JUDGMENT : - A.K. Yog, J. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned counsel for the Caveator Respondent No. 3. 2. PETITIONER, Mohammad Rafiq Rajbi, claims to be the Landlord of an accommodation (House No. CK- 67/54 Rajbi Kali, Varanasi). He claims that respondent No. 3 Munnu Son of Dildar Ahmad is a tenant in a portion of the said house (called the 'accommodation in question') at the rate of Rs. 60/- per month. Landlord/petitioner filed release application under Section 21 (l) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Let ting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972, U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (for short called 'the Act'), registered as P. A. Case No. 14 of 1990 (Rafiq Rajbi v. Munnu). Respondent No. 3 as tenant filed written statement. Parties exchanged affidavits and led evidence in support of their case. It may be mentioned that copy of the release application and written statement have not been filed for perusal of the Court to ascertain actual scope and extent of pleadings and controversy in the instant case. 3. AN application under Order 1 Rule 10 of Code of Civil Procedure (ANnexure-1 to the Writ Petition) was filed on behalf of Officer-in-charge Enemy Property, Varanasi, through the District Magistrate contending that house in question had be come enemy property and vested in the Officer In-charge Enemy Property (impleaded as Respondent No. 2 in the present petition ). Perusal of the said application under Order 1 Rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure shows that Respondent claimed relationship of Landlord tenant. 4. LANDLORD-petitioner filed objections dated 19th July, 1996 (Paper No. 16 Ga). The Prescribed Authority allowed said application vide judgement and order dated 23-2-1998 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition). The Prescribed Authority has given reason for not accepting application. By means of the said order dated 23-2-1998, case was directed to be listed on 6-3-1998 for further orders. Petitioner-Landlord field application (paper No. 136 Ga) praying for recalling of the order dated 23-2-1998. Copy of 136 Ga is not available on record. It is, therefore, not possible to ascertain bona fide and promptness on the part of the Landlord. The aforementioned application (paper No. 136 Ga) has been rejected by the Prescribed Authority vide impugned judgement and order dated 14th July, 1999 (Annexure 4 to the writ petition). Copy of 136 Ga is not available on record. It is, therefore, not possible to ascertain bona fide and promptness on the part of the Landlord. The aforementioned application (paper No. 136 Ga) has been rejected by the Prescribed Authority vide impugned judgement and order dated 14th July, 1999 (Annexure 4 to the writ petition). This order has been challenged by filing this writ petition. 5. THE Court below has given valid reasons for not recalling the order dated 23-2-1998. 6. PETITIONER contends that under the Act, Prescribed Authority has no power to allow impleadment or addition of a party. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to 1990 (1) Allahabad Rent Cases 201, Uma Shanker Pathak v. Additional District Judge, Kanpur and others, para 63 and 64 (Hon'ble A.N. Dikshita, J.). 7. CASE of Uma Shanker Pathak (Supra) renders no help to the petitioner for two reasons:- (1) It is distinguishable on facts. The learned Single Judge in the case of Uma Shanker Pathak (Supra) was considering the effect of non-impleadment of co-owner in a set of facts which are altogether different in the present case. (2) In the case of Uma Shanker Pathak (Supra) learned Single Judge gave no reason to ignore Clause (g) of Section 34 and Clause (f) of Rule 22. Learned Single Judge in its ultimate operative Judgment did not quash the order allowing impleadment dated 28-2-1986 passed by Court below. He held in favour of petitioner on the ground that there was no sub-tenancy. In this case application to implead co-owner dated 2:12-1985 was filed by the one V. K. Agarwal claiming to be the landlord. This application was al lowed by the Delegated Authority in exercise of powers under Section 16 of the Act vide order dated 28-2-1986 (See para 31, 33 and 55 the said judgement). Order dated 28-2-1986 has not been dealt with on merit nor it has been quashed (See Para 69 and 70 of the judgement). The only reference to the issue in hand e.g. 'whether Authority/tribunal, acting under the Act, has power to allow impleadment? can be had in para 63 of this judgement which does not disclose that Court consciously applied its mind to the question. We find no reason or discussion on the point in the said para. Only relevant portion of the said judgement on the question finds place in para 64. can be had in para 63 of this judgement which does not disclose that Court consciously applied its mind to the question. We find no reason or discussion on the point in the said para. Only relevant portion of the said judgement on the question finds place in para 64. Para 63 and Para 64 of this Judgment, for our purpose, read:- Para 63.-"a recital of Section 34 is necessary so as to extract where the Rent Con trol and Eviction Officer had any power to allow or permit a party to implead other co-landlords as opposite parties or as applicants within the ambit of Order 1, Rule 10 C. P. C. As mentioned under Rule 22 (f) application for impleadment cannot be allowed. "Para 64.-"the recital below would clearly show that such powers did not vest either in the District Magistrate or in the Rent Control and Eviction Officer or the Prescribed Authority or any Appellate or Revising Authority. Only some powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit has been specified in Section 34 (a) to (g)." 