RONOJIT KUMAR MITRA, J. ( 1 ) IN order to adjudicate the disputes between the parties in this application, the court was to consider whether the non obstante clauses as contained in the Companies Act, 1956, and the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, were conflicting, and if so then which was to prevail. For the sake of brevity, I shall in this order refer to the two enactments as the "companies Act" and the "debt Recovery Act", respectively. ( 2 ) IT was contended by the advocate on behalf of the petitioner, that the suit which was now pending before this court, ought to be transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 31 (1) of the Debt Recovery Act. The Debt Recovery Tribunal, in this order shall in short be referred to as "the Tribunal". It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that the Debt Recovery Act was a later enactment and the non obstante clause contained in it would be applicable in preference to the non obstante clause in the Companies Act, which in point of time was an earlier legislation. In support of his submissions he cited and relied on the decision in Sarwan Singh v. Kasturi Lal. According to him, the Legislature at the time of making the new enactment, was fully aware of the non obstante clause contained in the Companies Act, and therefore, the insertion of the non obstante clause in the Debt Recovery Act was a clear intention of the legislators that this non obstante clause would prevail over the non obstante clause contained in the Companies Act and hence the laws under the Debt Recovery Act would be given full effect. He further cited and relied on the decisions in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, Sanwarmal Kejriwal v. Vishiva Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. , and Srikant Kashinath Jituri v. Corporation of the City of Belgaum. ( 3 ) THE Companies Act was a composite legislation, contended the advocate for the official liquidator, and any other enactment would not affect the provisions contained in this legislation. ( 3 ) THE Companies Act was a composite legislation, contended the advocate for the official liquidator, and any other enactment would not affect the provisions contained in this legislation. According to him, since there was no specific provision in either of the two enactments as to which of the non obstante clauses would prevail, over the other, it would not be correct to arrive at a conclusion by seeking to interpret the minds of the legislators at the time when this legislation had been enacted. He submitted that such conclusions would prejudice the interest of the creditors in liquidation proceedings, under the Companies Act. He argued that the Tribunal had no power to wind up a company or to entertain proceedings instituted by a creditor under the provisions of the Companies Act and therefore while the non obstante clause contained in the Debt Recovery Act could be applicable to other proceedings, it had no application as regards proceedings under, nor could be regarded to have any effect on the provisions of the Companies Act. He emphasised that it would be especially so, because such proceedings could not be instituted in any other court but the court taking up company matters. He submitted that winding up proceedings were representative in nature, and if the suit was to be transferred to the Tribunal then the interest of the creditors would suffer, as there was no indication in the Debt Recovery Act, that the Tribunal would continue with the suit while the winding up proceedings continued before the company court. According to him the suit should not be transferred to the Tribunal. He submitted that it was the considered view of the Supreme Court that, where there was a conflict in the interpretation of a statute, courts would attempt to give a harmonious interpretation, favouring any special protection which may have been sought to be reserved by the Legislature in any of the conflicting enactments. He argued that in Section 31 (1) of the Debt Recovery Act, the words ". . . before any court. . . " should be taken to mean, before any original court, which would be the court where the suit had been originally instituted and not the court where the suit had come by way of operation of law, and was pending before that court on the date when the Debt Recovery Act came into force. . before any court. . . " should be taken to mean, before any original court, which would be the court where the suit had been originally instituted and not the court where the suit had come by way of operation of law, and was pending before that court on the date when the Debt Recovery Act came into force. Upon instruction he submitted that all formalities including publication of notice inviting and filing of claims had been completed in the present matter and settlement of claims in respect of the workers was near completion and the petitioner could receive its portion of claim as and when this court would direct. In support of his submissions he cited and relied on the decisions in [1996] 1 C. L. J. 380 (sic) and Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India Ltd. v. Srinivas Agencies [1996] 86 Comp Cas 255 (SC ). ( 4 ) IT would be pertinent to commence deliberation on the disputes between the parties, by quoting a passage from the decision of the Supreme Court in Sarwan Singh v. Kasturi Lal, which was cited by advocate for the petitioner, as mentioned by me earlier in this order. This Lordships were of the view that (headnote) : "when two or more laws operate in the same field and each contains a