Narayana Pai, J.- This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus directing the respondents to restore to liberty one Miss Janaki Varadan who is shown as the petitioner. It is stated that because she is unlawfully detained and physically restrained at a house called “the Crags” in Sesharinpuram, Bangalore, by her father, she is unable to make an affidavit herself. The affidavit in support of the petition is, therefore, sworn to by one Rajmohan Gandhi. The respondents are the Commissioner of Police of the Madras City and Janaki’s father C. Varadan. At the commencement of the hearing of this case on ‘25th October, 1966, Mr. Seshadri stated that as no relief is sought against the first respondent (the Commissioner of Police of Madras City) in the petition, he gives upthe said first respondent. We, therefore, directed that the name of the first respondent do stand deleted from the cause title. The controversy in the case, therefore, is now between Rajmohan Gandhi, deponent to the affidavit in support of the petition and the second respondent C. Varadan, father of Janaki. The petition was filed on 3rd October, 1966, and brought up for preliminary orders on the morning of the following day. The Court directed notice by emergent process to the second respondent with the further direction that he should produce his daughter Janaki before Court by 3 P.m. that day. As the notice could not be served, a fresh notice requiring the second respondent to produce the petitioner before Court and also to appear at 10 a.m. on 6th October, 1966, was ordered. As this notice also could not be served, a fresh notice was directed to be issued to him on 6th October, 1966, requiring him to produce the petitioner (Janaki) before Court and also to appear at 11 a.m. on Monday the 10th of October, 1966. On 10th October, 1966, the second respondent appeared through Counsel Mr. S.K. Venkataranga Iyengar and produced his affidavit sworn to the same day byhim before a Notary Public in Bangalore as also an affidavit by his daughter Janaki sworn to on 8th October, 1966, at Madras before a Notary Public at Madras. On 10th October, 1966, the second respondent appeared through Counsel Mr. S.K. Venkataranga Iyengar and produced his affidavit sworn to the same day byhim before a Notary Public in Bangalore as also an affidavit by his daughter Janaki sworn to on 8th October, 1966, at Madras before a Notary Public at Madras. He also produced two letters dated 24th May, 1966 and 9th June, 1966, in original received by him from Rajmohan Gandhi. In answer to the said affidavit of the second respondent, Rajmohan Gandhi filed an affidavit on 14th October, 1966 producing with it copies of Varadan’s letters to him dated 19th May, 1966 and 5th June, 1966. Varadan, who had not been served either with notice issued by this Court or with copies of the first affidavit of Rajmohan Gandhi filed in support of his petition, filed a further affidavit on 14th October, 1966, in answer to Rajmohan Gandhi’s first affidavit, after having taken out from Court copies of the petition and the affidavit in support of it. With this affidavit he produced a photostat copy of a letter said to have been written by Janaki to Rajmohan Gandhi after having delivered the original to Rajmohan Gandhi through his Counsel Mr. Seshadri. In reply to the said further affidavit of Varadan, Rajmohan Gandhi filed another affidavit on 25th October, 1966, producing with it the original letter of Janaki delivered to him as well as a copy of a letter dated 25th May, 1966, said to have been addressed by Janaki to one R.D. Mathur. The original of this letter was later produced into Court as directed by us on 28th October, 1966, in the course ‘of the hearing. On the merits of the case, the essential and the only point for examination is whether it is true, as Rajmohan Gandhi alleges, that Janaki is being unlawfully detained and physically restrained by her father Varadan. The original of this letter was later produced into Court as directed by us on 28th October, 1966, in the course ‘of the hearing. On the merits of the case, the essential and the only point for examination is whether it is true, as Rajmohan Gandhi alleges, that Janaki is being unlawfully detained and physically restrained by her father Varadan. On behalf of Varadan, however, what is described as a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition itself has been raised by his learned Counsel, the steps in the argument in support of which are the following: (1) Rajmohan Gandhi is a total stranger and cannot therefore be said to have any locus standi to maintain this petition; (2) Even if a stranger may not be said to be totally prohibited from sponsoring a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of a person said to be unlawfully detained, it is essential to examine his bona fides before a writ in the nature of habeas corpus could issue at his instance, and (3) In view of Janaki’s affidavit filed into Court as well as the letter addressed toy her to Rajmohan Gandhi, the prayer does not survive in existing circumstances Such being the clear scope of the enquiry in this case, it should besufficient for the disposal of this petition to examine the truth or otherwise of the material allegations of fact made in several affidavits placed before Court. We state this .at the very outset because although the affidavits are full and detailed giving the clear impression that the parties have placed before Court their case fully and in all detail, bulk of the statements in them are argumentative. We shall therefore first summarise the material facts gathered from the affidavits in chronological order. Janaki is the daughter of the second respondent Varadan, ordinarily residents at their house called “The Crags” in Seshadripuram, Bangalore. Both sides agree that she is now about 21 years of age. She was admitted into the Bangalore Medical College in the year 1962 and has been reading for the University Course of studies leading to the degree of M.B.B.S. In about March-April 1966 she had completed four years of the said course of study. Both sides agree that she is now about 21 years of age. She was admitted into the Bangalore Medical College in the year 1962 and has been reading for the University Course of studies leading to the degree of M.B.B.S. In about March-April 1966 she had completed four years of the said course of study. Rajmohan Gandhi claims to be the leader of an organization going under the name and style “Moral Re-armament” (hereinafter referred to as ‘MRA’) According to him, it is an international or world-wide organisation working with the object of improving relations among the peoples of various countries and inculcating the sense and spirit of purity and morality in private and public dealings and relations. He further stares that one of the many methods by which the said organisation seeks to promote its objectives is by staging public shows propagating its ideals. One of the shows currently being conducted by the organisation is a show entitled “India Arise.” It would appear that Janaki became interested in the activities of the MRA. The exact point of time when she so got interested is not quite clear. Gandhi, in paragraph 7 of his first affidavit, says that it was in March, 1964. Varadan in paragraph 5(e) of his affidavit dated 10th October, 1966, merely states that towards the end of April, 1966 his daughter wanted to attend the MRA shows at Bombay and return in about ten days and that it being vacation time he naturally had no desire to come in her way. In his affidavit of 14th October, 1966, in answer to Gandhi’s first affidavit of 3rd October, 1966, Varadan denied knowledge of his daughter having joined the MRA in March, 1964 or of her having organised shows or performances in Bangalore or of her having attended the camps or shows in various parts of the country as alleged by Gandhi. In his further affidavit of 25th October, 1966 in answer to Varadan’s of 14th October, 1966, Gandhi expressly said that he was not going to deal with that part of the affidavit of Varadan which, according to him, described only the reasons or motives of Varadan in allowing Janaki to join the MRA, taking the stand that it was enough to notice that Va:adan has freely and in many places in his affidavits admitted that he had originally. permitted his daughter to interest herself in the activities of the MRA. However, there can be no doubt that she did take active interest at least in or from April, 1966 which is of some materiality to this petition. It is also clear that she did go to Bombay out of her interest in the MRA organisation according to Varadan, and she did take part in the shows “India Arise” put on boards by the MRA according to Gandhi. The affidavits also disclose that some correspondence passed between Varadan and Gandhi regarding Janaki. In his first affidavit of 3rd October, 1966, Gandhi, refers to a letter dated 19th May, 1966, written by Varadan to him. In paragraph 8 of that affidavit, he extracted a couple of sentences from it, in one of which Varadan says that his daughter had been engaged in the MRA activities for more than two years. A full copy of that letter was later produced by him as an annexure to his affidavit of 14th October, 1966. In that letter Varadan, after referring to his daughter engaging herself in the MRA activities for more than two years and stating that she was studying for M.B.B.S. and was due to take her final examination in December, 1966 and that he did not interfere with her MRA activities till then as they were not affecting her studies, appealed to Gandhi to persuade his daughter to come back to Bangalore to resume her medical studies. He also said that he had permitted her to go to Bombay after receiving from her a solemn assurance that she would come back to Bangalore and rejoin the College on 8th May, 1966. He further stated that his daughter could attend the MRA camps and conferences after she finishes her