Vaidya, J.- This application has been filed under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 against the three respondents. The petitioner is a tenant of 3-6-127, situated in Hyderguda Hyderabad, which is also occupied by the owners. According to the petitioner, the 1st respondent is the owner of the house but the 2nd respondent who is the wife of the 1st respondent, has of late, started asserting the ownership of the house. The petitioner was inducted as a tenant in September, 1958. The petitioner alleges that the 1st respondent in the month of November, 1966 asked the petitioner to vacate the premises. He followed it up by further requests; but when he found that the petitioner was not amenable, respondents 1 and 2 and their children started giving the petitioner trouble. The petitioner in his affidavit has given particulars of such instances from 24th March, 1967 to 4th April, 1967, with which we are not concerned. The petitioner’s case is that with the intention of harassing the petitioner and forcing him to vacate the premises, respondents 1 and 2 closed the main gate of the premises and also stopped supply of water and electricity. The petitioner therefore filed a petition No. 168 of 1967 before the Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad on 5th April, 1967, seeking for an order of restoration of amenities illegally cut off by the respondents. Along with the petition, he filed I.A. No. 203 of 1967 for an interim injunction which was granted on the very same day. The injuction order runs as follows: “..........I am satisfied that the respondents have unjustifiably denied the amenity of the entrance through the main gate and passage. The respondent is directed to immediately restore the amenity of passage through the main gate and allow the members of the petitioner’s family and the servants and the people who come to the petitioner’s house. Call for compliance on 7th April, 1967.” The petitioner further alleges that the respondents 1 and 2 having heard about the petition filed by him before the Rent Controller tried their best to forcibly evict the petitioner’s family from the premises in his absence. When the petitioner returned from the Court on 5th April, 1967 at about 6 p.m. he found that the gates were locked and his request to open the same proved futile. When the petitioner returned from the Court on 5th April, 1967 at about 6 p.m. he found that the gates were locked and his request to open the same proved futile. He had therefore to jump the gate and was rediculed by the members of the respondent’s family. The petitioner moved again an urgent application on the morning of 6th April, 1967, in the Court of the Additional Rent Controller seeking for an interim direction against the respondents to restore the electricity and water supply. When this application was moved, the Additional Rent Controller stated that he had realised at the time of signing the warrants that the respondents were very well known to him and their son-in-law is a good friend of his and for that reason he made a request to the Principal Rent Controller to take back the main case as well as the I.A. on his file. The Additional Rent Controller therefore advised the petitioner’s Counsel to present the second application before the Principal Rent Controller and obtain appropriate orders. Accordingly the petitioner’s Counsel presented the second petition before the Principal Rent Controller. In the meantime the petitioner took the Bailiff, process server and the Court peon to the respondents’ house to serve the order of interim direction in I.A. No. 203 of 1967. He identified respondents 1 and 2 to the Bailiff and the process server. The Bailiff and the Process server told respondents 1 and 2 that they have come from the Office of the Rent Controller to serve the order of the Court directing the respondents to open the gates and restore the passage. The petitioner’s allegation is that; “The respondents were enraged on hearing those words and behaved in a high-handed manner using abusive language scandalizing and undermining the dignity of the Court and the Judge into contempt by uttering the following words: ‘This is my house. The Rent Controller has no authority to open the passage of my house. I do not take the interim order and I do not open the passage.’” After uttering those words, the 1st respondent went away in a jeep and returned within 10 minutes. The Bailiff had summoned the Police from Himayatnagar Police Station. Again in the presence of the police and the panchas the Bailiff and the process server requested the 1st respondent and the 2nd respondent to take the notices and orders. The Bailiff had summoned the Police from Himayatnagar Police Station. Again in the presence of the police and the panchas the Bailiff and the process server requested the 1st respondent and the 2nd respondent to take the notices and orders. The respondents 1 and 2 refused to take the notices and the orders and asked them to get out. The 1st respondent again left in a jeep. A panchanama was drawn up by the Bailiff in the presence of all the panchas and the same was signed by all of them. It is further alleged that when the Bailiff the process server and the Court peon were about to go, one of the peons of the respondents came to the Bailiff and informed him that the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Sultan Bazar Division, wanted to speak to him regarding the panchanama prepared by him to which the Bailiff replied that he was discharging his duty entrusted by a Court of law and he was not expected to meet any Officer and he left the place. When the petitioner was about to go to the Rent Controller’s Court to find out the result of the second application i.e., I.A. No. 236 of 1967 moved by him that morning, the 1st respondent came in a jeep along with the third respondent who was the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Sultan Bazaar Division, and made enquiries whether the Bailiff had left the place. On being informed that the bailiff and the process server had left the place, both the 1st respondent and the third respondent became furious for having allowed the bailiff to get away in spite of their specific instructions on phone to keep him there till they came to the spot. The petitioner thereafter went to the Rent Controller’s Court and met his Counsel who was waiting to obtain orders on the second application I.A. No. 236 of 1967. Having been informed that no orders were passed till then, the petitioner went into the Office to find out the position; when he saw the 1st respondent and the 3rd respondent going into the chambers of the Additional Rent Controller. The two respondents talked to the Additional Rent Controller for about half an hour and after they had left the chambers, the Additional Rent Controller went to the chambers of the Principal Rent Controller with whom I.A. No .236 of 1967 was pending. The two respondents talked to the Additional Rent Controller for about half an hour and after they had left the chambers, the Additional Rent Controller went to the chambers of the Principal Rent Controller with whom I.A. No .236 of 1967 was pending. Later on, the petitioner’s Counsel was informed that the file was with the Additional Rent Controller and that the Additional Rent Controller wanted him to come to the chambers. The Additional Rent Controller also called the petitioner inside the chambers and told him that the 1st respondent and the 3rd respondent bad come and met him and narrated as to what all happened. He further told the petitioner