non obstante clause stating that its provisions will override those of any other law, cases of such conflict have to be decided by reference to the object and purpose of the laws under consideration. " ( 5 ) INSTEAD of launching an enquiry or scrutiny of the contents of the two enactments to ascertain whether the laws did "operate in the same field", it would suffice, I should think, to consider "the object and purpose of the laws under consideration". The Debt Recovery Act had been enacted by the legislators upon the consideration, and on the basis of proposals forwarded by the Tiwari Committee which had been strongly recommended by the committee on financial system. The very name I would have thought, on a plain reading, should have left no scope for interpretation of the meaning and purpose of enacting the legislation. The principal concern of the legislators, in making the Act was obviously to expedite repayments of the various loans and advances which the banks and other financial institutions extended to their constituents. The very name I would have thought, on a plain reading, should have left no scope for interpretation of the meaning and purpose of enacting the legislation. The principal concern of the legislators, in making the Act was obviously to expedite repayments of the various loans and advances which the banks and other financial institutions extended to their constituents. The Companies Act on the other hand consisted of an uniform law throughout India relating exclusively to companies. It has been referred to as a "consolidating and amending Act". It must also be remembered that a company was a legal entity just as was an individual. It was almost certainly the intention of the Legislature to afford special protection to the companies, and everything and all concerned with the companies. So there was the company court, where all matters relating to companies only were dealt with and nothing else. The Legislature clearly had in this enactment, specially reserved to the bona fide creditors of a company, a summary procedure to realise from the company expeditiously a just debt by way of enforcing it in a company court. Special protection was also reserved to the workers in Section 529a of the Act to be regarded in pari passu with other secured creditors. If the suit was allowed to be transferred to the Tribunal, in effect, it would be allowing the bank to receive preferential payment without consideration of the other secured creditors and in particular the workers. That would surely be in derogation of the special protection sought to have been reserved to the claim of the workers in Section 529a of the Act. ( 6 ) IN spite of the statute, courts were averse to wind up a company ex debito justitiae. The courts in exercise of their equitable jurisdiction would generally afford the company opportunities to avoid being wound up and repay its debt. A winding up order would of course eventually be made, in the event the company failed to avail of the indulgence. With respect and humility I would think that a distinction was clearly drawn by the Supreme Court between "recovery" and "enforcement" of a debt. Their Lordships in the decision reported in Harinagar Sugar Mills Co. Ltd, v. M. W. Pradhan (now G. V. Dalvi ). With respect and humility I would think that a distinction was clearly drawn by the Supreme Court between "recovery" and "enforcement" of a debt. Their Lordships in the decision reported in Harinagar Sugar Mills Co. Ltd, v. M. W. Pradhan (now G. V. Dalvi ). [1966] 36 Comp Cas 426 (SC) approved the following passage from Palmer's Company Precedents, (Part III, 1960 edition at page 25) (p. 430) : "a winding up petition is a perfectly proper remedy for enforcing payment of a just debt. It is the mode of execution which the court gives to a creditor against a company unable to pay its debt. " ( 7 ) THE "just debt" which their Lordships found it proper to be enforced by way of winding up proceedings was a step, as it must be understood to be, subsequent or without recourse, in the case of an admission, to proceedings for recovery of the debt. Where the court was prima facie satisfied that there was a bona fide doubt as to the factum of the alleged debt, which was sought to be enforced, the court relegated the matter to a suit, in other words to obtain, if possible, recovery of the debt. The alleged debt when according to the court was a just debt, the inability to pay would entitle the creditor to an order for winding up. In those circumstances, I would be inclined to take the view that the laws in the two enactments did not "operate in the same field". It would be incorrect appreciation of the law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, if the laws applicable to winding up proceedings in the Companies Act and proceedings for the recovery of a debt in the Debt Recovery Act were considered to operate in the same field, or that the legislators had so intended. In any case, there could be little doubt that such an interpretation would create an undesirable state of affairs. The company court would be making one set of orders and the Tribunal a different. In any case, there could be little doubt that such an interpretation would create an undesirable state of affairs. The company court would be making one set of orders and the Tribunal a different. Once the company was in liquidation under Section 446 of the Companies Act it was mandatory to obtain leave of the company court to institute a suit against that company, and upon obtaining such leave the suit would have to be heard by that court