studies. He concluded his letter as follows: “Please treat the matter as urgent and persuade her to come back to her sorrowing parents immediately. I hope my appeal will not be in vain.” Gandhi replied to this letter on 24th May, 1966, as follows: “Dear Mr. Varadan, Thank you for your letter of May 19th. I well understand your feelings about your daughter Janaki. She has spoken to me about her conviction to go to Kerala. As far as I can make out, she is convinced that this is what she would like to do and ought to do. Varadan, Thank you for your letter of May 19th. I well understand your feelings about your daughter Janaki. She has spoken to me about her conviction to go to Kerala. As far as I can make out, she is convinced that this is what she would like to do and ought to do. I have conveyed to her what you say to me in your letter. My belief is that she genuinely feels that what she now proposes to do is the right step for her. And clearly she seems to have given the matter a good deal of thought. Permit me to suggest to you that the best course for you might be to encourage her and support her in her conviction. Next time I am in Bangalore, or you are in Bombay, I hope we can meet and talk more. With best regards, Yours sincerely, (Sd). Rajmohan Gandhi.” It is on the following day, 25th May, 1966, that Janaki is said to have addressed a letter to one R.D. Mathur of the MRA. We give below the full text of that letter: “Sylvan Roche” Carmichael Road, Bombay, 25th May, 1966. To Mr. R.D. Mathur Friends of Moral Re-Armament (India) Haroon House 1st Floor, 294, Bazargate Street, Bombay-1. Dear Mr. Mathur, As you are one of the men in charge of the work of Moral Re-Armament in India, I am writing to let you know that after careful consideration and thought, I have decided that I would not appear in the M.B.B.S. Examination in December, 1966. Instead, I want to use my life with Moral Re-Armament to save my country from corruption, division and hate. I feel it is hard to win a country’s freedom and harder still to preserve it. Therefore of my own choice and free will granted to me as a citizen of India by its Constitution, I join the force ‘of Moral Re-Armament, which is registered in India under the title of Firends of Moral Re-Armament (India) as a full time worker for the rest of my life, from 25th May, 1966. I am writing to let you know that some people will dislike this decision of mine, including my relatives and it may even be my parents. But I know what I am doing and I am 21 years of age and entitled to make up my own mind. I am writing to let you know that some people will dislike this decision of mine, including my relatives and it may even be my parents. But I know what I am doing and I am 21 years of age and entitled to make up my own mind. I am, therefore, writing to seek your protection with the help of the law of the land, to allow me to work with you and protect me with any means possible from being forced by anyone to go against my own decision. I hone I need never make use of this, but if the need does arise I hereby fully authorise you to act on my behalf in any legal matter so that my decision is not altered by force. Thanking you, Your; sincerely, (Sd.) Janaki, C. While at Bombay, a brother of Varadan is said to have seen and spoken to Janaki. Thereafter Janaki is said to have gone to Kerala with the MRA and thence to Madras, which place they reached on 27th August, 1966. Varadan and his wife then went over to Madras. On 2nd September, 1966 Varadan made a written complaint to the Commissioner of Police at Madras, a copy of which is produced as an annexure to Gandhi’s first affidavit of 3rd October, 1966. The substance of the complaint is that Janaki has been more or less kept in confinement, her movement being completely restrained by the MRA, that though he went to the MRA camp at Madras, he was not allowed by the organisation to contact his daughter; he prayed that prompt action may be taken in the matter and his daughter restored to him. It is also stated, both by Gandhi and Varadan, that by appointment the parents and their daughter were to meet at the place of a common friend one T.T. Rangaswamy residing at Sriram Nagar, Madras. Parties are not agreed as to the circumstances in which and the person by whom the said appointment was made. But that the parents and their daughter met at Rangaswami’s place is a matter of admission. What happened at that place is also a matter of controversy. According to the first affidavit of Gandhi, a posse of Police made a forcible entry into the bouse and forcibly removed Janaki in spite of her protests. But that the parents and their daughter met at Rangaswami’s place is a matter of admission. What happened at that place is also a matter of controversy. According to the first affidavit of Gandhi, a posse of Police made a forcible entry into the bouse and forcibly removed Janaki in spite of her protests. According to Varadan, when he and his wife expressed to their daughter their natural anxiety, she responded and offered to go with them to Bangalore. He proceeds to state that his daughter accompanied him and his wife to Bangalore on 2nd September, 1966. He denies the allegation that any posse of Police led by an officer made any forcible entry into the house of T.T. Rangaswamy. It has also been argued that Gandhi, according to his own affidavit, was not personally present on the occassion because he did not accompany Janaki to Rangaswamy’s house but another person called Mrs. Lala, a Senior Supervisor of the MRA team accompanied her. On 3rd September, 1966, Gandhi filed a petition before the Chief Presidency Magistrate at Madras under section 552 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As the Commissioner of Police of Madras City, who was originally impleaded as the first respondent, has since been given up, it is not necessary-as Mr. Seshadri fairly conceded, to relate or go into the details of this litigation. It is enough to observe that on 6th September the Magistrate directed the issue of notice to Janaki as well as Varadan to be present in his Court on 15th September, 1966. On 8th September, 1966, the State of Madras represented by its Public Prosecutor at Madras presented a petition to the High Court of Madras under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the quashing of the entire proceedings before the Magistrate. That petition was disposed of by the Madras High Court on 16th September, 1966. By its order pronounced on that date it held that the alleged detention of Janaki by the Commissioner of Police was not for any unlawful purpose within the meaning of section 552 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and consequently quashed the proceedings before the Magistrate. That petition was disposed of by the Madras High Court on 16th September, 1966. By its order pronounced on that date it held that the alleged detention of Janaki by the Commissioner of Police was not for any unlawful purpose within the meaning of section 552 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and consequently quashed the proceedings before the Magistrate. The affidavit of Gandhi further states that the Court did record a finding of fact that Janaki had gone to Bangalore with her parents on 2nd September, 1966, and further made an observation to the effect that if Gandhi was keen or anxious about securing the liberty of Janaki, he should pursue the person who is said to be detaining her i.e., Varadan. It is thereafter that this petition came to be presented to this Court. In the circumstances, it appears to be a sequel to the proceedings in Madras, and a considerable portion of the first affidavit in support of the petition is devoted to the narration in detail of the events in Madras and what according to the deponent may be regarded as natural inferences therefrom. Of course to the extent the inferences are or may be regarded as adverse to either the Commissioner of Police of Madras or the State Government of Madias, they have not been, in our opinion rightly, referred to or dwelt upon in the course of the arguments. The only use which can properly be made of those events or facts in this case is limited to the extent to which they may disclose such conduct of Varadan as may be relevant to the examination of the issue whether he has Unlawfully detained his daughter and deprived her of her liberty of movement. The direct and specific statements in the affidavit relating to such alleged detention are those contained in paragraphs 2 and 24 of Gandhi’s first affidavit which read as follows: “2. I state that the petitioner a young lady of about 21 years, is at the moment being unlawfully detained and physically restrained at “The Crags,” Seshadripuram, Bangalore-20, by her father, the 2nd respondent herein, and consequently she is unable to make the affidavit her: elf. This petition seeks at the hands of this Hon’ble Court the issue of a writ of habeas corpus in order to restore the petitioner to liberty, unrestricted and unrestrained. 24. This petition seeks at the hands of this Hon’ble Court the issue of a writ of habeas corpus in order to restore the petitioner to liberty, unrestricted and unrestrained. 