found guilty of contempt of court and was punished. The Honble Supreme Court, while parting with the case, made following observations: ``He deliberately used insulting language to overawe the Court with a view to securing a favourable order. Of late this type of behaviour by litigants appearing in person is on the increase. Such litigants carry the wrong notion that by such behaviour a favourable order can be extracted. If such an impression is gaining ground it needs to be removed at the earliest. As stated earlier it is a painful duty which we are called upon to perform, more so because the contemner had no valid or good reason for the manner in which he behaved in this Court. Even the order which we were passing was an innocuous one. Such behaviour and utterances cannot be tolerated as it undermines the Courts prestige and dignity and affects the working of the Court as it vitiates the atmosphere in which the Court normally functions. It has a direct impact on the Courts independence, dignity and decorum. To protect the administration of public justice, we are constrained to take action as his conduct and utterances cannot be ignored or pardoned. (21). In Ajay Kumar Pandey, Advocate, In Re. (3), the Honble Supreme Court considered the limits of fair criticism. In that case, a practising Advocate filed a cri-minal complaint against another advocate and a lady Addl. District Judge under Section 400 and 500 Indian Penal Code. The complaint was dismissed and thereafter he filed a criminal revision in the High Court which was also dismissed by a Single Judge observing that the applicant had made palpably scurrilous, indecent and abominable recitals intending to malign the lady Addl. District Judge and hold her at ransom. An SLP was filed against the judgment of the Single Judge. He also filed another complaint under Sections 500 and 504 Indian Penal Code against seven advocates alleging that they had made defamatory imputations regarding the relationship between him and the said lady Addl.District Judge. District Judge and hold her at ransom. An SLP was filed against the judgment of the Single Judge. He also filed another complaint under Sections 500 and 504 Indian Penal Code against seven advocates alleging that they had made defamatory imputations regarding the relationship between him and the said lady Addl.District Judge. The complaint having been dismissed an SLP was filed. He also filed several contempt petitions against the said Single Judge of the High Court, the Addl. District Judge and some other judicial officers of the subordinate judiciary. When the SLPs and contempt petitions were listed before the Honble Supreme Court, it was noticed that the language used in the memorandum of petitions was wholly objectionable, unparliamentary and abusive. In the memo of the petitions, similar expressions in more intemperate language casting aspersions on the conduct of various judicial officers and attributing motives to them in the discharge of their judicial functions had been used. There was hardly any criticism of the "judgment" and he only criticised and condemned the Judge by attributing motives and showering abuses on each one of the Judges who dealt with his cases at one stage or the other. At pages 258 and 259, the Honble Supreme Court observed: ``At the outset, we wish to emphasise that this Court being the Supreme Court of the country, has not only the right to protect itself from being scandalised or denigrated but it also has the right, jurisdiction and the obligation to protect the High Courts and the subordinate courts in the country from being insulted, abused or in any other way denigrated. Any action on the part of a litigant-be he a lawyer appearing in person-which has the tendency to interfere with or obstruct the due course of justice has to be dealt with sternly and firmly to uphold the majesty of law. No one can be permitted to intimidate or terrorise Judges by making scandalous, unwarranted and baseless imputations against them in the discharge of their judicial functions so as to secure orders which the litigant ``wants. The subordinate judiciary forms the very backbone of the administration of justice. No one can be permitted to intimidate or terrorise Judges by making scandalous, unwarranted and baseless imputations against them in the discharge of their judicial functions so as to secure orders which the litigant ``wants. The subordinate judiciary forms the very backbone of the administration of justice. This court would come down with a heavy hand for preventing the Judges of the subordinate judiciary or the High Court from being subjected to scurrilous and indecent attacks, which scandalize or have the tendency to scandalize, or lower or have the tendency to lower the authority of any court as also all such actions which interfere or tend to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceedings or obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner. No affront to the majesty of law can be permitted. The fountain of justice cannot be allowed to be polluted by disgruntled litigants. The protection is necessary for the courts to enable them to discharge their judicial functions without fear. The rule of law is the foundation of a democratic society. The judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law and if the judiciary is to perform its duties and functions effectively and remain true to the spirit with which it is sacredly entrusted, the dignity and authority of the courts had to be respected and protected at all costs. It is for this reason that the courts are entrusted with the extraordinary power of punishing those for contempt of court who indulge in acts whether inside or outside the courts, which tend to undermine the authority of the courts and bring them in disrepute and disrespect thereby obs-tructing them from discharging their judicial duties without fear and favour. This power is exercised by the courts not to vindicate the dignity and honour of any individual Judge who is personally attacked or scandalised but with a view to uphold the majesty of law and the administration of justice. The foundation of the judiciary is the trust and the confidence of the people in its ability to deliver fearless and impartial justice and as such no action can be permitted which may shake the very foundation itself. (22). After referring to the definition of ``Criminal contempt, as given in Sec. 