JUDGMENT S.K. Kulshrestha, J. 1. Heard on admission. By this petition, the Petitioner has challenged the order dated October 31, 1998 (Annexure-P/3), by which the Petitioner has been dismissed from service under Rule 12(3)(b)(6) of the "M.P. Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1963" on the charge of misconduct. The Petitioner was employed as a Conductor in the M.P. State Road Transport Corporation and a notice was issued to him on the basis of the report of the Accounts Department that he had deposited the amount in the Depot after the prescribed date. It is alleged that proceeding on assumption that the fact with regard to the delay in the deposit of the amount of collection was not disputed and it was therefore, not necessary to hold any enquiry, he was dismissed from service. 2. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has pointed out that Rule 12 providing for disciplinary action for misconduct requires holding of an enquiry in accordance with Sub-rule (4) thereof before imposition of the punishment but admittedly in the present case, the enquiry had not been conducted although the facts were disputed. Learned counsel has pointed out that the Petitioner had duly explained why the amount could not be deposited by him by the prescribed date and the explanation that the collection on the route was less than the targeted amount was not even considered. Learned counsel has invited attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilip Kumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni and Ors., 1983 AIR SC 109 : (1983-I-LLJ-i) in support of his contention that 'Life' includes livelihood and dismissal without following the procedure prescribed is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel has also referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda and Ors., 1984 AIR SC 289 : (1983-II-LLJ-415) in support of his contention that where the employer does not choose to lead evidence in support of the charge against the workman, it cannot be allowed to do so at any later stage of the contention that where the employer is an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, it is amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and rights emerging from Part-III of the Constitution can be enforced by invoking the writ jurisdiction. 3. Learned counsel for the Respondents appearing in response to the show cause notice, has raised a preliminary objection on the ground of the availability of an alternative remedy to the Petitioner by challenging order of termination under the provisions of the "M. P Industrial Relations Act, 1960". Learned counsel for the Respondents has referred to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Employers, Anand Cinema v. Mohan, 1992 MPLJ 336 (MP-DB) in which it has been held that rights of the employer to prove misconduct before the Labour Court in case the dismissal is challenged, is not taken away even in cases where domestic enquiry has not been held by the employer in terminating the services of the employees, if the employer seeks an opportunity to lead evidence to prove misconduct of the employees and to show that termination of the service was proper. Reliance has also been placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Jagat Singh Choudhary v. M.P. Electricity Board, Jobalpur and Ors. 1969 MPLJ 132 (MP-DB). 4. Considering the argument of .the learned counsel based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath's case (supra), it is noticed that in the said case, the employer did not seek an opportunity in the written statement to lead evidence in support of the charges framed against the workman. In the present case, it is at the threshold itself that objection has been raised that if ultimately the matter goes before the Labour Court under the M. P. Industrial Relations Act, the employer shall have the right to lead evidence to prove the misconduct although after notice to the petitioner and receiving his reply, the enquiry has been dispensed with on the ground that on the admitted facts, it was proved mat there was delay in deposit of the amount of collection on the route on which the Petitioner was a conductor. In Employers, Anand Cinema (supra), it has already been held that the employer cannot be denied an opportunity when its action of termination simpliciter is challenged in a Court of law, to bring all relevant facts and circumstances before the Court to prove that the employee's work and conduct was such that the employer should not be compelled to continue with his employment. The employer has thus, an opportunity to lead evidence to prove the misconduct which cannot be denied to him. 5. In Scooters India and Ors. v. Vijai E.V. Eldred, (1999-III-LLJ (Suppl)-138) the Supreme Court has observed that in a industrial dispute involving determination of disputed questions of fact for which remedy under the Industrial laws is available to the workman, a writ petition under Article 226 is inappropriate. In the present case, the employer is also seeking an opportunity to lead evidence to prove the misconduct and as held in the case of Employers, Anand Cinema, such an opportunity cannot be denied to an employer. In Jagat Choudhary (supra), it has been observed that an enquiry by the Labour Court itself is more advantageous to the employee for he gets the benefit of a verdict of the Court on the merits and is not left to another domestic enquiry by the employer and secondly, the Labour Court by itself enquiring into the charges gets the opportunity of finally adjudicating the dispute and of doing justice between the parties thereby-finally removing the cause of industrial strife. It is, therefore, appropriate in a situation like this where an employer asserts his right to lead evidence to prove misconduct that the parties are left to seek the normal remedy under the Industrial law. It is not disputed that the Petitioner has a remedy of making an application under Section 31(3) read with Section 61 of the M.P.I.R. Act to the Labour Court having jurisdiction to challenge the said impugned order. 6. The learned counsel has next contended that merely on account of a negligible delay in deposit of the amount for which the Petitioner had assigned sufficient reasons, the punishment of dismissal from service ought not to have been passed and since the punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the delinquency alleged, the order deserves to be set aside for this reason also. In U. P. State Road Transport Corporation and Ors. v. A.K. Parul, (1999-III-LLJ- (Suppl)-1093) (SC) it has been held that the High Court should not normally interfere in the punishment and in appropriate case where it is found to be shockingly disproportionate, it should direct the authority concerned to re- consider the matter. In U. P. State Road Transport Corporation and Ors. v. A.K. Parul, (1999-III-LLJ- (Suppl)-1093) (SC) it has been held that the High Court should not normally interfere in the punishment and in appropriate case where it is found to be shockingly disproportionate, it should direct the authority concerned to re- consider the matter. In the present case, it is not disputed that Section 107 (A) of the M.P.I.R. Act empowers the Labour Court concerned to set aside the order of dismissal and direct reinstatement of the employee as also to award any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require. Since the Statute empowers the Labour Court to award any lesser punishment, the petitioner can raise all grounds before the said Court. 7. In the result, this Petition is dismissed on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy under the Industrial law which the Petitioner is free to seek. There shall be no order as to costs.