Order.- The above revision petition arises out of the order passed by the Additional First Class Magistrate, Civil Station, Bangalore, in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 8 of 1966 regarding the disposal of a scooter which was seized from the petitioner to the second respondent-complainant, Dr. Ajit Kumar Singh of Bowring Hospital. Facts in brief are these: The scooter in question belonged to the second respondent (complainant). On 3rd September, 1965, it was lost at the Bowring Hospital at Bangalore. Immediately after the scooter was lost the second respondent filed a complaint before the Commercial Street Police who registered a case for an offence of theft in Crime No. 262 of 1965. Investigation was being conducted by the Police of the Commercial Street Police Station. In the meanwhile, on 10th November, 1966, the scooter was found deserted near Viranchipuram. The Police of Viranchi-puram found the scooter abandoned on the road and seized it and produced it before the Tahsildar and Administrative Second Magistrate, Vellore, on 12th November, 1965. The Tahsildar and Administrative Second Magistrate sold the scooter in public auction for a sum of Rs. 1,350 on 28th February, 1966, after notifying it in the District Gazette, but before the expiry of six months as required by law. The petitioner purchased it in the said public auction. On information received from the Police of Viranchipuram, the Commercial Street Police seized the scooter on 18th April, 1966, in Vellore, from the petitioner and produced it before the Additional First Class Magistrate’s Court on 19th April, 1966. The scooter was kept in charge of the Police. On 20th April, 1966, the Sub-Inspector made a report requesting the Court to hand over possession of the scooter to the complainant. The Magistrate passed, an order on 21st April, 1966, giving the custody of the scooter to the second respondent conditionally. Before that order was given effect to, the petitioner filed an application claiming possession of the scooter. On 25th April, 1966, the application filed by the petitioner was dismissed; and the previous order was given effect to. This revision petition is directed against the order dismissing the petitioner’s application for possession of the scooter Questions for decision are: 1. Whether the order handing over possession of the scooter to the second respondent is the one passed under section 516 (A) of the Criminal Procedure Code or under section 523 of the Criminal Procedure Code? 2. This revision petition is directed against the order dismissing the petitioner’s application for possession of the scooter Questions for decision are: 1. Whether the order handing over possession of the scooter to the second respondent is the one passed under section 516 (A) of the Criminal Procedure Code or under section 523 of the Criminal Procedure Code? 2. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to question the validity of the order passed by the Tahsildar and Administrative Second Magistrate of Vellore? 3. Who is entitled to the possession of the scooter in question? Mr. Subbaiah, learned Advocate for the petitioner, firstly contended, I think rightly, that provisions of section 516-A of the Criminal Procedure Code apply only when property is produced before a Criminal Court during enquiry or trial. In the instant case, the matter is still under investigation, and admittedly no charge-sheet has been filed. Therefore, this case does not attract the provisions of section 516-A of the Criminal Procedure Code. The State Public Prosecutor contended that the provisions of section 523, Criminal Procedure Code, are attracted to the case and that in fact, the application was made by the petitioner under section 523 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and, therefore, he urged that the order in question must be deemed to be the one passed under section 523 of the Criminal Procedure Code, though the order states that it was passed under section 516-A of the Criminal Procedure Code. My attention was invited to the petition dated 26th April, 1966, filed by the petitioner wherein it is written in ink that the application was made under section 523 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but the order-sheet dated 26th April, 1966, in the case discloses that the petition was made under section 518 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The note in the order-sheet appears to have been entered by the Bench Clerk and he must have entered the provisions of section 518 of the Criminal Procedure Code, wrongly. Mr. Subbiah was not in a position to deny that the application was made under section 523 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The note in the order-sheet appears to have been entered by the Bench Clerk and he must have entered the provisions of section 518 of the Criminal Procedure Code, wrongly. Mr. Subbiah was not in a position to deny that the application was made under section 523 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Further, it is clear from the order passed by the Magistrate that he has placed reliance on the tax token which disclosed the name of the owner and which was attached to the scooter, and has come to the conclusion that it is proper and equitable that the scooter should be handed over to the second respondent, Mr. Ajit Kumar Singh of Bowring Hospital. Mr. Subbiah, found fault with the order contending that the criminal Court under the provisions of Chapter XLIII relating to disposal of property could decide the right to possession and not the ownership. He, therefore, contends that the order of the Magistrate is bad. Nowhere in the course of the order, has the learned Magistrate declared that the second respondent is the owner. The Court has relied upon the tax token which discloses the name of the owner while ordering custody of the scooter to the second respondent. The question whether a person is entitled to possession of the property under section 523 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot be decided without having reference to the ownership of the property. