JUDGMENT This is plaintiff's Second Appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, directed against the judgment and decree dated 29.9.1980 passed by Additional District Judge, Dewas, in Civil Appeal No. 59-A/75, in affirmance of the judgment and decree dated 23.10.1975 passed by Civil Judge, Class-II, Bagli, in Civil Suit No. 14-A/74, dismissing suit of appellant/plaintiff for declaration, partition and possession. The suit pertains to certain agricultural lands which admittedly belonged to late Nabibux. Respondent/defendant No.1 - Munnabai, who has died during the pendency of this appeal, was the widow of Nabibux, while appellant/plaintiff Rehmat Bai, respondent/defendant No. 2 Najrabai and respondent No. 3 Hashmat Bai are their daughters. Nabibux died on 16.1.1967. It is no more in dispute that Nabibux had on 12.1.1962 executed a registered will (Ex. DA/1) bequeathing his entire property including the lands in suit to his wife, the respondent No. 1 Munnabai. It was further stated that in case Munnabai pre-deceased him (Nabibux) the property would devolve on his daughter respondent No.2 Hajrabai. He further nominated his two daughters Hajrabai and Hashmat Bai as heirs of Munnabai under this Will. Other defendants/respondents No.4 to 11 are the purchasers of certain parts of the land from Munnabai and Hajrabai. Appellant/plaintiff challenged the Will as also the transfers made by her mother and sister on the ground that the Will in-question is void ab initio, As according to the plaintiff a Will in favour of one of the several heirs of the testator is not valid under the Mahomedan Law, she further averred that she never consented to the Will after the death of her father, the testator. The suit was resisted by the defendants, who maintained that not only a valid Will in favour of Munnabai was made by late Nabibux, but his daughters the appellant and respondents No.2 and 3 after the death of Nabibux, consented to the bequest. Both the Courts below repelled the defendants contention and suit of the appellant as also her appeal were dismissed. The second appeal has been admitted on following substantial question of law : "Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the lower appellate Court erred in law in holding that the will executed by Nabibux was not void?" . I have heard Shri Z.A. Khan, learned counsel for respondents. The second appeal has been admitted on following substantial question of law : "Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the lower appellate Court erred in law in holding that the will executed by Nabibux was not void?" . I have heard Shri Z.A. Khan, learned counsel for respondents. Legal position as to bequests to heirs by a Mohomedan is stated in Article 117 of the Mohomedan Law by Mulla as follows : "A bequest to an heir is not valid unless the other heirs consent t6 the bequest after the death of the testator. Any single heir may consent so as to bind his own share". It will be thus seen that a bequest to an heir, by a Mohamedan is not void ab initio. Such a bequest is permissible but it is made valid only when other heirs consent to the bequest after the death of testator. In the instant case, as already stated, the fact of Will (Ex. DA/1) being made by late Nabibux in favour, of his wife Munnabai is not disputed and the same is established fully even otherwise by the evidence led by the defendants. Plaintiffs challenge to the Will is two fold; (one) that such a Will to an heir is void ab initio, and (two) that she never gave her consent to the Will after the death of Nabibux. So far as the first ground is concerned, the same is unsustainable in view of the legal position contained in Article 117 of the Mahomedan Law. As regards the consent, two Courts below, on appreciation of evidence led by the parties, have concurrently held that after the death of Nabibux and on the occasion of his Nukta (a rite to be performed on the death of a Mahomedan) all the daughters including the appellant had expressed their consent to the bequest made by Nabibux. Obviously, this is a finding of fact which is normally not open to challenge in Second Appeal. It is, however, contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the finding on the point of consent returned by the two Courts below against the appellant is perverse, not supportable by the evidence on record. The learned counsel took me through depositions of the witnesses examined by the parties and tried to substantiate his argument. I am, however, not persuaded by the arguments. The learned counsel took me through depositions of the witnesses examined by the parties and tried to substantiate his argument. I am, however, not persuaded by the arguments. Munnabai (DW I), Najrabai (DW 2), Pannalal (4 DW l), Ganpat (6 DW 1) and Balchand (6 DW 2) have deposed of the fact of consent being accorded by the appellant and other daughters of late Nabibux about the Will. It is pertinent to note here that the plaintiff Rehmat Bai (PW l) in her entire examination-in-chief has no-where stated that she did not at any point of time consent to the Will. The two Courts below have taken into consideration the entire evidence also the conduct of plaintiff Rehmat Bai and came to conclusion that all the three daughters of Nabibux consented to the Will made by him in favour of his wife. I need not to re-state the reasons given by the two Courts below. Suffice to say, that the view taken by the two Courts below is reasonable not perverse. Since consent to the bequest was given by the appellant and other two daughters of late Nabibux, the bequest made by the latter in favour of his wife Mannabai was valid in law and the plaintiff, therefore, did not get any right in the suit property on the death of Nabibux. She has been rightly non-suited by two Courts below and no interference is called for in second Appeal by this Court. This appeal thus fails and is dismissed, but without any order as to costs.