JUDGMENT 1. - In this misc. petition, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the first information report lodged against the petitioner cannot be sustained. The first information report was lodged at the Police Station, Kotwali, Bikaner being F.I.R. No. 64/97 on 19.6.1997. It was lodged by Dr. Sheela Oman alleging that the petitioner/accused married her in Kerala. Due to her employment in the Medical Department of the State of Rajasthan, she came to Bikaner. In the meanwhile, the petitioner remarried another lady and has committed an offence under Section 494 Indian Penal Code. It has also been alleged in the first information report that when the complainant demanded her Streedhan from the petitioner, he promised her that he would come to Bikaner and hand her over the articles of her Streedhan. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the first information report and has prayed for quashing the first information report on the ground that the offences under Sections 494 and 406 Indian Penal Code as mentioned in the first information report cannot now be proceeded against the accused petitioner/accused because the trial of these offences is barred by time. 3. Another argument raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner against the first information report is that the first information report is laconic and lacks in material details for which the petitioner cannot be proceeded against. 4. Learned counsel also alleges that as regards the offence under Section 406 is concerned, there is no allegation in the first information report regarding entrustment. There is also no averment regarding refusal. 5. Learned counsel has also alleged that the first information report could not have been lodged at Bikaner because the alleged offences have taken place at Kerala and the Bikaner Police had no jurisdiction to investigate the case. 6. Learned counsel for the State and the complainant have alleged that the question of the offences being time barred cannot be gone into in a petition under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code. The limitation prescribed under the Criminal Procedure Code is not absolute and the Court has a discretion to condone the delay. 6. Learned counsel for the State and the complainant have alleged that the question of the offences being time barred cannot be gone into in a petition under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code. The limitation prescribed under the Criminal Procedure Code is not absolute and the Court has a discretion to condone the delay. If the first information report is quashed at this stage the court taking cognizance or applying its mind will be deprived of exercising its power to see as to whether it is a fit case where the court can exercise its jurisdiction to condone the delay or not. Therefore, the question of limitation cannot be gone into at this stage. 7. Learned counsel for the complainant and State have further urged that the first information report gives sufficient details about the commission of the crime. That being the position, the basic ingredients of the offences being mentioned in the first information report, it cannot be said that the first information report does not disclose any offence against the petitioner. The first information report is not required to contain every minute details in itself. The basic ingredients of the offence are contained in the first information report. The contents of the first information report are sufficient to initiate the investigation into the offence alleged. On this ground also the first information report cannot be quashed. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has alleged that entrustment is not proved and there is no refusal on the part of the petitioner for handing over the streedhan to the complainant. Therefore, the offence under Section 406 Indian Penal Code cannot be considered to be made out against the petitioner. Learned counsel for the State and the Complainant states that there is a fallacy in the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner because the first information report records that the accused had promised to return the articles of her streedhan to the complainant. If the return of the streedhan articles at Bikaner is promised by the petitioner as alleged in the first information report then the offence under Section 406 Indian Penal Code is clearly made out against the petitioner. The promise to return some thing presupposes entrustment. Learned counsel for the complainant submits that in the back-ground of the fact that there is no allegation of entrustment in the first information report then that has no effect. The promise to return some thing presupposes entrustment. Learned counsel for the complainant submits that in the back-ground of the fact that there is no allegation of entrustment in the first information report then that has no effect. Be that as it may, it does not prejudice the case of the accused. The facts will surface after the investigation. 