In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution as originally filed, the petitioner who was an Assistant Teacher in Hindi in the Sacred Heart Boys' Higher Secondary School, Mawlai, Shillong, has challenged the decision of Managing Committee of the said school in its meeting held on 9.7.96 offering him the post of LDA and the decision of the Managing Committee of the said school held on 19.6.97 to terminate his services on expiry of one month from the date of receipt of the notice conveyed to the petitioner in the letters dated 5.8.96 and 21.7.97 respectively of the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the school. The petitioner has also prayed for a direction on the respondents to issue an appoint­ment letter and to pay him salary in terms of the order dated 4.11.90 of the Inspector of Schools, East Khasi Hills District, Shillong from November, 1994 onwards. 2. The relevant facts briefly are that by letter dated 24.5.86, the Headmaster of the aforesaid school acting for and on behalf of the Managing Committee of the school offered to the petitioner an appointment in the rank of Assistant Teacher and the petitioner joined as such Assistant Teacher in the aforesaid school with effect from 6.6.86. The aforesaid appointment of the petitioner as Assistant Teacher of the school was approved with effect from 6.6.96 in the scale of pay of Rs.400-14-470-EB-15-620-EB-16-700 PM by order dated 4.11.90 of the, Inspector of Schools, East Khasi Hills District, Shillong. Pursuant to the said approval of the Inspector of Schools, the petitioner was paid his salary in the aforesaid scale of pay for different months. But with effect from November, 1994 the petitioner was paid a fixed salary of Rs.3,310 on the ground that the Inspector of Schools had not sanctioned the salary for the post of the petitioner. Thereafter, by letter dated 5.8.96, the Headmaster of the school informed the petitioner that the Managing Committee of the school in its meeting No.110 held on 9.7.96 had unanimously decided him to offer the post of LDA in recognition of his services in the school in the past years. Thereafter, by letter dated 5.8.96, the Headmaster of the school informed the petitioner that the Managing Committee of the school in its meeting No.110 held on 9.7.96 had unanimously decided him to offer the post of LDA in recognition of his services in the school in the past years. The petitioner then submitted a representation dated 13.8.96 to the Inspector of Schools, East Khasi Hills District, Shillong stating therein that his appointment had been approved by the then Inspector of/i Schools, East Khasi Hills District, Shillong by Memo dated 4.11.90 and since then the petitioner had been paid the scale of pay as approved by the Inspector of Schools but he had been informed by the Headmaster of the school that he would no longer be entitled to such pay due to lack of sanctioned post. In the said representation dated 13.8.96, the petitioner requested the Inspector of Schools to intervene in the matter. No orders however appeared to have been communicated a by the Inspector of Schools on the said representation dated 13.8.96 of the petitioner. In the meanwhile, the petitioner received a notice dated 10.8.96 from the Headmaster of the school asking him to submit his written explanation and show cause as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for various acts of misconduct, gross indiscipline, breach of school rules and moral turpitude alleged in the said show cause notice dated 10.8.96. The petitioner submitted his explanation dated 20.8.96 to the Headmaster of the school. But the said explanation was not accepted and the Managing Committee of the school in its meeting held on 19.6.97 and 18.7.97 decided to terminate the services of the petitioner by giving one month's notice. Pursuant to the said decision of the Managing Committee, the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the school issued the notice dated 21.7.97 to the petitioner stating therein that his services would be terminated on the ground which would be stated in the termination letter after expiry of the period of one month from the date of receipt of the notice. Aggrieved, the petitioner has moved this Court for appropriate relief on the ground that the impugned letter dated 5.8.96 and the impugned notice dated 21.7.97 had been issued without the approval of the competent authority contrary to the provisions of the Meghalaya Schools Education, Act, 1981 and were violative of the principles of natural justice and Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution. When the writ petition was moved on 19.8.97, this Court issued notice on the respondents and passed order suspending the impugned notice/letter dated 21.7.97 issued by the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the school and made it clear that the petitioner would not be ousted from service. 