Somnath Iyer, J.- This is an application under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the issue of a direction of the nature of a habeas corpus. The applicant is a certain Velayudhan who professes to be a family friend and well-wisher of a certain Chinnaswamy. The complaint made in the affidavit produced by Velayudhan is that Chinnaswamy was illegally arrested on 14th November, 1966 at Gadag by a Police Constable, respondent 3. So, he seeks a direction that Chinnaswamy should be forthwith set at liberty. According to the narration contained in the affidavit of which Velayudhan is the deponent, Chinnaswamy along with his Counsel appeared before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Gadag, on 14th November, 1966 in the context of a prosecution concerning an offence of theft in a building punishable under section 380 of the Penal Code. It is stated that on 29th October, 1966 which was the earlier date of hearing, the Magistrate directed Chinnaswamy to produce cash security in the sum of one thousand rupees, and that on 14th November, 1966 the direction was altered and Chinnaswamy was permitted to produce a surety. The allegation is that when Chinnaswamy came out of the Court Hall and was near the road proceeding to make arrangements for the production of a surety, respondent 3, a Police Constable, of Shirahatti, 30 miles away, arrested Chinnaswamy and took him away with him without heeding the protests of Chinnaswamy’s Counsel Mr. Kalasannavar. It is also alleged that on the same day Mr. Kalasannavar complained about this to the Gadag Magistrate who issued a direction for the immediate production of Chinnaswamy but that he was not produced. In his affidavit, Velayudhan states that he apprehended that Chinnaswamy was being manhandled by those who were unlawfully detaining him. Velayudhan asserts that the concerned Sub-Inspector of Laxmeswar allowed himself to be influenced by respondent 4, a money-lender in Gadag, who, according to the allegation of Velayudhan, has been systematically persecuting Chinnaswamy in one form or another. Mr. Viswanath Rai who presented before us a careful and adequate argument, submitted that the apprehension of Chinnaswamy when Chinnaswamy had to present himself before the Gadag Magistrate at 3 p.m. to produce the surety which he was directed to produce, was both illegal and improper. Mr. Viswanath Rai who presented before us a careful and adequate argument, submitted that the apprehension of Chinnaswamy when Chinnaswamy had to present himself before the Gadag Magistrate at 3 p.m. to produce the surety which he was directed to produce, was both illegal and improper. He asked us to make the enunciation that when Chinnaswamy appeared before the Gadag Magistrate in obedience to the direction made on the previous date of hearing so that he may produce a surety and get himself enlarged on bail, Chinnaswamy came under the protection of the Gadag Magistrate and was in his effective custody, and that his apprehension by Shirahatti Constable without the permission of the Gadag Magistrate was contumacious and therefore improper. Mr. Rai who did not dispute that the Shirahatti Constable had the power to make an arrest of Chinnaswamy for an investigation into an offence which he was stated to have committed, submitted that he could not exercise that power when Chinnaswamy was in the custody of the Gadag Magistrate. It was maintained by Mr. Rai that the petitioner’s apprehension plainly impeded the progress of the prosecution before the Gadag Magistrate and that that was the reason why the Gadag Magistrate issued a direction for the immediate production of Chinnaswamy within 24 hours. The alternative submission made by Mr. Rai was that the detention invited the reproach that it was mala fide. It was said that respondent 4 who was out to involve Chinnaswamy in a variety of troubles had commenced an earlier prosecution against him which had ended in a discharge. The prosecution before the Gadag Magistrate, it was explained, was the second, and that the complaint made to the Laxmeswar Police which was the source of the impugned arrest was the third. On the basis of this chronology, the argument constructed was that the Shirahatti Sub-Inspector, respondent 2, had played into the hands of respondent 4 and had directed an irresponsible arrest, and that the Constable, respondent 3, had made that arrest without the realisation of the impropriety of the arrest although Mr. Kalasannavar who appeared for Chinnaswamy before the Gadag Magistrate warned him against it. This application was presented on 17th November, 1966. On 30th November, 1966 Mr. Kalasannavar who appeared for Chinnaswamy before the Gadag Magistrate warned him against it. This application was presented on 17th November, 1966. On 30th November, 1966 Mr. Shankara Chetty, the learned State Public Prosecutor, entered appearance for respondents 1 to 3 and produced two counter-affidavits; the deponent of one of them is the Head