I. M. QUDDUSI, J. ( 1 ) HEARD Sri M. A. Siddiqui for the petitioner and Sri B. K. Shukla for the respondent No. 2 who is the landlady of the premises In question which is a shop bearing No. 1160/9/41/69 measuring 8 feet x 20 feet situated at Mohalla Subhash Nagar, Faizabad. This shop was vacated by earlier tenant, namely, Mohd. Akhtar. The petitioner applied for its allotment on which an enquiry was directed to be made by the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Faizabad (in short r. C. E. O.) and thereafter vacancy was declared. After declaration of vacancy, two applications for release of the shop in question were moved by respondent No. 2 in her favour. The first application was not verified hence, second application was moved verifying the contents thereof but requisite court fee stamp was not affixed thereon. Thereafter, the R. C. E. O. rejected the release application on merits holding that the need of the landlady was not genuine and allotted the shop in question vide his order dated 30. 6. 1986. Thereafter, a revision under Section 18 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was filed before the District Judge, faizabad by the landlady-respondent No. 2 which was registered as Civil Revision No. 93 of 1986, Pushp Lata v. Mohd. Siddiq, against the aforesaid order of the R. C. E. O. The learned district Judge allowed the revision and ordered for release of the premises in question in favour of respondent No. 2 vide impugned order dated 13. 10. 1988. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has filed this writ petition before this Court. Siddiq, against the aforesaid order of the R. C. E. O. The learned district Judge allowed the revision and ordered for release of the premises in question in favour of respondent No. 2 vide impugned order dated 13. 10. 1988. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has filed this writ petition before this Court. ( 2 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has raised contention that the application for release was not verified properly and the second application which was duly verified did not bear the court fee stamp and hence, both the applications should have been rejected on technical ground ; that the need of the landlady was discussed first and after rejecting the release application, allotment was considered and the shop in question was allotted in favour of the petitioner, which was a legal order ; that the learned District Judge, Faizabad has exceeded his jurisdiction in passing the order of release of the shop in question in favour of the landlady while allowing the revision and that the findings of fact could not have been reversed by the learned District Judge while deciding the revision and in case, ultimately the revision was liable to be allowed, the matter should have been remanded to the R. C. E. O. for rehearing. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent No. 2 Sri B. K. Shukla has contended that the prospective allottee had no right to be heard before the decision on release application of the landlady by the r. C. E. O. and the R. C. E. O. had erred in giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner while deciding the release application. He has further contended that the need of the landlady was genuine and it has also not been mentioned that business was being done in the shop and in the counter-affidavit, it has specifically stated that the respondent No. 2 being a lady could not collect the details but a perusal of Annexure-4 to the writ petition, shows that the petitioner had admitted that he is a Salesman in Railway shop and a person who Is a Salesman at some other place, he has got no time to run his own shop and on account of lack of accommodation the respondent No. 2 is facing hardship as her husband is also residing with her. He has further submitted that during the pendency of the case, if any need is mentioned then it has to be considered by the R. C. E. O. but that has not been done. ( 4 ) FIRST of all, question with regard to the maintainability of the release application is to be considered. The first application was moved without proper verification but was duly stamped. Hence, the second application was moved in which proper verification was there but the same was not duly stamped. It is nobodys case that the first application was moved by the landlady, was not pressed by her. If the first application was pending and there was any technical defect in the same, the defect could be removed by moving second application with verification during the pendency of first application, both the applications should have been taken into consideration as by way of second application, the contents were verified. The intention of the respondent No. 2 was clear that she had to press her first application by removing the defect by means of filing verification of those contents which were mentioned in the first application. It is not the case of the petitioner that the second application was moved with different contents. Hence, it cannot be said that both the applications were defective and were liable to be rejected on this technical ground. Both the applications were liable to be treated as one and the same application and the second application treated as verification of the first application. Hence, the application was maintainable. The R. C. E. O. rejected her both the applications and on subsequent dates considered the question of allotment of the shop in question to the petitioner on 21. 11. 