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the Honble Supreme Court observed: ``The definition is self-explanatory. (22). After referring to the definition of ``Criminal contempt, as given in Sec. 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the Honble Supreme Court observed: ``The definition is self-explanatory. Scandalising the Judges or the courts tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrepute and is an affront to the majesty and dignity of law. Such acts constitute criminal contempt of court. No one can be permitted to foul the fountain of justice. If the authority of the court is under-mined or impeded by acts or publications, the fountain of justice would get sullied creating distrust and disbelief in the minds of the litigant public and the right-thinking public at large. Indeed everybody is entitled to express his honest opinion about the correctness or legality of a judgment or sentence or an order of a court. Objective criticism is permissible provided it is made with, detachment in a dignified language and respectful tone. The liberty of expression cannot be treated as a licence to scandalize the court and instead of criticising the judgment, to criticise the Judge who delivered it. (23). In L.D. Jaikwal vs. State of U.P. (4), the appellant, a Senior Advocate of long standing, made a written application before the learned Single Judge making imputation that the Judge was a "corrupt Judge" and adding that he was "contaminating the seat of justice." A threat was held out that a complaint was being loaded to higher authorities that he was a corrupt and did not deserve to be retained in service. The contemner was found guilty and punished. The appeal was preferred before the Honble Supreme Court. At the same time the contemner tendered his apology. The Honble Supreme Court observed: ``We do not think that merely because the appellant has tendered his apology we should set aside the sentence and allow him to go unpunished. Otherwise, all that a person wanting to intimidate a Judge by making the grossest imputations against him has to do, is to go ahead and scandalise him, and later on tender a formal empty apology which costs him practically nothing. If such an apology were to be accepted, as a rule, and not as an exception, we would in fact be virtually issuing a `licence to scandalize courts and commit contempt of court with impunity. If such an apology were to be accepted, as a rule, and not as an exception, we would in fact be virtually issuing a `licence to scandalize courts and commit contempt of court with impunity. It will be rather difficult to persuade members of the Bar, who care for their self-respect, to joint the judiciary if they are expected to pay such a price for it. And no sitting Judge will feel free to decide any matter as per the dictates of his conscience on account of the fear of being scandalised and persecu-ted by an advocate who does not mind making reckless allegations if the Judge goes against his wishes. If this situation were to be countenanced, advocates who can cow down the Judges, and make them fall in line with their wishes, by threats of character assassination and persecution, will be preferred by the litigants to the advocates who are mindful of professional ethics and believe in maintaining the decorum of courts. (24). In Sanjiv Datta, Re. (5), the Honble Supreme Court, while dealing with the affidavit filed by a public functionary causing aspersions on the Court, observed: ``Abuses, attribution of motives, vituperative terrorism and defiance are no methods to correct the errors of the courts. In the discharge of their functions the courts have to be allowed to operate freely and fearlessly but for which impartial adjudication will be an impossibility. Ours is a constitutional government based on the rule of law. The Constitution entrusts the task of interpreting and administering the law to the judiciary whose view on the subject is made legally final and binding on all till it is changed by a higher court or by a permissible legislative measure. Those living and functioning under the Constitution have to accept and submit to this obligation of respecting the constitutional authority of the courts. Under a constitutional government, such final authority has to vest in some institution. Otherwise, there will be a choas. The courts verdict has to be respected not necessarily by the authority of its reason but always by reason of its authority. Any conduct designed to or suggestive of cha-llenging this crucial balance of power devised by the Constitution is an attempt to subvert the rule of law and an invitation to anarchy. Otherwise, there will be a choas. The courts verdict has to be respected not necessarily by the authority of its reason but always by reason of its authority. Any conduct designed to or suggestive of cha-llenging this crucial balance of power devised by the Constitution is an attempt to subvert the rule of law and an invitation to anarchy. The contemner, for