JUDGMENT P.K. Deb, J. - All these three revision petitions are heard analogous and being disposed of by the following judgment as they arise out of the same and similar nature of order passed in the three suits, namely. Title Suit No. 124 of 1996, Title Suit No. 125 of 1996 and Title Suit No.123 of 1996 and the impugned order is dated 23.9.1997 in all the cases. 2. The opposite party M/s. R. L. Singh, Civil Engineers and Contractors, a proprietorship Firm, filed the abovementioned suits before the Sub-Judge-1 at Patna under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance, 1996 praying therein to refer the claims/disputes to the Arbitrator. The claims were mentioned in Schedule-1 of the plaint of all the suits. Admittedly, the plaintiff-opposite party was appointed as a contractor by the Central Public Works Department for doing some works and extra works on the basis of the usual contract forms and agreements of the Central Public Works Department. The main grievances of the plaintiff-opposite party had already been referred to the sole Arbitrator Shri T.K. Mishra, Arbitrator, Ministry of Urban Development, Calcutta. Schedule-I of the plaints in the present suits relate to claims/disputes with regard to the compensation on account of additional overhead and establishment expenditure caused due to performance of work under prolong period beyond contemplation for no fault on the part of the contractor and further claim of compensation - for loss in profit earning capacity and loss suffered of blockade capital for various laches of the Department. Prayer was made to-refer the disputes with regard to Schedule-I of the plaints to th8 Arbitrator already appointed. 3. After the suits were filed the petitioners appeared and challenged the jurisdiction of the Sub-Judge in entertaining the suits in view of the amended Arbitration Act, that civil revision was heard by a Bench of this Court and was rejected holding that Sub-Judge being a senior Civil court having unlimited jurisdiction has got jurisdiction under the amended Arbitration Act and that judgment had already been reported in 1997(1) PLJR 523 . When this matter came up before the Sub-Judge regarding reference to- arbitration it appears from the impugned order that both parties condeded to the arbitration clause 25 of the admitted general conditions of contract for Central Public Works Department's works and as per the agreement clause the learned Sub-Judge without appointing Arbitrator himself directed the Chief Engineer to appoint an Arbitrator to arbitrate the disputes between the parties as contained in Schedule-I of the plaint. The orders passed in all the three suits have been challenged in the aforementioned three revision petitions. 4. Learned counsel appearing for and on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the main dispute had already been referred to the Arbitrator and the damages/claims made in Schedule-I of the plaint although appeared and looked to be incidental/ancillary to the original claims but those are outside the scope of arbitration under the arbitration clause 25 of the agreement. He has referred to clause 2 of the general conditions of the agreement and submitted that under that clause these matters of blockade, loss due to remuneration of the labourers etc. as claimed in the Schedule-I of the plaint are to be settled by the Superintendent Engineer level and not be arbitrated under clause 25. 5. I have gone through clause 2 and clause 25 side by side and read in between the lines. There is no specific withdrawal by clause 2 in those claims from the arbitration clause. When it is admitted that claims in the Schedule-I are incidental/ancillary to the original claims then definitely the same should be arbitrated by the Arbitrator. On general and normal course if a matter incidental to the main claims is being adjudicated by a separate authority then there remains every possibility of coming to a contradictory decisions because the incidental claims cannot be adjudicated without reference to the original claims. This matter came up before the Apex Court and a Division Bench held as reported in 1984(SC) 1072 (M/s Tarapore & Co. vs. Cochin Shipyard) that claims for compensation arisen while implementing the contract work and in relation to the contract is incidental one and arbitrable as the arbitration clause is of widest amplitude. 6. This matter came up before the Apex Court and a Division Bench held as reported in 1984(SC) 1072 (M/s Tarapore & Co. vs. Cochin Shipyard) that claims for compensation arisen while implementing the contract work and in relation to the contract is incidental one and arbitrable as the arbitration clause is of widest amplitude. 6. Regarding the maintainability of these revision petitions vehement objection has been raised from the side of the opposite party to the effect that when on admission of the petitioner clause 25 was implemented by the court below then there remains no scope of the petitioners to challenge the order passed on concessions being made by the petitioner. 7. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that there was never any consent being given by the side of the petitioner in referring the matter to Arbitrator on the basis of arbitration clause 25 and as such consent does not arise when the petitioner was vehemently objecting to the claims of the opposite party. Objection regarding claims is on different footing then giving consent to the arbitration clause. Although it has now been stated that no consent was given before the court below but the impugned order specifically mentions that both parties have consented to it. It is the settled principles of law that when something is written on factual aspect in a judgment then the same cannot be challenged in the higher court unless consented to by the adverse party and such objection cannot be entertained in revisional jurisdiction and the matter can be only in the seisin of review jurisdiction. In this context 1964(SC) 377 (Bank of Bihar vs. Maharbir and ors.) has been referred to. It was held by the Apex Court in the following words. "Where a statement appears in the judgment of a court that a particular thing happened or did not happen before it, it ought not ordinarily be permitted to be challenged by a party unless both the parties to the litigation agree that the statement is wrong or the court itself admits that the statement is erroneous. The remedy of a party aggrieved is by way of review." 8. In the present case the opposite party vehemently asserts that consent was given to the petitioner in passing the impugned order referring the claim to the Arbitrator. The remedy of a party aggrieved is by way of review." 8. In the present case the opposite party vehemently asserts that consent was given to the petitioner in passing the impugned order referring the claim to the Arbitrator. Such fact before the court below should be taken as it is unless being averted by any cogent document. In that view of the matter, the revision petitions are definitely not maintainable. 9. On factual aspect also I have already said that no error either on jurisdiction or propriety has been committed by the learned court below in referring the claims of the opposite party to the Arbitrator. Thus all the three revision petitions are hereby rejected holding that those are neither maintainable in law nor on the aspects of merit. Hence rejected but no order as to costs. 10. The stay order passed on 21.1.1998 in the revision petitions is hereby withdrawn.