24. I state and state solemnly that the petitioner is at the moment kept unlawfully under confinement and under stringent physical restraint by the second respondent in Bangalore City. I state that the petitioner is not allowed any freedom and she is deprived of her liberty to move and to act.” The actual point for consideration is whether these statements are true or are satisfactorily established. Taking up first for consideration the preliminary objection on behalf of Varadan, it appears to us that only the first step in the argument, as analysed above, may be clearly regarded as a preliminary objection in the real sense of the term. It is only if we decide that Rajmohan Gandhi has no locus standi whatever to move this petition that the petition may be dismissed without any enquiry or investigation into the merits of the case. The other two steps relate, in some manner or other to the merits of the petition, which, as we have already pointed out, involves an investigation into the primary question whether Janaki is shown to be under unlawful detention by her father Varadan. As so understood, the preliminary objection calls for only a brief examination. There is no clear or definite rule of law totally prohibiting a stranger from moving for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus to secure the liberty of a person said to be under unlawful detention, nor is there any general principle of universal application on the basis of which the class of persons who may legitimately move for such a writ can be ascertained with definiteness. In the case of “In re Hardial Singh”1, Achhru Ram, J., observed: “I wish some rule should be framed by the authorities concerned limiting the rights to move petitions under section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, to the detenus their relations and at the most their friends. I understand that such is the practice in England and it will save a lot of judicial time and a good deal of unnecessary embarrassment to the authorities if a similar practice is introduced in this country. I understand that such is the practice in England and it will save a lot of judicial time and a good deal of unnecessary embarrassment to the authorities if a similar practice is introduced in this country. To allow irresponsible people to move petitions of this nature on behalf of persons about whose affairs they have really no knowledge, merely on account of the existence between them of any political or other affinity seems to me to be prejudicial to the proper and efficient administration of justice and otherwise undesirable.” In Kapildeo v. State of Bihar,2Choudhary, J., while expressing his concurrence with the above observations, stated: “The position, however, remains that a stranger has been permitted to move a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of a detenu and so far as the present case is concerned, it cannot be said that a stranger could not make the application. It is, however, open to the Court to examine such a petition to find out whether sufficient materials have been put in, as clearly as possible, in the petition to enable the High Court to come to a decision with respect to the matter in question in that petition and whether such a petition is a bona fide one.” As regards the English Practice, the following sentence occurring in paragraph ‘65 at page 37 of the Eleventh Volume of Halsbury’s Laws of England, Third edition has been relied upon: “A mere stranger or volunteer, however, who has no authority to appear on behalf of a prisoner or right to represent him will not be allowed to apply for habeas corpus.” It has been argued on the basis of the summary of cases referred to in Footnotes (p) and (s) on the same page that ordinarily the applicant should be either a husband on behalf of the wife, or a father on behalf of the son or other persons more or less similarly situated in relation to the prisoner but that total strangers who have no authority or claim to any authority on behalf of the prisoner are not entitled to make any application for habeas corpus. Of the cases there mentioned, two cases which have some relevance to our present discussion are the cases of Rex v. Clarke3and Ex parte Child4. In the former, one Sergeant Whitaker moved for the release of one Mrs. Of the cases there mentioned, two cases which have some relevance to our present discussion are the cases of Rex v. Clarke3and Ex parte Child4. In the former, one Sergeant Whitaker moved for the release of one Mrs. Anne Hunt who was kept confined in a private mad-house run by the said William-Clarke. A writ nisi to bring up the body of Mrs. Hunt having been issued, the Solicitor General on behalf of the respondent William Clarke moved to return the writ offering at the same time an affidavit of one Dr. Monro to the effect that at the instance of a daughter of Mrs. Hunt he had examined Mrs. Hunt about nine months prior thereto and that on examining Mrs. Hunt’s mental condition he had recommended her to the care of the said William Clarke and that the said Mrs. Hunt, m his judgment, was even then in so disordered a state of mind as to be unfit to be brought to the Court. On the strength of the affidavit, the Court enlarged time for making a fuller return in view of the fact that the persons under whose custody. Mrs. Hunt had then been placed were on the point of obtaining proper legal authority under the law relating to lunacy and custody of lunatics. At that stage, the original applicant Sergeant Whitaker moved for permission to have access to and inspection of Mrs. Hunt in order to see that she was properly treated. The request of his was rejected. The Report states: “But as he could not make out that his application was made on behalf of any person who had the least pretension to demand this the Court rejected his request.” The other case of Ex parte Child1was also a case of a lunatic who, however, had been confined in an asylum under Irish Medical Certificates. The applicant in that case, one Byles, the Report shows, admitted that his affidavit did not sufficiently show that the application was authorised by Captain Child in respect of whom habeas corpus had been sought. In discharging the rule already issued, Jervis, C.J., observed as follows: “I think my Brother Byles has not put himself in a condition to ask for the writ. In discharging the rule already issued, Jervis, C.J., observed as follows: “I think my Brother Byles has not put himself in a condition to ask for the writ. A mere stranger has no right to come to the Court and ask that a party who makes no affidavit, and who is not suggested to be so coerced as to be incapable of making one, may be brought up by habeas corpus to be discharged from restraint. For anything that appears, Captain Child may be very well content to remain where he is.” In both these cases it will be noticed that a rule or a writ had been issued in the first instance. In the case of Ex parte Child1, it was a rule to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued. In the case of Clarke2an actual writ of habeas corpus commanding the production of the body of Mrs. Hunt had been issued. The question of credentials of the petitioner or his competence to make the petition was considered at the time of the return. In the case of Clarke2, though the request of the applicant Whitaker to be permitted to have access to and inspection of Mrs. Hunt was rejected, in the face of the facts proved by the affidavit of Dr. Monro, a writ of habeas corpus had already been issued and in view of the affidavit, time for making a fuller and proper return was enlarged. In the case of Ex parte Child1there was an admission by the applicant that his affidavit did not show that he was duly authorised by Captain Child and there was also no suggestion that Captain Child himself was so coerced as to be incapable of making an affidavit. It is seen therefore that these cases do not support an argument for dismissal of habeas corpus petition in limine under all circumstances but call for a close scrutiny of the credentials and bona fides of a stranger-petitioner at the time a return is made to either a rule to show cause against the prayer or an actual writ of habeas corpus. Of course, it is open to a Court even at the very initial stage to dismiss an application for the issue of habeas corpns in limine, if on the materials placed before Court by the affidavit of the stranger the Court considers that not even a prima facie case is made put to entertain the petition. It is also within the discretion of the Court to issue in the first instance either a writ to produce the body of the prisoner or only a rule or notice to show cause why such a writ should not issue, depending upon the material then placed before the Court. As the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ikram Hussein v. State of U.P.3, observes, the matter is clearly one of discretion and the writ of habeas corpus being a “festinum remedium,” (meaning promptredress), there should be a clear case before a writ could issue. That is necessarily so because there must be a wrong before a remedy could be claimed or granted. In this case, however, we have crossed that stage and therefore the matter has necessarily to be examined on the basis of the return now made by Varadan, and the proposition stated by Jervis, C.J., in the case of Child1appears to us to have greater relevance to a consideration of the effect of the affidavit of Janaki filed in this case than to the question of alleged total lack of competence on the part of Gandhi to move this petition. The question of his bona fides also, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, is to a considerable extent mixed up with the question of the truth or otherwise of his allegation that Janaki is unlawfully detained by Varadan and is so completely deprived of her liberty as to be incapable of making an affidavit. In this view, Gandhi’s claim that as a leader of the MRA in India, he has certain responsibilities in relation to Janaki who, he states, has been accepted as a full-time worker of the organisation, as well as his further claim that Janaki’s letter of 25th May, 1966 addressed to Mathur is the source of his authority, do not call for examination while deciding his locus standi. We do not, therefore, express any opinion thereon at this stage for the said purpose and proceed to examine his case in the light of the principles laid down in the cases cited above. Gandhi’s allegation against Varadan that he has kept his daughter Janaki and is still keeping her in unlawful detention and that she is under stringent physical restraint has been specifically and expressly denied by Varadan. In his first affidavit of 10th October, 1966, before he has had an opportunity to read Gandhi’s affidavit in support of his petition, Varadan stated in paragraph 6 as follows: "I respectfully submit that it is far from truth and contrary to facts that any accusation should be made against me that my daughter is being unlawfully detained." After reading Gandhi’s affidavit, he traversed paras 2 and 24 thereof in paras. 