reasons which can only be attributed to his misconception of his role and overzealousness to assert himself and his side of the matter intentionally overstepped his limits and conven-iently ignored the above legal position, and abrogated to himself, in substance, the role of a Judge in his own cause. He has thus in effect not only challenged the jurisdiction of the Court to discharge its functions but also its authority to do so. (25). In Roshan Lal Ahuja, Re (6), the Honble Supreme Court observed: ``The tendency of maligning the reputation of judicial officers by disgruntled elements who fail to secure an order which they desire is on the increase and it is high time that serious note is taken of the same. No latitude can be given to a litigant to browbeat the court. Merely because a party chooses to appear in person, it does not give him a licence to indulge in making such aspersions as have the tendency to scandalize the court in relation to judicial matters. (26). In Ajay Kumar Pandeys case (supra), at page 266, the Honble Supreme Court observed: ``Judges cannot be intimidated to seek favourable orders. Only because a lawyer appears as a party in person, he does not get a licence to commit contempt of court by intimidating the Judges or scandalizing the courts. He cannot use language, either in the pleadings or during arguments, which is either intemperate or unparliamentary and which has the tendency to interfere in the administration of justice and undermine the dignity of the court and the majesty of law. These safeguards are not for the protection of any Judge individually but are essential for maintaining the dignity and decorum of the court and for upholding the majesty of law. Judges and courts are not unduly sensitive or touchy to fair and reasonable criticism of their ju-dgments. These safeguards are not for the protection of any Judge individually but are essential for maintaining the dignity and decorum of the court and for upholding the majesty of law. Judges and courts are not unduly sensitive or touchy to fair and reasonable criticism of their ju-dgments. Fair comments, even if outspoken, but made without any malice and without attempting to impair the administration of justice and made in good faith in proper language do not attract any punishment for contempt of court. However, when from the criticism a deliberate, motivated and calculated attempt is discernible to bring down the image of the judiciary in the estimation of the public or to impair the administration of justice or tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute, the courts must bestir themselves to uphold their dignity and the majesty of law. The alleged contemner, has, undoubtedly committed contempt of court by the use of objectionable and intemperate language. No system of justice can tolerate such unbridled licence on the part of a person, be he a lawyer, to permit himself the liberty of scandalising the court by casting unwarranted, uncalled for and unjustified aspersions on the integrity, abil-ity, impartiality or fairness of a Judge in the discharge of his judicial functions, as it undoubtedly amounts to an interference with the due course of administration of justice. No litigant, even a lawyer appearing in person in his own cause, can be permitted to overstep the limits of fair, bonafide and reasonable criticism of the judgment and bring the courts generally in disrepute or attributer motives to the Judges rendering the judgment. Perversity, calculated to undermine the judicial system and the prestige of the court, cannot be permitted for otherwise the very foundation of the judicial system is bound to be undermined and weakened. Liberty of free expression is not to be confused with a licence to make unfounded unwarranted and irresponsible aspersions against the Judges of the courts in relation to judicial matters. (27). Liberty of free expression is not to be confused with a licence to make unfounded unwarranted and irresponsible aspersions against the Judges of the courts in relation to judicial matters. (27). In view of the definition of Criminal Contempt given in Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and the law declared by the Honble Supreme Court, in the case mentioned above, it must be said that publication of any matter (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lower or tends to lower the authority of any court, or prejudice, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial pro-ceedings, or interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner, amounts to a Criminal contempt. (28). We have carefully considered the relevant portions of the written arguments filed by the contemner in the court of Additional District & Sessions Judge No.1, Chittorgarh. In para no.5 of the written arguments, the contemner made all-egation against Civil Judge (JD), Chittorgarh that he had given false reasons and acted in a corrupt way; that he fully acted with corrupt motive. In para no.5 it was further alleged that the District Collector and District Police Officers (Superintendent of Police) were indulging in corrupt practices but there was no necessity of producing evidence thereof in the suit. It was further alleged that the hearing was adjourned on 4.7.97 and 17.7.97, under the dictate of the defendant-party and there was apprehension of corruption. It was further alleged that Shri Shivcharanji Bhushan (Civil Judge (JD) Chittorgarh) departed from the judicial propriety and, at the instance of the defendants, made a wrong order in a corrupt manner observing the system of give and take and there were several things which need not be stated. In para No. 6 of the written arguments, it was alleged against the Civil