that when he had appraised them of the seriousness of the situation and the folly in rejecting the notices and orders,‘the 1st respondent had showed his willingness to take the notices if they were sent again. On the request of the petitioner’s Counsel to pass interim orders on I.A. No. 236 of 1967, the Additional Rent Controller observed that he would pass orders on the application after the notices and the order on the earlier petition had been served. He gave instructions to the Bailiff and the process server and posted the application to 7th April, 1967. The affidavit of the petitioner further alleges that when he and the Counsel were leaving the Court "surprised at the sudden turn of events and the conduct of the respondents in even going to the extent of trying to influence the judicial officers and interfering with due course of justice," the bailiff and the process server met him and wanted him to accompany them as they were going again to serve the notices on the respondents. The petitioner realised " at this stage that the bailiff and the process server were being frightened at the influence of the respondents, told them that when the summons and notices were once returned unserved and especially when the same was recorded in a panchanama, any further attempt to serve the returned notices would be an illegal act unless a fresh batta was paid after orders are duly made by the Court to that effect." However the respondents’ Counsel took the notices and summons from the Court on 7th April, 1967. On 7th April, 1967, it was represented to the Court that the respondents 1 and 2 had not complied with the terms of the order dated 5th April, 1967, and that an application for restoration of supply of electricity and water which were cut off, were still pending. On this the respondents’ Counsel gave an undertaking that this clients would restore the amenities, which the Court recorded and made an order to that effect. In spite of the undertaking given by the respondent’s Counsel, the amenities were not restored till the morning of 8th April, 1967. This fact was brought to the notice of the respondents’ Counsel by the petitioner and as a result of that the respondents opened the lock of the main gate for the first time for sometime in the evening of 8th April, 1967. In view of what all happened in the Rent Controller’s Court on 6th April, 1967, the petitioner apprehended that his interest would suffer if the case was to be tried in those Courts and he filed a transfer application 159 of 1967 before the appellate authority i.e., Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad who granted interim stay on 14th April, 1967, of all further proceedings in R.C No. 168 of 1967 including the I.As. on the file of the Additional Rent Controller. The appellate authority also called for a report from the Additional Rent Controller and posted the case, to 22nd April, 1967. The report had not been received till 22nd April, 1967. The respondents 1 and 2 filed a counter affidavit denying the statements of the petitioner and started arguing the case on merits. The appellate authority adjourned the case to 17th June, 1967, awaiting the report of the Additional Rent Controller. Realising that the report of the Additional Rent Controller would be in favour of the petitioner, respondents 1 and 2 represented to the appellate authority that the respondents had no objection for the case being transferred to the Court of the Rent Controller, Secunderabad. The petitioner further goes on to state that in spite of interim directions in I.A. No. 203 of 1967 andthe undertaking given in I.A. No. 236 of 1967 to restore the amenities, the respondents have been violating the orders time and again. The petitioner in para. The petitioner further goes on to state that in spite of interim directions in I.A. No. 203 of 1967 andthe undertaking given in I.A. No. 236 of 1967 to restore the amenities, the respondents have been violating the orders time and again. The petitioner in para. 24 of his affidavit states: "The 1st and 2nd respondents have thus committed the following 1 to 6 acts and the 3rd respondent had committed acts 4, 5 and 6 which amount to contempt of Court punishable under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 viz. (1) have refused to receive the order dated 5th April, 1967, passed by the Additional Rent Controller, directing them to restore the passage; (2) have flouted the orders of the said Court and the undertakings given by them dated 5th April, 1967 and 7th April, 1967, respectively; (3) have scandalised and undermined the dignity of the Court and the Judge; (4) have tried to influence the Judge in a pending case; (5) have influenced the Police Officers, from conducting proper enquiries of various offences complained of against respondents 1 and 2; (6) have interfered with the due course and administration of justice." During the course of arguments, the learned Counsel for the petitioner very fairly conceded that Act No. 5 does not come within the purview of the Contempt of Courts Act as it relates to influencing the Police Officer from conducting proper enquiries of various offences complained of against respondents 1 and 2. Respondents 1 and 2 have filed two separate counter affidavits raising the same contentions. The 1st respondent has alleged that the premises in question stands in the name of his wife the second respondent and that she is the owner of it. The respondent No. 2 also states in her affidavit to the same effect. The 1st respondent denied the allegations made in the petitioner’s affidavit as to the instances prior to 6th April, 1967, and it is not necessary for us to refer to that in detail. They have stated in the counter affidavit that there are two gates adjacent to each other to the premises and the main gate is always closed as it abuts on the main public road. They also denied the disconnection of water and electricity supply. They have stated in the counter affidavit that there are two gates adjacent to each other to the premises and the main gate is always closed as it abuts on the main public road. They also denied the disconnection of water and electricity supply. The 1st respondent denied that he used any abusive language scandalizing and undermining the dignity of the Court including what has been put in inverted comas in para. 15 of the petitioner’s affidavit. According to him the panchanama prepared by the bailiff is totally false and the petitioner had got it prepared to suit his evil designs. None of the respondents 1 and 2 had said anything as alleged by the petitioner. They further go on that they had no opportunity to talk with the bailiff and therefore the allegations against them were totally incorrect. No panchanama had been prepared in the presence of the respondents and no one had contacted the respondents. According to the respondents: "It appears that certain persons had come to the house of the respondents and contacted the respondents servant. The servant appears to have represented that the respondents could not be seen at that hour. The persons did not disclose their identity and furnish details. Based upon the servant’s version the bailiff and the petitioner appears to have got the panchanama prepared. Immediately when the servant brought the matter to the respondents’ notice, he went to the Office of the Rent Controller and met the Presiding Officer and came to know about the said proceedings being posted to 7th April, 1967". Thereafter he engaged a Counsel to receive the notices and on 7th April, 1967, his Counsel reported