Hegde, J.- Appellant No. 1 Basavaraju and appellant No. 3 Siddaiah aredirect brothers. Appellant No. 2 Ramaiah is the brother-in-law of A-1 and A-3. A-1 was tried for the murder of one Shivanna at about 12-00 noon on 7th February, 1965 in front of his house at Mandi Mohalla, Mysore, in Sessions Case No. 14 of 1965 on the file of the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Mysore. The remaining two appellants were also tried in that case for aiding and abetting A-1 in the murder of Shivanna. While A-1 was charged under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, A-2 and A-3 were charged under section 302 read with section 114 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned trial Judge held A-1 and A-2 guilty of the offences with which they were charged and for those offences, he sentenced them to suffer imprisonment for life. A-3 was convicted under section 352 of the Indian Penal Code and for that offence, he was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months. Aggrieved by that decision, they have come up in appeal to this Court. The prosecution case is: the deceased Shivanna was a gambler; he was also arranging for gambling; P.W. 10 Dasi was one of his customers; A-1 objected to gambling being conducted near about his house; on the morning of 7th February, 1965, the police raided the place of gambling near Hayatsab’s Mosque and at that time they arrested only P.W. 10 as the other gamblers had run away from the scene; he was released on ball at about 10-30 a.m. on that day; thereafter, the deceased joined him and when both of them proceeding in front of A-1’s house, they found A-1 standing in front of his house; at that stage the deceased pointed out A-1 to P.W. 10 telling him that he was the man responsible for the police raiding the place of gambling; A-1 retorted saying that he was responsible for conducting gambling; then. A-1 and the deceased began to abuse each other; the abusing went on for some time; at that stage, the deceased rushed to the shop of P.W. 13 Mahamad Ali and brought a soda bottle and tried to hit A-1 with the same; then A-2 interceded; the blow fell on the hands of A-2 and he sustained some injuries; then A-2 told A-1 “why are you looking on, cut off the head of this man”; at that stage, A-3 gave a kick to the deceased and simultaneously A-1 took out M.O. 1-a per knife that was in his pocket, unfolded it and stabbed the deceased first on the ba:k and then on the chest as a result of which the deceased fell down Unconscious; he was soon removed to the Mission Hospital; but by the time he could be admitted in the hospital, he had died as a result of the injuries sustained by him; immediately P.W. 10 rushed to the Mandi Mohalla Police Station and laid the complaint Exhibit P-12. This was by about 12-30 p.m. on 7th February, 1965. After necessary investigation, the appellants were charged as mentioned earlier. There is no dispute that the deceased died on 7th February, 1965 as a result of the injuries sustained by him. The post-mortem on the body of the deceased was held at about 10-00 a.m. on 8th February, 1965. P.W. 16 Dr.A.T. Srinivasa Iyengar, who conducted autopsy on the dead body, has deposed that at the time of the post-mortem, he found two injuries on the person of the deceased. The injury on the back was a simple injury. According to P.W. 16, the injury No. 1 was the fatal injury. That injury was described by him as follows: “Incised penetrating Wound 1½” x ½“x 2½” situated obliquely 2“below and medial to the left nipple Wound is spindle shaped and gaping. Margins are retracted and infiltrated will blood. Wound has penetrated the left thoracic cavity through the 5th and 6th costal cartilages, the pericardium and entered the right ventrticle on its anterior aspect ¾” above the medial to the apex of the heart. Margins are retracted and infiltrated will blood. Wound has penetrated the left thoracic cavity through the 5th and 6th costal cartilages, the pericardium and entered the right ventrticle on its anterior aspect ¾” above the medial to the apex of the heart. The direction of the wound is from above downwards and forwards and inwards.” The Doctor found the following internal injury corresponding to the aforementioned chest injury: “An oblique cut 1” through the costal cartilages of the 5th and 6th ribs, corresponding to external Wound No. 1, communicating with the left thoracic cavity. Edges are bevealled inwards, left pleural cavity contains 1,000 C.C. of blood and clots.” P.W. 16 has opined that death was due to haemorrhage as a result of the incised penetrating injury of the heart. The aforementioned chest injury is necessarily a fatal injury. The post-mortem certificate issued by P.W. 16 is Exhibit P-19. The prosecution case rests on the testimony of P.W. 10, P.W. 11 (Puttaiah), and P.W. 12 (Abdul Sattar). It is clear from the evidence of P.W. 10 that he is a close assoc’ate of the deceased. As seen earlier. he had been arrested by the police for gambling on the morning of 7th February, 1965 itself. He had been released on bail only at about 10-30 a.m. on that day. The coincidence of his meeting the deceased immediately after he came out of the police station is not without significance. Obviously, the deceased was waiting for him. It may be seen that for going to the house of cither P.W. 10 or of the deceased, they need not go in front of the house of A-1. But, yet on their own showing, they did go in front of his house. It is easy to find out the reason for their going in front of the house of A-1. It is clear from the evidence of P.W. 10 that they were convinced that the raid on their gambling place had been made at the instance of A-1. Evidently, they wanted to pick up a quarrel with A-1 in that connection. There is evidence to show that