Judge (JD) , Chittorgarh that under wrong inference, he ignored the commission of criminal offence and made a wrong order by departing from the judicial propriety and the order was full of deceit and was against the facts. In para No. 6 of the written arguments, it was alleged against the Civil Judge (JD) , Chittorgarh that under wrong inference, he ignored the commission of criminal offence and made a wrong order by departing from the judicial propriety and the order was full of deceit and was against the facts. It was also stated by the contemner that a complaint had been filed against Shri Shivcharanji Bhushan (Civil Judge(JD), Chittorgarh) along with proof.Against Shri Bhanwar Lal Shishodia, Advocate, the contemner alleged that he is habitual of obtaining wrong orders from the courts by practising deceit, advancing false argument and by giving them temptation. While making these allegations against Shri Bhanwar Lal, Advocate, the contemner added that it was not necessary for him to produce evidence in support of the allegations made by him. Again it was alleged that the impugned order (passed by the Civil Judge(JD), Chittorgarh) was passed while playing in the court-yard of corruption. In his application addressed to the Registrar General, the contemner made allegation against the Additional District & Sessions Judge, Chitto-rgarh who made the reference under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 that he had made reference on account of fear and pressure of Shri Bhanwar Lal Shishodia,Advocate. In para no.6 of his application, he casts espertions on the probity and bonafide of Civil Judge(JD), Chittorgarh. Again in para no.7 of his application, he alleged that the case was listed on several dates,i.e., 4.7.97, 17.7.97 and 21.7.97 after conclusion of final arguments because of the association with Shri Bhanwar Lal Shishodia (Advocate). We have no doubt in it that the allegations made by the contemner Shri Ladu Ram Toshniwal in his written arguments submitted in the court of Additional District & Session Judge No.1, Chittorgarh and in his application addressed to the Registrar General amount to criminal contempt of the court of Civil Judge(JD), Chittorgarh and Additional District & Sessions Judge No-1, Chittorgarh. We, therefore, hold that the contemner Shri Ladu Ram is guilty of committing criminal contempt, as defined in Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The question no.1 is decided accordingly. Question No.2 (29). The contemner Shri Ladu Ram Toshniwal submitted an application in this Court on 13.9.99. In para no.2 of the application, he has stated that the written arguments submitted by him contained true facts. The question no.1 is decided accordingly. Question No.2 (29). The contemner Shri Ladu Ram Toshniwal submitted an application in this Court on 13.9.99. In para no.2 of the application, he has stated that the written arguments submitted by him contained true facts. However, he added that if he has used any words which in the opinion of the court are not proper, then he withdraw those words and apolises for the same. We have carefully considered the contents of the application. There is no sincere and bonafide apology in this application. As pointed out by the Honble Apex Court in L.D. Jaikwal vs. State of U.P. (supra), a mere formal empty apology is not entitled to be accepted by the courts. The apology which may dispense with the necessity of imposing the punishment on the contemner must be bonafide, sincere and true. Unless a per-person, bonafide realises that he has committed a mistake which he ought not to have committed and undertakes by words as well as conduct that in future he would not repeat the same, any utterance by him though termed an apology would not be a real bonafide and sincere apology for the purpose of not imposing punishment on him. In fact acceptance of apology filed by the contemner in a pro-ceeding instituted under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is relevant for the purpose of determining the quantum of punishment to be imposed on the contemner who has been found guilty of committing contempt of court. If the apology is sincere, bonafide and true and the court before which the apology is tendered is convinced that the contemner has realised his mistake and he sincerely undertakes not to repeat the mistake in future and the contempt committed by him is not of a serious nature, the court may, in place of imposing any punishment on the contemner, release him after giving him warning not to commit contempt in future. After all the object of imposing punishment on the accused, is not to wrack vengeance but to take legal measures by way of imposing of sentence permitted by law so that the accused as well as other persons who may be tempted to follow the path of committing crime may be deterred from committing the offence in question. After all the object of imposing punishment on the accused, is not to wrack vengeance but to take legal measures by way of imposing of sentence permitted by law so that the accused as well as other persons who may be tempted to follow the path of committing crime may be deterred from committing the offence in question. In case of minor offences, the object behind imposition of sentence is solely to prevent the particular accused who is before the court from repeating the offence. The possibility of other persons following the path of crime in the case of such minor offences being remote may be ignored. If the accused who has been found guilty, in such cases, appears to be repentant for the wrong committed by him and the court is convinced that his repentance is founded on bonafide and sincere realisation of his mistake and is sufficient