Sharfuddin Ahmed, J.- Criminal Revision Case No. 854 of 1965 has been referred to us by our learned Brother Mirza, J., in view of the substantial questions of law involved in the case. The petitioner herein was seeking to quash the criminal proceedings instituted against him in C.C. No. 2 of 1965 on the file of the Special Judge, Kurnool under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act (II of [947) and section 161, Indian Penal Code. His main contention is that the Deputy Superintendent of Police who had laid the trap and later authorised one of his subordinates to investigate the case was not properly vested with Magisterial powers under section 14 of the Criminal Procedure Code and, therefore, the investigation conducted by his subordinates was vitiated. To appreciate the contention of the petitioner, the facts of the case may briefly be stated: The petitioner (hereinafter called the accused) is an Electrical Inspector, Kurnool having jurisdiction extending upto Srikakulam. There was a complaint against him to the Director, Anti-Corruption Bureau on 10th December, 1963, about his demand of illegal gratification for according permission to energise the transformer of Sri Sadguru Khandasari Sugars, Jaggannadharpuram, Bobbili in the first week of November, 1963 and that he had accepted a part of the illegal gratification and was making demands for the balance. Thereupon on nth December, 1963, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, one Madhav Rao made arrangements to lay a trap by providing Rs. 500 currency notes to the decoy S. Rajagopala Rao, the complainant in the case. The numbers of the notes were noted in the Panchanama and they were treated with phenolphthalein in the presence of the mediators. The decoy then proceeded to the office of the Electrical Inspector who received the amount and the same were recovered at about 3-30 p.m. under a Panchanama. The Dy. S. P. Examined the decoy and registered a crime Crime No. 22 of 1963 under section 151, Indian Penal Code, and section 5 (a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sent the report to the Court along with the arrest card etc. On the next day i.e., 12th December, 1963, he sent the tainted money to the Court. Later purporting to act under G.O. Ms. On the next day i.e., 12th December, 1963, he sent the tainted money to the Court. Later purporting to act under G.O. Ms. No. 253, Home (Courts-B) Department, dated 3rd February, 1961, he authorised one Subrahmanyam, an Inspector on the Anti-Corruption Bureau to investigate further into the case. Accordingly the Inspector took up investigation and examined all the witnesses and finally laid a charge-sheet against the accused before the Special Judge, Kurnool. It is conceded that the accused did not raise any objection before the Special Judge either to his jurisdiction to enquire into the matter or to the competency of the Inspector to investigate the case. He, however, filed this criminal revision case in the High Court for quashing the proceedings against him mainly on the ground that the subsequent investigation by the Inspector was vitiated. It is conceded by Sri T. V. Sarma, the learned Counsel for the petitioner that these objections were not raised before the Special Judge for the obvious reason according to him that the Special Judge was not competent to quash the proceedings and the matter lay exclusively within the jurisdiction of the High Court. The learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, contended that a revision did not lie at this stage and the objections raised herein should have been urged before the lower Court and thereafter the matter moved in the High Court if the petitioner was aggrieved by the finding of the lower Court, particularly so when the investigating officer had yet to be examined in the case. However, to obviate further delay in the matter he did not press this objection. It is well-settled that normally objections as to the jurisdiction of a Court or competency of an officer to investigate a case should be taken at the earliest opportunity in the trial Court itself, but having regard to the circumstances of this case viz-, that as a result of this revision the trial has been held up for more than two years, we think it expedient to dispose of the case on merits instead of directing the petitioner toseek a decision in the lower Court and approach this Court again if the finding goes against him. The main attack, as stated earlier, is directed against the G.O. issued by the State Government conferring Magisterial powers on certain Police Officers under section 14 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The main attack, as stated earlier, is directed against the G.O. issued by the State Government conferring Magisterial powers on certain Police Officers under section 14 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The said G.O. omitting the details not necessary for your purpose reads as under. “II. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Central Act VI of 1898), the Governor of Andhra Pradesh hereby confers upon the officers mentioned below all the ordinary powers of a Magistrate of the first Class under section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Central Act II of 1947), within the limits of the whole of the State of Andhra Pradesh: 8. Sri J. Madhavarao, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Hyderabad.” The conferment of power is under sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Purporting to act under this G.O. Sri J. Madhavarao has authorised the Inspector Sri M.V. Subrahmanyam of Anti-Corruption Bureau, Kurnool to investigate further into Crime No. 22 of 1963 under section 161 and (5) (1) (a) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act by his proceedings dated 12th December, 1963. The contention in brief is that the delegation of powers under G.O. Ms. No. 253, dated 3rd February, 1961, was itself in excess of the authority and, therefore, subsequent authorisation by the said Officer purporting to act under the Government Order was void ab initio. Section 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure falls under Chapter II of the Code dealing with the constitution of criminal Courts and offices. It makes provisions for the constitution of Special Magistrates in the following terms: “14. (1) The State Government may confer upon any person who holds or has held any judicial post under the Union or a State or possesses such other qualifications as may, in consultation with the High Court, be specified in this behalf by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette all or any of the powers conferred or conferrable by or under this Code on a Magistrate of the first, second or third class in respect to particular cases or to a particular class or particular classes of cases, or in regard to cases generally in any local area outside the presidency town. (2) Such Magistrates shall be called Special Magistrates, and shall be appointed for such term as the State Government may by general or special order direct. (3) .................................................. (4) No powers shall be conferred under this section on any Police Officer below the grade of Assistant District Superintendent, and no powers shall be conferred on a Police Officer except so far as may be necessary for preserving the peace, preventing crime and detecting, apprehending and detaining offenders in order to their being brought before a Magistrate, and for the performance by the Officer of any other duties imposed upon him by law for the time being in force.” Section 14(1) obviously provides the necessary qualification for conferment of Magisterial powers on any person, provided he has the necessary qualifications mentioned therein viz., he holds or has held any judicial post under the Union or a State or possesses such other qualifications as may have been specified by the State Government in consultation with the High Court. It is to be noted that the qualifications under section 14 (1) have been inserted by section 4 of Act XXVI of 1955 and prior to the amendment, the State Government had the powers to confer the Magisterial powers on any person it might deem fit to hold that office. The limitation on its power has been imposed only by the Amendment Act XXVI of 1955. The question is whether sub-section (4) is subject to the provisions of sub-section (1) or is independent of it. In other words, whether it enlarges the scope of section 14 (1) or imposes a further restriction on conferment of such powers on the Police Officers. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is to the effect that sub-section (4) imposes a further limitation on the powers of the Government i.e., the Police Officers on whom such powers have to be conferred have not only topossess the requisite qualifications as laid down in section 14 (1) but also hold a rank not below Assistant District Superintendent and such conferment shall be confined for the preservation of peace and prevention of crime etc., i.e., they will be precluded from trying cases as Magistrates. The learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, had urged that while section 14 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a general provision, section 14(4) specially deals with conferment of powers on Police Officers and, therefore, on the analogy of special law over-riding the provisions of general law section 14(4) has to be given effect to irrespective of the conditions laid down in section 14 (1). In our opinion, the difficulty has arisen obviously due to the fact that while amending section 14 (1) the provisions of section 14 (4) have not been correspondingly amended. If section 14 (1), as it stood before the amendment of 1955, is taken into consideration, the provisions of section 14 (4) do not in any way impinge or clash with the provisions of sub-section (1). Under section 14 (1) the State Government was competent to confer Magisterial powers upon “any person” which would also include a Police Officer, but by the amendment the words ‘any person’ have been qualified as meaning to be only those who hold or had held any judicial post or possessed such other qualifications as may be specified by the Government in consultation with the High Court. Thus the scope of ‘any person’ has been narrowed down. In the light of it, it is difficult to hold that the words ‘any person’ for purposes of Police Officers under sub-section (4) must be taken to having the same connotation as they were meant to carry prior to the amendment. The notification issued by the Government in consultation with High Court, G.O. Ms. No. 469, Home Department, dated 24th February, 1956, does not in any way advance the case of the respondent. The only qualifications mentioned therein for the appointment of Special Magistrates under section 14 are that the appointee must be over 40 years of age, must be (a) a retired Government servant who had experience in deciding disputes between parties or (b) a non-official of outstanding merit, commanding the confidence of the people and sufficiently conversant with the English language to be able to interpret the statutes. It is nobody’s case that the said Government Order is of any assistance in disposing of the point in issue. It is nobody’s case that the said Government Order is of any assistance in disposing of the point in issue. It is only if sub-section (4) of section 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is