that there were some repairs to the water tap and they were being attended to. He stated that electricity had not been cut off; but anyway he undertook to see that the water tap was restored within two days. The 1st respondent stated that when he went to the Rent Controller’s Office on 6th April, 1967, one Mr. Damodhar Rao a friend of his accompanied him and not the third respondent as alleged. It is further stated that the 3rd respondent never came to the house of the respondents on 6th April, 1967, or on any previous occasions. The 1st respondent stated that when he went to the Rent Controller’s Office on 6th April, 1967, one Mr. Damodhar Rao a friend of his accompanied him and not the third respondent as alleged. It is further stated that the 3rd respondent never came to the house of the respondents on 6th April, 1967, or on any previous occasions. The undertaking given to the Court was complied with by the respondents I and 2 and in fact the learned Counsel for the petitioner represented to the Court on 13th April, 1967, that the petitioner was enjoying all the amenities. The main gate was unlocked even prior to the receipt of the letter by the petitioner to the respondent’s Counsel on 8th April, 1967. The main gate which had hitherto been locked was unlocked after the receipt of the orders of the Court which according to the counter affidavit, was done on 7th April, 1967. The allegation of the respondents is that though the petitioner had a separate adjacent gate for ingress and egress, he has obtained ex parte orders by suppressing the facts. They have averred that no contempt has been committed by them. The third respondent in his counter affidavit has denied that he wanted to speak to the bailiff regarding the panchanama prepared by him. It was also false that he accompanied the 1st respondent in a jeep to his house within a few minutes after the bailiff left the place and that he enquired about him and having been told that the bailiff had left, he became furious that the bailiff was allowed to get away in spite of his instructions to detain him. He stated that he did not go to the second respondent’s house as alleged by the petitioner. He also denied that he accompanied the 1st respondent to the chambers of the Additional Rent Controller and talked to him for about half an hour. He further stated that the allegations made against him were false and frivolous. He stated: "I am in no way concerned with what transpired between the petitioner and the respondents 1 and 2. The dispute between the petitioner and respondents I and 2 never came up before me either in my official capacity or otherwise." He has averred that he has the highest regard and respect for Courts both as a citizen and as a responsible Police Officer. The dispute between the petitioner and respondents I and 2 never came up before me either in my official capacity or otherwise." He has averred that he has the highest regard and respect for Courts both as a citizen and as a responsible Police Officer. He had never attempted to do or did any act to influence the Rent Controller or any Judge in a pending case and he never interfered with the due course and administration of justice. The petitioner has also filed a reply affidavit and refuted the allegation regarding the false panchanama prepared by the bailiff. He reiterated all the allegations made by him in his affidavit. The bailiff was examined as a Court witness and the petitioner and the respondents were given an opportunity to cross-examine him. Report was also called for from the Additional Rent Controller. In his report the Additional Rent Controller stated that as the respondent and his family were known to him, with the intention to be fair to both parties, he wanted to make a request to the Principal Rent Controller to take up the case on his file and deal further in the matter. But when he approached the Principal Rent Controller in the lunch time, the Principal Rent Controller stated that as orders had been passed by him (Additional Rent Controller) on an interim application, he may continue to deal with the matter. The Additional Rent Controller further stated that the 1st respondent was not accompanied by the 3rd respondent when he came to the chambers. In fact "no police officer came to see me". The 1st respondent was accompanied with a friend of his. They went to the chambers without sending even a card or word. Immediately the Additional Rent Controller sent his Bench Clerk to call the petitioner and his advocate to the chambers so that both parties may be present when some representation was being made: but none of them were present and the Bench Clerk came and reported so. The Additional Rent Controller also states: "I told the 1st respondent that he ought not to have come into my chambers. Thereupon he said that he had come only to find out whether he should receive the summons of the Court and I told him that he should not only receive, but comply with the directions of the Court. The Additional Rent Controller also states: "I told the 1st respondent that he ought not to have come into my chambers. Thereupon he said that he had come only to find out whether he should receive the summons of the Court and I told him that he should not only receive, but comply with the directions of the Court. Then they went away saying that he would receive the summons.‘ The Additional Rent Controller again sent for the Counsel for the petitioner and told him as to what all happened in the chambers. He denied that he ever directed the bailiff to serve the notices on the respondents once again; because at that time the panchanama and the report of the bailiff were not before him and the bailiff had not returned the papers to the Court till late in the evening . The apprehension of the petitioner and his Counsel that the respondents were trying to influence by meeting the Additional Rent Controller in the chambers was, according to him, ill-founded firstly, because he had passed orders on both the interlocutory applications for immediate restoration of the amenities and secondly, that he told the petitioner and his Counsel immediately of what had happened in the chambers. As far as the report called for from him by the appellate authority, he had sent it through his letter dated 20th April, 1967. During the course of the arguments, the respondents 1 and 2 filed Application No. 262 of 1967 permitting them to raise an additional plea viz. As far as the report called for from him by the appellate authority, he had sent it through his letter dated 20th April, 1967. During the course of the arguments, the respondents 1 and 2 filed Application No. 262 of 1967 permitting them to raise an additional plea viz. "In view of the provisions of rule 23 of Act XV of 1960 the power of this Hon’ble Court ceases and the respondent-petitioner has to seek his remedy under Act XV of 1960." The following points arise for consideration: (1) Whether the Additional Rent Controller is a Court subordinate to the High Court under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act; (2) Whether any proceeding can lie under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act in view of rule 23, sub-rule 8 of the Rules made under A.P. Buildings (Lease, Eviction and Rent) Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Control Act); (3) Whether respondents 1 and 2 refused to receive the interim order of injunction and whether such refusal amounts to contempt; (4) Whether while refusing to receive the interim order, they gave expression to the words referred to by the petitioner in para. 15 of the petitioner’s affidavit and whether such words amount to contempt of Court; (5) whether there was any failure on the part of the respondents 1 and 2 to carry out the order of the Additional Rent Controller and in the event of such failure, does it amount to contempt of Court; (6) Whether the 1st respondent tried to influence the Additional Rent Controller in a pending proceeding; and (7) Whether the third respondent is responsible for any of the allegations made against him. To determine the question as to whether the Rent Controller is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, it is necessary to read section 3 of that Act: (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of Courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempt of itself. (2) No High Court shall take cognizance of contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code.