Order.- This reference is made under section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, by the learned Sessions Judge, Kolar, with a recommendation that the order of dismissal passed by the Special First Class Magistrate, K.G.F. in C.C. No. 2855 of 1966 on the file of this Court, for want of sanction as required under section 170 of the Mysore Police Act, 1963 should be set aside. The material facts briefly stated are: The complainant Manikyam filed a complaint under sections 323 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code against the accused Rangegowda, Sub-Inspector of Police. It was alleged in the complaint that on 18th June, 1966 at about 6 P.M. the complainant was standing in the verandha of police station house, Bethamangala taking protection against rain. The accused Sub-Inspector of Police asked him to go away and leave the station house. The complainant pleaded to stay there for sometime. But the accused became furious and dragged the complainant inside the police station house and assaulted him on the body with cane and arrested him. Subsequently at about 8 p.m. he was released on bail. The complainant alleged that he sustained bodily pain and loss of reputation. On the basis of the allegations made in the complaint petition, the trial Magistrate held that if those allegations are taken to be true, they are more than sufficient to infer that the accused has committed the acts complained of under the colour of his duty. Therefore sanction was required under section 170 (1) of the Mysore Police Act, 1963, and consequently dismissed the complaint petition filed by the complainant. In a revision filed by the complainant, the Sessions Judge of Kolar has made reference to this Court as observed, above. The learned Sessions Judge was of the view that there is no reasonable connection between the acts complained of and the duty imposed on the accused, and in the absence of any such relation, the accused cannot be held entitled to the protection of the provision contained in section 170 (1) of the Mysore Police Act, 1963. It is well-settled now that in order to claim the protection of section 170 (1) of the Mysore Police Act, 1963, the material point for consideration would be that there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. It is well-settled now that in order to claim the protection of section 170 (1) of the Mysore Police Act, 1963, the material point for consideration would be that there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. That was the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Matajoo Dobey v. M.C. Bhari1 It was observed therein: “The offence alleged to have been committed must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty. No question of sanction can arise under section 197, unless the act complained of is an offence; the only point to determine is whether it was committed in the discharge of official duty. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. It does not matter even if the act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the discharge of the duty, as this question will arise only at a later stage when the trial proceeds on the merits. What the Court must find out is whether the act and the official duty are so inter-related that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of the official duty, though possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation.” In that case the provision of section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code was. under consideration before their Lordships. Section 170 (1) of the Mysore Police Act, 1963 reads: “Suits or prosecutions in respect of acts done under colour of duty as aforesaid not to be entertained without sanction of Government- (1) In any case of alleged offence by the Commissioner, a Magistrate, Police Officer or Reserve Police Officer or other person, or of a wrong alleged to have been done by such Commissioner, Magistrate, Police Officer or Reserve Police Officer or other person, by any act done under colour in excess of any such duty or authority as aforesaid, or wherein it shall appear to the Court that the offence or wrong if committed or done was of the character aforesaid, the prosecution or suit shall not be entertained except with the previous sanction of the Government.” (italicizing is mine). The words “under colour or in excess of any such duty or authority” are of wider import than the provision contained in section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The words “under colour or in excess of any such duty or authority” are of wider import than the provision contained in section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In Virupaxappa v. State of Mysore2, the meaning of the words “under colour of office” was explained by their Lordships. It is observed at page 851 of the report- The expression “under colour of something” or “under colour of duty” or “under colour of office”, is not infrequently used in law as well as in common parlance. Thus in common parlance when a person is entrusted with the duty of collecting funds for, say, some charity and he used that opportunity to get money for himself, we say of him that he is collecting money for himself under colour of making collections for a charity. Whether or not when the act bears the true colour of the office or duty or right, the act may be said to be done under colour of that right, office or duty, it is clear that when the colour is assumed as a cover or a cloak for something which cannot properly be done in performance of the duty or in exercise of the right or office, the act is said to be done under colour of the office or duty or right. It is reasonable to think that the Legislature used the words "under colour" in section 161 (1) Bombay Police Act to include this sense. It is helpful to remember in this connection that the words ‘‘ colour of office" have been stated in many law lexicons to have the meaning just indicated above. Thus in Wharton’s Law Lexicon, 14th Edition, we find at page 214 the following: "Colour of office.- When an act is unjustly done by the countenance of an office, being grounded upon corruption, to which the office is as a shadow and colour." It was further observed at page 852 of the report: "It appears to as that the words "under colour of duty" have been used in section 161 (1) to include acts done under the cloak of duty, even though not by virtue of the duty. When he (the police officer) prepares a false Panchanama or a false report he is clearly using the existence of his legal duty as a cloak for his corrupt action or to use the words in Stroud’s Dictionary "as a veil to his falsehood." The acts thus done in dereliction of his duty must be held to have been done ‘under colour of the duty." Section 170 of the Mysore Police Act bars a prosecution in respect of an offence and therefore applies when an offence is committed. That is to say, that it applies when the officer or person mentioned in that section does something more than his duty — something which is not his duty — provided that he does it while he is acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. Even if the allegations made in the complaint are taken to be true, it clearly emerges from them that the Sub-Inspector of Police resented the complainant’s insistence to remain within the precincts of the police station house and put an end to those insistence by an unprovoked and unwarranted assault. Technically speaking the complainant had trespassed into the precincts of the police station house, and when he was told to go away he insisted in remaining there to which he had no legal right. In these circumstances, however unjustified the conduct of the Sub-Inspector of Police may have been there could be no doubt that he was not acting in any private capacity but was acting in discharge of his official duties. It cannot be said on the basis of the acts complained of that the act of the Sub-Inspector of Police was so contrary to his official duties that it cannot be said to have been done while acting or purported to be done in discharge of his official duties. In other words, it cannot be construed that the act complained of had no nexus with the official duties of the Sub-Inspector. This aspect has been overlooked by the learned Sessions Judge. He was of the opinion that the unwarranted attack by the Sub-Inspector was an act which cannot be said to be reasonably connected with his official duties. In other words, it cannot be construed that the act complained of had no nexus with the official duties of the Sub-Inspector. This aspect has been overlooked by the learned Sessions Judge. He was of the opinion that the unwarranted attack by the Sub-Inspector was an act which cannot be said to be reasonably connected with his official duties. As already observed by me, on the basis of the allegations made by the complainant in his complaint petition, however unwarranted and unprovoked the assault of the Sub-Inspector might be, in the context of the acts complained of, it cannot be construed that they do not reasonably relate to the discharge of his official duty. This reference is therefore rejected, and the same is dismissed. S.V.S. ----- Reference dismissed.