read independently of sub-section (1) that the conferment of powers on the Deputy Superintendent of Police can be held to be within the four corners of section 14. Otherwise, it has to be said that the said officer, though not below the grade of Assistant Superintendent of Police,did not have the requisite qualification for appointment as a Magistrate. It is not the case that the said officer prior to his appointment in the Police Department had “held any judicial post under the Union or State or was a re-employed officer having judicial experience to his credit as contemplated under section 14.” Therefore, the conferment of Magisterial powers on him under section 14 (4) could only be proper if he had the requisite qualifications prescribed in 14 (1). Sub-section 14 (4) is neither an exception nor a proviso to subsection (1). If it was an exception, it would have the non-obstantic clause and if it was to be meant to be a proviso to sub-section (1), the words ‘provided further’ would be found in the beginning of the said sub-section. Even if it is to be treated as proviso, it is well-settled that it could not be interpreted so as to have greater effect than the strict construction of the main provision. The conferment of Magisterial powers by State Government under the Government Order referred to above can only be sustained if sub-section (4) is treated as exception to sub-section (1) but the necessary intendment cannot be inferred from the wording of the said section. On the other hand, a plain reading of the two sub-sections together justifies the conclusion that sub-section (4) is subject to the provisions of sub-section (1). The contention of the learned Public Prosecutor that it is a special provision, which overrides the general provisions contained in sub-section (1) on the basis generalia specialibus non derogant does not appear to be acceptable. The contention of the learned Public Prosecutor that it is a special provision, which overrides the general provisions contained in sub-section (1) on the basis generalia specialibus non derogant does not appear to be acceptable. The decision in the case of N.K.K. Samaj v. Nagpur Corporation1, on which the learned Public Prosecutor has placed reliance, reiterates the rule of construction that where a general intention is expressed and also a particular intention which is incompatible with the general one, the particular intention is considered an exception to the general one. This is with reference to the provisions of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act (II of 1950). In section 57 (1) (m) of the said Act a general intention was expressed that the Corporation should make adequate provisions by any means or measures which it may law fully use or take for regulating markets. The particular intention of the Legislature as disclosed in section 415, clause (35), in general and in clause (b) in particular, made it abundantly clear that the intention of the Legislature so far as it relates to the sale of meat is that it should be regulated by making bye-laws. It was held that the intention of Legislature has to be construed as an exception to the provisions of section 57 (1) (m). The intention of Legislature is clear in the said case to justify the view taken by the Bombay High Court. But, unfortunately, in the instant case, the position is not so very clear. The amendment to section 14 introduced by the State of Bombay separately provides for the appointment of Special Magistrates and Executive Magistrates. Certain conditions are laid down for the appointment of Special Magistrates whereas under section 14 (2) the appointment of Executive Magistrates is not subject to the conditions imposed for the appointment of Special Magistrates. Further while dealing with conferment of powers on Police Officers it is laid down that “Provided no powers shall be conferred under this sub-section on any Police Officer......” making it clear that conferment of powers on Police Officers comes within subsection (2) viz., appointment of Executive Magistrates. There is thus no difficulty in holding that the Police Officers to be empowered with Magisterial powers are not required to have requisite qualifications mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 14. There is thus no difficulty in holding that the Police Officers to be empowered with Magisterial powers are not required to have requisite qualifications mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 14. The amendment to section 14 of the Criminal Procedure Code, by Amending Act (XXVI of 1955), has not proceeded on those lines and thus Bombay amendment is not helpful in arriving at a decision. Similarly, the fact that certain Police Officers are vested with Magisterial powers under the Police Act or the Police Manual is of no consequence in so far as the interpretation of this section is concerneda for the conferment of such powers on the Police Officers therein is under a statute, whereas in sub-section (4) of section 14 of the powers are sought to be conferred on Police Officers by State Government in exercise of the powers vested in them under that section. The various cases cited by the learned Counsel on either side do not seem to have a direct bearing on the question before us. They either relate to the enunciation of the principle that special provisions over-ride general provisions or with the construction to be placed on provisions as to how far they enlarge or restrict the scope of the main provisions. The case of Ishverlal v. Motibhai2, dealt with the effect of proviso to section 43-C of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (LXVII of 1948). It was held therein that “the proper function of a proviso is to except or qualify something