“ It is not necessary to consider the provisions of sub-section 2 as it is not alleged that the respondents are guilty of contempt punishable under the Indian Penal Code. The word ‘Court’ has not been defined in the Contempt of Courts Act. It is also not defined in the General Clauses Act. But it has been judicially considered. The latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court is in Thakur Jugal Kishore Singh v. The Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd.1. Their Lordships have referred to Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain2, where the question was whether a Commissioner appointed under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 was a Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. There, after referring to authorities like, Coke on Littleton and Stroud and Stephen, the Privy Council decision in shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation3, and the earlier decision in Barat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd.4, Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay’ and Cooper v. Wilson6, it was observed: “It is clear, therefore, that in order to constitute a Court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the Court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.” A passage from Brajnandan Sinha’s case2 was extracted: ”It may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a Court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declares the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question, therefore, arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a Court. Their Lordships have also extracted the passage from Cooper v. Wilson1: “A true judicial decision pre-supposes an existing dispute between two or more parties, and then involves four requisites: (1) The presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to the dispute; (2) if the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence; (3) if the dispute between them in a question of law, the submission of legal arguments by the parties; and (4) a decision which disposes of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of the law of the land to the facts so found, including where required a ruling upon any disputed question of law”. Their Lordships have also further held: “......the subordination for the purpose of section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act means judicial subordination and not subordination under the hierarchy of Courts under the Civil Procedure Code or the Criminal Procedure Code.” In view of this latest authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court, it is unnecessary to refer to all the earlier cases on the subject. To apply the test as laid down by the Supreme Court it is necessary to consider the various provisions of the Rent Control Act. Under section 10 of the Act, the Rent Controller has been given the exclusive jurisdiction for eviction of tenants in accordance with the provisions of sections 12 and 13 of the said Act. Various grounds on which an application for eviction can be made and ordered, have been stated in section 10. Under section 10 of the Act, the Rent Controller has been given the exclusive jurisdiction for eviction of tenants in accordance with the provisions of sections 12 and 13 of the said Act. Various grounds on which an application for eviction can be made and ordered, have been stated in section 10. Section 14 provides that the landlord shall not without just and sufficient cause, cut off or withhold any of the amenities enjoyed by the tenant and provides for the procedure where any amenities are cut off by the landlord. Sub-section 4 says that if the Controller on inquiry finds that the tenant has been in enjoyment of the amenities and that they were, cut off or withheld by the landlord without just or sufficient causes he shall make an order directing the landlord to restore such amenities Section 15 of the said Act gives the Controller the power to execute his orders made under sections 10, 12, 13, 14, 20, 21, and 22 of the Act. It further provides that the order passed in execution will not be subject to an appeal but shall be subject to revision under section 22 of the said Act. Section 16 of the Act enacts the rule of res judicata. Section 17 provides for the pronouncement of the orders of the Controller in open Court. Section 20 provides for an appeal from the Rent Controller to the Chief Judge, Small Causes Court in the cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad and elsewhere to the Subordinate Judge or if there are more than one Subordinate Judge, the Principal Subordinate Judge having original jurisdiction over the area Section 21 gives discretion to the Controller to award costs. Section 22 provides for a revision to the High Court and the High Court may at any time on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or of propriety of such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. Section 23 makes every order passed under the Act binding on the sub-tenants. Section 24 provides for continuation of legal proceedings against the legal representatives in the event of death of any of the parties. Section 25 empowers the Controller to issue summons to witnesses requiring them to attend in person to give evidence or to produce documents in their custody. Section 24 provides for continuation of legal proceedings against the legal representatives in the event of death of any of the parties. Section 25 empowers the Controller to issue summons to witnesses requiring them to attend in person to give evidence or to produce documents in their custody. It is pertinent to note here that the Civil Procedure Code has not been made applicable to proceedings under the Rent Control Act. The procedure has been provided by the Rules made under section 30 of the Rent Control Act. Rule 7 makes provisions as to the contents of an application made before the Rent Controller. Under rule 8 after the application is made, the Rent Controller has to fix a date and issue notice to the applicant and the respondent. After the service of notice the Controller shall give the parties a reasonable opportunity to state their case. He shall also record a brief note of the evidence of the parties and witnesses and after consideration of the evidence so recorded and the documentary evidence, he shall pass orders on the application. Sub-rule 3 of rule 8 provides for setting aside of ex parte orders. Rule 15 says any appearance, application or act in any proceeding before the Controller or the appellate authority may be made or done by the party in person or by his recognised agent or by Counsel. Rule 