Tukol, J.- This is an appeal by a private complainant against the order of acquittal passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Badami, in Criminal Case No. 1026 of 1963. The appeal has been admitted only against the first three respondents and accordingly, we have heard Mr. Deshpande, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, only as against these respondents. The appellant filed a complaint on 14th August, 1963 alleging that she was the lawfully wedded wife of accused No. 1 (respondent No. 1) and that he had married accused No. 2 (respondent No. 2) during her life time. Accused No. 3 (respondent No. 3) is the father of accused No. 2. The allegation against him was that knowing full well that the complainant who was the lawfully wedded wife of accused No. 1 was alive, he had performed the marriage of A-2 with A-1. It was pleaded that all the accused were guilty of the offences punishable under section 17 of the Hindu Marriages Act and section 494 read with section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. All the accused pleaded not guilty. The accused Nos. 1 and 2 stated that there had been no marriage between them as alleged by the complainant. Accused No. 3 also stated that the allegation of marriage made by the complainant was wholly false. The complainant examined six witnesses including herself. The learned Magistrate was of the view that the evidence of the material witnesses, namely, P.Ws. 2, 3 and 5 who were examined as eye-witnesses to the celebration of the marriage, bristles with material contradictions, discrepancies and inconsistencies and that he was of the opinion that the complainant had miserably failed to prove the offences under sections 494 and 495 of the Indian Penal Code read with section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 against any of the accused. He, accordingly, passed the order of acquittal on 24th April, 1965. Mr. Deshpande appearing for the appellant has submitted that the Magistrate had erred in excluding from evidence the complaint filed by accused No. 3 on 28th January, 1964 against accused Nos. 1, 5, 6 and another, that he had erred in appreciating the evidence in isolation, that he had failed to note the circumstances disclosed by the documents produced in the case and that the order of acquittal against the three respondents was bad in law. Mr. 1, 5, 6 and another, that he had erred in appreciating the evidence in isolation, that he had failed to note the circumstances disclosed by the documents produced in the case and that the order of acquittal against the three respondents was bad in law. Mr. Malimath, the learned Counsel, appearing for the respondents, supported the judgment and further submitted that even if everything that has been urged on behalf of the appellant were accepted, the order of acquittal was bound to be confirmed in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhaurao Shankar v. The State of Maharashtra1. Since we are in agreement with the stand taken up by Mr. Malimath, we would indicate very briefly the merits of the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant. We agree with Mr. Deshpande that the learned Magistrate has committed an error of law in rejecting the complaint wholly as inadmissible in evidence. Though there may be some difficulty about a complaint, we are clear that the statement of verification recorded by the Magistrate is a public document as defined by section 74 of the Evidence Act. To confine ourselves to the relevant portion of that section, it lays down that documents forming the acts or records of the acts of a Judicial Officer are public documents. When accused No. 3 filed the complaint as complainant charging accused No. 1 and others with certain offences, he was examined under section 200, Criminal Procedure Code by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence and the latter recorded the substance (or the statement in verbatim) of the examination. This record of the statement of verification recorded by the Magistrate is undoubtedly a record of a judicial act which he was required by section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to perform and hence the entire record made by the Magistrate duly signed by him and the complainant in his presence is a public document and should have been received as evidence by the Magistrate. The original document had been produced by the Nazir from the custody of the Court and the statement of verification should have been admitted into evidence without any further proof. The admission of this document into evidence raises the question of its evidentiary value against the different accused. The original document had been produced by the Nazir from the custody of the Court and the statement of verification should have been admitted into evidence without any further proof. The admission of this document into evidence raises the question of its evidentiary value against the different