Judgment.- On going through the calendar in this case I felt sceptica of the conviction and therefore issued notice to the State to show cause why it should not be set aside. Sri C. J. Antony has appeared in response thereto on behalf of the State and has placed fairly all aspects of the case. The accused is the driver of a lorry which the Sub-Inspector of Police, Calicut Town Station, found at about 4 p.m. on 23rd October, 1965, in the Calicut City, carrying 39 bags of rice weighing 28 quintals and 44 bags of paddy weighing 24 quintals. He was prosecuted and has been convicted under clause 3 (2)-incorrectly mentioned as section 3 (2) in the judgments of the Courts below-of the Kerala Foodgrains Dealers’ Licensing Order, 1964, and sentenced "to pay a fine of Rs. 500, and in default to suffer S. I. for six months." It has been ordered further "The rice and paddy seized have been disposed of and the proceeds thereof remitted to treasury under Criminal C.D. That amount will be consficated to Government. On appeal by him, the Sessions Judge has affirmed the conviction and the sentence. Clause 3 of the Kerala Foodgrains Dealers’ Licensing Order — hereinafter the K. F. D. L. Order — reads thus: "3. Licensing of dealers. (1) No person shall carry on business as a dealer except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence issued in this behalf by the licensing authority. (2) For the purpose of this clause, any person who stores any foodgrains in quantity often quintals or more of any of the foodgrains or 25 quintals of all foodgrains taken together at any one time shall, unless the contrary is proved be deemed to store the foodgrains for the purposes of sale." This inhibition here is against carrying on business as a dealer without a licence — apparently unrelated to a lorry-driver. A dealer is defined in clause 20 (a) of the Kerala Food-grains Dealers’ Licensing Order thus: "2. Definitions. A dealer is defined in clause 20 (a) of the Kerala Food-grains Dealers’ Licensing Order thus: "2. Definitions. In this Order, unless the context otherwise requires, (a) ‘dealer‘ means a person engaged in the business of purchase, sale or storage for sale of any one of the foodgrains in quantity of ten (10) quintals or more at any one time, or in quantity of twenty five (25) quintals or more of all foodgrains taken together, and includes commission agents engaged in such business, but does not include a person engaged in such business on Government account or a person who sells or stores for sale any foodgrains produced by him by personal cultivation or by cultivation of land owned by him." The Sessions Judge has held the accused to be a dealer because " The definition of a ‘ Dealer ‘ in section 2 (a) of the Kerala Foodgrains Dealers’ Licensing Order..............includes..........a person engaged in the business of storage for sale of foodgrains in quantity of 10 quintals or more at any one time. There is nothing to show that the appellant was the owner of the bags of rice and paddy in the lorry. But the question is whether by his having been in charge of the lorry which admittedly contained more than 10 quintals of foodgrains, he cannot be said to be a person who was engaged in the business of storage for sale of the same..........Section 3 (2) of the Order says that unless the contrary is proved a person who stores foodgrains in quantity of 10 quintals or more should be deemed to have stored the foodgrains for the purpose of sale. The word ‘Store’ is not defined in the Order. Its dictionary meaning is............‘hold,‘ ‘keep,‘ ‘contain,‘ etc. Therefore even though the appellant: did not have proprietary right in the foodgrains contained in the lorry, he was in charge of the lorry which stored the foodgrains and therefore should be held to be a dealer as contemplated by the Kerala Foodgrains Dealers’ Licensing Order." Apparently, the Sessions Judge has overlooked the significance of the expression "engaged in the business of purchase, sate, or storage for sale" in the definition of a dealer. Dealing with the parallel expression in the Manipur Foodgrains Dealers’ Licensing Order, in Manipur Administration v. M. Nila Chandra Singh1, the Supreme Court has observed: "The said definition shows that before a person can be said to be a dealer it must be shown that he carries on business of purchase orsale or storage for sale of any of the commodities specified in the Schedule, and that the sale must be in quantity of 100 mds. or more at any one time. It would be noticed that the requirement is not that the person should merely sell, purchase or store the food-grains in question, but that he must be carrying on the business of such purchase, sale, or storage; and the concept of business in the context must necessarily postulate continuity of transactions. It is not a single casual or solitary transaction of sale, purchase or storage that would make a person a dealer. It is only where it is shown that there is a sort of continuity of one or the other of he said transactions that the requirements as to business postulated by the definition would be satisfied. If this element of the definition is ignored, it would be rendering the use of the word ‘business’ redundant and meaningless." There is not even an allegation-much less proof-by the prosecution that the accused carries on a business of