3. In the return, the Managing Committee of the school and the Secretary-cum-Headmaster of the Managing Committee of the school, respondents 1 and 2, contended inter alia, that the school was a minority institution established, administered and controlled by the Salesian Society of the Catholic Church and was therefore entitled to the right guaranteed under Article 30 of the Constitution. It was further contended by the respondents 1 and 2 in their affidavit-in opposition that the school was purely a private school situated on a land provided by the Catholic Church and housed in a building constructed primarily with the money provided by the Catholic Church and was administered by a Managing Committee appointed and constituted by the Salesian Society of the Catholic Church and was therefore not an agency or instrumentality of the 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and that a writ petition was not maintainable as against the respondents 1 and 2. The respondents 1 and 2 in their counter-affidavit further contended that the said respondents were not required to take any approval from the competent authority before appointing a teacher in the school or before terminating his services. The said respondents 1 and 2 relied on the provisions of the Meghalaya Schools Education Act, 1981 (for short the Act, 1981) and in particular sub-section (5) of section 9 of the said Act to show that the provisions relating to approval of the competent authority contained in sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of section 9 were not applicable to a minority school. In view of the said stand taken by the respondents 1 and 2 in their counter-affidavit, the petitioner amended the writ petition and made an additional prayer for declaring, the said provisions of sub-section (5) of section 9 of the Act, 1981 as ultra virus Articles 14,21 and 23 of the Constitution and for declaring the provisions of sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of section 9 of the Act, 1981 as beneficial provisions which ought to be enforced even in the case of a minority school. Simultaneously, the petitioner filed a rejoinder affidavit stating that the school was not a minority school and that the Salesian Society of the Catholic Church was not a religious nor linguistic society or community distinct from the Christian Religion and they did not represent the minority population of the State of Meghalaya. The respondents 1 and 2 thereafter filed an affidavit-in-reply stating therein that the Catholics of Meghalaya constituted a distinct religious minority of the State and as per the Catholic Directory of North East India, 1997 their numbers were 2,92,533 in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills and 1,56,098 in the Garo Hills aggregating at 4,48,631 in the whole State of Meghalaya which was below 50% population of the State of Meghalaya which was 17,74,778 approximately. 4. Mr. VK Jindal, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that sub-section (2) of section 9 of the Act, 1981 clearly provided that no employee of a recognised private school would be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor would his service be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the competent authority, but no such approval of the competent authority had been taken before the impugned letter dated 5.8.96 and the impugned notice of termination dated 21.7.97 were issued by the Headmaster and Secretary of the Managing Committee of the school. He further contended that the resolution of the Managing Committee of the school adopted in its meeting held on 19.6.97 it would show that the services of the petitioner were terminated on the allegations that he had tarnished the good name of the institution and he had incited the students against the Headmaster of the school. He further contended that the resolution of the Managing Committee of the school adopted in its meeting held on 19.6.97 it would show that the services of the petitioner were terminated on the allegations that he had tarnished the good name of the institution and he had incited the students against the Headmaster of the school. The termination of the petitioner therefore was by way of punishment but no enquiry was conducted on the said allegations against the petitioner although the petitioner denied the said allegations in his explanation dated 20.8.96 submitted to the Headmaster of the school. The impugned notice of termination was therefore violative of the principles of natural justice and was liable to be quashed. Mr. Jindal relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in SP Mittal vs. Union of India & others, AIR 1983 SC 1 , for the proposition that in order to claim benefit of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution the community must show that it is a religious or linguistic minority and that the institution was established by it. According to Mr. Jindal therefore the respondents 1 and 2 have to satisfy the Court for claiming the benefit of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution that the Catholics of Meghalaya constituted a religious minority and that the school had been established by the said religious minority. Mr. Jindal relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Dav College, Jullundur vs. State of Punjab & others, AIR 1971 SC 1737 , in which the Supreme Court held that the question as to whether a particular religious community was a minority community or not had to be determined only in relation to the particular legislation and if it was a State Legislation then the question had to be determined by reference to the entire population of the State to which the legislation applied, further submitted that since that Act applies to the State of Meghalaya, a religious a community could be a religious minority if it was a minority with reference to the population of the State of Meghalaya. He also submitted that Catholics of the State of Meghalaya did not constitute a separate religious community than the Christians of Meghalaya and that the Christians of Meghalaya represented the majority population in the State of Meghalaya and it was for this reason that the school in question said to be established by the Salesian Society of the Catholic Church could not be held to be an educational institution established and administered by a religious minority so as to be entitled to the right under Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. For this proposition, Mr. Jindal relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Bramchari Sidheswar Shai & others vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1995 SC 2089 , in which the Supreme Court held that Ram Krishna religion was not a religion distinct and separate from Hindu religion and was therefore not entitled to protection under Article 30 (1) of the Constitution, though it would be a religious denomination entitled to establish and maintain institutions of a charitable nature under Article 26 (a) of the Constitution. Mr. Jindal contended that in the event this Court holds that the school in question is a minority school, the petitioner's case is that sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of section 9 of the Act, 1981 should also apply to a minority school as these are provisions for the benefit of the employees and that sub-section (4) of section 9 of the Act, 1981 which makes the said provisions in applicable to a minority school is ultra virus Articles 14, 21 and 23 of the Constitution. He explained that the Supreme Court in the case of Frank Anthony Public School Employees' Association vs. Union of India & others, AIR 1987 SC 311 , held that the management of a minority educational institution could not be permitted under the guise of fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30 (1) to oppress or exploit its employees and struck down section 12 of the Delhi Schools Education Act which made the provisions of Chapter IV inapplicable to unaided minority institutions as discriminatory and void and directed the Union of India and the Delhi Administration and their officers to enforce the provisions of the said Chapter IV except section 8 (2) in the manner provided in the Chapter in the case of Frank Anthony Public School which was a minority institution and further directed the Management of the said school not to give effect to the orders of suspension passed against the members of the staff. Mr. Jindal accordingly submitted that sub-section (5) of section 9 of the Act, 1981 in so far it makes sub-section (2) of section 9 of the Act, 1981 inapplicable to a minority school should be struck down as discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 5. In reply, Mr. S. Chakraborty, learned counsel appearing for the respondents 1 and 2, submitted that Article 30 of the Constitution nowhere states that a religious community must be a religious minority in a particular' State for claiming the benefit of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution and, therefore, a religious community which is in minority in the whole country is entitled to the right guaranteed under Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. He further submitted that the Christians are in minority in India and are therefore a religious minority for the purpose of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. Mr. Chakraborty explained that even though the Christians may be a majority in the State of Meghalaya, the Catholics are in minority as indicated in the Catholic Directory of North East India, 1997 annexed to the reply affidavit of the respondents 1 and 2 as they numbered a total of 4,48,631 in the whole State of Meghalaya which is less than 50% of the population at 17,74,778 approximately. Mr. Mr. Chakraborty contended that the decision of the Supreme Court in Bramchari Siddeswar Shai vs. State of West Bengal, (supra) relating to Rama Krishna religion or religious denomination cannot possibly apply to the facts of the present case as it related to Hindu religion and its denomination. He relied on the various averments made in the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 to show that the school had been established and was being administered by the Salesian Society of the Catholic Church and was therefore a minority institution and was entitled to the protection of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution and sub-section (5) of section 9 of the Act, 1981. Mr. Chakraborty submitted that since sub-section (5) of section 9 of the Act, 1981 clearly stated that sub-section (2) of section 9 v/as not applicable to a minority school, the question of taking prior approval from the competent authority before terminating the services of the petitioner or reducing him in rank did not arise. He further explained relying on the averments in the counter affidavit of respondents 1 and 2 that the total of 30 posts had been sanctioned by the Govt and all the 30 sanctioned posts were filled up before the appointment of the petitioner to the post of Assistant Teacher with effect from June, 1986 and that the approval granted by the Inspector of Schools by his letter dated 4.11.9.0 was therefore without any substance. He further submitted that notwithstanding the fact that there was no sanctioned post in which the petitioner could be accommodated, the Managing Committee of the school sympathetically considered his case and offered him the post of LDA as mentioned in the impugned letter dated 5.8.96 of the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the school, but the petitioner refused to accept the said post of LDA. He referred to clause 7 of the terms of appointment as contained in the offer of appointment dated 24.5.86 issued to the petitioner to snow that the appointment of the petitioner could be terminated by either side after giving-one month's notice in writing or by making payment of salary in lieu of such notice. Mr. He referred to clause 7 of the terms of appointment as contained in the offer of appointment dated 24.5.86 issued to the petitioner to snow that the appointment of the petitioner could be terminated by either side after giving-one month's notice in writing or by making payment of salary in lieu of such notice. Mr. Chakraborty submitted that since the impugned notice of termination dated 21.7.97 was in accordance with