8. LEARNED Single Judge then quoted Section 34and Rule 22 in extenso. For convenience Section 34 and Rule 22 of the Act are reproduced below: 34. Powers of various authorities and procedure to be followed by them.-The District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority or any (Appellate or Revising Authority) shall for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing of any appeal or revision) under this Act have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act No. V of 1908). When trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely:- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) receiving evidence on affidavits; (c) inspecting a building or its locality, or issuing commission for the examination of wit ness or documents or local investigation; (d) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (e) awarding, subject to any rules made in that behalf, costs or special costs to any party or requiring security for costs from any party; (f) recording a lawful agreement, com promise or satisfaction and making an order in accordance therewith; (g) any other matter which may be prescribed. "rule 22. "rule 22. Powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.- (Section 34 (l) (g)-The District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority or the appellate or Revising Authority shall, for the purpose of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal or revision under the Act, shall have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely:- (a) the power to dismiss an application, appeal or revision for default and to restore it for sufficient cause, (b) the power to proceed ex pane and to set aside, for sufficient cause, an order passed ex pane; (c) the power to award costs and special costs to any successful party against an unsuccessful party; (d) the power to allow amendment of an application, memorandum of appeal or revision; (e) the power to consolidate two or more cases of eviction by the same landlord against different tenants; (f) the power to in Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the authority concerned. " 9. READING of Paragraphs 63 to 65 of the judgment show that Court did not consciously apply its mind to relevant provisions nor directly adjudicated the said issue as such. Apparently Court made passing observation without specifically dealing with relevant provisions; namely Section 34 (g) of the Act and Clause (f) of Rule 22 of the Rules framed under the said Act. There is no reference to Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure being made applicable to the proceedings under the Act, nor to the inherent powers conferred under relevant provisions. Observation of the learned Single Judge is, thus, in my opinion, only per incuriam in sub-silentio-as observed by Supreme Court in (1989) 1 SCC 101 (para 11) and (1990) 3 SCC 684 (Para 40 to 44). 10. IN (1999) 3 AWC 2546 SC, Supreme Court held that it is well settled preposition of law that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not that everything said therein constitutes precedent. 10. IN (1999) 3 AWC 2546 SC, Supreme Court held that it is well settled preposition of law that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not that everything said therein constitutes precedent. It is further said that Courts are obliged to employ an intelligent technique in the use of precedents bearing in mind that decisions of the Court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it was rendered. It is true that an Officer or an Authority does not possess inherent powers like the one vested in a Court or a quasi-judicial authority required to act judicially. Inherent powers have been vested in a Court under Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure. It is also now well settled that application for substitution can be entertained, even if there is no specific provision, in exercise of powers under Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure, See AIR 1972 Allahabad504 (506) (FB ). 11. SECTION 151 in the Code of Civil Procedure is aimed to prevent fraud, oppression, and abuse of the process of a Court or miscarriage of justice. The object of law is to meet justice. The underlying object in incorporating 151 Code of Civil Procedure is to shorten the litigation, to avoid protraction of proceedings and miscarriage/abortion of Justice. It cannot be disputed that there can be addition of par ties against the wishes of plaintiff if one is to be impleaded being necessary or proper party. This is underlined principle under Order 1 Rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure as well. Before a person is impleaded, the only condition precedent is that he must be directly and legally interested in the action. Once such person is impleaded, he shall be bound by the result of the action and the question required to be settled in the action which could be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. In other words, the action and the answer to the same, if affects or prejudices legal rights of a person he must be allowed to join the proceedings. 12. IT is held that 'authority' or a Court has inherent power to entertain application of a stranger to be made a party in appropriate case, where it considers that without the exercise of such powers, the ends of justice would be frustrated. 