1986 against which civil revision was filed by the respondent No. 2 which was decided by the Vth additional District Judge. While allowing the revision, the matter was remanded back to the r. C. E. O. for fresh decision after visiting and measuring the shop in question. The Rent Control inspector submitted his report on 8. 4. 86 and thereafter on the application of the opposite party no. 2 that she had married just a year before and her husband is to retire in the year 1985, she was allowed to adduce additional evidence. The Rent Control inspector submitted his report on 8. 4. 86 and thereafter on the application of the opposite party no. 2 that she had married just a year before and her husband is to retire in the year 1985, she was allowed to adduce additional evidence. ( 5 ) NOW, It is to be seen whether the petitioner was given an opportunity of hearing while deciding the release application and whether the release application was not decided first prior to the passing of allotment order. In this regard, a perusal of the order passed by the R. C. E. O. shows that first of all he had considered the release application and when the release application of respondent No. 2 was rejected, thereafter the matter of allotment was considered taking into account the objections filed by the landlady-respondent No. 2. It appears that the R. C. E. O. heard the matter on one date but first of all decided the release application and when the release application was rejected, he proceeded to decide the allotment order in his order but the same was done by one and common order. This Court is conscious that it is well-settled proposition of law laid down by Full Bench in the case of Talib Husain v. 1st A. D. J. and others, AIR 1986 All 196 that the prospective allottee has no right or interest in the property or claim against the landlord so as to be entitled to any hearing in the disposal of the release application on general principles or doctrine of audi alteram partem and the R. C. E. O. had to satisfy himself only on the question whether the need of the landlord bonafide or not. He was also not required to make comparison of the hardship which falls within the domain of Section 20 (1) of the Act, The prospective allottee" has no locus standi to be heard. The view taken in Talib Husains case (supra) was affirmed by the Apex Court in the case of Vijay Kumar Sarkar v. Incharge District judge, 1994 (1) SCC 646. ( 6 ) AT this stage, it is also necessary to consider whether the revisional court (District Judge) has acted illegally while deciding the revision or not. The view taken in Talib Husains case (supra) was affirmed by the Apex Court in the case of Vijay Kumar Sarkar v. Incharge District judge, 1994 (1) SCC 646. ( 6 ) AT this stage, it is also necessary to consider whether the revisional court (District Judge) has acted illegally while deciding the revision or not. In this regard, provisions of Section 18 of the act are liable to be quoted herein below : "section 18 (1)--No appeal shall He from any order under Section 16 or Section 19, whether made before or after the commencement of this section, but any person aggrieved by a final order under any of the said sections may, within fifteen days from the date of such order, prefer a revision to the District Judge on any one of or more of the following grounds, namely : (a) that the District Magistrate has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law ; (b) that the District Magistrate has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by law ; (c) that the District Magistrate acted In the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. (2) The revising authority may confirm or rescined the final order made under sub-section (1) or may remand the case to the District Magistrate for rehearing, and pending the revision, may stay the operation of such order on such terms, if any, as it thinks fit. Explanation.--The power to rescind the final order under this sub-section shall not include the power to pass an allotment order or to direct the passing of an allotment order in favour of a person different from the allottee mentioned in the order under revision. (3) Where an order under Section 16 or Section 19 Is rescinded, the District Magistrate shall, on an application being made to him on that behalf, place the parties back in the position which they would have occupied but for such order or such part thereof as has been rescinded, and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary. " ( 7 ) THE provision of sub-section (2) of Section 18 are clear that the revising authority, may confirm or rescind the final order made under sub-section (1) or may remand the case the District magistrate for rehearing and pending the revision may stay the operation of such order on such terms, if any, as it thinks fit. But the Explanation to this subsection provides that power to rescind the final order under his sub- section shall not include the power to pass an allotment order or to direct the passing of an allotment order in favour of a person different from the allottee mentioned in the order under revision, but In Section 18, it is no where mentioned that the revising authority cannot pass an order of release. The intention of the Legislature restricting the revisional authority to make only the order of allotment is that in case, the revislonal court thinks fit. It can make a release order and the word "release" has not been included purposely in the statute. In this regard, cases of Lokesh Kumar Dwivedi