the said clause 7 of the offer of appointment, the same was not illegal as contended by the petitioner and that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed. 6. Mr. OS Ajar, learned Govt Advocate, Meghalaya while adopting the aforesaid argument of Mr. S. Chakravorty submitted that sub-section (5) of section 9 of the Act, 1981 provided that sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) would not apply in the case of a minority school as the said sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of section 9 of the Act, 1981 if made applicable to a minority school will impinge upon the right of religious and linguistic minority under Article 30 (1) of the Constitution to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. He further-submitted that the said provision in sub-section (5) of section 9 of the Act, 1981 was not discriminatory or arbitrary or violative of Articles 14, 19,21 and 23 of the Constitution as contended by Mr. Jindal, learned counsel for the petitioner. He further argued that the decision of the Supreme Court in Frank Anthony PSE Association (supra) would show that the said decision supported the case of minority institutions and did not help the petitioner in any way. According to Mr. Ajar, learned Govt Advocate, therefore no declaration should be issued in this case declaring sub-section (5) of section 9 of the Act, 1981 as ultra virus the Constitution. 7. Section 9 of the Act, 1981 which provides for terms and conditions of services of employees of recognised private schools in the State of Meghalaya is quoted herein below: 9. Ajar, learned Govt Advocate, therefore no declaration should be issued in this case declaring sub-section (5) of section 9 of the Act, 1981 as ultra virus the Constitution. 7. Section 9 of the Act, 1981 which provides for terms and conditions of services of employees of recognised private schools in the State of Meghalaya is quoted herein below: 9. Terms and Conditions of service of employees of recognised private schools (1) The State Govt may make rules regulating the minimum qualifications for recruitment and the conditions of service of employees of recognised schools : Provided that neither the salary nor the service conditions of the employee in the employment of an existing recognised school at the commencement of this Act shall be varied to the disadvantage of such employee. (2) Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf no employee of a recognised private school shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the competent authority. . (3) Any employee of a recognised private school who is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank may, within three months from the date of communication to him of the order of such dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, appeal against such order to the prescribed authority. (4) Where the Managing Committee of a recognised private school intends to suspend any of its employees, such intention shall be communicated to the competent authority and no such suspension shall be made except with the prior approval of the competent authority : Provided that the Managing Committee may suspend an employee with immediate effect and without the prior approval of the competent authority, if it is satisfied that such immediate suspension is necessary by reasons of gross misconduct, within the meaning of the code of conduct prescribed under section 10 of the Act: Provided further that no such immediate suspension shall remain in force for more than a period of thirty days from the date of suspension unless it has been communicated to the competent authority and approved by it before the expiry of the said period. (5) Nothing contained in sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) shall apply in the case of a minority school. (5) Nothing contained in sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) shall apply in the case of a minority school. (6) Where the intention to suspend or the immediate suspension of an employee is communicated to the competent authority, it may, if it is satisfied that there are adequate and reasonable grounds for such suspension, accord its approval to such suspension.” Sub-section (2) of section 9 of the Act, 1981, quoted above, thus provides that subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, no employee of a recognised private school shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor his services be otherwise terminated except with the approval of the competent authority. Sub-section (5) of section 9 of the said Act however provides that nothing in sub-section (2) shall apply in the case of a minority school. The expression 'minority school' has been defined in section 3 (xv) of the Act, 1981 which is quoted herein below: “Minority school' means a school established and administered by a minority having the right to do so under clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution.” Thus a minority school is a school established and administered by a minority having the right to do so under clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution cause” (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution provides that all minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. In SP Mittal vs. Union of India & others (supra), ( AIR 1983 SC 1 ), the Supreme Court held : “... In order to claim the benefit of Article 30 (1) the community must show: (a) that it is a religious or linguistic minority, (b) that the institution was established by it. Without satisfying these two conditions it cannot claim the guaranteed rights to administer it." As per the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court therefore the respondents 1 and 2 who claim that the Sacred Heart Boys' Higher Secondary School is a minority school must show that the Salesian Society of the Catholic Church which is said to have established the school belongs to a religious minority. 