12. IT is held that 'authority' or a Court has inherent power to entertain application of a stranger to be made a party in appropriate case, where it considers that without the exercise of such powers, the ends of justice would be frustrated. In following judgements it is held that in exercise of 'inherent powers' under Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure a Court can allow impleadment of a party in the ends of justice: (1) 1986 Alld 174 (177) (Dwarka Prasad v. Kishan Lal) (2) 1954 Alld 11 (12) Para 7 and 8 (D. B.) (3)1958sc394 (398) (4) 1988 (2) SCC 602 (ARAntulay\. R. S. Nayak) 13. IN the case of A. R. Antulay (Supra), Supreme Court observed that 'rules of procedure' are the handmaids of Justice and there is nothing to detract the power of the Court to review its Judgment exdebito, in case injustice is caused. Even if there are technicalities, the Supreme Court should not feel shackled and decline to rectify that injustice or otherwise the injustice noticed will remain forever a blot on justice. 14. IN the light of the above observation, to prevent abuse of process of Court, to meet the ends of justice and in order to secure the ends of justice a Court can always exercise its inherent power vested under Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure. Similar view has been taken in- (i) 1982 UPLBEC 82 -Para 8 to 13 (DB) (ii) (1997) 1 ARC 348-Para 5 and 6 (Ram Narain Sharma v. Ml Additional District Judge). 15. IN last ten decades there has been tremendous expansion of legal horizon of our country. Legal process is revolutionised which necessarily requires transparency and procedural laws to be elastic so as to avoid rigidity and in turn make the system meaningful and avoid multiplicity of proceedings. 16. ONE must have liberal broad out look and Have 'flexible approach' in procedural matters within permissible limits. There is no justification to have a pedantic or narrow look to procedural laws 'sub stance of Justice' should not be sacrificed at the cost of procedure. In the above backdrop, it cannot be said that authorities under the Act do not possess inherent power contemplated under Sections 151 and 152, Code of Civil Procedure. There is no justification to have a pedantic or narrow look to procedural laws 'sub stance of Justice' should not be sacrificed at the cost of procedure. In the above backdrop, it cannot be said that authorities under the Act do not possess inherent power contemplated under Sections 151 and 152, Code of Civil Procedure. Rule 22 (f) clearly confers upon Authorities under the Act unfettered inherent powers like the one contemplated under Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure to prevent abuse of the process to adjudicate under the Act to achieve ends of justice ( AIR 1966 SC 935 ). Supreme Court has laid stress on principle of progressive Interpretation in the case ( (1990) 1 SCC 109 -Para 14 Synthetics Chemical Limited v. State of U. P. 17. THEREFORE, I hold that Authority/tribunal under the Act has inherent power to which include power to allow impleadment of party as a Civil Court has under Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure. 18. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner also referred to the following decisions which, in my opinion, are not of much help to the petitioner in the facts of the present case:- (i) AIR 1974 Allahabad 275 (Abdul Rashid v. Sitaramji Maharaj Brajman and others). (Paragraphs) (ii) 1979 Allahabad Civil Journal 192 (Shri Chhakkan and another v. Shri Zaheer Hassan and another) (Paragraph 3). (iii) 1974 All India Rent Control Journal 96 (State of Uttar Pradesh and another v. Anand Swamp) (Paragraph 10). (iv) 1998 (33) Allahabad Law Reports 246 (Bunlad Flusain and others v. Zila Adhikari, Bara Banki and another) Para 5. As already noted above - it may even at the cost of repetition be mentioned, that present writ petition has not been filed against original order allowing "impleadment" but primarily against the order refusing to allow review against the order allowing impleadment. It is a clear case of attempt to delay the proceedings by abusing process of Court. 19. THERE is another ground Application for recalling said order is un tenable and misconceived. Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to review its own order in absence of 'permissible grounds' for review. Petitioner has failed to point out manifest error apparent on the face of record in the impugned order. 20. FURTHER by the impugned order, no substantive rights of any of the parties as such, are shown to have been adjudicated or prejudiced in any manner. Petitioner has failed to point out manifest error apparent on the face of record in the impugned order. 20. FURTHER by the impugned order, no substantive rights of any of the parties as such, are shown to have been adjudicated or prejudiced in any manner. There is no good ground for interference with the impugned judgement and order dated 14th July, 1999 under Articles 226 and 227, Constitution of India. In any case, I do not find the present case fit for interference under Articles 226/227, Constitution of India. 21. WRIT Petition is devoid of merit and it dismissed with costs, quantified at Rs. 2,500/ -. Costs shall be paid by present petitioner within two months from today by depositing the same before Prescribed Authority/responding No. 1 in case No. 14 of 1990 (Mohd Rafiq Rajbi v. Munnu). In case petitioner does not deposit the cost as indicated above, he shall not be heard by the Prescribed Authority. Aforementioned amount of Rs. 2,5qo/-shall be allowed to be paid to Munnu/respondent No. 3, who alone appeared as Caveator in this case. Petition dismissed.