Order GURUSHARAN SHARMA, J. On 26.2.1996 the petitioner filed Title (Eviction) Suit No.19 of 1996 against the opposite party for eviction from the suit premises, detailed in schedule 1 to the plaint. 2. The opposite party is daughter-in-law of petitioners full brother, Deo Narain Chaudhary. She is a doctor posted in Patna Medical College Hospital and is running a clinic and her practice in the suit premises. 3. According to the plaintiff, she was permitted to occupy suit premises, i.e., a room on the ground floor for opening a clinic as licensee. The plaintiff required the premises for his personal necessity and hence revoked her licence and on her refusal to vacate the premises filed the suit. 4. On the other hand, the opposite party claimed the house belonging to her father-in-law and denied herself to be a licensee of the petitioner, who had no interest in the house. 5. On 14.5.1996, the said Deo Narain Chaudhary filed Misc. Case No. 65 of 1996 for making an award dated 20.4.1996, Rule of the Court. It was claimed that on dispute between him and his brother Shree Narayan Chaudhary in respect of the house in question there had been an arbitration, wherein award was made on 20.4.1996. The petitioner appeared therein and filed his objection. 6. The opposite party filed an application in the eviction suit to stay its proceedings till disposal of Misc. Case No. 65 of 1996, pending in the court of first Subordinate Judge, Patna. The petitioner filed rejoinder thereto and opposed the prayer. 7. By impugned order dated 18.8.1997 the Munsif, third court, Patna stayed further proceedings in the eviction suit, till disposal of the aforesaid Misc. Case under section 10 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. In eviction suit the only question to be determined was as to whether the suit premises was in occupation of the opposite party as licensee and if the petitioner failed to prove it, the suit was bound to fail. However, in this suit question of petitioner's title could also be gone into incidentally. 9. Admittedly the entire house is in possession of the petitioner and only one room, which is subject matter of the eviction suit is in occupation of the opposite party. 10. However, in this suit question of petitioner's title could also be gone into incidentally. 9. Admittedly the entire house is in possession of the petitioner and only one room, which is subject matter of the eviction suit is in occupation of the opposite party. 10. The question of issuing an order to a party restraining him from proceedings with his suit in a regularly constituted court of law deserves great care and consideration and such an order is not to be made unless it was found absolutely essential for the ends of justice. Provisions of section 10 are clear, definite and mandatory, under which a court in which a subsequent suit has been filed is prohibited from proceedings with the trial of that suit in certain specific circumstances. In the present case there was no question of staying the proceedings of Miscellaneous Arbitration Case, which was initiated subsequently. One test of the applicability of section 10 to a particular case is whether, on the final decision being reached in the previous suit, such decision would operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit. In the present case decision in the eviction suit is not to operate as res judicata in the liberation case. 11. In my opinion, scope of eviction suit and the aforesaid Misc. Arbitration Case are absolutely distinct and separate and the matters in issue are also directly and substantially not the same. The parties are also not the same and the eviction suit was filed earlier to the Misc. Arbitration Case. The question of attracting the provision of Section 10 of the Code, therefore, does not arise at all, since there was neither substantial identity in subject matter nor the field of controversy between the parties of the eviction suit and the Misc. Arbitration proceeding were the same. 12. It is true that under those circumstances where the requirement of section 10 of the Code are not satisfied, recourse of section 151 is permissible for staying a suit or for injuncting the plaintiff from proceeding with the case, provided the court is satisfied that such a recourse is necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the court, and it is not violative of any express and specific provision of the Code or any other law applicable to the case to be stayed or injuncted. 13. 13. In an interlocutory petition involving inherent jurisdiction of the court to grant stay under section 151 of the Code, the burden is on the party seeking stay to establish facts for exercise of discretion in favour of such party. The other requirements will be whether such order is considered, justified for the ends of justice or for preventing abuse of the process of the court and whether such an order is expressly or specifically prohibited by any other provisions of the Code or any other Act. 14. Here there was no question to stop another action between the same parties on the principle that multiplicity of action was vexatious. The inherent powers are to be exercised by the court in very exceptional circumstances. In my opinion in the present case the impugned order staying eviction suit could not be said to be an order necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent an abuse of the process of court. 15. In my opinion stay of eviction suit by invoking inherent powers of the court under section 151 of the Code, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, amounts to an abuse of process of court and there can be no manner of doubt that such recourse cannot be said to observe the ends of justice, rather it would be inducing the court to resort to a procedure which will do complete injustice to the parties. 16. I, therefore, set aside the impugned order dated 18.8.1997. This revision application is allowed, but without costs.