enacted in the substantive clause, which but for the proviso would be within that clause.” But the principle laid down therein would be applicable only if we are in a position to treat sub-section (4) as proviso to sub-section (1) for which, as observed above, there is no indication. Even if we accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that it is meant to be a proviso then it only imposes a further restriction on the conferment of powers in the cases of Police Officers, inasmuch as it directs that only (certain) powers and that too for a limited purpose (be conferred). There is no room for the argument that it enlarges the scope of sub-section (1) and contemplates conferment of Magisterial powers irrespective of the conditions prescribed in the said sub-section. There is no room for the argument that it enlarges the scope of sub-section (1) and contemplates conferment of Magisterial powers irrespective of the conditions prescribed in the said sub-section. It is to be noted that even the impugned Government Order is purported to have been issued with reference to sub-section (1) of section 14 and not under sub-section (4) so as to sustain the argument that sub-section (4) is a provision independent of sub-section (1). The learned Counsel for the petitioner also raised the contention that the delegation of powers to a Deputy Superintendent of Police was bad inasmuch as the section lays down conferment of such powers only on Police Officers not below the grade of Assistant District Superintendent of Police. The distinction he seeks to make out is that a Deputy Superintendent of Police is not of the same grade as Assistant District Superintendent of Police which post is now designated as Assistant Superintendent of Police. It is well known that there is a distinction between Deputy Super intendent of Police and Assistant Superintendents of Police the latter being more or less direct recruits to the Indian Police Service whereas the Deputy Superintendents of Police are mostly promotees from the lower ranks. For the purpose of conferment of powers however the Grade of Assistant District Superintendent of Police has been equated with that of Deputy Superintendent of Police as so far as duties are concerned, there is no distinction between the two classes of the officers mentioned above. The section only contemplates that the Magisterial powers will not be conferred on Police Officers below the grade of Assistant District Superintendent of Police. It does not refer to their emoluments or mode of recruitment. For the purpose of gradation, therefore, there is no distinction between the two categories of officers as laid down in the Police Manual and the relevant Standing Orders. A Bench of the Mysore High Court in G. Moogappa v. The State1, had occasion to deal with this aspect of the case in connection with the competency of an Assistant Superintendent to investigate a case under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The argument was that as an Assistant Superintendent of Police and not a Deputy Superintendent of Police had investigated into the matter, the investigation was vitiated. The argument was that as an Assistant Superintendent of Police and not a Deputy Superintendent of Police had investigated into the matter, the investigation was vitiated. Repelling this argument, it was held that the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police is not inferior to the, Deputy Superintendent and thus the investigation was properly conducted. We find ourselves in agreement with the said observation. The contention of the learned Counsel therefore that the delegation of powers was bad on that account cannot be accepted. It has also been urged that even if the powers were properly delegated, the Deputy Superintendent of Police was not competent to delegate his powers to the Inspector for investigation as the power conferred on him was only for a limited purpose viz., for maintaining law and order, etc. This argument is also devoid of force, for sub-section (4) of section 14 itself provides that conferment of powers“for the performance by the officer of any other duties imposed upon him by law for the time beign in force.” The officer was empowered to investigate into the case under section 5-A (c) Prevention of Corruption Act. He therefore entrusted the same to his subordinate for carrying out the duties imposed upon him by law i.e., under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. This argument has therefore to be rejected. Similarly, the contention put forth by the learned Counsel that the provisions of Presidency Towns are attracted in the present case has no substance. The Presidency Towns where the Superintendents of Police have been empowered to investigate have been enumerated in section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, itself and there is no room for extending the appellation of the Presidency Towns to any of the towns in Andhra Pradesh. The last argument put forth before us is that the objection in regard to the competency of the officer to investigate has not been taken at the earl est stage of trial and that the defects in investigation are curable and once the Court has taken ocognizance of the offence a defective investigation would not vitiate the trial. It has been pointed out that as many as eight witnesses have been examined in the case and the objection in regard to the competency of the Investigating Officer was not taken at the earliest. Mr. It has been pointed out that as many as eight witnesses have been examined in the case and the objection in regard to the competency of the Investigating Officer was not taken at the earliest. Mr. Sarma, learned Counsel for the petitioner on the other hand, with reference