to raise an expectation that he would repeat the offence, the court may release him without imposition of any punishment. In other cases, the court has to award sentence for the offences committed by the accused having regard to the gravity of crime and all other important fact including the possibility of the accused being reformed after a small sentence undergone by him. If there is no repentance on the part of the accused and he persists and justifies his conduct as legal and valid and shows no inclination to give up the path of crime, he by his own conduct would be disabling the court from showing any mercy to him in the matter of imposition of sentence by the court on him. Viewed in this context, the apology is neither a formal document nor a pardon nor it is a formal piece of oration which would by itself protect the accused from the sentence to which he is liable under the law of the land. In fact, while considering the question of sentence, the court is required to consider whether any sentence should be imposed on the accused for the crime committed by him and, if so, what should be the quantum of punishment. In fact, while considering the question of sentence, the court is required to consider whether any sentence should be imposed on the accused for the crime committed by him and, if so, what should be the quantum of punishment. It is for the purpose of deciding these questions that the court has to keep in mind the ultimate object of sentence, which object is to deter the particular accusing facing trial before the court and other persons who might be thinking of following the path of crime from committing the crime in question. -If the accused expresses bonafide and sincere repentance and satisfies the court that he will not commit the crime again, the court may, if the offence is minor, in appropriate cases, release the accused after giving war-ning not to commit crime again. The apology which may be sufficient for not imposing punishment on the accused must be expression of bonafide and sincere repentance and a promise on the part of the accused that he would not commit similar crime in future. In the instant case, the apology is neither bonafide nor sincere. The contemner has tried to justify his conduct and most reluctantly sought pardon of the court, with a view to avoid the punishment for which he had made himself liable under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. (30). In the instant case, the contempt committed by the contemner Shri Ladu Ram is criminal in nature and cannot be regarded as minor contempt of the subordinate courts. At the costs of repetition we reiterate that bonafide and sincere apology, may save the contemner from punishment only if the contempt is of a minor nature. If the contempt is of a serious nature, even a second apology would not be sufficient to save the accused from the punishment. (31). The contemner has more than once asserted that he is a social worker and that whatever he did was prompted by the motive to give benefit to the public inasmuch as he has raised a voice against the exaction of fees charged by the defendant-society. Probably the contemner wants to submit that being a public spirited man, he cannot commit the contempt of court even by making such allegations as are contained in the written arguments filed by him in the court and the application addressed to the Registrar General of this Court. Probably the contemner wants to submit that being a public spirited man, he cannot commit the contempt of court even by making such allegations as are contained in the written arguments filed by him in the court and the application addressed to the Registrar General of this Court. In the facts and circumstances, we feel it necessary to point out the fallacy which is evident in the approach of the contemner. There is no harm if any person, dedicates himself to a proper case whether it is for the benefit of individual or for the benefit of general public. In fact, just as every individual human being depends on the rest of the society, the society, in turn, depends on the contribution to be made by every indi-vidual human being. We, therefore, find no fault in the motive of the contemner to cause benefit to the public. If the contemner bonafide believed that the defendant-society had no legal right whatsoever to collect fees from any individual, or from the owner of the vehicle, nothing stopped him from ventilating his grievance before proper authorities and the courts. If the law permitted to join as plaintiff in filing a civil suit against the defendant, no offence of contempt can be said to have been committed by filing of the suit or by ventilating grievances before any other authority. The law of the land entitles every person to approach the courts in accordance with the law for the redressal of their grievances. But the right to approach the courts for the redressal of their grievances is neither absolute nor unbridled. The right to approach the court is a right conferred by or under the Constitution and, therefore, this right is in the nature of human right created by the laws of the land by the society in favour of the individual. This right cannot be permitted to be utilized against the society/sovereign/Constitution or the law which has conferred this right. The object behind the right to approach the courts, is to enable the citizen to enforce his fundamental right or other legal right in accordance with law so that he may get justice which necessarily depends on law and truth. One who wants to exercise his right to approach the court for the redressal of the grievance must abide by the law of the land and must also adhere truth. One who wants to exercise his right to