JUDGMENT Both these appeals, u/s 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, are directed against the judgment and decree dated 30.10.96, passed in Civil First Appeal No. 22-A/93 by XVth Addl. District Judge, Indore, in affirmance of the judgment and decree dated 6.2.90, passed in Civil Suit No. 11-A/92 by Vth Civil Judge, Class I, Indore, decreeing respondents' suit for eviction on the ground specified in clause (a) of Sec. 12(I) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short, 'the Act'). Appeal No. 45/97 is filed by one of the defendants namely Indo-Burma Petroleum Company Limited (Presently, IBP Co. Ltd.) while Appeal No. 395/96 is filed by other two defendants namely J.J. Sharma & Co., and Punjab Motor Oil Stores. These appeals have been admitted on following common substantial question of law : 1. Whether the Courts below have erred in not properly appreciating the covenants contained in the lease deed dated 14.9.60 regarding the permission for construction? 2. Whether the Courts below were justified in not appreciating that if the lease is granted for raising permanent construction then on the ground under section 12(1) (n) the defendant -- tenant can't be evicted? It is not disputed that originally lease of open land was granted to the appellants who have thereafter raised some construction said to be of permanent nature in order to run their business of petroleum products. It is also not disputed that the lease period has expired. The respondent-plaintiffs (Res. No. 1 to 7 herein) sought appellants' eviction on the ground that the tenanted accommodation was an open land and that the respondent-landlords require it for constructing a house on it. The suit was resisted by the appellant-defendants. The trial Court as also the first appellate Court below have concurrently held that the tenanted accommodation was an open land and that the plaintiffs require it for construction of a house on it. On these findings decree for eviction has been passed against the appellants and which stands affirmed in first appeal, thus giving rise to this appeal. I have heard Shri S.C. Bagadia, learned Sr. Counsel appearing with Shri V.K. Jain for appellants (S.A. No. 45/97), Shri Umesh Maheshwari, learned counsel for appellants (S.A. No. 395/96) and Shri S.D. Sanghi, learned Sr. Counsel appearing with Shri M.L. Agrawal for the respondent Nos. 1 to 7 in both the cases. I have heard Shri S.C. Bagadia, learned Sr. Counsel appearing with Shri V.K. Jain for appellants (S.A. No. 45/97), Shri Umesh Maheshwari, learned counsel for appellants (S.A. No. 395/96) and Shri S.D. Sanghi, learned Sr. Counsel appearing with Shri M.L. Agrawal for the respondent Nos. 1 to 7 in both the cases. The main contention of the appellants is that although open land was taken on lease but later on pursuant to that lease and in terms thereof the appellants have constructed pakka structure for running petrol pump on the tenanted accommodation and as such the accommodation has ceased to be an open land and no decree for eviction could legally be, therefore, passed under clause (n) of Sec. 12(1) of the Act. As against it, learned counsel for plaintiff-respondents submitted that by raising any structure on the land the nature of the accommodation is not changed. It is further pointed out that under the terms of the lease the tenants, on termination of lease, was required to remove the structure. The point projected in these appeals stand concluded by a decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Krishnapasuba [ AIR 1966 SC 1024 ] followed by this Court in Motilal [ 1972 JLJ 532 ] and Bharat Petroleum [1984 MPRCJ Note, 137]. In Krishnapasuba (supra) the Apex Court while dealing with a similar provision of Bombay Rents Act, 1947, and under almost similar fact situation held that when tenancy was in respect of an open land only, provision of Sec. 13(1) (i) (of Bombay Act, which is para materia of clause (n) of Sec. 12(1) of the M.P. Act), was applicable. Following the ratio decided in the case of Krishnapasuba (supra), this Court in Motilal (supra) held that where the tenant at his own costs builts a shade on portion of the land leased, the subject matter of the lease is not altered. In Bharat Petroleum (supra), the facts of which were exactly same as that of the present case and it was held that "if the accommodation at the inception of lease was an open land how it ceased to be so merely because the tenant had made construction thereon for carrying on his business". The lease in the instant case also provide that on termination of the lease, the construction made by the tenants shall be removed by them. The lease in the instant case also provide that on termination of the lease, the construction made by the tenants shall be removed by them. This clinches the issue inasmuch as the accommodation was an open land when it was leased and it would be again an open land when the lease is terminated. The questions extracted above thus deserves to be answered against the appellants and their appeals must, therefore, fail. As a last leg the appellants in S.A. No. 395/96 have made an application under Or. VI B, 17 r/w Sec. 151 of CPC (I.A. No. 2536/97) seeking amendment in the written statement and it is averred that the land in question has been acquired by the State Government for construction of Railway over-bridge. The proposed amendment, I am afraid, is wholly irrelevant not necessary for adjudication of the real dispute between the parties. The subsequent acquisition of the property would not nullify the decree in so far as the appellant - tenants are concerned. No right is vested in the appellants on account of the said acquisition and in any case they would be required to vacate the accommodation. This application is, therefore, also dismissed. The appeals are accordingly dismissed with costs. However, as prayed by learned counsel for appellants, they are granted 2 (two) months time to vacate the suit accommodation.