some days prior to the occurrence, some of the members of the family of A-1 had been assaulted by some of the gamblers; in that connection a criminal case was pending. Evidently, they wanted to pick up a quarrel with A-1 in that connection. There is evidence to show that some days prior to the occurrence, some of the members of the family of A-1 had been assaulted by some of the gamblers; in that connection a criminal case was pending. In fact, we have it from P.W. 10 that the attack in question was organised by the deceased. That at any rate is what he learnt from the deceased himself. It is in this background we will have to evaluate the evidence relating to the occurrence. We further get it from the evidence of P.W. 10 that when he and the deceased were in front of the house of A-1, they found A-1 standing there. A-1 could not have known that the deceased and P.W. 10 were coming in that direction. Evidently he was unaware of that fact. No sooner the deceased and P.W. 10 saw A-1, the deceased immediately picked up a quarrel with A-1. He went on abusing him. Naturally A-1 abused him in return. At that stage, the deceased ran to the shop of P.W. 13 and brought a soda bottle and tried to hit A-1 with the same. An attempt is now being made to show that the bottle in question was an empty bottle and was a broken bottle. That version cannot be believed, as the same does not find any support from the first information given by P.W. 10 (Exhibit P-12). It is further seen from the evidence of P.W. 13 that he demanded money in advance for that soda bottle. That indicates that the bottle in question was intact at that time. Quite possibly it was also filled with soda. P.W. 13 would not have demanded money in advance for a broken soda bottle. The prosecution wants us to believe that the incident of stabbing took place after the soda bottle was snatched away from the deceased by P.W. 11 Puttaiah. This version runs counter to that given in Exhibit P-12. In Exhibit P-12 it is said thus: “At that time, Shivanna was there itself. He went to the Kaka shop and brought a soda bottle and went to hit Basavaraju. At that time Ramayya, brother-in-law of Basavaraju gave blows to Shivanna with his hands to snatch the soda bottle. Shivanna hit him with the soda bottle. In Exhibit P-12 it is said thus: “At that time, Shivanna was there itself. He went to the Kaka shop and brought a soda bottle and went to hit Basavaraju. At that time Ramayya, brother-in-law of Basavaraju gave blows to Shivanna with his hands to snatch the soda bottle. Shivanna hit him with the soda bottle. Ramayya sustained injuries on his hand and there was bleeding. At that time, Ramayya told that what were you seeing, cut off the prostitute’s son’s head’........” It is not mentioned in Exhibit P-12 that any of the persons gathered there had snatched away the soda bottle from the deceased. On the other hand, from the version given in Exhibit P-12, it appears that the soda bottle was all along in the hands of the deceased till he fell down; he first attempted to hit A-1 with the same; at that stage, A-2 tried to snatch it from him, but at that stage he hit A.-2 with that soda bottle and caused injuries to him; it is only then A-2 asked A-1 to attack the deceased. The version now given in the Court is totally different from the version that was given to the police immediately after occurrence. It is Unfortunate that the learned Counsel for the defence had not made as best a use of the contents of Exhibit P-12 as he should have. It is clear from the version given in Exhibit P-12 that the deceased was the aggressor; he had come to the place with the determination to pick up a quarrel with A-1; he did pick up the quarrel with A-1; not being satisfied with it, he went and armed himself with a soda bottle; then he tried to hit A-1, when A-2 interceded; he hit A-2 also; it is at that stage A-1 stabbed him with the pen-knife that was already in his pocket. It is not as if A-1 had armed himself and kept himself in readiness to attack the deceased. It is not even the case of the prosecution that he rushed into his house and brought a knife. It is not as if A-1 had armed himself and kept himself in readiness to attack the deceased. It is not even the case of the prosecution that he rushed into his house and brought a knife. In these circumstances, there can be little doubt that A-1 would have had a reasonable apprehension that death or grievous hurt would be caused to him or to his brother-in-law A-2 if he did not take time by the forelock and attack the deceased as effectively as the circumstances required. As seen earlier, he just inflicted two stabs, one of which was more or less a scratch. The only effective stab was that inflicted on the chest. If the deceased got that injury, there is no doubt he invited it. Soda bottle is undoubtedly a dangerous weapon. If the deceased had succeeded in hitting A-2 or A-1 with that soda bottle, it would have resulted either in their death or at least it would have caused grievous hurt to both or at least one of them. I such a situation, A-1 had every right to defend himself as well as his brother-in-law, A-2. If the deceased had succeeded in hitting A-2 or A-1 with that soda bottle, it would have resulted either in their death or at least it would have caused grievous hurt to both or at least one of them. I such a situation, A-1 had every right to defend himself as well as his brother-in-law, A-2. As observed by the Supreme Court in Jai Dev and Hari Singh v. State of Punjab1, under section 100, if the person claiming the right of private defence has to face assailants who can be reasonable apprehended to cause grievous hurt to him, it would be open to him to defend himself by causing the death of the assailant; where an individual citizen or his