accused. So far as accused No. 3 is concerned, it is a record of statements made by him before the Magistrate and if it contains any admissions made by him, such admissions can be used against him. It is well established that when admissions are sought to be used as evidence, they can be used against the maker only under section 21 of the Evidence Act. In Sardul Singh v. State of Bombay2, it was held that admissions contained in letters written by the accused could be used against them. Mr. Deshpande contended that accused No. 3 had admitted the marriage between the present accused Nos. 1 and 2. What accused No. 3 has stated therein is that the ‘Akshata’ ceremony of his daughter was performed on Sunday the 4th August, 1963 at 10 a.m. as he was induced by accused Nos. 2 to 4 in that case into believing that the present accused No. 1 had secured a valid divorce from his wife. This admission of marriage is not unqualified; it is sought to be circumscribed by a statement that the complainant was deceived into the belief that there had been a divorce between accused No. 1 and his first wife. In such cases, “it is settled law that an admission made by a person whether amounting to a confession or not cannot be split up and part of it used against him. An admission may be used either as a whole or not at all.” (See Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh.3 If the whole of the statement is taken into account, it won’t amount to an admission of guilt in this case and is therefore not of any assistance against accused No. 3. Mr. Deshpande, however, submitted that the admission of the factum of marriage as contained in the complaint could be used against accused Nos. 1 and 2 under sections 32 and 33 of the Indian Evidence Act. There is no force in this contention. Mr. Deshpande, however, submitted that the admission of the factum of marriage as contained in the complaint could be used against accused Nos. 1 and 2 under sections 32 and 33 of the Indian Evidence Act. There is no force in this contention. Even if we assume that the appellant can claim the benefit of the two sections and that the statement falls under any of the sub-sections of section 32, it can fall only under sub-section (5). In that case, the statement should be one which should have been made before the question in dispute was raised. In the present case, the complaint of the appellant was filed in 1963, while the complaint of accused No. 3 was filed in January, 1964. Therefore, section 32(5) is not attracted. It follows that the statement about the existence of relationship by marriage was made after the dispute about the matter had arisen between the parties. As regards the use of the statement under section 33, one of the essential requirements is, as provided by the second clause of the proviso, that the adverse party in the first proceeding had the right and opportunity to cross-examine. The statement that is sought to be used is the statement of verification. Though accused No. 1 was an accused in that case, he had neither the right nor opportunity to cross-examine the complainant in that case. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even if the verification statement is admitted in evidence, the admissions therein cannot be used against any of the accused in this case. As regards the allegation that accused Nos. 1 and 2 were married at Banashankari on Sunday the 4th August, 1963 at about 10 a.m. , the complainant (P.W. 1) and her brother Martandappa (P.W. 6) have no personal knowledge. P.W. 4 is the Nazir of the Court who was examined to produce the complaint filed by accused No. 3. So, the only three witnesses who are material for proof of the complainant’s case are Basappa (P.W. 2), Byavappa (P.W. 3) and Irappa (P.W. 5). As already mentioned, all these witnesses have been disbelieved by the learned Magistrate. P.W. 4 is the Nazir of the Court who was examined to produce the complaint filed by accused No. 3. So, the only three witnesses who are material for proof of the complainant’s case are Basappa (P.W. 2), Byavappa (P.W. 3) and Irappa (P.W. 5). As already mentioned, all these witnesses have been disbelieved by the learned Magistrate. So far as Basappa and Byavappa are concerned, they have stated that on Saturday prior to Sunday, they had gone to Banashankari for the purchase of bullocks and that on Sunday morning they thought of visiting Banashankari Temple, and that when they actually went there, they witnessed the marriage of accused Nos. 1 and 2 being performed in the presence of accused No. 3 and others. Both of them admitted in the cross-examination that they did not purchase any bullocks. It is also in evidence that Kerur which is at a distance of 8 miles from Kagalgomb from which place these witnesses come, is famous for weekly cattle bazaar. So if these witnesses were interested in purchasing bullocks, they would have gone to Kerur and would not have gone to Badami. They are not able to state in whose