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention of Mr. Subbiah. Under section 523 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Criminal Court is required to find out the person entitled to possession of property suspected to have been stolen or found in circumstances which create suspicion of commission of any offence. This is what the learned Magistrate has done in this case. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the order passed in the case is one passed under section 523 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and not under section 516-A of the Criminal Procedure Code. As regards the second question, the learned State Public Prosecutor firstly questioned the validity of the order passed by the Tahsildar and Administrative Second Magistrate,VelIore,in selling the scooter in question in public auction on 28th February, 1966. He pointed out two serious infirmities in the proceedings culminating in the auction sale of the scooter is question. As regards the second question, the learned State Public Prosecutor firstly questioned the validity of the order passed by the Tahsildar and Administrative Second Magistrate,VelIore,in selling the scooter in question in public auction on 28th February, 1966. He pointed out two serious infirmities in the proceedings culminating in the auction sale of the scooter is question. Firstly, he pointed out that under section 523 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code the Magistrate was required by law to give six months’ time from the date of proclamation requiring arty person who may have a claim thereto, to appear before him and establish the same. Admittedly, in this case, six months’ time had not been given. The date of proclamation is dated 5th February, 1966, as can be seen from a copy of the North Arcot District Gazette, Vellore, produced in the case. It has been sold in public auction on 28th February, 1966. Sri Subbiah also concedes that the six months’ time was not given. Thus, it is the sale conducted by the Tahsildar and Administrative Second Magistrate does not satisfy the requirements of section 523 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code as contended by the learned State Prosecutor. The other infirmity pointed out by the State Prosecutor is that under section 524 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, where no claimant appears within six months, the property may be sold under the orders of a Magistrate of the First Class empowered by the State Government, in this behalf. The designation. “Tahsildar and Administrative Second Magistrate”, clearly shows that the said Magistrate has not been invested with powers of the Magistrate of the First Glass. Mr. Subbiah did not bring to my notice any Madras Amendment to section 524 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, investing the Tahsildar and Administrative Second Magistrate with powers under section 524 Criminal Procedure Code. In my opinion, the latter infirmity or the irregularity in proceedings is also not cured under the provisions of section 529 (h) of the Criminal Procedure Code which lays down; "If any Magistrate not empowered by law to do any of the following things, namely: .................................... (h) to sell property under section 524 or section 525.......... In my opinion, the latter infirmity or the irregularity in proceedings is also not cured under the provisions of section 529 (h) of the Criminal Procedure Code which lays down; "If any Magistrate not empowered by law to do any of the following things, namely: .................................... (h) to sell property under section 524 or section 525.......... erroneously in good faith does that thing, his proceedings shall not be set aside merely on the ground of his not being so empowered." I am unable to say that the Tahsildar and Administrative Second Magistrate of Vellore has passed the order to sell the scooter in question in good faith, because the said order contravenes the provisions of section 523 (2) which empowered the Magistrate to issue a proclamation, as required under that section only if the person entitled to the possession is unknown. As can be seen from the search list produced before the Tahsildar and Administrative Second Magistrate by the Police of Viranjipuram, there was a tax token attached to the scooter which gave certain details which would enable the Magistrate to know the person who is entitled to possession. The Tahsildar and Administrative Second Magistrate appears to have totally ignored the contents of the tax token while issuing a proclamation under section 523 (2)of the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, as contended by the learned State Public Prosecutor, the proceedings before the Tahsildar and Administrative Second Magistrate, Vellore, are plainly invalid for want of jurisdiction, as they do not satisfy the requirements of section 523 (2) and section 524 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, I agree with the view of the learned Magistrate that the auction has become a proceeding of doubtful validity. But the argument of Mr. Subbiah in this context is that this Court has no jurisdiction to question the validity of the order passed by the Tahsildar and Administrative Second Magistate of Vellore which is a Tahsil under the Madras State. He wants that full faith and credit should be given to the act of the Tahsildar and Administrative Second Magistrate of Vellore by this Court as required under Article 261 of the Constitution of India, which reads as under: "261. (.1) Full faith and credit shall be given throughout the territory of India to public acts, records and judicial proceedings of the Union and ofevery State. (.1) Full faith and credit shall be given throughout