P. K. JAIN, J. ( 1 ) THESE two revisions have been filed against the common order passed by the Tribunal allowing the second appeal of the department and upholding the order of the assessing authority imposing penalty under Section 15-A (l) (a) of the U. P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 (hereinafter called as "the Act" ). ( 2 ) IN the assessment year 1997-98 the assessee could not deposit the admitted tax for the months of June, 1997 and July, 1997. An application as contained in annexure 1 was moved for extension of time on the ground of financial constraint and further on the ground that the company has submitted a revival proposal to the B. I. F. R. and is waiting its order on the proposal. It was stated in the application that being a sick company raising outside funds for the current operation was quite impossible. This application was moved on September 8, 1997 and was rejected on September 9, 1997 and simultaneously by the same order penalty to the tune of Rs. 1,88,250 for the month of June, 1997 and Rs. 1,97,930 for the month of July, 1997 was imposed. It further appears that after the said penalty order was passed the revisionist had deposited the entire amount of tax due along with interest. ( 3 ) TWO separate appeals against the penalty order, being Appeal Nos. 1571 of 1997, and 1572 of 1997 were filed which were dismissed by the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Trade Tax, moradabad, considering the financial constraint of the assessee and relying upon a decision of this Court rendered in Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1990] 76 stc 421 (All.) ; 1989 UPTC 1074. Certain other decisions were also referred to by the appellate authority. ( 4 ) THE department felt aggrieved against the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) and filed second appeals which have been allowed by the Tribunal by the impugned judgment and order by setting aside the order of the first appellate authority and the order of the assessing authority were restored. ( 5 ) AGGRIEVED by the judgment and order of the Appellate Tribunal the assessee has filed these two revisions. ( 5 ) AGGRIEVED by the judgment and order of the Appellate Tribunal the assessee has filed these two revisions. ( 6 ) SRI Bharatji Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Piyush Agrawal, learned counsel for the revisionist and Sri R. D. Gupta, learned Standing Counsel for the opposite party have been heard. ( 7 ) SINCE only legal question is involved both the revisions, with the consent of the parties, are being decided at the admission stage itself. ( 8 ) THE facts stated above are not disputed. It is correct that the dealer-revisionist had deposited the tax due along with interest soon after passing of the penalty order by the assessing authority. It is further evident that the application as contained in annexure 1 for extension of time to deposit the tax due was rejected by the order by which the penalty was imposed. ( 9 ) THE submission of Sri Agrawal is that the company of the revisionist was declared sick by the b. I. F. R. on July 9, 1997 as is evident from copy of the scheme prepared by the Board for industrial and Financial Reconstruction as contained in annexure 7. He points out that the tribunal has wrongly observed in its order that the unit was neither sick nor was declared as such by the B. I. F. R. It is further submitted that the settled view of law has been ignored by the tribunal while allowing the appeal. The learned Standing Counsel justified the order on the ground that the tax due for the months of June, 1997 and July, 1997 was deposited after the order of penalty was passed. ( 10 ) SRI Agrawal has referred to the judgment of the honourable Supreme Court rendered in Tata davy Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1998] 111 STC 462 (SC) ; (1997) 6 SCC 669 , in which it was held by the apex Court that "the respondent cannot recover the arrears of sales tax from the appellant-company without first seeking the consent of the said Board in this behalf. This decision, however, does not help the revisionist. The present dispute does not relate to the recovery of the amount of penalty levied by the assessing authority as affirmed by the Tribunal. The dispute relates to the liability of the revisionist with regard to penalty. This decision, however, does not help the revisionist. The present dispute does not relate to the recovery of the amount of penalty levied by the assessing authority as affirmed by the Tribunal. The dispute relates to the liability of the revisionist with regard to penalty. The question is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the revisionist was liable to penalty as imposed by the assessing authority and affirmed by the Appellate Tribunal. ( 11 ) SECTION 15-A (l) (a) of the Act provides that : " (1) If the assessing authority is satisfied that any dealer or other person- (a) has without reasonable cause, failed to furnish the return of his turnover or to furnish it within the time allowed and in the manner prescribed, or to deposit the tax due under this Act, before furnishing the return or along with the return, as required under the provisions of this Act ; or. . . . . . . . . . . . it may, after such inquiry, if any, as it may deem necessary, direct that such dealer or person shall pay, by way of penalty, in addition to the tax, if any, payable by him. . . . . . . " ( 12 ) IT is evident from perusal of the above provisions of law that penalty under Section 15-A (l) (a) of the Act can be imposed only when the assessing authority is satisfied that the dealer has failed to deposit the amount of tax due without reasonable cause. In the instant case, it is evident from annexure 7 that the revisionist was declared a sick unit and it was under financial constraint. This was also a finding of fact recorded by the first appellate authority. That was a reasonable cause which ought to have been considered by the Tribunal. Penalty cannot be imposed for the mere reason that the assessee has failed to deposit the tax due before furnishing of the return or along with the return. Besides this Section 8 (1) of the Act envisages the circumstances in which a dealer may not be able to deposit the tax due within the time provided and in such cases provisions for interest have been made. Besides this Section 8 (1) of the Act envisages the circumstances in which a dealer may not be able to deposit the tax due within the time provided and in such cases provisions for interest have been made. Sub-section (1-B) of Section 8 provides for simple interest at the rate of one and a half per cent per mensem on the unpaid amount calculated from the date of such expiration. It is true that Sub-section (1-C) which has been added by U. P. Amendment Act No. 21 of 1994 provides that the amount of interest payable under Sub-Sections (1), (1-B) and (2) shall be without prejudice to any other liability or penalty that the dealer may incur under this Act or under any other law for the time being in force and shall be added to the amount of tax and be also deemed for all purposes to be part of the tax but the penalty can be imposed only after the assessing authority is satisfied that there do not exist sufficient reasons for delayed payment of the tax due. ( 13 ) IN Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax (1990) 76 STC 421 (All.); 1989 UPTC 1074. which has been followed in a number of subsequent decisions it was held that if the tax due deposited along with interest the penalty under Section 15-A ( l) (a) of the Act cannot be imposed. In my view, mere fact of deposit of the tax due along with interest after passing of the penalty order cannot be a sufficient ground for sustaining the penalty order. ( 14 ) IN this view of the matter, both the revisions succeed and the same arc hereby allowed. The orders passed by the Tribunal are set aside and the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) arc restored. No order as to costs.