3 and 19 of his (Varadan’s) affidavit of 14th October, 1966. They read: "3. Re: Para. 2 of the affidavit.-It is mischievous and false to allege that the petitioner Miss Janaki is unlawfully detained and physically restrained by me and therefore it is that Rajmohan Gandhi is making the affidavit for and on her behalf, she being unable to make the affidavit herself." 19. Re: Para. 24. of the affidavit.-It is a repetition of the allegations made in pars. 2 by the deponent. I submit that it is totally false to allege that I have kept my own loving daughter under confinement and under stringent physical restraint and that I am not allowing her any freedom and deprived her of liberty to move and to act. As I have already stated in my main affidavit, the petitioner has been quite happy, in my house with all her relations and she has even gone about to see pictures in Bangalore." With his affidavit of 10th October, 1966, he produced an affidavit by Janaki herself affirmed before Mr. Jacob A. Chakramakal, Advocate and Notary Public of Madras. At the time of filing his affidavit of 14th October, 1966, he delivered to Gandhi through his Counsel Mr. Seshadri a letter addressed by Janaki to Gandhi. Jacob A. Chakramakal, Advocate and Notary Public of Madras. At the time of filing his affidavit of 14th October, 1966, he delivered to Gandhi through his Counsel Mr. Seshadri a letter addressed by Janaki to Gandhi. The affidavit of Janaki reads as follows: "I Miss Janaki Varadan, daughter of Sri C. Varadan, residing at "The Crag" Seshadripuram, Bangalore-20, aged about 21 years, staying with my grandmother Smt. Kamalammal at Chingleput, now at Madras, do solemnly and sincerely affirm and state as follows: I am the daughter of Sri C. Varadan, "The Crags", Seshadripuram, Bangalore-20. I left Bangalore with my parents on 5th October, 1966, to see my ailing grand-mother at Chingleput and I am with my grand-mother since then. I saw in the newspaper that a petition has been filed in the High Court at Bangalore and the High Court has directed my father to appear with me before Court. I state that I am with my parents of my own free will for the last one month. We have been discussing my future. My parents while strongly advising me against going back to MRA are not in any way physically preventing me from doing so. In April 1966, I decided to postpone my studies and travel with "India Arise". Neither Mr. Rajmohan Gandhi nor anybody else in MRA forced me in any way to take this decision. (Sd.) Janak Varadan." The letter reads as follows: “Dear Mr. Gandhi, I have given my father an affidavit which protects him completely. Even in person I am going to do the same. Please withdraw the petition now at least and say you are doing it at my request. It will spare me and MRA a lot of embarrassment. My uncle Mr. Seshadri who knows Mr. Vaitheshwaran has come to say this in person. Thanking you. (Sd.) Janaki.” If this affidavit and this letter of Janaki are genuine and can be believed there can be no doubt that they will not only deprive Rajmohan Gandhi of his locus standi to make this petition or at any rate his competence to proceed further with it but also entail a dismissal of the petition itself on the ground that there is no case whatever for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus of the type prayed for in the petition. Hence, most of the arguments on behalf of Gandhi addressed by Mr. Hence, most of the arguments on behalf of Gandhi addressed by Mr. Seshadri have been directed towards making out that there is something suspicious about these documents and therefore no reliance should be placed on them. A considerable portion of the further affidavits of Gandhi filed on 14th and 25th October, 1966 is devoted to formulating suggestions and arguments why these documents should not be accepted, as genuine or as representing the true state of affairs. With reference to Janaki’s affidavit, the case of Rajmohan Gandhi, as stated in para. 6 of his affidavit of 14th October, 1966 is- “I state also, with respect that in the context of the events it is open to serious doubt whether the signature in the affidavit purported to be that of Miss Janaki Varadan is or can be hers and also whether were the signature genuine, she signed it without pressure.” The two arguments stated apparently in support of this case are to be found in. paragraphs 3 and 4 of the same affidavit which read: “3. In answer to a question of this Hon’ble Court, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent stated on the 10th instant that the aforesaid affidavit was made before a Magistrate, in fact, it is not so. 4. Why an affidavit from the petitioner alone became possible is not clear. The respondent has stated that he felt it was only fair to have an affidavit from his daughter”if for any reason she should not go over to Bangalore with me. “The respondent has come over to Bangalore but the reason which prevented the petitioner from being brought over to Bangalore in obedience to the orders of this Hon’ble Court has not been indicated by him in his affidavit.” We have quoted these paragraphs because on the pleadings they appear to be exhaustive of the case of Rajmohan Gandhi regarding the affidavit of Janaki. They also represent the substance of the oral arguments addressed before us by Mr. Seshadri. Taken at their face value and making every concession in favour of the arguments, the highest that has been stated is that what is described as the context of events casts serious doubts on two matters: (1) Whether the signature on the affidavit is really that of Janaki and (2) even if it is her signature, whether she made the affidavit without pressure. Beyond raising these doubts, no specific material is placed before Court nor any positive facts even suggesting the circumstances in which the affidavit was sworn to before the Notary Public have been set out in the affidavit of Rajmohan Gandhi. Indeed, the genuineness of the signature appears to be admitted or not seriously disputed when, in the subsequent affidavit dealing with the letter, he makes the suggestion that the signature on the letter appears to differ from the signature on the affidavit. In fact, while winding up the arguments in chief in relation to the affidavit and letter of Janaki, Mr. Seshadri stated that, after considering all the circumstances stated either in support of the genuineness of these documents or against them, there is or there still persists some speck of doubt and that so long as such speck of doubt exists, we should not place any reliance on these documents. Later before commencing his arguments in reply, Mr. Seshadri produced a supplemental affidavit of Rajmohan Gandhi stating that the signature reading “Janaki, C.” in her letter to Mathur of 25th May, 1966 is her normal signature and that he has since learnt that such is her signature in all official records or papers. The latter statement is hearsay. The former may not be decisive or clinching because the signature “Janaki Varadan” in her affidavit obviously follows her description in the cause title to the petition wherein she is called “Janaki Varadan.” Now, there are two matters in relation to the affidavit of Janaki which have to be examined separately,-at any rate in the first instance,-before one could express an opinion as to its genuineness. They are, firstly, the actual mating of the affidavit before the Notary Public and secondly, whether Janaki can be said to have been under any pressure while making that affidavit. On the first aspect of the question, the conduct or bona fides or honesty to be examined or considered is not of Varadan but of Mr. Jacob A. Chakramakal, the Notary Public. Whatever may be the arguments available or suggestions which could be made on the basis of the context of events against Varadan, nothing has been stated against the Notary Public himself. Jacob A. Chakramakal, the Notary Public. Whatever may be the arguments available or suggestions which could be made on the basis of the context of events against Varadan, nothing has been stated against the Notary Public himself. The statement in the affidavit of Gandhi to the effect that the Counsel for Varadan stated before the Court that the affidavit had been sworn to before a Magistrate has been denied by Mr. Venkataranga Iyengar. Whether he stated so or not is also immaterial because the affidavit was produced before the Court in original and it is perfectly clear therefrom that it was sworn to before Mr. Jacob A. Chakramakal, Advocate and Notary Public of Madras. If there is nothing said against him, there is no reason whatever to believe that he was guilty of any nefarious conduct in relation to the affidavit or that he did not take the steps or did not observe the precautions which a Notary Public attesting an affidavit is ordinarily expected to take and observe. It has no doubt been argued that there is nothing to show that Mr. Chakramakal was acquainted with Janaki personally, especially because he has taken the signature of another Advocate of Madras as the person who has identified the deponent Janaki before him. The said signature reads: “P.T. Saraswathi, M.A., B.L., Advocate, Madras. 