the territory of India to public acts, records and judicial proceedings of the Union and ofevery State. (2) The manner in which and the conditions under which the acts, records and proceedings referred to in clause (1) shall be proved and the effect thereof determined shall be as provided by law made by Parliament. (3) Final judgments or orders delivered or passed by Civil Courts in any part of the territory of India shall be capable of execution any where within that territory according to law." Mr. Subbiah relying upon clause (1) of Article 261 urged that full faith and credit shail be given throughout the territory of India to public acts, records and judicial proceedings of the Union and of every State as laid down in the constitution. The intendment of the provisions of the above Article is to regulate the effect to be given to public acts, records and judicial proceedings of the Union and of every State in order to avoid conflict of laws as between the States or between a State and the Union. But, they confer no new jurisdiction on the Courts of any State in India. We have analogous provisions in Article 4 of the Constitution of U.S.A. which says that "ful faith and credit shall be given in each State to public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved and the effects thereof.“While interpreting the said Article in a decision in Collis P. Nuttington v. Elizabeth C. Attril1, the United States Supreme Court referring to an earlier decision in Thompson v. Whitman2, has laid down that ‘the provisions of Constitution gave no effect to judgments of a Court which had no jurisdiction to the subject-matter of the parties. And they confer no new jurisdiction on the Courts of any State and therefore, do not authorise them to take jurisdiction of suit or prosecution of any penal nature that it cannot on settled rules of public and international law, be entertained by the judiciary of another State than that in which the penalty was incurred.” (See Wiscoesin v. Pelican Ins. Co.3). The decision in Joseph J., Thompson v. John Whitman,2 referred to in the above decision lays down the law as under. Co.3). The decision in Joseph J., Thompson v. John Whitman,2 referred to in the above decision lays down the law as under. The head, notes by Mr. Justice Bradley who delivered the opinion of the Court reads as under: “Neither the constitutional provision that full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public act, records and judicial proceedings of every other State, nor the Act of Congress passed in pursuance thereof, prevents an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the Court by which a judgment was rendered. The record of a judgment rendered in another State may be contradicted as to the facts necessary to give the Court jurisdiction; and if it be shown that such facts did not exist, the record will be a nullity, notwithstanding it may recite that they did exist. Want of jurisdiction may be shown, either as to the subject-matter of the person, or in proceedings in rem as to the thing.” The learned Judge in the course of the Judgment quotes the principle stated by Chief Justice Marshall: “‘Upon principle’, says Chief Justice Marshall, ‘it would seem that the operation of every judgment must depend on the power of the Court to render that judgment; or, in other words, on its jurisdiction over the subject-matter which it has determined. In some cases, that jurisdiction unquestionably depends as well on the state of the thing as on the constitution of the Court. If by any means whatever a price Court should be induced to condemn, as prize of war, a vessel which was never captured, it could not be contended that this condemnation operated a change of property. In some cases, that jurisdiction unquestionably depends as well on the state of the thing as on the constitution of the Court. If by any means whatever a price Court should be induced to condemn, as prize of war, a vessel which was never captured, it could not be contended that this condemnation operated a change of property. Upon principle, then, it would seem that, to a certain extent, the capacity of the Court to act upon the thing condemned, arising from its being within, or without, its jurisdiction, as well as the constitution of the Court, may be considered by that tribunal which is to decide on the effect of the sentence.”’(Rose v. Himely,4) Further, his Lordship observed in the course of the judgment as follows: “On the whole, we think it clear that the jurisdiction of the Court by which a judgment is rendered in any State may be questioned in a collateral proceeding in another State, notwithstanding the provision of the 4th article of the Constitution and the law of 1790, and notwithstanding the averments contained in the record of the judgment itself.” It is clear from the interpretation given by the United States Supreme Court that the provision that full faith and credit shall be given in each State to public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other State, does not prevent an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the Court by which a judgment was rendered or passed. Want of jurisdiction may be shown either as to the subject-matter or the person, or proceedings in rem as to the thing. Further, such a judgment rendered in any State may be questioned in a collateral proceeding in another State, notwithstanding the provision relating to full faith and credit given to public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other State. Therefore, in my opinion, the provision of Article 261 (1) of the Constitution of India is no bar to inquiry into the jurisdiction of the Court of any State in which a judgment was rendered in another State in a collateral proceeding. Their is no bar to question the jurisdiction of the Court, other as to the subject-matter or the person or proceedings in rem as to the thing. Their is no bar to question the jurisdiction of the