16 provides for service of all notices and orders passed by the Controller. Rule 19 lays down the period of limitation for preferring legal representation petition. Rule 20 makes provision for issue of summons to the witnesses. Rule 22 provides for service of summons. Rule 23 lays down the procedure for an application for the execution of order passed under the Act. The provisions of the Act and the Rules referred to above satisfy all the four tests that have been laid down in the case of Cooper V. Wilson1. The Rent Controller has got exclusive jurisdiction to decide cases of eviction and restoration of amenities to the tenants. He is also empowered to decide questions of law if they arise during the course of proceedings before him. He has power to summon any person, examine witnesses on oath and come to a conclusion on the evidence adduced and the arguments submitted. The parties are entitled to be represented by legal practitioners. He is also empowered to decide questions of law if they arise during the course of proceedings before him. He has power to summon any person, examine witnesses on oath and come to a conclusion on the evidence adduced and the arguments submitted. The parties are entitled to be represented by legal practitioners. He has got power to execute orders passed by him. The decision of the Rent Controller is not based upon a private reference nor his decision is arrived at in a summary manner. In view of the provisions of section 22 there cannot be any doubt that the Rent Controller is subordinate to the High Court. In our opinion therefore the Rent Controller is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the terms of section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act. In Advocate-General, Andhra Pradesh V. Ramana Rao2, a Division Bench of this High Court of which one of us (Narasimham, J.) was a party, has considered the question whether the Election Tribunal appointed under the Representation of People Act is a Court within the meaning of the expression in section 3(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act. After referring to the detailed discussion of the characteristics of a Court in Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain3, it has been held that proceeding before the Election Tribunal approximate in all essential matters to proceedings in civil Courts and its findings are a definitive judgment and therefore the election Tribunal can be regarded as a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 3 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act and a contempt of it can be dealt with by the concerned High Court under the provisions of the Act. The learned Counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 referred us to a decision of our learned brother Ekbote, J., in Firm of S. Mohd. Ali & Sons v. V. Madhavarao4, and contended that it was held by this Court that the Rent Controller is not a Court subordinate to the High Court. Our learned brother was considering an application made under section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code for transfer of an eviction petition from the file of the Rent Controller, Secunderabad to the Court of the Second Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. Our learned brother was considering an application made under section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code for transfer of an eviction petition from the file of the Rent Controller, Secunderabad to the Court of the Second Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. In order to apply the provisions of section 24, Civil Procedure Code, he had to consider the applicability of the Civil Procedure Code to the proceedings under the Rent Control Act. It has been observed in that case that neither the Rent Controller Act nor the Rules made thereunder, apply the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. The Civil Procedure Code also in view of section 5 of the Act is not applicable to the Rent Controller. The power to transfer cases from one Controller to the other Controller vests in the appellate authority which is a creature of the Act. Similar power to transfer cases from one appellate authority to the other, vests in the Government. In both these cases there being special provisions under the rules, “section 24 of the Civil Procedure God6 is manifestly kept out”. It has therefore been observed that: “the Rent Controller is not a Court within the meaning of section 24, Civil Procedure Code, but is a tribunal, who in the exercise of its powers acts judicially.” This decision does not in any manner help the respondents. A contention has been raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 that in view of the provisions of rule 23 sub-rule 8, no proceedings for contempt can lie. Sub-rule 8 of rule 23 reads: “If an order passed under section 14 or section 21 has not been obeyed by the party concerned, the same may be enforced by the attachment of his property or by detention in the Civil Prison or by both or by any other manner suitable in the opinion of the Controller.” According to him, as the special procedure has been provided for the enforcement of any order passed under section 14 and the interim order passed in this case is an order under section 14 of the Rent Control Act, no contempt proceedings can lie against his clients. The provisions of sub-rule 8 corresponds in material particulars to Order 39, rule 2, sub-rule 3, Civil Procedure Code. This Rule provides for enforcing an order made under section 14. The provisions of sub-rule 8 corresponds in material particulars to Order 39, rule 2, sub-rule 3, Civil Procedure Code. This Rule provides for enforcing an order made under section 14. A distinction has to be drawn between enforcing an order and punishing a person for contempt of Court. Generally speaking “any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect or disregard or to interfere with or prejudice the party litigant or their witnesses during their litigation” are contempts of Court. (Oswald on Contempt page 6). Indisputably contempt proceedings are initiated against the person who acted in the manner which would tend to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect or disregard. The intention of contempt proceedings is solely not the enforcement of orders but to see that a person who has brought the authority and administration of law into disrespect is punished. The proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act are taken to maintain the purity of administration of law and to see that the law is respected by all citizens. From the purpose for which contempt of Court proceedings are taken it will be clear that it can be very easily distinguished from proceedings for enforcement of order. The Privy Council in Ali Mohomed Adamalli v. Emperor1, has observed on page 150: “No doubt the fact that there is another remedy available is a matter for the Court to consider when exercising its discretion whether to commit or not to commit.” The learned Counsel for respondents 1 and 2 relied upon a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in In the matter of Mr. Hayles2. On the basis of this decision he contended that where provision is made for enforcing disobedience of an order no proceedings for contempt can lie. No such proposition has been laid down by the Madras High Court. The Madras High Court was considering whether the High Court has an inherent jurisdiction to punish any contempt of an Industrial Tribunal appointed under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, even