property is faced with a danger and immediate aid from the State machinery is not readily available, the individual citizen is entitled to protect himself and his property; that being so, it is a necessary corollary to the doctrine of private defence that the violence which the citizen defending himself or his property is entitled to use must not be unduly disproportionate to the injury which is to be averted or which is reasonably apprehended and should not exceed its legitimate purpose; the exercise of the right of private defence must never be vindictive or malicious; in judging the conduct of a person who proves that he had a right of private defence, allowance has necessarily to be made for his feelings at the relevant time; he is faced with an assault which causes a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt and that inevitably creates in his mind some excitement and confusion at such a moment, the uppermost feeling in his mind would be to ward off the danger and to save himself or his property, and so, he would naturally be anxious to strike a decisive blow in exercise of his right; it is no doubt true that in striking a decisive blow, he must not use more force than appears to be reasonably necessary; but in dealing with the question as to whether more force is used than is necessary or than was justified by the prevailing circumstances, it would be inappropriate to adopt tests of detached objectivity which would be so natural in a Court room, for instance long after the incident has taken place; the means which a threatened person adopts or the force which he uses should not be weighed in golden scales; to begin with, the person exercising a right of private defence must consider whether the threat to his person or his property is real and immediate; if he reaches the conclusion reasonably that the threat is immediate and real, he is entitled to exercise his right; in the exercise of his right, he must use force necessary for the purpose and he must stop using the force as soon as the threat has disappeared. So long as the threat lasts and the right of private defence can be legitimately exercised, it would not be fair to require that "he should modulate his defence step by step, according to the attack, before there is reason to believe the attack is over"; the law of private defence does not require that the person assaulted or facing an apprehension of an assault must run away for safety; as soon as the cause for the reasonable apprehension has disappeared and the threat has either been destroyed or has been put to rout, there can be no occasion to exercise the right of private defence; if the danger is continuing", the right is there; if the danger or the apprehension about it has ceased to exist, there is no longer the right of private defence. From the facts and circumstances set out earlier, it is clear that A-1, would have had reasonable apprehension that either he or his brother-in-law would be killed or at least grievously injured if he did not act in time. In these circumstances, he had every right to defend himself as well as his brother-in-law. One of the strange features in this case is that though according to the prosecution itself a large number of neighbours were present at the time of the occurrence, not one of the persons of the locality has been examined to support the prosecution case. The prosecution was hard put to examine three persons as occurrence witnesses who were all residing at distant places from the scene of occurrence. Neither P.W. 10, nor P.W. 11 nor P.W. 12 was residing near the scene of occurrence. Further, P.W. 10 and the deceased were co-gamblers. P.W. 10 is an ex-convict. From the evidence of P.W. 11, it is clear that he is also living by gambling; his only source of livelihood is the running of a club where playing of cards appears to be the main feature. P.W. 12 had been convicted in a prohibition case. It was suggested to him that he lives by manufacturing illicit liquor. He denied that fact. But we are unable to accept the denial at its face value. Neither P.W. 10 nor P.W. 11 nor P.W. 12 can be considered as respectable witnesses. It is odd that the prosecution had to entirely rely on them in this case. They are omnibus witnesses. He denied that fact. But we are unable to accept the denial at its face value. Neither P.W. 10 nor P.W. 11 nor P.W. 12 can be considered as respectable witnesses. It is odd that the prosecution had to entirely rely on them in this case. They are omnibus witnesses. They speak to the occurrence; they speak to the motive; they are the panch witnesses; and they are also witnesses for the recovery of M.O. 1. It may be that because of the turn given to the case, the prosecution was unable to get any assistance from the respectable residents of the locality. The accused were unwise in not taking the plea of self-defence in this case. Their plea that they had nothing to do with the occurrence in question is, on the face of it, Unacceptable. It may be that they were timid or probably were unaware of the extent of the right given by law to defend one self. It is not known why they were not advised to take that plea. In failing to take that plea they were running a great risk. Within the limits laid down by law, it is the right of every citizen of this country to defend himself, or others or his property. It is wrong to think that law requires Us to meekly submit to aggression. It is neither morally wrong nor legally an offence to exercise one’s right of self-defence, if one does not exceed the bounds set by law. For the reasons mentioned above, we allow this appeal and acquit the appellants. A-1 and A-2 are in the custody. They shall be released forthwith. A-3 is on bail. His bail bonds shall stand cancelled. S.V.S. ----- Appeal allowed.