unless that court allowed the filing of and proceeding with the suit in a different court or forum. This was the law for the simple reason that the suit was in relation to a company, in liquidation, and concerned the company to such an extent that the official liquidator was required to be impleaded in the suit to protect the interests of all the creditors and the workers of the company. A reasonable and harmonious interpretation would surely be in the present circumstances, that the non obstante clause in the Companies Act would operate in its full force, and the suit would be heard by the company court. The provisions of the non obstante clause in the Debt Recovery Act would have no effect on the procedure as contained in the Companies Act. Consequently there would be no conflict in the operation of the two clauses. For it was on record that Section 446 of the Companies Act was not repealed and it could not be said with any certainty that there appeared any intention of the Legislature anywhere in either of the enactments, that the later enactment would in effect operate as against the earlier clause. Had the legislators so intended, indeed appropriate provisions to that extent would have been provided for in the later or in further legislation. ( 8 ) IN those circumstances, I would be inclined to hold that those rights of the creditors and workers, which were protected by the legislators in the Componies Act, in the absence of any specific and categorical provision, a non obstante clause contained in a different enactment neither could nor did operate to deprive or deny such right. Any other interpretation would amount to a violation of the principles of natural justice and a wrongful denial of rights and privileges bestowed on the creditors and the workers by an existing statute. Any other interpretation would amount to a violation of the principles of natural justice and a wrongful denial of rights and privileges bestowed on the creditors and the workers by an existing statute. The Debt Recovery Act was concerned with the process of recovery of the debt, in other words procedure to adjudicate the debt in perhaps every other circumstances except as against a company which was in liquidation. The Companies Act was primarily for companies which was a separate legal entity, and everything that related or touched the companies. According to the Supreme Court in the decision in Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India Ltd, v. Srinivas Agencies [1996] 86 Comp Cas 255, it has been clearly stated that each case dealing with the question of transfer of suit to the Tribunal would depend on the facts of that case. In this case, before this court, advocate for the official liquidator had submitted that all formalities for filing and settlement of claims had been completed, and the official liquidator would be commencing disbursement soon. Taking into account the question of the banks and financial institutions receiving their dues expeditiously, it would also be just and convenient that this suit should be heard by this court and enable the official liquidator to commence and complete disbursement expeditiously. ( 9 ) FOR those reasons this application is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. ( 51 ) IN Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Beard v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. , the award was not found to be indefinite. As regard reasonableness of the award, the learned judges observed :--"reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual and the times and the circumstances in which he thinks. The word 'reasonable' has in law prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called upon to act reasonably, knows or ought to know". ( 52 ) IN Ct. A. Ct. Nachiappa Chettiar v. Ct. A. Ct. The word 'reasonable' has in law prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called upon to act reasonably, knows or ought to know". ( 52 ) IN Ct. A. Ct. Nachiappa Chettiar v. Ct. A. Ct. Subramaniam Chettiar the law is stated in the following terms ;--"in appreciating the effect of the words used in the award we must bear in mind that the arbitrators were laymen not familiar with the technical significance of legal expressions, and so we must read the relevant clauses as a whole with a view to determine what in effect and substance they intended to decide". ( 53 ) IN Abdul Rahiman v. M. L. Narasimhiah AIR 1950 Mysore 60, it is stated (Para 9):-"the second point raised in this appeal is that whatever might be the right of a plaintiff to claim a share in the profits of the property directly to be divided that cannot be the case of defendant. Defendant 2 in this case is entitled to half a share in the property in dispute in the possession of the appellant. The policy of law recognised as early as 1873 in Khoorshed Hossein v. Nubbee Fatima, (1877-78) ILR 3 Cal 552 : 2 Cal LR 187 which lays down : That a decree for a partition amounts to a joint declaration of the rights of the persons interested in the property of which partition is sought and that it must be taken that a decree in such suits is a decree, when property drawn up in favour of each shareholder or set of shareholders having a distinct share is accepted in 50 May HCR 46. There can therefore be no distinction between the case of a plaintiff and that of a defendant entitled to a share". ( 54 ) IN Raja Sasi Sekhareshwar Roy Bahadur v. Lalit Mohan Mitra 29 Cal WN 633 : (AIR 1925 PC 34), it was held by the Privy Council that the suit to enforce an award was not maintainable. ( 55 ) FURTHERMORE, the