in cases where a Judge of the High Court has been appointed as a Tribunal under the said Act. The Madras High Court was considering whether the High Court has an inherent jurisdiction to punish any contempt of an Industrial Tribunal appointed under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, even in cases where a Judge of the High Court has been appointed as a Tribunal under the said Act. After referring to section 30 of the Appellate Tribunal Act, their Lordships observed that the said Act has defined contempts of Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal and Vested the powers to punish for such contempt not in the High Court but in the Industrial Tribunal under section 30 (1) of the Act. They go on to observe: “No doubt that Act does not purport to deal with or affect the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to punish contempts of inferior tribunals, which stems from the power of superintendence possessed by the High Court as its necessary concomitant; but nonetheless when the Indian Parliament has made specific statutory provision for the punishment of contempt of Industrial Tribunals, the High Court, in our opinion, should not thereafter invoke its inherent jurisdiction to punish any contempt of the Tribunal created under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 even assuming that such a power exists.” From this observation it is clear that as specific statutory provision has been made for the punishment of contempt of Industrial Tribunal, the High Court should not invoke its inherent jurisdiction. Rule 23 (d) of the Rent Control Act relied upon by the learned Counsel does not make any provision for punishment of contempt of Courts. It makes provision for enforcement of an order. The decision cited therefore does not help the respondents 1 and 2 in any manner. We are therefore of the opinion that this Court has jurisdiction to commit for contempt of the Rent Controller appointed under the Rent Control Act. We now turn to the question whether any contempt has been committed by the respondents. The learned Counsel for the petitioner argues that the respondents’ refusal to take the notice and the utterance of the words already referred to, clearly amount to a contempt of Court. Respondents 1 and 2 in the counter affidavit have denied that they were at all served with the interim order passed by the Additional Rent Controller and never refused to receive the order. Respondents 1 and 2 in the counter affidavit have denied that they were at all served with the interim order passed by the Additional Rent Controller and never refused to receive the order. They have also stated that the panchanama made by the bailiff is entirely false. The evidence on this point consists of the petitioner’s affidavit, the panchanama prepared by the bailiff and also the bailiff’s statement. According to the petitioner on 6th April, 1967, he took the bailiff, the process server and the Court peon to the respondents’ house to have the order served upon them. He identified respondents 1 and 2. The bailiff and the process server told the respondents that they had come from the office of the Rent Controller to serve the order of the Court directing the respondents to open the gate and restore the passage to the petitioner and also to serve the notice in the main case. The petitioner then says: “The respondents were enraged on hearing those words and behaved in a high handed manner using abusive language scandalizing and undermining the dignity of the Court and the Judge into contempt by uttering the following words: ‘This is my house. The rent Controller has no authority to open the passage of my house. I do not take the interim order and I do not open the passage’.” According to the petitioner, after uttering those words, the 1st respondent went away in a jeep and returned within 10 minutes. In the meantime the bailiff had summoned the police from the Himayatnagar Police Station. It is the case of the petitioner that in the presence of the police and the panchas, the bailiff and the process server again requested the 1st respondent and the 2nd respondent to take the notice and orders. The respondents 1 and 2 refused to take them and asked them to get out. The 1st respondent again left in a jeep. A panchanama was drawn up by the bailiff in the presence of all the panchas and the same was signed by all of them. From this statement in the affidavit of the petitioner it is clear that the words attributed to the first respondent were not spoken in the presence of the panchas. It happaned prior to the arrival of the panchas, on the spot. From this statement in the affidavit of the petitioner it is clear that the words attributed to the first respondent were not spoken in the presence of the panchas. It happaned prior to the arrival of the panchas, on the spot. The respondents in the presence of the panchas, merely refused to take the notice and the orders and asked the process server and the bailiff to get out. But if we look at the panchanama which has been marked as Exhibit C-2, it is evident that the words attributed to respondent No. 1 were spoken in the presence of the panchas. The panchanama states that the respondents 1 and 2 refused to take the interim order and said: “The house belongs to me. The Rent Controller has no authority to open the passage in my house. I will not take the interim order and I will not open the passage.” The bailiff in his evidence has stated in examination-in-chief that the respondent refused to take the order. What else they said he could only say after referring to the panchanama. He referred to the panchanama and said that: “Sri V.N. Reddy also said that this is my house and the Rent Controller has no authority to open the passage of my house. I will not take the order and I will not open the passage.” He further goes on to say that the panchas whose names are given in the panchanama Exhibit C-2 were all present when he tendered the orders to the respondents and they refused. In cross-examination by respondents 1 and 2 he has stated that he drew up the panchanama immediately after the. respondents refused to take order and said: “This is my house. The Rent Controller has no authority to open the passage of my house.” He goes on further to say that after the respondents refused to take the order, the bailiff gathered the panchas and Sri Reddy was standing outside the house when the panchanama was prepared. At the time when the respondents refused to take the order, the petitioner was standing by his side. He presented the interim order for service again in the presence of the panchas. The bailiff further says: “At the time when the panchas came and when I presented the order again for service, the respondents were sitting in their drawing room. At the time when the respondents refused to take the order, the petitioner was standing by his side. He presented the interim order for service again in the presence of the panchas. The bailiff further says: “At the time when the panchas came and when I presented the order again for service, the respondents were sitting in their drawing room. At that time they said ‘we do not receive the order.