purchase, sale or storage for sale of foodgrains. All that the prosecution has alleged and proved is that the accused was on a solitary occasion found driving a lorry carrying more than 10 quintals of foodgrains. There is no allegation that he has purchased or was about to sell or was taking for sale by him the foodgrains. The Sessions Judge has relied on clause 3 (2) of the Kerala Foodgrains Dealers’ Licensing Order to draw a presumption of intention to sell in the accused; but that presumption does not obviate the necessity of proof of accused having been " engaged in the business of purchase, sale or storage for sale " before be can be convicted as a dealer under clause 3 of the Kerala Food-grains Dealers’ Licensing Order. Referring to this aspect, the Supreme Court has observed in the above-cited case in Manipur Administration v. M. Nila Chandra Singh1 thus: "In this connection, clause 3 (2) raises a statutory presumption. Referring to this aspect, the Supreme Court has observed in the above-cited case in Manipur Administration v. M. Nila Chandra Singh1 thus: "In this connection, clause 3 (2) raises a statutory presumption. It is no doubt a rebuttable presumption which is raised by this provision. If it is. shown by a person with whom a storage of more than 100 mds. of one or the other of the prescribed foodgrains is found that the said storage was referable to his personal needs or to some other legitimate cause unconnected with and distinct from the purpose of sale the presumption would be rebutted, in case, of course, the explanation given and proved by the person is accepted by the Court as reasonable and sufficient. What does this presumption amount to? It amounts to this and nothing more that the stock found with a given individual of 100 or more maunds of the specified foodgrains had been stored by him for the purpose of sale. Having reached this conclusion on the strength of presumption, the prosecution would still have to show that the store of the foodgrains for the purpose of sale thus presumed was made by him for the purpose of carrying on the business of store of the said foodgrains. The element of business which is essential to attract the provisions of Clause 3 (1) is thus not covered by the presumption raised under clause 3 (2). That part of the case would still have to be proved by the prosecution by other independent evidence." The Courts below have characterised the loading of foodgrains in a lorry as storage of foodgrains for sale within the meaning of the Kerala Foodgrains Dealers’ Licensing Order. The Sessions Judge has referred to the dictionary meaning of the word as ‘hold, keep, contains, etc’ The Concise Oxford Dictionary shows that they are meanings of the word ‘store’ in relation to a ‘receptacle.‘ In the Kerala Foodgrains Dealers’ Licensing Order the word is used in relation to a person carrying on business in foodgrains, when the meaning "deposit (furniture etc.) in a warehouse for temporary keeping" is alone apt. When the goods are put in a lorry for purpose of transport from one station to another, it cannot be said that the goods are under storage for sale. When the goods are put in a lorry for purpose of transport from one station to another, it cannot be said that the goods are under storage for sale. The words ‘store’ and ‘storage’ in the context of the Kerala Foodgrains Dealer’s Licensing Order connote a stage of stagnancy and not of motion. It must relate to a warehouse or a store-room, which a goods vehicle cannot be said to be. Transporting in a goods vehicle may be for purpose of storing, but is not in itself storing; and loading in a lorry is only a step preliminary to transporting. It would be ridiculous to think that a railway which transports foodgrains from one station to another is storing the foodgrains for sale or that every driver of a public carrier should have a foodgrain dealers’ licence to transport foodgrains. Reference has also been made by the Courts below to clause 11 of the Kerala Foodgrains Dealers’ Licensing Order, which runs thus: “11. Powers of entry, search, seizure etc. Reference has also been made by the Courts below to clause 11 of the Kerala Foodgrains Dealers’ Licensing Order, which runs thus: “11. Powers of entry, search, seizure etc. (1) The licensing authority or any other officer authorised by the Government in this behalf may, where he has reason to believe that any contravention, of the provisions of this order or of the conditions of any licence issued thereunder has been, or is being, or is about to be, committed, or generally for the purpose of satisfying himself that the provisions of this Order and of the conditions of any licence issued thereunder are being complied with, with such assistance, if any as he thinks fit- (a) require the owner, occupier or any other person in charge of any place, premises, vehicle or vessel connected with, or in use for the purpose of his trade, to produce any book, accounts or other documents showing all or any of his transactions: (b) enter, inspect or break open and search any place or premises, vehicle or vessel, connected with, or in use for the purpose of his trade; (c) take or cause to be taken, extracts from or copies of, any documents showing all or any, of his transactions; and (d) search, seize or remove stocks of foodgrains and the animals, vehicles, vessels or