question as regard validity of the award has been upheld by a Division Bench of this Court. The said decision is (1992) 96 Cal WN 1. Thus, the award having been held to be valid it does not lie in the mouth of the parties to contend otherwise in this proceeding. ( 55 ) FURTHERMORE, the question as regard validity of the award has been upheld by a Division Bench of this Court. The said decision is (1992) 96 Cal WN 1. Thus, the award having been held to be valid it does not lie in the mouth of the parties to contend otherwise in this proceeding. This Court can not shut its eyes to the fact that by reason of paragraph 3 of the award it has been held that the assets of the partnership firm which belong absolutely to Mungturam Group and Banwarilal Group will get money from Mungturam Group. It is, therefore, an award which can be executed by both the parties. It is, thus, preposterous to suggest that one part of the award can be executed whereas other part cannot be. Such a construction given to the award would render the entire award nullity. The Court must raise a presumption that a decree passed by a Court of law pursuant to an award made by an arbitrator is valid. A decree, also carries with it, a presumption that the same is just and reasonable. ( 56 ) FURTHERMORE, it has to be borne in mind that the award has been made by a commercial man. He had no legal training and, thus, such an award has to be construed liberally. ( 57 ) IN Commercial Arbitration, Second Edition by Mustill and Boyd at page 569, it is stated:--"just as the Courts have shown themselves increasingly willing to accommodate procedural discrepancies when there is no resulting injustice, so also have they adopted a more benevolent attitude to the interpretation of arbitral awards and particularly to those made by commercial men. Thus, an award will be construed liberally and in accordance with the dictates of commonsense, and as far as possible in accordance with the real intention of the arbitrator. The Court will not go out of its way to find uncertainty or error in the award merely because the arbitrator has not expressed his conclusions in the correct legal language. Furthermore, not only will the Court not be astute to look for defects, but in case of uncertainty it will so far as possible construe the award in such away as to make it valid rather than invalid. Furthermore, not only will the Court not be astute to look for defects, but in case of uncertainty it will so far as possible construe the award in such away as to make it valid rather than invalid. Thus, if it is alleged that an award is subject to error on the face, but the award contains insufficient facts to enable the Court to tell whether arbitrator's conclusion of law was justified or not, it will assume that any justifying facts which could exist did exist, even though the arbitrator has not fpund them. This process cannot, however, be carried too far. The Court is not concerned with fanciful hypotheses in order to support awards. It must have regard to probabilities, and not to flights of fancy". (Underlining is mine for emphasis) ( 58 ) THE award if construed in the manner as has been done by the learned trial Judge would make the same ambiguous or uncertain and, thus, an attempt should be made to avoid such construction. Whether the award was uncertain or ambiguous could have only fallen for decision by the Division Bench while considering the objection filed by the parties under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act but in the said proceeding it had been found to be a valid award and, thus, when an execution case is filed, the Court must proceed with the presumption that the same is enforceable. It is not the case that by reason of award determination of matters had been made which did not comprise in agreement of reference. ( 59 ) IN Selby v. Whitbread and Co. (1917) 1 KB 736 at 748 it has been held that me Court should approach an award with a desire to support rather than destroy it and presumes, unless and until the contrary is shown, that the arbitrator or umpire has by his award determined those matters and those matters only, which were referred to him. See also Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, paragraph 610. ( 60 ) IN any event, reasonable construction be always made in support of a decree and the Court always should also construe the same in a manner which renders a decree executable. See also Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, paragraph 610. ( 60 ) IN any event, reasonable construction be always made in support of a decree and the Court always should also construe the same in a manner which renders a decree executable. ( 61 ) IN Taraprasanna Ganguly v. Naresh Chandra Chakrabarty AIR 1933 Cal 329, it is stated :-- "the decree might have been more explicit but a reasonable construction must always be put on a decree and the court should always lean against a construction which would render a decree inexecutable". ( 62 ) IN Manvikrama Raja v. Thattamangalath , AIR 1931 Madras 328, it was opined :--"to ascertain the meaning and effect of a decree of any Court, it is permissible, where the words are capable of more than one meaning, to look at all relevant papers and circumstances which were before the Court and the objects which the directions contained in the decree were aimed to achieve. Of two possible constructions, the Court will not accept the one which leads to plain injustice and makes its own decree an instrument of depriving parties, whose case had not been heard and decided of valuable and cherished rights