‘We have already told you so. You can return the order”. From this it is evident that the panchas were not present when the words “This is my house etc., etc.” were uttered by the 1st respondent. The statement in the panchanama that those words were uttered in the presence of the panchas, becomes false. The only contemporaneous record of what had exactly happened at the time of the service of the order, cannot be relied upon. The bailiff’s statement also cannot be relied upon because the panchanama prepared byhim is a false one. There remains then, only the affidavit of the petitioner and the counter affidavit of the 1st respondent. Neither the petitioner nor the 1st respondent have been cross-examined. It is only oath against oath and we have to consider the surrounding circumstances to ascertain as to which of the versions should be believed. It is the case of the petitioner that after the incident of the service of order, the 1st respondent went to the Rent Controller’s office. This conduct of 1st respondent is not at all consistent with the alleged defiant attitude at the time of the service of the order. We are therefore not prepared to hold that the 1st respondent had given utterance to the words: “This is my house; the Rent Controller has no authority to open the passage in my house and I will not open the passage.” We are also not prepared to hold that the 1st respondent was not at all present at the time of the service of the order. In his counter-affidavit he states: “It appears that certain persons had come to the house of the respondents and contacted the respondents’ servant. The servant appears to have represented that the respondents could not be seen at that hour. The persons will not disclose their identity and furnish details. Based upon the servant’s version the bailiff and the petitioner appears to have got the panchanama prepared. The servant appears to have represented that the respondents could not be seen at that hour. The persons will not disclose their identity and furnish details. Based upon the servant’s version the bailiff and the petitioner appears to have got the panchanama prepared. Immediately when the servant brought the matter to the respondents’ notice, he went to the office of the Rent Controller and met the presiding Officer..........” According to the 1st respondent, the persons who had come to serve the order, did not disclose their identity and furnish any details. If that is so, it is beyond comprehension as to how the 1st respondent presumed that those persons must have come from the Rent Controller’s Office and rushed to the Rent Controller. He does not say that his servant informed him that the bailiff and the process server had come from the Rent Controller’s Office. Evidently the 1st respondent in not speaking the whole truth. Either he was told by the servant that the bailiff had come from the Rent Controller and had some order to serve which made the 1st respondent immediately go to the Rent Controller’s Court or the respondent himself had read the order and had refused it and having realised the folly of such refusal or having been made to realise the folly of such refusal, he rushed to the Rent Controller’s Court with a friend of his. In the face of his categorical statement that the persons had not disclosed their identity and furnished any details to his servant, the only alternative that remains is that the 1st respondent had seen the order himself and had refused to take it. His going to the Rent Controller’s Office immediately after the so-called attempt to serve him, is not at all consistent with the statement that he was not present when the bailiff had come to his house for purpose of service; especially when his servant did not tell him as to the office from which the order had emanated or the persons who had come to serve that order. Considering the affidavit of the petitioner, the bailiff’s statement and the counter affidavit filed by the 1st respondent, we are constrained to hold that the 1st respondent was present and had refused to receive the interim order made by the Additional Rent Controller. Considering the affidavit of the petitioner, the bailiff’s statement and the counter affidavit filed by the 1st respondent, we are constrained to hold that the 1st respondent was present and had refused to receive the interim order made by the Additional Rent Controller. The question that arises for consideration then is whether mere refusal to receive the order made by a competent Court, amounts to contempt. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn a distinction between an ordinary summons and an order of injunction where a person to whom the order is addressed is asked to do or not to do a particular thing. For this proposition he relied on Ram Charan v. Debi Dayal Dubey1. It was observed at page 489: “Refusal to accept, or evade service of, a summons may not be contempt, but refusal to accept, or evade service of, an injunction order is contempt, because there is a fundamental difference between a summons and an injunction order. A summons (I am dealing with a summons issued in a civil proceeding) does not require obedience. The party summoned is at liberty not to appear in Court because the proceeding can still be taken ex parte against him. An injunction requires obedience and since there can be no obedience unless the contents of the order are brought home to the person, the injunction must be accepted when offered. To refuse to accept an injunction order is to interfere with the course of justice by refusing to acquire the knowledge without which the Court’s order cannot be complied with.” The learned Counsel for respondents 1 and 2 tried to distinguish this decision of the Allahabad High Court by saying that while making the abovesaid observation, their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court were referring to certain English. cases which dealt with treating process server of a Court contemptuously, and asking him to eat up the subpoena and abusing and assaulting a process server while serving a notice was held to be contempt of Court. His contention is that the conclusion drawn by the High Court does not stem from the decisions of the English cases mentioned therein. We do not agree with this contention. His contention is that the conclusion drawn by the High Court does not stem from the decisions of the English cases mentioned therein. We do not agree with this contention. The learned Judges have considered the English cases and from those cases have extracted a principle that refusing to accept an injunction order, is a contempt because it amounts to interference with the course of justice by refusing to acquire the knowledge without which the Court’s order cannot be complied with. We are in agreement with the observation of the Allahabad High Court that refusal to accept an injunction order amounts to contempt and respondent No. 1 is clearly guilty of the same. As far as respondent No. 2 is concerned, there is no clear evidence to show that she Had refused to receive the order on her own volition and that she knew what that order was. She refused it because of her husband. In these circumstances she can be considered to be technically guilty of contempt and in the circumstances of the case we feel that her conduct does not call for any action. According to the petitioner, the 1st respondent is also guilty of a more worse type of contempt; inasmuch as he tried to influence the Additional Rent Controller. It is not disputed that the 1st respondent visited the Additional Rent Controller and had a talk with him. Different versions have been given as to what transpired in the Chambers of the Additional Rent Controller. We would restrict ourselves to the report of the Additional Rent Controller in this behalf. The Additional Rent Controller in his report states that the 1st respondent came to the Chambers and he told the 1st respondent that he ought not to have come into the Chambers. Thereupon the 1st respondent said that “he had come only to find out whether he should receive the summons of the Court and ‘I told him that he should not only receive but comply with the directions of the order.