v. IIIrd Addl. District Judge, 1981 (1)ARC 34 ; P. C. Tripathi v. Ist Addl. District Judge, 1983 (1) ARC 58 ; Himmat Bahadur Singh v. XIIth Addl District Judge, 1984 (1) ARC 433 and Udai Narain Lal v. District Judge, 1976 ALR 487 are the authorities of this Court, in which It has been held that where a revision is filed by a landlord against an order refusing to release the disputed, accommodation and allotting it to some other person, the Revising Authority can pass an order setting aside allotment order and releasing the accommodation in landlords favour. In the matter of Bechan Pandey v. Dulahin janki Devi and others. AIR 1976 SC 666, it has been held that the Court be clothed to entertain a plea which would have the effect of condemning succeeding general of the families to spend major part of their lives in protracted litigation. The intention of the Legislature in this regard is clear from perusal of Section 19 of the Act in which the word revision under Section 18 have been substituted by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976. Language of section is as follows : " 19. The intention of the Legislature in this regard is clear from perusal of Section 19 of the Act in which the word revision under Section 18 have been substituted by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976. Language of section is as follows : " 19. Re-allotment in the event of landlord abusing the release order,--Where a building or part thereof is released in favour of the landlord under Section 16 or on revision under Section 18, on the ground that it was required by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family or any person for whose benefit it was held by him, or for the objects of the trust of which he was trustee, or on the ground that it was required for purposes of demolition and new construction, and the landlord either puts or causes to be put into occupation any person different from the person for whose occupation, according to the landlords representation, it was required, or permits any such person to occupy it, or otherwise puts it to any use other than the one for which it was released or, as the case may be, omits to occupy it within one month or such extended period as the District Magistrate may for sufficient cause allow from the date of his obtaining possession or in the case of a building which was proposed to be occupied after some construction or reconstruction from the date of completion thereof, the District Magistrate or, as the case may be. the District Judge, on an application being made in that behalf within three months from the date of such act or omission, may after giving to the landlord an opportunity of being heard, revoke the order of release in whole or in part, and on such order being made, the district Magistrate may treat the building or part as vacant and allot it as such. " ( 8 ) FROM perusal of the above, it Is clear that release order can be passed by the District Judge in revision or he may revoke the order of release in whole or in part, and as such order being made, the District Magistrate may treat the building or part as vacant and allot it as such. " ( 8 ) FROM perusal of the above, it Is clear that release order can be passed by the District Judge in revision or he may revoke the order of release in whole or in part, and as such order being made, the District Magistrate may treat the building or part as vacant and allot it as such. ( 9 ) IN view of well-settled view and also there being no restriction in the statute, the revising authority, i. e. , the District Judge has jurisdiction to pass a release order while assailing the order of R. C. E. O. / District Magistrate. The aforesaid view has been taken by this Court in the case of mehkar Singh v. VIth A. D. J. , 1994 (1) ARC 523. Relevant para 9 of the report reads as under : "in Lokesh Kumar Dwivedi v. IIIrd Addl. District Judge, Lucknow and others, 1981 ARC (Short Notes on Cases 56) 34, it has been held that where a revision is filed by a landlord against an order refusing to release the disputed accommodation and allotting it to some other person, the revising authority can pass an order setting aside allotment order and releasing the accommodation in landlords favour. In P. C. Tripathi v. Ist Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others, (1983) (1) ARC 58, the Court held that the Revising Authority while rescinding the final order made under sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Act has a power to pass an order releasing the disputed property in favour of the landlord. The words rescind the final order does not confine itself to remand the matter after an order passed by the District Magistrate under section 16 of the Act is set aside. The Revising Authority may itself after setting aside the order of the District Magistrate passed by him under Section 16 (1) of the Act, can pass a final order of release in favour of the landlord. The same view was taken by Honble N. D. Ojha, J. in Himmat singh v. XIth Addl. District Judge, Kanpur and others, 1984 (1) ARC 433. The same view was taken by Honble N. D. Ojha, J. in Himmat singh v. XIth Addl. District Judge, Kanpur and others, 1984 (1) ARC 433. " ( 10 ) THE next point contended by learned counsel for the petitioner is that whether the revisional court has no jurisdiction to give its own finding by reversing the findings of fact recorded by r. C. E. O. As discussed above, the revising authority has jurisdiction to order for release while rescinding the order