Constable of Shirahatti and that of the other is respondent 3. In the affidavit of the Head Constable who is not a party to these proceedings, it is stated that respondent 2 was on “sick leave” since two months and that on 14th November, 1966 when Chinnaswamy was apprehended, he, the Head Constable was the Station House Officer in the Shirahatti Police Station and was in charge of the Station House Officer’s duties. He proceeded to state that a certain Kolliwad, who, it was explained to us by Mr. Rai was an employee of respondent 4-although that allegation is not admitted by Mr. State Public Prosecutor-presented a complaint that Chinnaswamy had committed theft of a gold ring and Rs. 50 on 14th November, 1966 from his house at Shirahatti, and that that complaint was registered at 8-20 a.m. He proceeded to explain that Kolliwad stated that Chinnaswamy was at Gadag and that he would point him out and that he therefore deputed Hassanalli, respondent 3, with a written order for his apprehension and production. The affidavit proceeds to state that at 6-30 p.m. on that day Hassanalli produced Chinnaswamy and that on 15th November, 1966, the Head Constable produced him before the Laxmesvar Magistrate at 3 p.m. and obtained an order of remand to judicial custody. Paragraph 10 of the affidavit states that charge-sheet was placed against Chinaswamy on 25th November, 1966 and that the prosecution is pending. It was also asserted in that paragraph that Chinnaswamy is now injudicial custody. Hassanalli who is respondent 3 has stated in his affidavit that he apprehended Chinnaswamy in obedience to the order issued to him by the Shirahatti Head Cons cable and that he did so at the municipal grounds. He proceeded to state that when he was getting the panchannama drawn up in the context of the apprehension. Mr. Kalasannavar who was with Chinnaswamy questioned his authority to take away Chinnaswamy and threatened him with dismissal. Mr. State Public Prosecutor resisted this application on two grounds. He proceeded to state that when he was getting the panchannama drawn up in the context of the apprehension. Mr. Kalasannavar who was with Chinnaswamy questioned his authority to take away Chinnaswamy and threatened him with dismissal. Mr. State Public Prosecutor resisted this application on two grounds. The first was that Chinnaswamy’s apprehension was neither Unlawful nor illegal nor improper, and the second was that since there was an order of detention made by the Laxmeswar Magistrate under section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure when Chinnaswamy was produced before him on 15th November. 1966, and that order of detention is entirely above reproach, there is no longer any power for this Court or any occasion for a direction that Chinnaswamy should be set at liberty. Since we are disposed to take the view that the second submission made by Mr. State Public Prosecutor is unanswerable, we do not find it necessary to embark upon a discussion of the first. What is abundantly clear from the affidavits of the Head Constable of Shirahatti and of respondent 3 is that on 15th November, 1966 Chinnaswamy was produced by the Head Constable before the Laxmeswar Magistrate at about 3 p.m. when the Laxmeswar Magistrate remanded Chinnaswamy to judicial custody. What is also clear is that on 25th November, 1966 a chargesheet was placed against Chinnaswamy and that the Laxmeswar Magistrate before whom the charge-sheet was placed, directed Chinnaswamy to continue in judicial custody. So, it is indisputable that at the time of the return, whatever may have been the position on the date of the institution of the proceedings before us, Chinnaswamy was in detention under an order made by the Magistrate. The order by which the Laxmeswar Magistrate remanded Chinnaswamy to judicial custody was made under section 167(2) and the order that he should continue in judicial custody, was made under section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. So, even if there was any illegality or impropriety in regard to the arrest made by respondent 2 in the vicinity of the premises of the Gadag Magistrate’s Court on 14th November, 1966-and on that question we express no opinion-what transpires is that on the date of the return and thereafter, Chinnaswamy is in detention not because he was arrested by respondent 2, but, because his detention was ordered by Laxmeswar Magistrate. Mr. Mr. Viswanatha Rai, however, contended that even so, the detention ordered by the Magistrate stood vitiated by the illegality of the arrest by respondent 2, and this illegality of the order of detention he asked us to deduce on the basis that the detention ordered by the Magistrate was a continuation of the illegal or improper arrest. We. do not accede to this submission. The power of the Magistrate to order detention under section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure or to make a remand under section 344 is an independent power which has no manner of