approach the court for the redressal of the grievance must abide by the law of the land and must also adhere truth. He cannot be permitted to violate the law of the land and depart from the path of truth while taking part in the proceedings before the court. In this collection, we would like to re-call the words of Dr. Ambedkar who said in his Concluding Speech in the Constituent Assembly on 25.11.1949: ``If we wish to maintain democracy not merely in form, but also in fact, what must we do ? The first thing in my judgment we must do is to hold fast to constitutional methods of achieving our social and economic objectives. It means we must abandon the bloody methods of civil disobedience, non-cooperation and satyagraha........... But where constitutional methods are, open, there can be no justification for these unconstitutional methods. These methods are nothing but the Grammar of Anarchy and the sooner they are abandoned, the better for us. (31). In short, we deem it fit to restate that those, who approach the courts for the redressal of their grievances, must adopt constitutional methods while taking part in the proceedings before the court and while dealing with the matters in any manner whether before the institution of litigation or during the pendency of litigation or after the final disposal of the case. Obedience to laws of the land (including the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971) and adherence to truth are two fundamental duties of every citizen towards the court from which he wants justice to be delivered to him and to his fellow citizens. (32). The constitutional methods of moving the court and taking part in the proceedings before the court broadly constitute of two major steps, (a) to take part in the proceedings in accordance with the law and (b) to assist the court in ascer-taining the law correctly as well as in ascertaining the facts correctly. The parties are, therefore, required to place before the court all relevant facts. The parties are, therefore, required to state before the court nothing but truth and proof nothing but truth and advance their arguments in accordance with the law. The parties are, therefore, required to place before the court all relevant facts. The parties are, therefore, required to state before the court nothing but truth and proof nothing but truth and advance their arguments in accordance with the law. The path of stating the truth and producing evidence which are stated before the court is no doubt long and laborious and, some times, it takes years for the trial to reach a stage of conclusion but that is the only constitutional and legal path open to the litigant for the purpose of obtaining a judgment or order relevant to their dispute from the court. They cannot adopt any short-cuts because the short-cuts do not lead to justice. When the constitutionally valid paths are given up on the ground that they are longer and shorter paths, which are neither sanctioned by the Constitution or the laws made thereunder, nor sanctioned by the principle of social engineering, are adopted, the rule of law becomes casuality and anarchy starts spreading it wings. (33). The role of a Judge in the matter of dispensation of justice, is to ascertain the law and facts correctly and apply the law to the facts ascertained by him. He does not have any personal knowledge about the facts relating to dispute. He is to necessarily depend on evidence which may be produced before him by the parties or which he may suo motu order to be produced before him. He is guided by the procedure of laws applicable to the case before him and the evidence on which he may rely for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion, can only be such evidence as is declared by the Evidence Act to be relevant. The worth of evidence produced before him is to be judged by him having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case and his finding is required to be based on his own judgment without being inference by what any party, advocate or other party says in the matter. The functions require a high degree of sensitivity, devotion and dedication and absolute freedom from all such factors as may interfere in a fair and impartial process of adjudication. The functions require a high degree of sensitivity, devotion and dedication and absolute freedom from all such factors as may interfere in a fair and impartial process of adjudication. The Judges are required to act freely and fearlessly without affection or illwill while dealing with the case and a Judge would become disqualified from hearing a case if he per-chance becomes a victim of fear, favour, affection or illwill. It is true that the Judges have to perform a divine task of dispensing justice by correct ascertainment of law and facts and conducting themselves in accordance with the law but they are human beings and, therefore, they are vulnerable to all those functions which may be made against them by persons-. intending to interfere with their judicial function. (34). In Income Tax Appellate Tribunal through President vs. V.K. Agarwal (7), the Law Secretary empowered to write confidential reports of the Tribunal Members, wrote certain letters to President of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal on the basis of pseudonemous complaint and commented upon two so called contradictory orders by the Members of the Tribunal and questioned bonafides of Members in deciding case and asked their explanation. The Honble Supreme Court held that the conduct of the Law Secretary amounted to contempt of court. At page 459 of the All India Reporter, the Honble Supreme Court observed:- ``Our attention was drawn to Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 