other conveyances connected with, or used in carrying foodgrains and take or authorise the taking of all measures necessary for securing the production of stocks of foodgrains and the animals, vehicles, vessels, or other conveyances so seized, in a Court and for their safe custody pending such production. .........................” Obviously, this clause does not contemplate prosecution of drivers who merely transport foodgrains. The things mentioned in sub-clauses (a) to (d) above are only to be done for the purpose mentioned in the clause, namely of satisfying that the provisions of the Kerala Foodgrains Dealers’ Licensing Order and the conditions of any licence issued under it are duly complied with by the dealers concerned, and for no other. It is pertinent to note here that”reason to believe“in the above provision is not a [vain expression. It contemplates that the belief of the officer acting under the clause 11 that some contravention of the Kerala Foodgrains Dealers’ Licensing Order or of a licence issued thereunder has taken place or is about to take place must be based on reason. It is pertinent to note here that”reason to believe“in the above provision is not a [vain expression. It contemplates that the belief of the officer acting under the clause 11 that some contravention of the Kerala Foodgrains Dealers’ Licensing Order or of a licence issued thereunder has taken place or is about to take place must be based on reason. It cannot be a mere pretence; the belief must be held in good faith. Hence, when an action under clause 11 is challenged in Court, the officer has to justify his action by showing that his reasons for the belief have a rational connection or relevant bearing to the formation of his belief, though the Court may not scrutinise them further as to their sufficiency for the belief. (See S. Narayanappa v. The Commissioner of Income-tax1).. In the present case, no action is laid before Court under clause 11 of the Kerala Foodgrains Dealers’ Licensing Order. The judgment of the Additional First Class Magistrate says: “P.W. 6 is the S.I. who detected the offence and investigated the case........He states that during investigation four persons put in petitions before Court claiming ownership of different quantities of rice and paddy.“Whether it be before the Court or before the Sub-Inspector of Police, four persons have claimed the rice and paddy in the lorry driven by the accused as belonging to them. Their claims have not been investigated in this case. The Sessions Judge has observed categorically: “There is nothing to show that the appellant (the accused) was the owner of the bags of rice and paddy in the lorry.” and has concluded: “Therefore, even though the appellant did not have proprietary right in the foodgrains contained in the lorry, he was in charge of the lorry which stored the foodgrains and therefore should be held to be a dealer as contemplated by the Kerala Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order.“ It is then clear that the accused is not found to have any interest in the foodrains in the lorry; he is only the driver of the lorry and the foodgrains found in it belong to somebody else. It passes beyond my comprehension how, without any proceeding against the owners of the foodgrains concerned-particularly when four persons have come forth as the owners thereof-they could be confiscated to Government The entire case appears to have proceeded at a tangent and sentiments or black-marketing of foodgrains in these days of scarcity thereof seem to have overs had owed the law and justice in this case. I am tempted to quote here an observation of Kailash Prasad, J., in Narain Das v. State1, with reference to section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, which reads: “No person shall himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture lor sale or store, sell or distribute: (i) any adulteratred food; (ii) ..................................” The learned Judge said, with concurrence of Oak, J.: ”The verb, ‘store’ is a word of general import. It means to keep or lay up for future use. If a mother keeps milk diluted with water for feeding her infant child or to administer it to an ailing child, it will amount to storing of adulterated milk. To treat such an act on the part of the mother as an offence will certainly lead to an absurdity. This illustrates well how a hypertechnicality in grammatical interpretation of the text of an Act may lead to absurd consequences and why it has to be avoided, particularly at criminal trials where life and liberty of a citizen are at stake. The sagacity cannot be overestimate of the prescription of Brihaspati. “(Do not enter judgments based on texts alone. Trials without a sense of propriety may cause miscarriage of justice).” In the result, I find that the accused, who was merely driving a lorry carrying more than 10 quintals of foodgrains, was not a dealer within the meaning of the Kerala Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1964, and that the charge levelled against him under clause 3 (2) of the said Order is unwarranted in fact and law. His conviction is therefore set aside and the amounts realised against him-the fine if any, as also the price of rice and paddy taken from him and sold by Court-will be refunded to him forthwith. M.C.M. ----- Conviction set aside.