ORDER 1. The appellant has been convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life for having killed his six-month-old son by snatching him from the lap of his wife. The conviction recorded by the Sessions Judge has been upheld in appeal. The prosecution case in a nutshell is that Krishnabai, wife of the appellant, had gone to her parents house with her child and after some time when she did not return notwithstanding the promise of his father-in-law, the appellant himself went to the house of his father-in-law and asked Krishnabai to come with him and when she refused to come with him, the accused-appellant got infuriated and snatched his son from the lap of Krishnabai and threw him down. On account of such throwing the young child got his skull fractured and ultimately died. 2. In view of the evidence of the wife of the accused as well as other prosecution witnesses, the learned counsel for the appellant does not assail the prosecution story as unfolded through these witnesses, but it is contended that even accepting the prosecution version in to, it cannot be said that the accused-appellant threw his child with the intention to kill him and as such the offence will not be under Section 302 IPC, but under Part I or Part II of Section 304 IPC, as the result of the act of the appellant was that the young child died, his skull having been fractured. 3. We find sufficient force in the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. From the evidence of two witnesses as indicated in the impugned judgment and the scenario under which the accused-appellant snatched away the child from the lap of his wife Krishnabai and threw him on the floor, it is not possible for us to hold that he threw the child with the intention of killing him. In this view of the matter, the appellant cannot be convicted under Section 302 IPC. We, therefore, set aside his conviction under Section 302 IPC and instead convict him under Part I of Section 304 IPC and sentence him to imprisonment for seven years. Since the appellant is stated to be in custody since 1985, we direct that the appellant be set at liberty forthwith unless required in any other case. 4. This appeal is accordingly allowed.