to the docket-sheet, has urged that on the very next day subsequent to the appearance of the accused, the entire evidence was recorded at a stretch. The revision petition was filed in this Court soon after the evidence was recorded. Thus there was no delay in raising the objection. According to him still some evidence has to be examined and the case is not ripe for final disposal. Therefore, it could not be said that he had waived his right and should agitate the question only after the disposal of the case if it goes against him. Having heard the case at length, we are not inclined to attach any weight to this objection at this stage, for otherwise it would only prolong the trial of the case and even at the outset the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that it would not be desirable to remit the case on that ground. Further, having regard to the fact that the objection was taken at a fairly early stage it could not be equated with cases wherein such objection had been taken after the termination of the trial and sometime even at the stage of appeal. The next contention of the Public Prosecutor, however, that the investigation though defective could be cured is not acceptable. It has been repeatedly held in a catena of cases that the provisions of section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act are mandatory and non-observance thereof would vitiate the investigation. It would be sufficient to refer just to two cases viz., H.N. Rishbud v. The State of Delhi1, and Munnalal v. The State of U.P.2, where it has been observed that section 5-A of the said Act is mandatory and not directory and that the investigation conducted in violation thereof is illegal. Having reached the conclusion that the Deputy Superintendent of Police was not competent to authorise the Inspector to investigate the case, we have no hesitation in holding that the investigation conducted by the Inspector was vitiated. Having reached the conclusion that the Deputy Superintendent of Police was not competent to authorise the Inspector to investigate the case, we have no hesitation in holding that the investigation conducted by the Inspector was vitiated. This illegal investigation cannot vitiate the entire proceedings commenced by the Court on a charge-sheet filed by the Investigating officer for it is not a matter like the one in section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and puts limitation on the power of the Court to take cognizance of the offence. Any irregularity or illegality committed during the course of investigation cannot, therefore affect the competency or jurisdiction of the Court. At the same time the breach of a mandatory provision such as section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot go unnoticed by the Court. That provision is based on a broad policy and serves as an important safeguard for public servants against being exposed to undue harassment of investigation, unless such investigation is called for. What was an offence hitherto non-cognizable has been made cognizable by the Act. At the same time care has been taken to see that the public servants are free to discharge their functions diligently and are not exposed to undue harassment on the information given by persons affected by their official acts which may be at some times frivolous. What was a sort of protection offered formerly by making the offence as non-cognizable has now been substituted by providing a safeguard that the investigation should be conducted normally by a Police Officer of a designated rank and if it is to be conducted by an officer of the lower rank, that can be done only by the order of a Magistrate of a specified rank who is to be satisfied as to whether the investigation should be made. The advantage of investigation by on officer of higher rank whose experience and authority are certainly reflected in his outlook and handling of the matter cannot be over-emphasized. the Magistrate’s order on satisfaction is also a suitable substitute and affords the guarantee that flimsy and frivolous charges are not investigated into. The breach of this imperative provision, therefore, is likely to result in prejudice to the accused. the Magistrate’s order on satisfaction is also a suitable substitute and affords the guarantee that flimsy and frivolous charges are not investigated into. The breach of this imperative provision, therefore, is likely to result in prejudice to the accused. It is true, being an irregularity or illegality only in investigation, it may not affect the trial as such for that turns upon the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, but when the trial ends in conviction and sentence the accused can legitimately complain of prejudice done to him by illegal investigation and of miscarriage of justice resulting therefrom. He is certainly entitled to acquittal if the Court is satisfied of the same. When such is the consequence of illegality there is 310 reason why breach of the mandatory provision should not be taken note of if it is brought to the knowledge of the Court during the course of trial. The Court can take necessary steps for curing this illegality or rectifying the defect by ordering such investigation as the circumstances of the case warrant, keeping the case on file. Having regard to it, we allow the revision petition and quash so much of the proceedings before the Special Judge, Special Police Establishment Cases. Kurnool as relate to the evidence collected by the Circle Inspector during the course of investigation. The case shall be taken up on the completion of further investigation and report by a competent officer and disposed of in accordance with law. G.S.M. -----Revision allowed; Further investigation ordered.