9. Learned counsel for the complainant and State have stressed that the question of jurisdiction is highlighted by the petitioner beyond proportion. Offence alleged against the petitioner is an offence under Section 406 Indian Penal Code. The allegation regarding offence under Section 406 Indian Penal Code as mentioned in the first information report is that the articles of streedhan were to be returned at Bikaner as per para 4 of the first information report Section 181(4) Criminal Procedure Code says that an offence under Section 406 Indian Penal Code can be enquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property which is the subject to the offence was received or retained or was required to be returned or accounted for, by the accused person. Therefore, in this back-ground it cannot be said that Bikaner Court or Police has no jurisdiction to try and investigate the case. 10. Hon'ble Supreme Court has very recently held in the case of Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal and Ors 1999 Cri. L.J.S.C. 4325 that inherent powers under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code should not be exercised to quash a first information report on the ground that the court has no territorial restrictions jurisdiction to take cognizance of offence alleged and issue process because the jurisdiction aspect becomes relevant only when the question of enquiry or trial arises. Therefore, it is not proper but also premature to say that the court taking cognizance has no jurisdiction. 11. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. 12. The question of the offence being time barred cannot be gone into because sufficient material and details are not available from the material produced by the learned Counsel for petitioner on record. 11. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. 12. The question of the offence being time barred cannot be gone into because sufficient material and details are not available from the material produced by the learned Counsel for petitioner on record. In the absence of sufficient material it cannot be said that the offences are time barred and further if the question of offence being time barred is considered at this stage it would fetter the jurisdiction of the court to condone the delay under section 473 Criminal Procedure Code if it ultimately comes to the conclusion that it is a fit case where the delay occasioned can be condoned. section 473 Criminal Procedure Code reads as under: "473. Extension of period of limitation in certain cases. Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it Is necessary so to do in the interest of justice." Therefore, the first argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is rejected having no force. 13. The second argument of the learned Counsel is that there is no sufficient material or details in the first information report is also devoid of force. A reading of para 4 of the first information report clearly makes out a case under Section 406 Indian Penal Code. In this para it has been alleged that the accused promised to return the streedhan articles at Bikaner. In this back ground it cannot be said that the first information report does not give out sufficient details to come to the conclusion that a cognizable offence has been committed by the petitioner. Therefore, the Police cannot be stopped from investigating the first information report as lodged. Thus, the second argument of the learned Counsel is also rejected having no force. 14. The argument No. 3 is also not based on sound footing. There is a clear allegation in the first information report that the accused i.e. petitioner had promised to return the articles at Bikaner and that constitutes an ingredient of entrustment. Had there been no entrustment there would not have been any promise to return the articles. 14. The argument No. 3 is also not based on sound footing. There is a clear allegation in the first information report that the accused i.e. petitioner had promised to return the articles at Bikaner and that constitutes an ingredient of entrustment. Had there been no entrustment there would not have been any promise to return the articles. Thus, the Criminal Procedure Code gives powers to the Magistrate and the police of Bikaner to go into the crime as alleged in the F.I.R. Support can be drawn in this regard from Niraj Garg v. The State of Rajasthan 1988 (2) R.L.W. 10 wherein this Court has held that at the stage of 156(3) ordering investigation, the question of jurisdiction cannot be gone into. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on Praveen Kumari v. The State of Punjab and Orders 1994(1) C.L.R. 53 ; wherein the F.I.R. was quashed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in exercise of its inherent powers when there was no allegation in the F.I.R. that any specific article of dowry was entrusted to the petitioner at the time of marriage of complainant nor any date of her alleged harassment at the hands of the petitioner mentioned therein. 16. In this regard, learned Counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on Gurdip Singh v. Gurjit Kaur 1994 (1) C.L.R. 188 ; Rakesh Kumar Goyal & Ors v. The State of Haryana and Anr. 1994 (2) C.L.R. 202 and Hart Prem Rastogi and Anr. v. Union Territory. Chandigarh 1993 (2) C.L.R. 640 . 17. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the cases relied upon by the learned Counsel. These cases are clearly distinguishable because in none of these cases the promise of the accused for return of the articles was under consideration. Here, in the instant case, in the first information report it is clearly mentioned that the accused had clearly stated that he intends to return the articles at Bikaner. Therefore, these cases having no application will not govern the case in hand. 18. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no force in the misc. petition and the misc. petition is dismissed.Misc. petition dismissed. *******