houses they saw the bullocks nor are they able to give the name of the broker who assisted them in seeing the bullocks. It appears to us that they have not gone to Banashankari at all. The other witness (P.W. 5) has stated that he had gone to Banashankari because he had cultivated the land of Shankarbhat, adjacent to the Banashankari temple. Shankarbhar has not been examined and no document has been produced to show that this witness had cultivated any land in Banashankari. Apart from these circumstances which improbabilise the presence of these witnesses on Sunday, what is required by law, to sustain a conviction under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhaurao Shankar v. State of Maharashtra1, is that the prosecution must establish that the essential ceremonies for a valid marriage were gone through by the accused on a date on which either party to the marriage had a spouse living. After referring to the provisions of section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and sections 494 and 495 of the Indian Penal Code, their Lordships concluded: “It is, therefore, essential for the purpose of section 17 of the Act, that the marriage to which section 494, Indian Penal Code applies on account of the provisions of the Act, should have been celebrated with proper ceremonies and in due form. Merely going through certain ceremonies with the intention that the parties be taken to be married will not make the ceremonies prescribed by law or approved by any established custom.” Then, their Lordships quoted from page 605 of Mulla’s Hindu Law (12th Edition) to show that the two essentials to the validity of marriage are: (1) invocation before the sacred fire and (2) saptapadi, that is, the taking of seven steps by the bridegroom and the bride jointly before the sacred fire, and that a marriage may be completed by the performance of ceremonies other than those aforesaid, if it is allowed by the custom of the caste to which the parties belong. In the present case, none of the witnesses has stated as to what were the essential requisites of a valid marriage amongst the Reddy Community to which the accused belong. The evidence of the witnesses does not establish clearly what were the ceremonies that were performed on the occasion. P.W. 2 stated: “Some preliminary ceremonies prior to the throwing of rice were being performed by them at the time when we had gone to the temple. A-1 then tied ‘Mangalasutra’ to A-2 and A-1 and A-2 were garlanded and then they threw rice on A-1 and A-2 and thus the marriage of A-1 and A-2 was celebrated and completed at the place, where Mantap exists in front of Banashankari Deity.” He further stated that there was neither a ‘priest’ nor a ‘Jangam’ for the performance of the marriage. P.W. 3 stated: “When we had gone there, we saw A-4, A-8 applying turmeric to A-1 and A-2 at about 8-00 a.m. and A-1 tied ‘Tali‘or ‘Mangala sutra’ to A-2. A-2 garlanded A-1 and after this rice or Akshata were put on the couple i.e. A-1 and A-2.” It may be noted that this witness does not refer even summarily to any of the preliminary ceremonies mentioned by P.W. 2. A-2 garlanded A-1 and after this rice or Akshata were put on the couple i.e. A-1 and A-2.” It may be noted that this witness does not refer even summarily to any of the preliminary ceremonies mentioned by P.W. 2. P.W. 2 does not speak about the application of turmeric powder by any of the other accused to accused Nos. 1 and 2. In his cross-examination, this witness stated that he did not see whether ‘Mangalasutra’ was tied or not to A-2 at Banashankari temple. P.W. 5 deposed: “I saw accused Nos. 1 to 10 before the Court in the temple of Banashankari deity.” It was a Sunday. When I saw accused No. 6 applying ‘arshina’ to A-1 and A-2. and A-1 was to marry A-2. At that time one Easappa of Kagalagomb and some others came in a tonga to the temple of Banashankari..................After this ‘Akshata’ were thrown on the married couple i.e., A-1 and A-2 and A-1 tied ‘Tali’ to A-2. The marriage of A-1 with A-2 took place at about 8-30 a.m. on that day just in front of the deity of Banashankari in the ‘Mantap’ There is thus no consistency even as regards the alleged ceremonies that are said to have been gone through by accused Nos. 1 and 2. We are of the opinion that these 3 witnesses had not, in all probability, gone to Banashankari on that Sunday. In that view, there is no need to deal with the other inconsistencies and discrepancies pointed out by the Magistrate. On the whole we are satisfied that the appellant has miserably failed to establish the charges levelled against the respondents and that the order of their acquittal is valid. In the view we take of the evidence and the relevant provisions of law we are of the opinion that there are absolutely no grounds to disturb the order of acquittal passed by the Magistrate. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. S.V.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.