Order.- These three petitions relate to the same matter and can be dealt with together. The Writ Petitions are filed for the issue of a writ of certiorari calling for the records of the Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, Cauveri Division, Tanjore relating to the suspension order of the petitioners and for quashing the same. As the facts are similar in all the three writ petitions, Writ Petition No. 3971 of 1965 will be dealt with. The petitioner was working as Head Lascar in Public Works Department, Valangaiman section at Sakkottai. The Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, Cauveri Division, by his order No. 5015-M dated 30th September, 1964, transferred the petitioner from Valangaiman to Sirkali. This order was served on the petitioner on 2nd October, 1964. The petitioner met the Executive Engineer in person on 3rd October, 1964, and requested him to cancel the orders of transfer and permit him to continue in Valangaiman section itself. On 7th November, 1964, there was an incident in which the Section Officer of Valangaiman was assaulted by the petitioner herein and the petitioners in the other two petitions - Writ Petitions No. 3972 of 1965. The Section Officer sent a telegram to the Superintending Engineer, and the Superintending Engineer reported the matter to the Chief Engineer on 9th November, 1964. The Superintending Engineer by his order dated 9th November, 1964, placed the petitioners under suspension pending enquiry. The suspension order was forwarded to the Section Officer, Valangaiman on 10th November, 1964. The petitioner was served only on 19th February, 1965, while the petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 3972 and3973 of 1965 were served with the suspension order soon after it was made. A criminal complaint was also preferred, and the District Magistrate (J), Kumbakonam acquitted the petitioner herein and the petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 3972 and 3973 of 1965 on 27th February, 1965. The Department did not revoke the order of suspension, as departmental proceedings were in contemplation under the directions of the Superintending Engineer by his letter dated 18th June, 1965. After the order of acquittal by the District Magistrate, the petitioners applied to the Executive Engineer for cancellation of the order of suspension on 22nd March, 1965. On 24th July, 1965, the petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 3971 to 3972 of 1965 addressed a letter to the Chief Engineer praying for cancellation of the order of suspension. After the order of acquittal by the District Magistrate, the petitioners applied to the Executive Engineer for cancellation of the order of suspension on 22nd March, 1965. On 24th July, 1965, the petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 3971 to 3972 of 1965 addressed a letter to the Chief Engineer praying for cancellation of the order of suspension. The petitioners not having received any reply from the authorities have preferred these Writ Petitions. The main contention in the Writ Petitions is that on identical facts and charges the petitioners were acquitted by the District Magistrate and therefore the Department is not justified in embarking on a fresh enquiry on the same facts. On the materials on record I am unable to say that the enquiry contemplated is on the same facts on which the petitioners were tried by the Criminal Court. Apart from the order of suspension, no charge memo. has yet been given to the petitioners. Till a charge memo. is given it cannot be said on what facts the departmental enquiry is based. It is therefore too early to accept the contention of the petitioners that the departmental proceedings are based on the same facts on which the petitioners were acquitted by the District Magistrate. It has been held that a finding of a Criminal Court is not always binding on a disciplinary tribunal. In this connection the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Rama Rao1may be referred to. In that case the Sub-Magistrate found that one Durgalu, the only eye witness, who spoke to the torture of Reddy Simhachalam, turned hostile and that his evidence could not be accepted. In his earlier statement Durgalu stated that he was an eye witness to the torture of Reddy Simhachalam. Durgalu stated before the Sub-Magistrate that he had escaped from the custody before he reached the Police Station on 5th March, 1964, and that he was re-arrested only on 8th March, 1964. The torture of Reddy Simhachalam was on 7th March, 1964. On revision, the learned Sessions Judge declined to accept the evidence of Durgalu that he escaped on 5th March, 1964. In the departmental enquiry against the respondent for misconduct, the Enquiry Officer declined to accept the finding of the Magistrate. The torture of Reddy Simhachalam was on 7th March, 1964. On revision, the learned Sessions Judge declined to accept the evidence of Durgalu that he escaped on 5th March, 1964. In the departmental enquiry against the respondent for misconduct, the Enquiry Officer declined to accept the finding of the Magistrate. In the circumstances the Supreme Court observed as follows at page 1727: "The Enquiry Officer appears to have stated that the Judgment of the Magistrate holding a Criminal trial against a public servant could not always be regarded as binding in a Departmental enquiry against that public servant. In so stating the Enquiry Officer did not commit any error. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India2, the Supreme Court observed as follows (at page 792): "If the trial of the criminal charge results in conviction, disciplinary proceedings are bound to follow against the public servant so convicted; even in case of acquittal proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. The usual practice is that where a public servant is being tried on a criminal charge, the Government postpones holding a departmental enquiry and awaits the result of the criminal trial and departmental proceedings follow on the result of the criminal trial." The two decisions above cited make it clear that it cannot be said that in the case of an acquittal by a criminal Court the departmental proceedings cannot be initiated on the same facts. Even in the case of acquittals the departmental proceedings may follow when the acquittal is ‘other than honourable’. As to how far a departmental enquiry is competent, when the Officer is acquitted on the same facts by a criminal Court, is dealt with in Shaik Kasim v. Superintendent of Post Officers1, and by a Bench of this Court in Krishnamurthy v. Chief Engineer2. It has been observed in Jerome De Silva v. Regional Transport Authority3. As to how far a departmental enquiry is competent, when the Officer is acquitted on the same facts by a criminal Court, is dealt with in Shaik Kasim v. Superintendent of Post Officers1, and by a Bench of this Court in Krishnamurthy v. Chief Engineer2. It has been observed in Jerome De Silva v. Regional Transport Authority3. “As primarily the criminal Court of the land are entrusted with enquiry into offences, it is desirable that the findings and orders of the criminal courts should be treated as conclusive in proceedings before quasi-judicial tribunals.” The Bench in Krishnamurthy v. Chief Engineer2, in dealing with the case in Jerome De Silva v. Regional Transport Authority3, observed: “The utmost that can be gathered from Jerome De Silva’s case3, cited earlier is that where the charge relates to the identical subject-matter of the criminal trial, and there has been an acquittal on the merits at that trial, it might not be proper for the departmental authority to arrive at some other finding inconsistent with that acquittal.” No doubt it would be a strange predicament, if, in spite of a trial by a criminal Court on the same facts, the domestic tribunal were to come to a different conclusion on. the same facts. But there cannot be a complete prohibition against the tribunal coming to a different conclusion, for it is well known that the tribunal is not bound by several rules that are binding on appreciation of evidence by a criminal Court. As for instance, a criminal Court would not accept the evidence of an accomplice, unless corroborated in material particulars, while the departmental enquiry may base its finding on the uncorroborated testimony of the accomplice. In this connection it is significant to note that the Supreme Court has observed in. R.P. Kapur v. Union of India4, that the departmental proceedings might follow where the acquittal was ‘other than honourable’. The question whether the principles of natural justice had been violated in not giving due and proper weight to the finding of the criminal Court can only depend on the facts of each case. As already observed, it is premature to go into this question, as a charge memo. has not yet been given. On this ground these petitions are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. R.M. ----- Petitions dismissed.