8. The contention of Mr. 8. The contention of Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 is that the community which has established the school is a religious minority for the purpose of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution because the Christians are a religious minority considering the population of India as a whole. Mr. Jindal, learned counsel for the petitioner on the other hand, contended that since in this case the Court is to decide as to whether the school has been established by a religious minority and is therefore a minority school for the purpose of Act made by the State Legislature of Meghalaya, the question as to whether Christians are minority for the purpose of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution has to be decided by reference to the population of the State of Meghalaya and not to the population of India as a whole. I find a lot of force in the aforesaid submission of Mr. Jindal. In Dav College, Jullundur vs. State of Punjab (supra), ( AIR 1971 SC 1737 ) a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held : “Though there was a faint attempt to canvass the position that religious or linguistic minorities should be minorities in relation to the entire population of the country, in our view they are to be determined only in relation to the particular legislation which is sought to be impugned, namely that if it is the State legislature these minorities have to be determined in relation to the population of the State...” In the instant case, the legislation that is challenged has been made by the State Legislature and the legislation for the purpose of which the school is to be treated as a minority school is a legislation made by the State Legislature of Meghalaya. Thus the question as to whether or not the community which hasestablished in the said school is a religious minority has to be determined in relation to the population of the State of Meghalaya and not in relation to the population of India as a whole. 9. In the Census of India, 1991, Series 16 relating to Meghalaya published by the Directorate of Census Operations, Meghalaya, proportion of the population by major religions in Meghalaya has been given thus: ”Proportion of the population by major religions in Meghalaya. 9. In the Census of India, 1991, Series 16 relating to Meghalaya published by the Directorate of Census Operations, Meghalaya, proportion of the population by major religions in Meghalaya has been given thus: ”Proportion of the population by major religions in Meghalaya. In Statement 4, the proportion of the population by major religions to the total population in Meghalaya in both 1981 and 1991 is presented. From the statement, one can notice that, unlike in India, in Meghalaya, the Christians constitute the majority of the population in both 1981 and 1991, at 52.62-per cent and 64.58 per cent respectively. While in India, the second highest proportion of the population is constituted by the Muslims, in Meghalaya, it is formed by those professing 'other religions and persuasions' in both 1981 and 1991, at 25.77 percent and 16.82 percent respectively. The Hindus form the third-highest proportion of the population in both 1981 and 1991, and 18.03 per cent and 14.67 percent respectively. The population of the Muslims, the Buddhists, the Sikhs and the Jains constituted quite an un-significant proportion except that of the Muslim which is quite noticeable. The C proportion of those who cannot or do not state their religion is also just a minuscule, higher only to that of the Jains. It is also noticed that while the proportion of the Christians, the Muslims, the Sikhs and those who cannot or do not state their religions has shot up during the decade from 1981 to 1991, that of the Hindus, Buddhists, the Jains and those professing 'other religions and persuasions' has plummeted. STATEMENT 4 Percentage of the population by major religious to the total population, 1981-1991 SI percentage No. Major Religions 1981 1991 1 2 3 4 All religions 100.00 100.00 1. Christians 52.62 64.58 2. Hindus 18.03 14.67 3. Muslims 3.10 3.46 4. Buddhists 0.20 0.16 5. Sikhs 0.13 0.15 6. Jains 0.04 0.02 7. Others religions and persuasions 25.77 16.82 8. Religion not stated 0.11 0.14 It would be clear from the aforesaid extract that as per the Census of 1991, the Christians constitute 64.58% of the population in the State of Meghalaya. Thus, Christians do hot constitute a religious minority in the State of Meghalaya. Mr. Jains 0.04 0.02 7. Others religions and persuasions 25.77 16.82 8. Religion not stated 0.11 0.14 It would be clear from the aforesaid extract that as per the Census of 1991, the Christians constitute 64.58% of the population in the State of Meghalaya. Thus, Christians do hot constitute a religious minority in the State of Meghalaya. Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 however contended that the school has been established by the Catholics and that the Catholics is the State of Meghalaya are less than 50% of the total population of the State of Meghalaya. This contention of Mr. Charkaborty is based on the premise that Catholic is not a part of he Christian religion and is a religion different from the Christianity. The premise is misconceived. In Webster's Third New International Dictionary published by Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. the meaning of the term 'Catholic' is given as under : A person who belongs to the universal Christian church : a member of a Catholic church : as a member of the Roman Catholic Church : A member of an Eastern Orthodox Church (a Greek Catholic): a member of an Anglican or EpiscopalChurch (an Anglo Catholic): A member of an Old Catholic Church: A member of a national Catholic Church (Polish National Catholics)” The aforesaid meaning of the term 'Catholic' given in Webster's Third New International Dictionary shows that Catholic is a person who belongs to the Christian Church. The word 'Church' has been described in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 5, published in 1971 as follows : “Chruch : The word 'church' refers both to the Christian religious community and to the building used for Christian worship ....” Further, in the said Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 5, published in 1971, the following information has been given regarding the term 'Catholic': “Some confusion in the history of the term has been inevitable as various groups that have been condemned by Rome as heretical or Schismatic have not renounced their claim to the note of Catholicity, so that in the modern world not only the Roman Catholic Church but also the Eastern Orthodox Church, the Anglican Church and a variety of national churches and minor sects claim to be Catholic, if not the only true Catholic Church. From this point of view the meaning attached to the term Catholic and the claim to Catholicity will be conditioned by the theory of the nature and constitution of the Church accepted, being rigid and exclusive or tolerant and comprehensive as that is rigid or tolerant....” The aforesaid information given in Encyclopaedia Britannica shows that the Catholics are part of the Church or Christianity and that they may be sects of the Christianity but are not different from Christians. That the Catholics in the State of Meghalaya are part of the Christian religious community would also be clear from the following extracts of the Catholic Directory of North East India, 1997 annexed to the affidavit of respondents 1 and 2 : “At present Shillong Archdiocese comprises the following districts of Meghalaya: East Khasi Hills, West Khasi Hills, Ri Bhoi and Jaintia Hills. Area: 14,262 Sq KMs; Total Population: 12,28,038; Catholics: 2,92,533. Languages: Khasi, Hindi, English, Assamese, Garo, Karbi, Nepali, Boro, Bengalee. Patroness of the Archdiocese: Mary Help of Christians.”(emphasis supplied) The underlined portion of the aforesaid extracts would show that the Catholics in the State of Meghalaya are not different from the Christians. Since the Christians constitute a majority in the population of the State of Meghalaya in respect of which the Act, 1981 has been made by the State Legislature of Meghalaya, the contention of respondents 1 and 2 that the Sacred Heart Boys' Higher Secondary School established by the Salesian Society of the Catholic Church is a minority school within the meaning of sub-section (5) of section 9 of the Act, 1981 has no merit. 10. The result is that sub-section (2) of section 9 of the Act, 1981 applies to the Sacred Heart Boys' Higher Secondary School. The said sub-section (2) of section 9, inter alia, provides that an employee of a recognised private school shall not be reduced in rank except with the prior approval of the competent authority. The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Teacher of the school pursuant to the offer of appointment dated 24.5.86. Thus he could not be reduced from the rank of Assistant Teacher to the rank of LDA without the prior approval of the competent authority. The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Teacher of the school pursuant to the offer of appointment dated 24.5.86. Thus he could not be reduced from the rank of Assistant Teacher to the rank of LDA without the prior approval of the competent authority. Since without such prior approval of the competent authority the petitioner was reduced to the rank of LDA from the rank of Assistant Teacher of the school by the decision of the Managing Committee of the school communicated to the petitioner by the impugned letter dated 5.8.96 of the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the school, the said decision of the Managing Committee taken in its meeting held on 9.7.96 is liable to be quashed. Further, the aforesaid sub-section (2) of section 9 provides that no employees of a recognised private school would be otherwise terminated from service except with the prior approval of the competent authority. Since the services of the petitioner had been sought to be terminated by the impugned notice dated 21.7.97 issued by the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the school to the petitioner without the prior approval of the competent authority pursuant to the decision of the Managing Committee of the school taken in its meeting held on 19.6.97, the said decision of the Managing Committee is liable to be quashed. The aforesaid decision of the Managing Committee taken on 9.7.96 reducing the petitioner from the rank of Assistant Teacher to the rank of LDA and the decision of the Managing Committee taken on 19.6.97 terminating the services of the petitioner are liable to be quashed by appropriate writs/directions from this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution because the said reduction in rank and the termination of services were in breach of the statutory provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 9 of the Act, 1981. 