which excludes innocent publication as specified in that Section, published when the Civil or Criminal proceeding concerned is not pending, from the realm of contempt. The present case, however, deal with acts which lower the authority of a Court and tend to interfere with the administration of justice. Section 3 has no application in the present case. The letters of the first respondent insinuate a dishonest conduct on the part of the two members, presumably because the view expressed by the Judicial Member in the first alleged order is changed by him in favour of the revenue when he concurs with the order which was actually pronounced. This kind of an attack based on access to a confidential draft exchanged between the Members of the Bench is bound to affect free exchange or ideas between the two Members who have to judicially decide a case. It is a clear obstruction to proper decision-making and to proper administration of justice. (35). This kind of an attack based on access to a confidential draft exchanged between the Members of the Bench is bound to affect free exchange or ideas between the two Members who have to judicially decide a case. It is a clear obstruction to proper decision-making and to proper administration of justice. (35). At page 460 of the All India Reporter, the Honble the Apex Court further observed: ``The public have a major stake in effective and orderly administration of justice. A letter from a high officer such as the Law Secretary which questions the bona fides of the Members of the Tribunal in deciding a case and asks them to explain the judicial order which they have passed, unfairly tampers with the judicial process and interferes with judicial decision-making. (36). In performance of judicial functions, a Judge does not act as a private individual human being no matter where the judicial matter is being performed. He acts as an institution, viz., an integral part of institution of judiciary. While per-forming judicial functions, no doubt he is required to make use of all the faculties of his body and mind as well as the vast store of knowledge which he has acquired, but there is no room for allowing his personal interest to play any part in the performance of his judicial functions. Every Judge for the purpose of performing the judicial functions, is required to deliberately ignore all those factors whether they exist within or without, so that he may arrive at a correct conclusion. The role of a Judge in dispensation of justice is thus very important. If the court have to deliver justice to the people, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the Judges who performed the extremely difficult task of ascertaining the law and truth correctly, must be protected from all those interference, temptations, affections, offences, insults or persuations which are likely to interfere with the process by which truth and law are to be ascertained. Since the role of the Judge in dispensation of justice is pivotal, all those persons, who want favourable orders from the Judges, whether by interrogation of law or facts or without following the constitu-tional path provided for the litigant to prove their respective cases, are tempted to adopt the easy course of attacking the Judge in the hope that if the Judges are attacked, all their energies would be diverted to self-defence and they may be persuaded to act according to the dictate of the contemners. The path of offending the Judges or throwing mud on them, is the shortest path of obtaining favourable orders and we have no hesitation in declaring that this approach is unconstitutional, illegal, impermissible and fallacious. There appears to be another motive behind throwing of mud on the Judges or committing one or more acts of contempt of court. It appears that second motive behind the commission of contempt is to divert the attention of all concerned to the false allegations made against the Judge so that the case set up by the contemner may not be subjected to proper judicial scrutiny and favourable orders may be passed in his favour without requiring him to establish his case in accordance with law. In our opinion, those who make allegations against the Judges, with ulterior purpose of diverting the attention of the concerned persons and authorities from the real state of facts and law so that a judicial scrutiny of the case set up by the contemner may be avoided and favourable orders may be passed in his favour, is also unconstitutional, illegal, unfair and impermissible. In the instant case, the contemner Shri Ladu Ram Toshniwal, appears to have adopted the easy path of making allegations against Civil Judge(JD), Chittorgarh and Additional District & Sessions Judge No.1, Chittor-garh for the purpose of showing that the former made a wrong order and the latter made an unnecessary reference under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 and thereby adopted an approach which is unconstitutional, illegal, fallacious and impermissible. It does not appear that he has realised his mistake nor it appears that he undertakes not to repeat the act of scandalizing the courts in inter-fering with the process of administration of justice. It does not appear that he has realised his mistake nor it appears that he undertakes not to repeat the act of scandalizing the courts in inter-fering with the process of administration of justice. We wish him to realise his mistake, but for the present, we conclude that his apology is not apology in the eye of law. The question no.2 is decided accordingly. (37). So far as sentence to be imposed on the contemner is concerned, we propose to give an opportunity of hearing to the contemner on sentence and, there-fore, we direct that sentence shall be imposed after hearing the learned Additional Advocate General and the contemner. 