association with the antecedent arrest made by a Police Officer. The power accrues to the Magistrate to make an order of detention under section 167(2) on the accused being produced before him, and similarly the power becomes available during the pendency of the trial under section 344. If the orders made under these two sections are within the competence of the Magistrate and so are above reproach, any defect or illegality concerning the antecedent arrest cannot contaminate the order of detention or remand subsequently made by the Magistrate, which is otherwise legal and proper. That being so, the allegation that the arrest by respondent 2 was illegal or improper ceases to have relevance after the Magistrate made his order of detention. We cannot overlook or discard the subsequent event in consequence of which Chinnaswamy’s detention is both legal and proper, under the orders made by the Laxmeswar Magistrate. The material date for the investigation of the legality or propriety of the detention is not the date on which an application was presented to us, but the date when the return was made, and, if at that point of time it transpires that Chinnaswamy is not in illegal or improper detention, there would be no occasion for the issue of a direction in the nature of a habeas corpus. Before we could issue that direction, it should be established that the illegal or improper detention continues. But if by the happening of a subsequent event, whatever might have been the nature of the earlier detention, the detention has become legal and proper by an order made by a Magistrate such as the one to which we have referred, the direction that he should be set at liberty becomes impossible. But if by the happening of a subsequent event, whatever might have been the nature of the earlier detention, the detention has become legal and proper by an order made by a Magistrate such as the one to which we have referred, the direction that he should be set at liberty becomes impossible. That that is the true position was explained by the Federal Court in Basanta Chandra v. Emperor1, in which it was observed: “The analogy of civil proceedings in which the rights of parties have ordinarily to be ascertained as on the date of the institution of the proceedings cannot be invoked here. If at any time before the Court directs the release of the detenue, a valid order directing his detention is produced, the Court cannot direct his release merely on the ground that at some prior stage there was no valid cause for detention. The question is not whether the later order validates the earlier detention l:ut whether in the face of the later valid order the Court can direct the release.” The enunciation made in this case by the Federal Court was the subject-matter of elucidation by the Supreme Court in Naranjan Singh v. State of Punjab2 in the following words: “Once it is conceded that in habeas corpus proceedings the Court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the return and not with reference to the date of the institution of the proceeding, it is difficult to hold, in the absence of proof of bad faith, that the detaining authority cannot supersede an earlier order of detention challenged as illegal and make a fresh order wherever possible which is free from defects and duly complies with the requirements of the law in that behalf.” A similar enunciation was made by the Supreme Court again in Ran Narayan Singh v. The State of Delhi and others3. The principle of law applicable to preventive detention, is, in our opinion, applicable alike, to an arrest made by a Police Officer in respect of an offence concerning which a complaint was made to him. Even if as contended by Mr. The principle of law applicable to preventive detention, is, in our opinion, applicable alike, to an arrest made by a Police Officer in respect of an offence concerning which a complaint was made to him. Even if as contended by Mr. Rai the arrest was without power, if the arrest is succeeded by a valid order of detention made by a Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the person detained being no longer in illegal detention, the power to make a direction in the nature of a habeas corpus becomes unavailable. That was also the view taken by the High Court of Kerala in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Kerala4, in which an arrest made by a Police Officer whose legality was challenged was followed up by an order of remand made by a Magistrate of competent jurisdiction. The High Court of Kerala had no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the enunciation made by the Federal Court in Basanta Chandra v. Emperor1, precluded any investigation into the legality of the antecedent order of arrest made by the Police Officer, and that no direction in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus could issue. It is on this short ground that we should dismiss this application, and we dismiss it. M.C.M. ----- Application dismissed.