Order.- The petitioner has been charged "under section 24(3) of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, read with rules 3 and 12 of the Kerala State Cement Control Order, 1961" and convicted by the District Magistrate "of the offence of contravention of rule 9 of the Kerala State Cement Control Order, 1961"; and that has been affirmed by the Sessions Judge in appeal. Counsel for petitioner contends that the offences under rules 3 and 12 of the Kerala State Cement Control Order-hereafter ‘the Order’ for short-are absolutely independent of an offence under rule 9 of the same Order and as there was no charge under rule 9 the conviction is bad in law. That the offences under rules 3 and 12 of the Order are distinct from an offence under rule 9 of the Order cannot be disputed. Rule 2(vii) of the Order defined ‘stockist’ as a person who deals in cement involving the purchase, sale and storage for the sale of cement. The finding is that "he had been in possession of 59 bags of cement for his personal use", and that clearly takes him out of the definition of a stockist. Rule 3 of the Order, which prohibits carrying on business as a stockist except under a proper licence, could not be attracted to the petitioner. Rule 12 read: "No stockist shall sell or offer for sale and no person shall buy cement at a price higher than that fixed under any order made under section 18-G of the Industries (Development Regulation) Act (LXV of 1951)." There is no case that the accused sold or attempted to sell or purchased cement at a price above that fixed by authority. Rule 9 of the Order read: No person requiring cement for his personal use shall acquire cement except under and in accordance with a permit in Form E issued by the State Cement Controller or such other officer as the state Government may authorise in this behalf. " Obviously this relates to a different kind of transaction than those covered by rules 3 and 12 of the Order. The Complaint against the accused is under. "Section 24 (iii) of the Industrial Development and Regulation Act, 1951 read with rules 3 and 12 of Kerala Cement Control Order, 1961." Evidently he is charged as a trader in cement, i.e., as a stockist only. The Complaint against the accused is under. "Section 24 (iii) of the Industrial Development and Regulation Act, 1951 read with rules 3 and 12 of Kerala Cement Control Order, 1961." Evidently he is charged as a trader in cement, i.e., as a stockist only. The averments in the complaint and the provisions of law cited therein put the matter beyond any doubt in my view. In Nanak Chand v. State of Punjab1, S.R. Das, Bhagwati and Imam, JJ., have held unanimously that a charge for a substantive offence under section 302, Indian Penal Code, is for a distinct and separate offence from that under section 302, read with section 149, and that a person charged with an offence read with section 149 cannot be convicted of the substantive offence without a specific charge therefor and further that a conviction for a charge not framed is an illegality and not an irregularity curable by the provisions of sections 535 and 537, Criminal Procedure Code-vide head note (h) of A.I.R. report. Their Lordships observed: "By framing a charge under section 302, read with section 149, Indian Penal Code, against the appellant, the Court indicated that it was not charging the appellant with the offence of murder and to convict him for murder and sentence him under section 302, Indian Penal Code, was to convict him of an offence with which he had not been charged. In defending himself the appellant was not called upon to meet such a charge and in his defence he may well have considered it unnecessary to concentrate on that part of the prosecution case. " In Suraj Pal v. State of U.P.2,another Bench of the Supreme Court constituted by Bose, Jagannadhadas and Sinha, JJ., unanimously reiterated the abovesaid proposition (vide head note (a) of the A.I.R. report) observing. “It appears to us quite clear that a charge against a person as a member of an unlawful assembly in respect of an offence committed by one or other of the members of that assembly in prosecution of its common object is a substantially different one from a charge against any individual for an offence directly committed by him while being a member of such assembly.” There can, therefore, be no doubt that the direct individual liability of a person can only be fixed upon him with reference to a specific charge in respect of the particular offence. Such a case is not covered by sections 236 and 237, Criminal Procedure Code. The framing of a specific and distinct charge in respect of every distinct head of criminal liability constituting an offence, is the foundation for a conviction and sentence therefor. The above principles laid in respect of a charge in a warrant case must, in my opinion, apply to the contents of a complaint in a summons case too, as they form the essential prerequisites of a judicial act that is likely to affect the personal liberty of a citizen in this democratic republic. As there is no charge here under rule 9, nor a trial for contravention of rule 9 of the Order, the conviction as now entered is unsustainable in law. As the Kerala State Cement Control Order, which was only a temporary-statutory measure, has been repealed, no useful purpose would be served if the matter is remitted now for framing a proper complaint under rule 9 and trial thereon. The Criminal Revision Petition is therefore allowed and the conviction set aside. The fine, if. paid, must be refunded. M.C.M. ----- Petition allowed.