These two Revision Petitions raise a common question of law. They can therefore be disposed of by a common order. In these two cases the petitioners were prosecuted for violation of some provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Paddy and Rice Declaration of Stocks Order. The prosecution evidence was closed on 16th April, 1966. The defence witnesses were examined in one case on 19th May, 1966 and in the other case on 21st May, 1966, and the evidence was closed. On 26th May, 1966, an application was filed by the A.P.P.O. under section 540, Criminal Procedure Code, requesting the Court to permit some additional documentary evidence to go on record and also to summon the Tahsildar, Kondangal to be examined as a witness. This petition was resisted by the accused. The Munsif-Magistrate, Kondangal by his order dated 26th May, 1966, allowed the petition received the documentary evidence and directed summons to be issued in the name of the Tahsildar so that he can be examined as a witness. It is this order that is now challenged in these Revision Petitions. The only contention of Sri Y. Sivarama Sastry, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, is that the Court below has erred in allowing the documentary evidence to go on record and has also erred in summoning the Tahsildar. Before I consider this argument, I must mention a few more facts. One of the defences of the accused was that he had sent his clerk on 2nd and 3rd December, 1965 to the Tahsil’s Office to submit the declaration in regard to the stock. But as the Tahsildar was on tour and was not available, the declaration was filed on 4th December, 1965 after his return to the headquarters. This defence was for the first time disclosed only after the prosecution evidence was closed. It look a precise form when the accused produced certain documents to show that the Tahsildar was not at the headquarters on 2nd and 3rd December, 1965. It is true that some vague questions in the cross-examination in this connection were put to the Sub-Inspector by the accused. It is to meet this case set up by the accused in the defence that the prosecution wanted to file the documentary evidence and summon the Tahsildar. It is true that some vague questions in the cross-examination in this connection were put to the Sub-Inspector by the accused. It is to meet this case set up by the accused in the defence that the prosecution wanted to file the documentary evidence and summon the Tahsildar. In these circumstances, the Munsif-Magistrate allowed the evidence as in his opinion it was necessary “to meet the ends of justicee.” Now, under section 540, Criminal Procedure Code, a criminal Court has got ample powers to receive additional evidence. The section consists of two limbs. The first limb vests discretion in the Court to summon any person as awitness or examine any person in attendance though not summoned as a witness. That he can do at any stage of the inquiry or trial. He can also recall and re-examine any person already examined. In the second part of the section, it is enjoined that if it appears to the Court that the evidence of any person is essential to the just decision of the case, the Court shall summon and examine or recall and reexamine such person. The magistrate, while passing the order under revision, does not mention as to under what part his order falls. It is however, clear from his order that he thought that it was necessary to meet the ends of justice, that is why the additional evidence was admitted to go on record. That obviously falls within the ambit of the second limb of the section. It is not for this Court to interfere in such an order unless of course it is perverse or not passed in good faith. There are no such allegations made in these Revision Petitions. The second limb of section 540, Criminal Procedure Code, leaves it to the satisfaction of the Court, and if it appears to the Court that it is essential for the just decision of the case that a particular person should be examined as a witness or a particular document should go on record as evidence, it is bound to examine such person or allow the documents to be produced in evidence. It does not matter whether the Magistrate himself reaches that conclusion suo motu or he reaches that conclusion after his attention was invited to it by a party by filing an application. It does not matter whether the Magistrate himself reaches that conclusion suo motu or he reaches that conclusion after his attention was invited to it by a party by filing an application. Even under the first part of the section, it is in his discretion to allow any witness to be examined or document to be produced. In that case, however, the discretion has to be exercised on the same lines as judicial discretions are exercised and in accordance with the well accepted principles in the exercise of such discretion. In this case, it is not in doubt that the defence set up by the accused came to the light only after the close of the prosecution evidence and it took a definite form only when certain documents were filed by the accused showing that the Tahsildar was not at the headquarters on 2nd or 3rd December, 1965. It is only then that the prosecution thought that the fact that the Tahsildar was at the headquarters will have to be established. It was not a case where the prosecution is trying to fill in a lacuna appearing in their case, but it was a case in which the prosecution was not aware at all about the defence which was subsequently set up by the accused. In such cases, the decided cases permit additional evidence to go on record. In re N. Krishnaswamy1, Somasundaram, J., observed: "If in this case the Court is of opinion that any matter has arisen ex improvise, which could not have been contemplated by the prosecution, then certainly the Court is entitled to examine these witnesses as Court witnesses. In any event, even if all these witnesses are examined by the Court, their evidence cannot be used to fill up the gap in the prosecution. Otherwise, these witnesses, if they fall within the scope of the observations mentioned by Tindal, C.J., may be examined." The learned Judge earlier extracted the observations made by Tindal, C.J. in Reg v. Frost2. If any matter arises ex improviso, which no human ingenuity can foresee on the part of a defendant in a civil suit or a prisoner in a criminal case, there seems to me no reason why that matter which so arose ex improviso may not be answered by contrary evidence on the part of the Crown. If any matter arises ex improviso, which no human ingenuity can foresee on the part of a defendant in a civil suit or a prisoner in a criminal case, there seems to me no reason why that matter which so arose ex improviso may not be answered by contrary evidence on the part of the Crown. That rule applies only to a witness called by the Crown and on behalf of the Crown, but we think that the rule should also apply to a case where a witness is called in a criminal trial by the Judge after the case for the defence is closed, and that the practice should be limited to a case where a matter arisen ex improviso which no human ingenuity can foresee, on the part of a orsioner, otherwise injustice would ensue". To the same effect is Shareelal Kajaria v. The State3. In In re Vadlamudi Kutumba Rao4, Krishna Rao, J., (as he than was) observed that the Magistrate approached the application from wrong side. He merely confined himself to the question whether the accused were in a position to obtain the evidence of the witness otherwise than as Court-witnesses. He did not at all consider the question whether the best available evidence was going to the Court. In the circumstances of the case he ought to have clearly come to the conclusion that the best available evidence had not been given and that his duty was to take the evidence of the witness in question. In view of these principles and in view of the wide language of section 540, Criminal Procedure Code every case has to be decided in the context of its own facts. In this case, as stated earlier the learned Magistrate was quite within his competence to permit the documentary evidence to go on record and also summon the Tahsildar. I do not therefore think that his order suffers from any infirmity which calls for interference at the hands of this Court. The revision petitions are therefore dismissed. G.S.M. ----- Revisions dismissed.