which no one had any intention to destroy. " ( 63 ) IT will not be correct to contend that there cannot be any declaratory award at all on the ground that the power to grant a declaratory decree had been conferred upon a Court specifically under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 inasmuch as there may be cases where an award may be declaratory in nature. The Court shall not however begin with a presumption that keeping in view the nature of the disputes and differences between the parties which had been referred to the arbitrator for its determination to the effect that instead and place of dividing the joint family properties the Arbitrator had chosen to pass only a declaratory award. ( 64 ) PARAGRAPH 3 of the award itself requires interpretation. Although the said paragraph begins with the words 'i declare' but the same by itself does not mean that the award is declaratory in nature. By reason of the award a declaration had been made that all the assets of the firm of M/s. Anandram Gajadhar, all its branches shall belong to Mangturam Jaypuria. Sitaram Jaipuria and Rajaram Jaipuria absolutely. Although the said paragraph begins with the words 'i declare' but the same by itself does not mean that the award is declaratory in nature. By reason of the award a declaration had been made that all the assets of the firm of M/s. Anandram Gajadhar, all its branches shall belong to Mangturam Jaypuria. Sitaram Jaipuria and Rajaram Jaipuria absolutely. Does the word 'shall belong' and that too suffixed by the word 'absolutely' would only mean a declaration of title? The answer to the said question, in the considered opinion of this Court, should be rendered in negative. ( 65 ) IN Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmed Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur, it is stated (Para 14) :--"now to revert to paragraphs 2, 5 and 8 which the learned Judges considered amounted to a clear and unequivocal denial of the Governments title, they referred in para 2 to the words belonging to me as constituting a disclaimer of the tenancy and a repudiation of the landlord's title. We do not agree that this is the only or proper construction which the words are capable of bearing. Though the word belonging no doubt is capable of denoting an absolute title, is nevertheless not confined to connoting that sense. Even possession of an interest less than that of full ownership could be signified by that word. In Webster belong to is explained as meaning inter alia to be owned by, be the possession of. The precise sense which the word was meant to convey can therefore be gathered only by reading the document as a whole and adverting to the context in which it occurs". ( 66 ) IN Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan v. Commr. of Wealth-tax, Hyderabad , the Apex Court had referred to the dictionary meaning of the word 'own' and held that the word 'belonging to' would include to be owned by and be in possession of. Thus, the declaration to the effect that the property shall belong to absolutely, would clearly mean that not only beneficiary therein would have a title in respect thereof but shall also be entitled to possession thereof. The word 'absolutely' means 'exclusive'. Furthermore, thequestion, is whether they can be made certain. Thus, the declaration to the effect that the property shall belong to absolutely, would clearly mean that not only beneficiary therein would have a title in respect thereof but shall also be entitled to possession thereof. The word 'absolutely' means 'exclusive'. Furthermore, thequestion, is whether they can be made certain. For the said purpose one has to bear in mind that identification of the properties would not be difficult as by reason of the entire assets in respect of the partnership firm and their branches had been allotted to the appellants. Such assets of the partnership allotted to the appellants being immoveable properties, can be found out from various documents, if any question is raised in relation thereto. Even where an award is uncertain for the purpose of interpretation thereof even the pleadings of the parties can be taken into consideration with a view of ascertain'as regard the nature of dispute between the parties. ( 67 ) FURTHERMORE, when possession can be delivered in terms of an award the same cannot be said to be a declaratory decree and, thus, executable. ( 68 ) THERE cannot be any doubt whatsoever that pure declaratory award or decree is not executable as has been held by the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Krishan Dayal Sharma , State of Punjab v. Buta Singh 1995 Suppl. (3) SCC 684, Rajasthan SRTC v. Ladulal Mali an in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mangilal Sharma but the said decisions have been rendered on the peculiar facts situation obtaining in the said decision. ( 69 ) EACH award and/or decree has to be construed on its own keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. In the event, a contention is raised as has been done in the instant case that the decree is uncertain, the Court for the purpose of construing a decree cannot only go behind the same, (although ordinarily it cannot do so) and look to the pleadings and other materials of the parties so as to arrive at a finding as to the nature of disputes between the parties, their respective claims and the determination made thereon by the arbitrator in its award. An award is referable to the claims as also disputes and differences before the parties the Court, therefore, with a view to construe a decree/award can even