10.12.1999 (38). Heard Mr. Ladu Ram Toshniwal, contemner, present in person and the learned Additional Advocate General regarding the question of sentence. (39). Mr.Ladu Ram, contemner, was found guilty of committing the contempt of court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) cum Judicial Magistrate, Chittorgarh, by our order dated 5.11.1999 (supra). Since he was not represented by any advocate, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we deemed it fit to give an opportunity for hearing on the question of sentence. (40). Mr. Ladu Ram has today produced before us the copies of two documents viz; his application addressed to Honble the Chief Justice of this court against the learned Civil Judge (J.D.) cum Judicial Magistrate and a copy of the order passed by the Additional District Judge No.2, Chittorgarh, in ``Chand Mal Garg and others vs. Union of India and others (8). (41). It is submitted by him orally that the Injunction Application which he had filed in the court of Civil Judge (J.D.), Chittorgarh and which had been dismissed by the said court, was allowed in appeal by the Additional District Judge No.2, Chittorgarh and it shows that the subject matter for which he was pursuing in the lower courts, was found to be prima facie correct. He has also placed reliance on the decisions given by this court in Sohan Lal Bothra vs. Ram Narain Arvind & ors. (9) and in State through District & Sessions Judge, Pratapgarh vs. Babulal (10). (42). So far as the contention that his application for injunction was allowed in appeal by the Additional District Judge No.2, Chittorgarh, is concerned, it has no relevance in this case. (9) and in State through District & Sessions Judge, Pratapgarh vs. Babulal (10). (42). So far as the contention that his application for injunction was allowed in appeal by the Additional District Judge No.2, Chittorgarh, is concerned, it has no relevance in this case. Whether his case as pleaded in the civil court, was correct or false has no bearing on the contempt, which he committed. Hence, we do not find any force in the submission that the order passed by the Additional District Judge No.2, Chittorgarh, on 23.10.99 in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 65/98 has any bearing on the question of sentence in this case. Similarly, the complaint filed by him before Honble the Chief Justice of this court on administrative side, does not have any bearing on the question of sentence. In the instant case, he has been found guilty of committing contempt and we do not find any reason to hold that any complaint made to Honble the Chief Justice against the Civil Judge (J.D.) has any bearing on the question of sentence in this case. (43). In Sohanlal Bothras case (supra), a Division Bench of this court of which one of us was a member, accepted the unconditional apology tendered by the contemner. In Babulals case (supra), a Division Bench of this court dropped the proceedings for contempt against an advocate having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case. The facts of the instant case are different from the facts of the cases, relied upon by the contemner Mr.Ladu Ram. (44). As we have pointed out in our order, in serious cases of contempt, the court is not bound to accept the apology. In the instant case, the apology which was tendered by the contemner, was found to be insufficient for the contempt committed by him. (45). After hearing the contemner and the learned Addl. Advocate General and carefully taking the facts and circumstances of the case into consideration, we do not deem it necessary to sentence him to any long term of imprisonment. Mr. Ladu Ram appears to be of advanced age and is not feeling well as submitted by him. (45). After hearing the contemner and the learned Addl. Advocate General and carefully taking the facts and circumstances of the case into consideration, we do not deem it necessary to sentence him to any long term of imprisonment. Mr. Ladu Ram appears to be of advanced age and is not feeling well as submitted by him. In our opinion, it would serve the ends of Justice if he is sentenced to simple imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-and to undergo simple Imprisonment for one month for default in payment of fine and, accordingly, it is ordered that he is sentenced to simple imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/-and to undergo simple imprisonment for one month for default in payment of fine. (46). Mr. Ladu Ram has submitted orally that he wants to file an appeal against the decision of this court and we are satisfied that it is a fit case in which the sentence imposed by us, should be suspended under sub section (2) of Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. (47). For the reasons mentioned above we direct that the sentence imposed on the contemner shall be suspended for a period of thirty days from today on his furnishing a personal bond of Rs. 10,000/-before the Dy. Registrar (Judicial) for his appearance before this court on 10.01.2000. On that day, he will either surrender himself to serve out the sentence awarded to him and pay the fine or he will produce the order of the appellate court as contemplated by sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The order of sentence shall form part of the order of conviction dated 5.11.99. (48). 15.12.1999 In view of Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, it appears necessary to direct that the words ``Rs. ten thousand in the operative portion of the order dated 10.12.1999 be read as ``Rs. two thousand and we direct accordingly.