8-10-66.” All that has been said is that one cannot be sure whether the said identifying witness knew or was acquainted with Janaki. The answer to this argument is that it is not sufficient to raise fanciful doubts but that if Rajmohan Gandhi wanted to make out that the ordinary presumptions about the truth and regularity of the acts of the Notary Public resulting in this affidavit are not available in this case, it was up to him to place the necessary material before Court and that he having failed to do so in spite of the Court having given him full opportunity to do so, no value can be attached to mere suspicions either set out in his affidavit or elaborated in the course of arguments by his learned Counsel. It seems to us that these arguments on behalf of Varadan in support of the genuineness of the affidavit of Janaki deserve to be accepted in preference to those on behalf of Rajmohan Gandhi suggesting mere suspicions without placing any material to substantiate those suspicions. It seems to us that these arguments on behalf of Varadan in support of the genuineness of the affidavit of Janaki deserve to be accepted in preference to those on behalf of Rajmohan Gandhi suggesting mere suspicions without placing any material to substantiate those suspicions. As to whether Janaki swore to this affidavit under pressure or as a free agent, free to state what she really wanted to state, the arguments are all related to what is described as the context of events and to the inferences said to be reasonably flowing therefrom. It is said that the conduct of her father Varadan in going to Madras and removing Janaki by force to Bangalore and his deliberate omission to bring her to Court as required by the notices issued by this Court are sufficient to infer that he must have got the statements in the affidavit made under pressure. It is further stated that Varadan, by making several contradictory statements in his letters to Gandhi, in his complaint to the Commissioner of Police of Madras City and in his affidavits produced in this Court, has shown himself to be a person on whose words no reliance should be placed. Before considering the arguments based on the alleged conduct of Varadan, it is necessary to state one important circumstance which has a very material bearing on the question of alleged pressure. There is no evidence to show that Varadan was present at the time the affidavit was sworn to by Janaki; nor is there any suggestion that he had such control or influence over the Notary Public Mr. Chakramakal as to be able to use him as his instrument for exerting pressure on Janaki. If so, even assuming that the text might have been prepared either without consulting her or at some pressure, she must be regarded as free from all pressure when she was before the Notary Public and could be expected to refuse of decline to swear to the affidavit or affix her signature thereto, if she thought that the contents of the affidavit were not such as she would willingly subscribe to. Apart from this circumstance, there is intrinsic evidence afforded by the text of the affidavit itself to support the argument that the text fairly represents her own independent attitude about the matter. Apart from this circumstance, there is intrinsic evidence afforded by the text of the affidavit itself to support the argument that the text fairly represents her own independent attitude about the matter. It will be seen from the text which we have already copied that her future was still the subject of discussion between her and her parents, which would mean that whether she should work for MRA in future or not was still being discussed, which would further mean that whatever opinion or views she may entertain regarding MRA have not been finally or totally altered or herself made to give them up under pressure. Further, in the last paragraph she says that when in April, 1966 she decided to postpone her studies and travel with the MRA show "India Arise’‘, neither Rajmohan Gandhi nor anybody else in the MRA had forced her in any way to take that decision. The impression clearly created by this affidavit is that whatever may be the views of her father about the desirability or otherwise of her working for the MRA and whatever may be his grievances or complaints against Rajmohan Gandhi or others of MRA or their responsibility for or their contribution to the decision allegedly taken by her to work for the MRA, Janaki herself has no complaints either against Rajmohan Gandhi and the MRA or against her father. If, as suggested, the father had been guilty of exerting either undue influence or unlawful pressure by utilising his position as the father of the girl and had done so successfully, he could as well be expected to have extracted from his daughter an affidavit supporting ids complaints and grievances against Rajmohan Gandhi and other members of the MRA. The fact that he. has not done so is strongly in favour of the view that Janaki swore to the affidavit as a free agent, and what is stated in it fairly represents her own attitude and ideas. To the value to be attached to the last paragraph of the affidavit and its general tenor and to the inferences reasonably available therefrom as stated above, Mr. Seshadri had no clear answer to give in the first instance. But as the matter remained part-heard, he made further submissions when the arguments were resumed on the following day which he stated were the result of further reflections by him. Seshadri had no clear answer to give in the first instance. But as the matter remained part-heard, he made further submissions when the arguments were resumed on the following day which he stated were the result of further reflections by him. He suggested that though Varadan had originally made serious allegations against Rajmohan Gandhi in his complaint before the Commissioner of Police of Madras, he has in his affidavits filed in this petition made several admissions to the effect that initially at any rate he had no objection to his daughter taking interest in the MRA activities or did not object to her doing so. Mr. Seshadri states that the last paragraph of the affidavit of Janaki is consistent with the present line taken by Varadan. The answer appears plausible, but upon closer scrutiny not quite acceptable. It is not quite accurate to say that there is any real or perceptible change in the attitude of Varadan after the date of complaint to the Commissioner of Police, Madras. That prior thereto he had not stood in the way of his daughter taking interest in the MRA activities is found stated not merely in the affidavits filed before this Court but also in his complaint to the Commissioner of Police, Madras, made on 2nd September, 1966. While referring to her interest in the MRA in the earlier stages, he does state in the complaint that he was under the impression that because his daughter always had ideas of reforming society, she wanted to get full advantage from the MRA organisation and that that was the reason why she had attended some camps. His real anxiety as to the consequences of her doing so arose only when his daughter, who had gone to Bombay towards the end of April, 1966, did not return to Bangalore as expected. It should be remembered that there were also a letter written by him to Gandhi in May, 1966 and Gandhi’s reply thereto dated 24th May, 1966, to which reference has already been made. It is because his appeal did not succeed and his daughter in his view appeared to be more and more attached to the MRA to the detriment of her studies that he started thinking that members of the MRA had resorted to deceitful means in securing his daughter’s entry into the organisation as a full-time worker. It is because his appeal did not succeed and his daughter in his view appeared to be more and more attached to the MRA to the detriment of her studies that he started thinking that members of the MRA had resorted to deceitful means in securing his daughter’s entry into the organisation as a full-time worker. There is nothing to show that he has changed this attitude since then. Therefore a positive and unequivocal declaration by the daughter in her affidavit to the effect that no one of the MRA had exerted any pressure on her in the matter of coming to what she calls her decision to work for the MRA. should reasonably be attributed to her own free opinion, not to any extent coloured or prejudiced by whatever views her father may hold in that regard. It has been argued that in her letter to Mathur of 25th May, 1966, which we have already copied, Janaki had been very emphatic and categorical in stating that she had made a final choice in favour of working as a full-time worker for the MRA for the rest of her life, and that against that background it is too much to expect that she would depose to an affidavit of the type now produced. In the first place, it is argued by Mr. Venkataranga Iyengar that the language or the phrasealogy employed in the letter suggests that it was probably a composition by an experienced legal mind rather than by Janaki herself who has had no training in legal matters. The original letter, which we got produced, is not in her writing but the entire text is typed and Janaki has signed it twice over. Atthe foot of the letter there were typed the words “yours sincerely” and the words “Janaki C.” leaving sufficient space between them for Janaki to sign. Actually she has signed both in the said space and below the typewritten text “JanakiC” It is suggested therefore that the text would have been prepared and Janaki asked to sign and that she would not have known first where exactly she was expected to sign. The argument, however, is speculative and it is not possible for us to say, anything definite in regard to it. The argument, however, is speculative and it is not possible for us to say, anything definite in regard to it. R.D. Mathur, to whom the letter is addressed has not come before Court or made any affidavit setting out the circumstances in which the letter came to be written when both the writer and the addressee were together at Bombay, nor has Rajmohan Gandhi stated anything in that regard. What we are called upon to decide is whether Janaki who subscribed to that letter would have subscribed to the affidavit now produced. The argument presumes or proceeds upon the assumption that Janaki was as clear and definite in her decision to work for the MRA as the