Order.- This Revision Petition is directed against an order of the Munsif-Magistrate of Luxettipet passed on 5th April, 1966. It arises in the following circumstances: The nine petitioners before me are the respondents in M.C.No. 19 of 1965. In that case, the respondents were sought to be proceeded under section 110, Criminal Procedure Code. The Munsif-Magistrate issued a show cause notice under section 112, Criminal Procedure Code. The petitioners appeared before the Munsif-Magistrate and filed an application raising two grounds. It was firstly contended that since the charges are not common to all the nine petitioners, a joint trial is likely to prejudice each one of them and therefore a separate trial should be directed. Secondly, the charges, even if taken to be true, do not warrant any proceedings under section 110, Criminal Procedure Code. This petition was resisted by the prosecution. The learned Magistrate disallowed the petition on both the grounds. In this revision petition, the principal contention of Mr. E. Ayyapu Reddy, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, is that in view of the nature of charges, the learned Munsif-Magistrate has erred in holding that a joint trial would not cause any prejudice to anyone of the petitioners. In order to appreciate this contention, it is necessary to read section 110, clauses (d), (e) and (f), Criminal Procedure Code. The section, together with those clauses, reads as follows: “Whenever a Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government receives information that any person within the local limits of his jurisdiction. The section, together with those clauses, reads as follows: “Whenever a Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government receives information that any person within the local limits of his jurisdiction. * * * * * * * (d) habitually commits, or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of, the offence of kidnapping, abduction, extortion, cheating or mischief, or any offence punishable under Chapter XII of the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860) or under section 489-A, section 489-B, section 489-C or section 489-D of that Code, or (e) habitually commits, or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of, offences involving a breach of the peace, or (f) is so desperate and dangerous as to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community, such Magistrate may, in manner hereinafter provided, require such person to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond, with sureties, for his good behaviour for such period, not exceeding three years, as the Magistrate thinks fit to fix.” Section 117(5), Criminal Procedure Code, is material for our purpose. It reads as follows: “Where two or more persons have been associated together in the matter under inquiry, they may be dealt with in the same or separate inquiries as the Magistrate shall think just.” It is plain that under sub-section (5) of section 117, Criminal Procedure Code, it is left to the judicial discretion of the Magistrate to direct either a joint trial or a separate inquiry. That discretion however has to be exercised in accordance with the well-established principles in that behalf. What sub-section (5) requires is that where two or more persons have been associated together in the matter under inquiry, they may be either tried jointly or separately. In order to direct a joint or separate trial, these persons must associate together in the matter under inquiry. Even in such a case, the sub-section vests the Magistrate with discretion to order a separate inquiry. What must follow is that in a case where it is not possible to hold that these persons were associating together in the matter under inquiry, then separate inquiry will have to be made. No question of the Magistrate’s discretion then arises. Even in such a case, the sub-section vests the Magistrate with discretion to order a separate inquiry. What must follow is that in a case where it is not possible to hold that these persons were associating together in the matter under inquiry, then separate inquiry will have to be made. No question of the Magistrate’s discretion then arises. What has therefore to be seen is whether all the 30 charges framed against the nine petitioners and regarding which inquiry is to be made related to all these nine petitioners. In other words, can it be said that all the nine petitioners have been associated together in all the 30 charges under inquiry? There must be a common thread running through all these 30 charges in order to establish the association of all the nine petitioners in the commission of those offences mentioned in these charges and which are required to be inquired into. It is not of course necessary that each and every one of the petitioners must be actually involved in the commission of every offence involved in all the 30 charges. What is however necessary is that there should exist a common element which brings all the petitioners together and it is in pursuance of that they should have committed all the offences enumerated in the 30 charges. If, on a careful scrutiny of the 30 charges, it is found that at least a few of the charges are not only committed by some of the petitioners only but have absolutely nothing common with other charges or persons committing the same, then it is obvious that joint trial would be not only not desirable but would be not quite legal. It is found to prejudice the accused. A reading of these charges would disclose that they cover a period of more than seven years. It is impossible to understand how the petitioners can be called upon to meet the charges which are not only elastic, sprawling and pervasive but cover a wide range of activities. It is found to prejudice the accused. A reading of these charges would disclose that they cover a period of more than seven years. It is impossible to understand how the petitioners can be called upon to meet the charges which are not only elastic, sprawling and pervasive but cover a wide range of activities. It is obvious from the above said three clauses of section 110, Criminal Procedure Code (extracted above) that the prosecution will have to make out that the petitioners habitually commit extortion or cheating or mischief, or habitually commit or attempt to commit offences involving breach of the peace or they are so desperate and dangerous as to render their being at large without security hazardous to the community. It is now firmly settled that in so far as clause (f) of section 110, Criminal Procedure Code is concerned, every person has to be tried separately for the obvious reasons that a particular petitioner is desperate or dangerous as to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community would have to be individually judged in reference to each petitioner. In regard to the variety of charges, it is enough to say that the prosecution will have to lead evidence in reference to various allegations and to control and analyse the evidence and apply its effects to each of the persons standing trial in proof of so many charges as being dangerous and desperate seems to me to expect too much from such an inquiry. It may be that the first petitioner is a big landlord as well as an M.L.A., wielding considerable influence in the locality. But that by itself does not warrant a joint trial along with;he other petitioners in the circumstances of the case. If these charges are separated connecting the persons involved in them and those persons are tried separately, it will be easy for those petitioners to meet them squarely. For prosecution also, it will be convenient to lead the evidence and it is unnecessary to point out that even for the Magistrate the scope of the inquiry will be limited as the matter would be very clear and precise. It is nobody’s claim that the entire evidence in regard to all the charges is going to be precisely the same. There is no allegation that there has been any conspiracy between these persons to commit all these offences. It is nobody’s claim that the entire evidence in regard to all the charges is going to be precisely the same. There is no allegation that there has been any conspiracy between these persons to commit all these offences. Every person therefore has to be tried separately for the offences enumerated in the charges. It is not seriously disputed that out of 30 charges at least there are some charges which can easily be separated and in which it can be easily pointed out that persons involved in those charges have nothing in common with the other persons connected with other charges. The trial Court has analysed these 30 charges and in a way found that they belong to different categories. Some charges are absolutely individual in their nature. In these circumstances, discretion under section 117(5) should have been exercised in favour of separate trial. The learned Magistrate pointed out that after taking down the evidence, if it is found that the respondents are prejudiced, then a suitable order may be passed. But I do not think that is what is contemplated by section 117(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code. That provision contemplates the exercise of discretion at the beginning of the trial. The Magistrate has to apply his mind to the charges and the circumstances of the case and then reach the conclusion whether a joint trial in such circumstances is advisable. I am satisfied that the joint inquiry against the petitioners cannot proceed. The charges can be separated and those petitioners who are involved in them may be proceeded against separately. In the view which I have taken, it is not necessary to go into the second contention. It is open to the petitioners to raise the objections when separate inquiries are held against them. The revision petition is therefore allowed accordingly. G.S.M. ----- Revision allowed.