11. Regarding the contention in the counter-affidavit of respondents 1 and 2 that the Sacred Heart Boys' HS School is a private school and is therefore not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court, the school nonetheless is an Aided school receiving substantial aid from the State Govt of Meghalaya and admittedly as many as 30 posts have been sanctioned by the State Govt and they are being paid out of funds of the State Govt. Moreover, the school is subject to extensive statutory provisions contained in the Act, 1981 and the employees of the school have been given statutory protection under the various provisions of section 9 of the said Act. Where the said statutory provisions affording protection to the employees of a recognised private aided school are violated by the Managing Committee of the school, the High Court will be well within its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue appropriate writs/directions and grant appropriate relief to the employees. In Manmohan Singh Jaitla vs. Commissioner, Union Territory, Chandigarh, AIR 1985 SC 364 , the services of the confirmed Headmaster and Drawing Teacher of an Aided High School were terminated without enquiry in defiance of the provisions of section 3 of the Punjab Aided Schools (Security of Service) Act by taking recourse to a clause in agreement between the concerned teachers and the Management; though the High Court of Punjab & Haryana rejected the writ petition in limine observing that as the school was not 'other authority' under Article 12 of the Constitution it was not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, the Supreme Court held following its earlier decision in Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, AIR 1981 SC 487 , that since the school was an Aided school receiving financial assistance from the State and there was existence of deep and pervasive State control and the employees of the school received statutory protection, the High Court was in error in holding that the school was not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the Court. There is thus no force in the contention of respondents 1 and 2 that the impugned decisions of the Managing Committee of the school cannot be challenged before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution 12. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 however have stated in their counter-affidavit that a total number of 30 posts of teachers were sanctioned by the State Govt and all these 30 posts had been filled up before the appointment of the petitioner in the year 1986 and that there was therefore no scope for the Inspector of Schools, East Khasi Hills District, Shillong for passing the order dated 4.11.90 approving the appointment of the petitioner as Assistant Teacher (Hindi) in the scale of pay of Rs.400-14-470-EB-15-620-EB-16-700 PM with effect from 6.6.86. It was quite possible that the Inspector of Schools, East Khasi Hills District, Shillong had exceeded his authority by approving the appointment of the petitioner as Assistant Teacher in the school when there was no clear sanction from the higher authority of the State Govt for the said post. It was also quite possible that the said Inspector of Schools was armed with the sanction from the higher authority of the State Govt when he issued the said order dated 4.11.90 approving the appointment of the petitioner with retrospective effect from 6.6.86. Without going into the aforesaid controversy as to whether or not there was a sanction of the appropriate authority of the State Govt to the post of the petitioner, I am of the opinion that since as a matter of fact an order was issued by the Inspector of Schools, East Khasi Hills District, Shillong on 4.11.90 approving the appointment of the petitioner as Assistant Teacher (Hindi) in the aforesaid scale of pay with effect from 6.6.86 and the petitioner continued to work as such Assistant Teacher (Hindi) in the school till 1997, for more than 10 years, this is a fit case in which the Secretary to the Govt of Meghalaya, Education Department (respondent No. 3) should be directed to issue appropriate orders sanctioning the post of the petitioner as Assistant Teacher (Hindi) in the Sacred Heart Boys' Higher Secondary School within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment and order from the petitioner. It is made clear that the aforesaid sanctioned post of the petitioner would be in addition to the 30 sanctioned posts which according to the respondents 1 and 2 were said to have been filled up prior to the appointment of the petitioner in the year 1986. 13. Since I have held that the Sacred Heart Boys' Higher Secondary' School is not a minority school within the meaning of sub-section (5) of section 9 of the Act, 1981, it is not necessary to decide the question as to whether the said sub­ section (5) of section 9 of the Act, 1981 is ultra virus Articles 14, 21 and 23 of the Constitution. 14. 14. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the decisions of the Managing Committee of the Sacred Heart Boys' Higher Secondary School taken in its meeting held on 9.7.96 and in its meeting held on 19.6.97 conveyed to the petitioner in the impugned communications dated 5.8.96 and 21.7.97 of the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the school are quashed, and the Secretary to the Govt of Meghalaya, Education Department, is directed to sanction a post of Assistant Teacher (Hindi), if necessary retrospectively, for the petitioner within a period of two months from the date of received of a certified copy of this judgment and order from the petitioner. Since the respondent No. 2 has issued the letter of appointment dated 24.5.86, no further directions need be issued to the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to issue any letter of appointment to the petitioner but the petitioner will be paid his salary, both current and arrear, as per the b approval of the Inspector of Schools, East Khasi Hills, Shillong contained in the Memo Dated 4.11.90. Considering however the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their respective costs.