text of the letter suggests. Assuming for the sake of argument that it may be so, her affidavit does not make her out as a person who has been forced to give up those views. As we have already stated, the affidavit clearly states that the matter is still being discussed and that the parents are strongly advising her against joining the MRA. She does not say that she has accepted the advice or has finally given up her ideas about the MRA. In all the circumstances, it appears to us that the situation described in he affidavit is one in which the daughter, who apparently holds or at any rate once held what appears to be a fairly definite opinion about her joining the MRA is being advised by her parents to re-consider the matter, if possible, and that no final decision in that regard has so far been arrived at. As the daughter herself says that in spite of what she describes as strong advice by her parents the matter is not finalised and her future is still under discussion, there appears to be no valid reason why we should disbelieve her when she says that her parents are not in any way physically preventing her from going back to the MRA. The next question is whether these inferences thus reasonably available from the facts and circumstances already considered, became unavailable or unacceptable by reason of Varadan’s conduct or his alleged untrustworthiness. The next question is whether these inferences thus reasonably available from the facts and circumstances already considered, became unavailable or unacceptable by reason of Varadan’s conduct or his alleged untrustworthiness. Much time was expended in cataloguing what are said to be clear discrepancies in the statements of Varadan made at different times and in different documents, with a view to make out that no reliance should or could be placed on what he says. Although we did not interrupt the arguments, because we did not wish to deprive ourselves of any material which may be useful to us in coming to a conclusion on the main point at issue, it is necessary to observe that the said argument would be of value to the case of Rajmohan Gandhi only if he makes out that Varadan has been guilty of exerting unlawful pressure or undue influence on his daughter. Mere discrepancies or even apparent contradictions which are capable of a reasonable explanation and which are not directly relevant to or very nearly decisive of the real point in controversy have little or no value either to the parties to make out their case or to the Court to adjudicate upon it, nor are they in themselves sufficient to charge a person with deliberate falsehood. Most of the alleged discrepancies are pointed out and relied upon with a view to be able to say that Varadan’s charge of abduction and other related offences made against Gandhi in his complaint to the Commissioner of Police, Madras, cannot be true or must be regarded as having been made hastily and without sufficient reflection. We are, however, not concerned with the truth or otherwise of those charges in this case. The fact that he did make such a charge which Rajmohan Gandhi resents strongly is a circumstance which is of assistance to us as a Court in evaluating his accusations against Varadan in this case, because if we are to accept and act upon the argument on his behalf addressed by Mr. The fact that he did make such a charge which Rajmohan Gandhi resents strongly is a circumstance which is of assistance to us as a Court in evaluating his accusations against Varadan in this case, because if we are to accept and act upon the argument on his behalf addressed by Mr. Seshadri that Varadin is labouring under a sense of extreme frustration on account of his inability to persuade his daughter to charge her views about the MRA and that therefore he is willing to make all manner of attacks against the bona fides of Gandhi without stopping to consider whether they are true or justifiable or not, then by parity of reasoning, the resentment or, if a milder expression is to be used, righteous indignation, by which Rajmohan Gandhi is obviously inspired in consequence of Varadan’s complaint may also be regarded as furnishing him with sufficient motive to read or misread every statement of Varadan as open to the criticism that it is false. Most of the discrepancies, if not all of them, are pointed out and relied upon to show that whereas in his complaint to the Commissioner of Police, Madras, and to a certain extent in the pleadings of this case also, Varadan suggests or desires one to believe that he is wholly averse to his daughter having anything to do with the MRA and that her entry into the organisation was perhaps secured by deceitful means, his previous attitude, as disclosed by his letter of 19th May, 1966, to Gandhi supported by several allegations in the affidavits produced in this case, indicates that he freely permitted his daughter to interest herself in the professed objectives of the MRA and engage herself in its activities. It is therefore stated that all allegations now made tending to show that his daughter was being subjected to some influence or restraint by the MRA organisation to persuade her to break away from her parents are all made out of a sense of frustration that his influence as a parent is of no consequence or is ineffective and that therefore such allegations must be regarded as deliberately false. It appears to us that the central weakness in the argument is the emphasis it repeatedly lays on the fact that prior to the date of his complaint to the Commissioner of Police, Madras, Varadan had freely permitted his daughter to take part in MRA activities. If that is so, he cannot be charged with any definite or defined animous either against the MRA as an organisation or against the ideals it professes. It would also make out that he was not a person who was given to the exercise of his parental authority in such a way as to deprive his children of all freedom of thought and action. Even in his complaint he has stated that he had found that his daughter Janaki has always had ideas of reforming society and that his impression was that it was those ideas which made her attend the MRA camps. In his affidavit of 10th October, 1966 also, he states that he did not desire to stand in the way of his daughter going to Bombay to attend the MRA shows towards the end of April 1966 because it was vacation time and she said that she would return in about ten days. In his letter to Gandhi of 19th May, 1966, he stated that his only anxiety was that her studies should not be disturbed by her MRA activities, and while appealing to Gandhi, as a parent vitally interested in the welfare of his daughter, to persuade Janaki to return to Bangalore to resume her studies, he clearly stated that she could resume her MRA activities after completing her studies and qualifying herself as a doctor. If such were his attitude, it is difficult to describe him as a parent who would go the length of imposing even physical restraint on his children, should they act or propose to act contrary to his wishes. The statement in his affidavit to the effect that “the grant of the writ would mean deprivation of the parents of the control over a daughter for advancement of her own interests to complete her education and to settle down to a married life” has been interpreted in the course of the arguments to mean that the parents were exerting such control over the daughter as to force her to enter into married life. We do not think that so much can be read into it or that it could be misinterpreted that way. Mr. Seshahdri himself conceded that ordinarily there is nothing wrong in a parent expecting his or her daughter as to get married and settle down in life, but that the only thing he was objecting to was parents trying to impose their views on their children and forcing them to adopt a course of conduct opposed to their own independent opinions. The statement of principle is all right, but the averment of fact which it takes for granted or assumes to be true, it should be remembered, is the very matter for investigation. If, from what is stated above, one can reasonably state that in the initial stages Varadan has not shown himself to be an authoritarian father intolerant of the views of his daughter but has allowed her considerable freedom of thought and action, it would require considerable persuasion before we can hold that he has since turned out to be such a father by reason only of the fact that he made a complaint to the Commissioner of Police, Madras, on 2nd September, 1966, and that he is resisting this petition sponsored by Rajmohan Gandhi. The reason why he came to make the complaint is said to be the natural anxiety of a father that his daughter, who has completed four years of her study in medicine securing good marks, should complete the course of study which was almost getting completed, and the apprehensions roused by the fact that his daughter who had promised to return from Bombay did not do so. Whether his daughter did so on her own volition or under the influence, healthy or otherwise, of other persons the fact remained that she did not return to Bangalore and there was clear cause for apprehension that she would leave her studies uncompleted. It cannot be said that there is anything intrinsically wrong in a parent desiring that his child who has taken up a particular course of study should complete it, especially when, a:; in this case, the child is said to have been doing well in her studies. Indeed, no exception is taken by Mr. Seshadri to a parent honestly and bona fide taking such a view and trying to persuade the child to act on that view. Indeed, no exception is taken by Mr. Seshadri to a parent honestly and bona fide taking such a view and trying to persuade the child to act on that view. The circumstances in which Janaki is said to have accompanied her parents from Madras to Bangalore on 2nd September, 1966, are stated differently by Rajmohan Gandhi and Varadan in