Court, other as to the subject-matter or the person or proceedings in rem as to the thing. In the instant case, there is no question of any judgment in a criminal case, but it is an act of Executive Magistrate concerning the disposal of unclaimed property. Therefore, what holds good to a judgment passed in a Criminal Court applies equally to an act of an Executive Magistrate. Therefore, the power of this Court is not barred under Article 261 (1) of the Constitution of India, to consider the jurisdiction of the Tahsildar and Administrative Second Magistrate, Vellore, to pass an order of sale of the scooter in public auction. As already stated above, the proceedings relating to the sale are plainly invalid for want of jurisdiction. Therefore, the contention of Mr. Subbiah that this Court has no jurisdiction to consider the validity of the order passed by the Tahsildar and Administrative Second Magistrate, of Vellore under Article 261 (1) of the Constitution of India, fails. Now turning to the third question: Both the State Prosecutor and Mr. Masilamani for the second respondent contended that the Court has decided, in this case, that the scooter should be handed over to the second respondent on the ground that the second respondent is entitled to the possession of the property. The State Public Prosecutor placed reliance upon the decision in Roshan Lal L. Malik Ram and another v. State of Punjab and others1, wherein the words "person entitled to possession" found in sections 517 (1) and 519 are interpreted as under: "Sub-section (1) of section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not refer to any question of title other than question of title to such property based on possession. What the Court has to decide at the conclusion of an enquiry or trial is this; who is "entitled to possession" of the property? What the Court has to decide at the conclusion of an enquiry or trial is this; who is "entitled to possession" of the property? Section 519 provides a very clear indication of the meaning which the Legislature intended to attach to the expression "entitled to possession’ as used in sections 517 and 519 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which meaning is that where property is found to be stolen property and at the same time found to have been purchased by another person in good faith for value, the person ‘entitled to possession’ of the same, in such a case, is the person who originally lost possession of the property in consequence of theft or misappropriation and the other person, who subsequently purchased the property, is only entitled to be compensated. That expression has the same meaning in both the sections." Mr. Subbiah contended that in the Punjab case, the stolen articles were not sold by a Magistrate, but they were sold by the person to whom they Were entrusted. In the instant case, he pointed out that the scooter was found by Viranjipuram Police as an unclaimed property, and was produced before the Tahsildar and Administrative Second Magistrate of Vellore, who ordered proclamation in the District Gazette; and when nobody claimed the the scooter, the same was ordered to be sold by the said Magistrate, and it was purchased by the petitioner in the public auction held on 28th February, 1966. I do not see force in the argument of Mr. Subbiah. In cases where section 523 of the Criminal Procedure Code applies, the Magistrate may, if the person entitled to the possession thereof is unknown, detain it, and, shall, in such cases, issue a proclamation specifying the articles of which such property consists and require any person who may have a claim thereto, to appear before him and establish his claim within six months from the date of such proclamation. If no such person within such period establishes his claim to such property, according to the provisions of section 524, Criminal Procedure Code, such property shall be at the disposal of the State Government and may be sold under the orders of any one of the Magistrates enumerated in the said section and empowered by the State Government in that behalf. The words "such property shall be at the disposal of the State Government" do not amount to an order of confiscation. Therefore, the property is kept at the disposal of the State Government and sold under orders of certain Officers for the benefit of the true claimant. Hence, the order under section 524 (1), Criminal Procedure Code does not determine the right to the seized article finally. The seizure of the article is only an act for the benefit of the rightful claimant. It is only necessary for him to establish his title on the strength of which he would be entitled to claim the article. Therefore, I am in respectful agreement with the ratio of the decision in Roshan Lal L. Malik Ram and another v. State of Punjab and others1 and hold that there the property found to be stolen property and at the same time found to have been purchased by another person in good faith for value, whether from a private person or in public auction by an order passed under section 524, Criminal Procedure Code, the person entitled to the possession of the same is the person who originally lost possession of the property in consequence of theft or misappropriation and the other person who subsequently purchased the property is only entitled to be compensated, or claim refund of the money indeposit at the disposal of the Government. In that view of the matter, I am of opinion that the order passed by the Additional First-Class Magistrate, Bangalore, handing over the scooter in question to the second respondent is in accordance with law and does not call for interference. The petitioner, if so advised, can take such steps as are necessary to recover the bid amount from the Tahsildar and Administrative Second Magistrate, Vellore. For the reasons stated above, the impugned order does not call for interference. The petition is dismissed. S.V.S. ----- Petition dismissed.