refer to the pleadings of the parties for the purpose of its true construction. ( 70 ) IN Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalapatram Ichharam it has been held (Para 29 of AIR) :--"be that as it may, in cases where an objection as to the non-executability of the decree on the ground of its being a nullity, is taken, the executing Court is not competent to go behind the decree, if the decree on the face of it, discloses some material on the basis of which the Rent Court could be satisfied with regard to the existence of a statutory ground for eviction. In such a case it must accept and execute the decree as it stands. If, on the face of it, the decree does not show the existence of such material or jurisdictional fact, the executing Court may look to the original record of the trial Court to ascertain whether there was any material furnishing a foundation of the trial Courts jurisdiction to pass the decree it did. The moment it finds that prima facie such material existed, its task is complete". ( 71 ) IN the instant case the decree passed on the basis of award is not said to be inexecutable on the ground that it is a nullity. ( 72 ) A Court of law is not to pass an order on the basis of more technicalities. The technicalities of the law have their own say but the Court must be allowed to have their own say. In the ultimate result of the Us. ( 73 ) IT has also to be borne in mind as has been said by U. C. Banerjee, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Division Bench in Tantia Construction Co. Ltd. v. Union of India 1998 (1 )Cal HN 344:--"this, however, cannot be the due process of law. Law Court exists not to make a mockery of law but to give effect to the due process of law, so that justice is meted out to a concerned party seeking a judicial redress. Ltd. v. Union of India 1998 (1 )Cal HN 344:--"this, however, cannot be the due process of law. Law Court exists not to make a mockery of law but to give effect to the due process of law, so that justice is meted out to a concerned party seeking a judicial redress. Technicality alone cannot possibly outweigh the course of justice and it is the concept of justice which ought and is the predominant factor in so far as the Law Court is concerned. " ( 74 ) IT is true that in Santlal v. Ramaya Ram AIR 1938 Lahore 177, Tek Chand, J. has held that despite bar of a suit under Section 32 of the Arbitration Act, a suit is maintainable. With utmost respect to the learned Judge the said decision does not appear to have laid down the correct legal position particularly in view of the decision of the Privy Council In Sasi Sekhareshwar Roy v. Lalit Mohan Maitra 29 Cal WN 633: (AIR 1925 PC 34 ). For the self-same reason, no reliance can be placed on Kailashpati Singhania v. Ram Gopal Gupta. ( 75 ) IT is true that the appellants had made prayer in their objection under Section 47 of the CPC which do not come within the purview of the said provision but such objections could not have been gone into by the learned trial Judge. Mr. Mitra has contended that the appellants themselves having invited the Ld. Trial Judge to go into all such questions they are estopped and precluded from doing so. ( 76 ) IN ordinary circumstances the Court could have held the same but as indicated hereinbefore the very basis of the judgment of the learned trial Judgment viz. construction of paragraph 3 of the award having been found to be unsustainable in law. It is not for this Court at this stage to consider the objections which might be raised by the respondents herein as regard executability of the decrees passed in their favour. ( 77 ) IT is, therefore, held :1. The application for execution filed by the respondent No. 1 was maintainable and the objection under Section 47 filed by the Appellants herein to that effect was not sustainable in law and the judgment of the learned trial Judge must be upheld and furthermore no appeal lies thereagainst;2. ( 77 ) IT is, therefore, held :1. The application for execution filed by the respondent No. 1 was maintainable and the objection under Section 47 filed by the Appellants herein to that effect was not sustainable in law and the judgment of the learned trial Judge must be upheld and furthermore no appeal lies thereagainst;2. But that part of the judgment of the learned trial Judge whereby it has been held that paragraph 3 of the award is declaratory in nature and, thus, non-executable; was beyond the scope of the objection filed by the appellants under Section 47 of the CPC and, thus, the appeal is maintainable against that part of the order under appeal. 3. The finding of the learned trial Judge of the effect that paragraph 3 of the award is not executable cannot be sustained and, thus, the order and judgment to the said effect is set aside. 4. It is made clear that all the execution proceedings shall proceed in accordance with law and it would be open to other parties to raise their respective contentions in the execution proceeding and in the event any occasion arises therefor the bench concerned may proceed to hold trial on evidence. ( 78 ) AN interlocutory application has been filed on behalf of the appellants. Keeping in view our aforementioned conclusion in our opinion, it is not necessary to pass any order thereupon. It will be open to the appellants or any other parties to file appropriate application before the learned trial Judge and the same may be considered and dealt with on their respective merits. ( 79 ) THE appeal and the application are disposed of accordingly. ( 80 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.