their respective affidavits. As Gandhi’s statement is not a statement made on his own knowledge, we cannot proceed on the basis that any illegal force was used or that any action, not in accordance with the law, was taken by the Police. Nor is it proper for us to express any opinion on the truth or otherwise of the allegations made by Varadan in his complaint to the Commissioner of Police, Madras. If, as already stated, Varadan has admittedly been tolerant towards his daughter’s views about the MRA., had not objected to the same but had even permitted her to go to Bombay and if, as it appears from the records and is also admitted, she did not return to Bangalore as expected by the father but continued to be away from Bangalore till the end of August, 1966, and if, as we have stated, it is perfectly natural and not to any extent open to criticism or condemnation that a parent should be anxious that the child should complete her studies, we do not think that there is any reason not to believe him when he says, in para. 8 of his affidavit of 10th October, 1966, that whatever he had done had been done in the discharge of his parental responsibilities and in the best interests of his daughter. This general impression of his conduct towards and regard for the feelings of his daughter is also sufficient, in our opinion, to remove what Mr. Seshadri calls a speck of doubt attaching to the affidavit, although we should say that a general statement of suspicions without placing any material in substantiation of the same can hardly be regarded as material enough to raise any doubt whatever. We think therefore that the affidavit of Janaki produced by Varadan is an affidavit duly made by her as a free agent and describes the true state of affairs. We think therefore that the affidavit of Janaki produced by Varadan is an affidavit duly made by her as a free agent and describes the true state of affairs. If the affidavit could be so accepted and believed, there is scarcely any reason why the letter should not also be accepted as genuine and true. Here again, the averments in the affidavit of Rajmohan Gandhi as well as the arguments addressed on his behalf proceed only upon certain suggested suspicions. It is stated that the top of the paper on which the letter is written appears to be cut, that the letter does not state the place from which or the date on which it was written and that her uncle named therein has not himself come to deliver the letter. We have already mentioned that a suggestion is made that Janaki’s signature therein differs or appears to differ from the signature in the affidavit. In paragraph 25 of the affidavit dated 14th October, 1966, Varadan has stated that the letter was entrusted to him for being delivered to Gandhi because the uncle, who was expected to do so, had to go away to Hyderabad. Some comment was made that no reason is stated why the uncle himself could not have come and delivered the letter. But, so long as the letter has been actually delivered, wedo not think it really matters whether it was delivered by the uncle or by the father. It has also been argued that it was delivered to Mr. Seshadri very shortly before the Court assembled on the 14th for being handed over to Gandhi, after Varadan had taken and retained some photostat copies of the same. This circumstances also is not of any materiality so far as the question of genuineness of the letter is concerned. The letter is in manuscript and it is stated on oath that it is the writing of Janaki herself. It is hot as if Rajmohan Gandhi was not acquainted with the writing of Janaki. Nevertheless, except stating that he apprehends that all is not well with the letter, he has not chosen specifically to deny the writing of Janaki thereon, nor has he taken any other steps to prove that the letter is a fabrication. It is hot as if Rajmohan Gandhi was not acquainted with the writing of Janaki. Nevertheless, except stating that he apprehends that all is not well with the letter, he has not chosen specifically to deny the writing of Janaki thereon, nor has he taken any other steps to prove that the letter is a fabrication. The only other argument which has reference to both the affidavit and the letter is that if, indeed, the state of affairs disclosed by them is true, the best thing for Varadan would have been to bring his daughter to Court and dispel all suspicions. His omission to do so is said to have added significance because there had already been orders of this Court directing him to produce her before Court and lis omission to do so should be regarded as contumacious conduct on his part amounting to deliberate disobedience of the orders of this Court. Whether or not Varadan can be said to be guilty of contumacious conduct,- which we shall presently examine,-we are not persuaded either that the production of Janaki before Court is, in the circumstances of this case, the only way of proving the truth of her affidavit and the letter produced by her father or that even after her production it would not be open to Mr. Seshadri to argue that there is still some doubt of the genuineness or acceptability of the affidavit and the letter. It will be remembered that while not placing sufficient material or any material before Court in support of the suggestions that there is something suspicions about the affidavit and the letter, his arguments were concentrated on the question that the said documents were prepared when Janaki was in what he describes as hostile custody and completely under the influence or pressure of her father. If the pressure is at all to be regarded as sufficient argument to discard these documents it must be a type of pressure which persists or continues to operate on the mind of Janaki as to make her say what the father wants her to say. If such is the pressure, Mr. Seshadri could still argue that the pressure could continue to operate even if Janaki should appear before Court and say that she deposed to the affidavit and wrote the letter without any pressure whatever. If such is the pressure, Mr. Seshadri could still argue that the pressure could continue to operate even if Janaki should appear before Court and say that she deposed to the affidavit and wrote the letter without any pressure whatever. Hence the suggestion that we shall be free from all doubts and may, on her mere appearance before Court, straightaway accept the truth of the affidavit and the letter cannot be accepted at its face value. When the argument of the type mentioned above is available and continues to be available to Mr. Seshadri and may, in all probability, be expected to be pressed even if Janaki should appear before Court, we will not be relieved of the necessity of examining the probabilities and circumstances, even if she does. As we have come to the conclusion upon an examination of such probabilities and circumstances that both the affidavit and the letter should be accepted as genuine and stating the truth, we do not think that her presence or absence can make any difference to our opinion. We are therefore satisfied that Janaki is not under any unlawful detention or restraint by her father Varadan and that therefore the allegations to the contrary contained in the affidavits of Rajamohan Gandhi have not been established. Nevertheless, it has been argued that actual physical restraint may rot be necessary or essential before a writ of habeas corpus may be issued, and that such a writ is available as a remedy in all cases of wrongful deprivation of personal liberty. It may be that the respondent in an application for a writ of habeas corpus, who is said to have detained or restrained the person sought to be liberated, does not himself have the actual physical custody of the prisoner as was the case in The King v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, ex parte O’Brien1. But in that case, the Home Secretary of England, who had already sent the prisoner away to Ireland, had admitted before the Parliament that he could, if necessary get the prisoner back to England and therefore may be said to have had control over the prisoner and he is in a position to obey or comply with a writ of habeas corpus. The statement that the writ is available in all cases of wrongful deprivation of personal liberty is taken from paragraph 41 of the nth Volume of Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edition. The relative Foot-note shows that it is based on an extract from the Blackstone’s Commentaries which describes the writ as the great and efficacious writ in all manner of illegal confinement. The liberty referred to is physical liberty as the name of the writ itself indicates, which is a command in respect of the body of a person. We do not think therefore that the writ has anything to do with the liberty of thought or opinion. It is necessarily so because the jurisdiction of the Court, however extensive, can at the highest control a man’s body but can never control his mind The question whether Gandhi is right in his views, or Janaki or her father Varadan, is not a question into which we can enter. If the argument deals with or refers to liberty in its widest sense, then such liberty is not confined to a single individual alone but means equal liberty of all individuals constituting society; such liberty can be maintained and sustained only by respectful tolerance of one another’s views and not uncompromising attachment to one’s own views. People who love liberty must therefore respect the liberty of others and be prepared to be persuaded while attempting to persuade. The statement, therefore, in Janaki’s affidavit that her parents are trying to advise her strongly against going back to the MRA is not sufficient to hold that the said advise does not proceed from legitimate attempts to persuade by reasoning or that she is actually deprived of any physical liberty or liberty of movement, especially when she expressly states that in spite of their advice, her parents are not making any attempt to physically prevent her from going back to the MRA. In this view and in view of our finding against him on the merits of the case, it is not necessary to examine the arguments relating to the bona fides or otherwise of Gandhi in making this petition. The question whether Varadan can be said to have been guilty of contumacious conduct or deliberate disobedience of the order of this Court can be disposed of very briefly. The question whether Varadan can be said to have been guilty of contumacious conduct or deliberate disobedience of the order of this Court can be disposed of very briefly. In support of the argument that he is guilty of such conduct, strong reliance has been placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case reported in Mohammad Ikram Hussain v. State of U.P.2. In that case, the High Court of Allahabad, having made an order directing Ikram Hussain to produce his daughter before Court, later held him guilty of contempt of Court for his failure to do so and sentenced him to undergo three months’ simple imprisonment. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, their Lordships, while holding that the order to produce the daughter was one which need not have been made in the circumstances of the case, declined to interfere with the sentence awarded for contempt of Court on the ground that it was incumbent upon Ikram Hussain to obey the order, whether it. was right or wrong. But their Lordships do not say that in every case where there is noncompliance with the order of a Court it should straightway be regarded as a deliberate disobedience of the order amounting to contempt of Court. It is also not necessary in every case to commit a person for contempt, the accepted principle being that the power of High Courts to commit a person for contempt is a power which should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection in the interest of upholding 1 he dignity and majesty of the law, which may suffer rather than stand enhanced by action which may appear to be harsh or uncalled for in the circumstances of the case. In this case, what are described as orders for the production of Janaki were all made in the absence of Varadan before Court and were sought to be communicated to him by notices issued pursuant to the orders. It is a matter of record that none of the notices issued to him had been actually served on him personally. After his appearance before Court, no attempt has been made to serve the original notice on. him nor was any further order made directing him to produce his daughter. It is a matter of record that none of the notices issued to him had been actually served on him personally. After his appearance before Court, no attempt has been made to serve the original notice on. him nor was any further order made directing him to produce his daughter. Upon his filing the affidavit of 10th October, 1966, the Court merely adjourned the matter to enable Rajmohan Gandhi to file a reply-affidavit according to the notings on the order sheet of the case. It is stated that Rajmohan Gandhi, who was permitted to address the Court personally, submitted that Varadan had not produced Janaki and that he might be asked to do so, to which the Court observed: “It is another matter”. It follows therefore that even when the attention of the Court was drawn to the fact that Varadan had not produced his daughter Janaki, he Court did not not think fit to call upon him immediately to produce his daughter or question him as to why he had not done so. It is quite conceivable and highly probable that the Bench, before which this petition was posted on the 10th of October, 1966, having perused the affidavit of Janaki produced by Varadan on that date, felt that in the light of that affidavit, the matter was really at an end, but that because Rajmohan Gandhi wanted to make further submissions about the acceptability or otherwise of the affidavit, he was granted time to give him an opportunity to file a reply-affidavit or furnish whatever material he wanted to on the question of acceptability or otherwise of the affidavit of Janaki. It has been argued further that though the notices have not been served upon Varadan, the case had received wide publicity in the Press and that Varadan has admitted that he came to know from newspaper reports that there was a direction for the production of Janaki by him. It is further stated that though the first two orders were passed on 4th October, 1966, he left Bangalore only on the 5th for Chingleput to see his ailing mother-in-law along with his wife and daughter Janaki. It is inconceivable, according to the argument, that Varadan was not aware or did not become aware of the Courts order even before he left Bangalore. It is inconceivable, according to the argument, that Varadan was not aware or did not become aware of the Courts order even before he left Bangalore. The fact that the exact time of his departure from Bangalore has not been stated in his affidavit has been adversely commented upon. Regarding the newspaper report, Varadan does not deny that he did come to know therefrom sometime later that there had been an order directing him to produce his daughter in Court. Whether he was aware of it before he left Bangalore is more than one could say. But reports in newspapers need not necessarily be accepted as absolutely accurate, though of course they may be said to make it necessary or prudent for Varadan to make enquiries with the Court as to the exact position. He has, however, explained that after the wide publicity given to the proceedings in Madras, he and his family were considerably disturbed and in a confused state of mind and that when he received information about his mother-in-law’s illness, he left Bangalore with the twin object of being near his ailing mother-in-law and of trying to find some opportunity to collect his thoughts after the very disturbing effect which the proceedings in Madras have had on him and his family. Human nature being what it is, we do not think that we should disbelieve him. The feelings of parents towards their children are such that anything untoward happening to children does disturb their minds considerably, and it is more so in a case ike this where the child concerned is an unmarried daughter. We do not think therefore that it will either be fair or correct to hold that Varadan has been guilty of contumacious conduct or has taken any deliberate steps to escape the law or disobey the orders of this Court, so as to be visited with punishment for contempt of Court. We might also add that though a writ of habeas corpus might have beenissued before the appearance of a respondent in an application, he need not necessarily be held guilty of disobedience and punished therefor, if at the time of making the return to the writ he gives a satisfactory explanation by affidavit or otherwise. It has no doubt been very strenuously contended by Mr. It has no doubt been very strenuously contended by Mr. Seshadri that a writ of habeas corpus is a mandatory order and that the reason for non-compliance with it should be clearly and unequivocally stated by the party to whom the writ is directed. In this case, as already stated, the original ex parte direction, though incorporated in the notices and may be regarded as a writ, has not actually been served upon Varadan. Secondly, an explanation need not, in our opinion, necessarily be a statement either that the prisoner is not in his custody or control or that it if impossible for some reason to produce the prisoner; committing a person for contempt of Court being itself a matter for the exercise of wise discretion by the Court we think it is open to the Court to accept any other type of explanation also as satisfactory. In the case of Rex v. William Clarke1, to which we have already referred, in which there had already been issued a writ of habeas corpus for the production of the body of Mrs. Hunt, the Court did not punish Clarke for not producing her but enlarged the time for making a fuller return on a consideration of two circuit stances viz., that the affidavit of Dr. Monro disclosed that Mrs. Hunt was not in a fit state to be brought before Court and that William Clarke and other persons concerned with the private mad house, where she was confined, were about to take steps for obtaining legal authority to detain her under the law relating to lunacy. It will be seen that even when the confinement or detention then complained of was patently without the authority of the law, the Court did not immediately make the original writ absolute, but accepting the bona fides of the respondent gave time to him to take steps to regularise it and bring it within the authority of the law. There is therefore no absolute rule as to which explanation or which circumstances alone can or will be accepted by Court as a satisfactory explanation for non-compliance with a writ nisi or an interim writ. Every case must be decided on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. There is therefore no absolute rule as to which explanation or which circumstances alone can or will be accepted by Court as a satisfactory explanation for non-compliance with a writ nisi or an interim writ. Every case must be decided on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. In this case, we have accepted as true the statement made on affidavit by Janaki that she is and has been with her parents on her own free will for a month prior to the making of her affidavit and that her parents have not placed her under any physical restraint. We have declined to accept the allegations that Varadan is an unreliable person whose word cannot be accepted and held, upon the indications available from the record, that he should be regarded as a tolerant parent who has given due consideration to the feelings and opinions of his children, particularly the daughter Janaki. The Petition therefore has to be and is hereby dismissed. S.V.S. ----- Petition dismissed.