of R. C. E. O. This can only be done if the revising authority comes to the conclusion that the District Magistrate acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of his jurisdiction and in that case, the revising authority without coming to consider the facts of each case cannot arrive at the conclusion whether order of release Is liable to be passed or not. In this regard, similar view has been taken In Mehkar Singh v. VIth A. D. J. (supra ). ( 11 ) THE basic difference between Section 115. C. P. C. and Section 18 of the Act Is only of explanation given below Section 18 of the Act has been added purposely, had there been no such Explanation, then the revising authority or revisional court could not have- exercised its jurisdiction to consider findings of fact as the provisions of Section 18, sub-section (1) is pari materia with Section 115, C. P. C. ( 12 ) IN view of the above, this Court is of the view that the District Judge can pass order of release of the premises and he has committed no illegality or irregularity in passing such order in the instant case. However, with regard to consideration of need of the respondent No. 2, it has to be taken note of whether learned District Judge has considered the same properly or not and whether he has committed material irregularity in reversing the findings of fact regarding need of the respondent No. 2 properly. ( 13 ) A perusal of provisions of Sections 18 and 19 of the Act it appears that release order can be made only for specific purpose. In the order of R. C. E. O. dated 30. 6. ( 13 ) A perusal of provisions of Sections 18 and 19 of the Act it appears that release order can be made only for specific purpose. In the order of R. C. E. O. dated 30. 6. 1986, a finding has been given to the effect that in possession of the landlady, there is one hall measuring 20 feet x 8 feet, one room measuring 10 feet x 12 feet, one kitchen, one latrine and one bathroom and the disputed shop was already under the tenancy of one person, namely, Mohd. Akhtar and the accommodation which was already in occupation of the landlady was not released and the landlady lives alone in the house according to the report of the Rent Control Inspector dated 8. 4. 1986 and It is not proved that any body else lives with the landlady in her house and as such, two rooms, one staircase, one bathroom, one latrine and one kitchen are being used independently by her which is sufficient for her use. At one place, it has been indicated that her husband will open shop of general merchant after getting the shop in question repaired, but the learned District Judge in revision has indicated that the landlady wants to use some part of the shop in question as drawing room of her house and some part as shop to be run by herself. Hence, it is not clear that the shop which a commercial building would be used for commercial purpose or for residential purpose, At one place, it is said that the shop in question would be used as Drawing Room by making necessary alterations while by revisional court, it has been indicated that some part of the shop shall be used as drawing room and some part as shop, meaning thereby that some part of the disputed shop would be used for commercial purpose and some part would be used as residential purpose. No definite finding has been given regarding the need of respondent No. 2. Hence, without there being a definite finding on this, this Court is of the opinion that as the revisional court has rescinded the findings and the order of R. C. E. O. , it was necessary for him to hold specifically about the need of the landlady and the purpose for which the premises in question was released. Hence, without there being a definite finding on this, this Court is of the opinion that as the revisional court has rescinded the findings and the order of R. C. E. O. , it was necessary for him to hold specifically about the need of the landlady and the purpose for which the premises in question was released. In absence of any proper discussion regarding the need of the landlady-respondent No. 2 and specific purpose for which the building in question has been released, I am of the opinion that the case be remanded to the learned District Judge for fresh decision. ( 14 ) IN the result, the writ petition is allowed In part. The impugned judgment and order passed in rent Control Revision No. 93 of 1986, Pushp Lata v. Mohd. Siddiq, dated 13. 10. 1988, is set aside. The matter is remanded back to the learned District Judge for reconsideration of the matter afresh. White reconsidering the matter, it will be open for the learned District Judge to consider the need of the landlady himself or rescind the order of R. C. E. O. or confirm it or remand the matter in exercise of powers under Section 18 of the Act. It will also be open to the learned district Judge to consider the matter of court-fee stamp or to send the matter to R. C. E. O. for reconsideration of the matter regarding payment of court-fee stamp. In case, it is found that the first application of release which was moved by respondent No. 2 without verification had different contents to that of second application moved subsequently without court-fee stamp in which proper verification was made. Both the applications would be treated differently, unless there is already an application to consider these two applications as one and the same but in that case, contents which have not been verified would not be taken into consideration by the lower court. ( 15 ) NO order as to costs. .