‘Then he went away saying that he would receive the summons.” From this there does not seem to be any attempt to influence the Additional Rent Controller. The 1st respondent only asked him as to whether he should receive the summons and on his reprimanding him, he expressed his willingness to do so. The 1st respondent only asked him as to whether he should receive the summons and on his reprimanding him, he expressed his willingness to do so. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the facts mentioned in the affidavit that earlier the Additional Rent Controller had expressed his unwillingness to deal with the case and that it was after he met the 1st respondent that it happened that the case still continued to be with him and that in spite of urgent application for orders regarding the cutting off the water and electric supply, the Additional Rent Controller did not pass any orders on the 5th but directed the issuance of a notice to respondents 1 and 2,which created an apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that this was because of the visit of the 1st respondent to the Additional Rent Controller and that the Additional Rent Controller hadbeen influenced by the 1st respondent. We do not find any substance in this contention. The Additional Rent Controller has clearly stated that the case had not been transferred from his file. He had only made a request to the Principal Rent Controller to take up the case on his file and deal further in the matter; but when he approached the Principal Rent Controller in the lunch time, the Principal Rent Controller stated that since the Additional Rent Controller had already passed orders on the interim application, he may continue to deal with the matter. This clearly shows that it was the Principal Rent Controller who had asked the Additional Rent Controller to continue the case and that the Additional Rent Controller had nothing to do with it. Refusal of the Additional Rent Controller to pass any orders on the application filed on 6th April, 1967, before any service of notice, does not show that he was in any manner influenced by the 1st respondent. A further contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the 1st respondent had come to know of the order for restoration of the amenities by opening the main gate and that as he did not carry out these orders till the evening of the 7th, he is guilty of contempt. A further contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the 1st respondent had come to know of the order for restoration of the amenities by opening the main gate and that as he did not carry out these orders till the evening of the 7th, he is guilty of contempt. As we have held that the 1st respondent had refused to receive the order and as it is admitted by him that the main gate was not unlocked till the evening of 7th, the 1st respondent did not obey the order of the Additional Rent Controller. The order called upon the 1st respondent to restore the amenity of passage through the main gate and allow the members of the petitioner’s family and the servant and other people who come to the petitioner’s house to pass through the main gate. This order did not specifically say that the respondents 1 and 2 should remove the lock they had put on the gate; but the 1st respondent understood the order to mean that for purposes of restoring the passage, he has to unlock the gate. It cannot therefore be contended that as the order was not clear, it was not given effect to. The 1st respondent understood what the order was and did give effect to it on the 7th evening. The question as to how far the third respondent can be proceeded against for contempt of Court remains to be considered. It was conceded by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that on the affidavit and the evidence on record, no case has been made out as against the respondent No. 3. Three allegations Lad been made against him. The first was that the servant of the 1st respondent came and informed the bailiff that there was a phone call from the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Sultan Bazar Division and that the bailiff should go and receive the call. When the bailiff was asked about this, he clearly denied of having (been) informed of any phone call. Further there is nothing to show that this phone call had emanated from the third respondent. The second allegation was that the third respondent reached the place immediately after the bailiff had left and was furious that the bailiff was allowed to go away. There is also no evidence to substantiate this statement of the petitioner. Further there is nothing to show that this phone call had emanated from the third respondent. The second allegation was that the third respondent reached the place immediately after the bailiff had left and was furious that the bailiff was allowed to go away. There is also no evidence to substantiate this statement of the petitioner. The third allegation is that the third respondent had gone to the Rent Controller along with the 1st respondent. That has been specifically denied not only by the 1st respondent and third respondent, but also by the Additional Rent Controller. The Additional Rent Controller in his report says that “third respondent never came to him. As a matter of fact no Police Officer accompanied the 1st respondent.” The learned Counsel for the petitioner has tried to build up an argument on the statement of the Additional Rent Controller “no Police Officer ever came to him.” His contention is that the Additional Rent Controller has stated that the third respondent did not come. This contention is clearly wrong. The Additional Rent Controller has specifically stated that the 1st respondent was not accompanied by the third respondent and in support of this statement of his, he further stated that no Police Officer came with the 1st respondent. No case therefore has been made out against the third respondent and the learned Counsel for the petitioner very fairly conceded this position. In the circumstances of the case, we feel that the ends of justice would be met if the 1st respondent is sentenced to a fine of Rs. 250 and is directed to pay the costs of the petitioner. As no case has been made out by the petitioner against the third respondent, he is ordered to pay the costs of the third respondent. Office Note.-The 1st respondent has remitted the fine amount of Rs. 250 in the High Court on 24th October, 1967. This case coming on for orders pursuant to the office note dated 26th October, 1967, for fixations of costs of the petitioner and the 3rd respondent the Court made the following Order.-Petitioner’s costs are fixed at Rs. 150.00 inclusive of Advocate’s fee. Third respondent’s costs are fixed at Rs. 75.00 inclusive of Advocate’s fee. As we are told that the fine imposed has been paid by the first respondent, it does not appear necessary now at this stage to impose any default sentence. 150.00 inclusive of Advocate’s fee. Third respondent’s costs are fixed at Rs. 75.00 inclusive of Advocate’s fee. As we are told that the fine imposed has been paid by the first respondent, it does not appear necessary now at this stage to impose any default sentence. G.S.M. ----- Respondents 1 and 2 are found guilty and sentenced to fine; Petition dismissed against Respondent 3.