JUDGMENT - V.K. BARDE, J.:---Heard learned Counsel for the respective parties. The respondents Nos. 1 to 18 have raised a preliminary issue regarding admissibility of this petition and that point is being considered as to whether the writ petition be entertained or not. 2. The petitioner has challenged the enrolment given to the respondent No. 18 for the 1997 January Batch for M.S. (Opthalmology) in Government Medical College, Aurangabad. The challenge is based on the ground that while giving this admission mala fide practice was there on the part of the authorities who gave admission. Firstly, when the seat became vacant in June, 1998, no action was taken to fill in the seat till 17th December, 1998. It is further contended that the respondent No. 18 is the son of the respondent No. 14 and the respondent No. 14 participated in the committee meeting which considered the question of admission for M.S. (Opthalmology) course for January, 1997 Batch. It is contended that not only the action is with mala fide but, it is also void ab-initio. The order ought to have been considered for admission to that course instead of the respondent No. 18. 3. Various arguments are advanced by both sides regarding merits of these contentions raised by the petitioner and the reply given by the respondents No. 1 to 17 to those contentions. However, basically the fact remains whether this writ petition for admission to M.S. (Opthalmology) course for January, 1997 batch is maintainable or not. The learned Counsel for the respondents No. 1 to 18 have placed reliance on the provisions of section 66 of the Maharashtra University Act, 1994 which reads :--- "The Tribunal or Tribunals constituted under sub-section (1) of section 58 for every University shall also be the Tribunal or Tribunals for any such University for adjudication of all the disputes relating to admissions to affiliated colleges or recognised institutions of such University. Such Tribunal or Tribunals shall adjudicate admission disputes as provided hereinafter." 4. There is no dispute that the date on which this petition was filed in the High Court, i.e. 31-12-1998 the University College Tribunal was functioning for Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Marathwada University, Aurangabad (hereinafter referred to as the B.A.M.U.). So considering the provisions of section 66 this petition very well could have been filed before the tribunal for the reliefs sought. 5. Babasaheb Ambedkar Marathwada University, Aurangabad (hereinafter referred to as the B.A.M.U.). So considering the provisions of section 66 this petition very well could have been filed before the tribunal for the reliefs sought. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that as it is alleged that the admission was given to the respondent No. 18 with mala fide intentions and without jurisdiction of the committee, these points could be raised only by filing the writ petition in the High Court. However, on going through the provisions of section 66 of the Maharashtra University Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) all questions arising with respect to the admission are to be considered by the tribunal. It means that the questions whether the committee which gave admission had jurisdiction or not, whether the Rules prescribed for giving admissions are followed or not, are to be considered by the said tribunal. 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has also argued that the petitioner is seeking relief under Articles 14, 21, 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. It is the fundamental right of the petitioner to take higher education and that right is being violated by the actions of the respondents Nos. 1 to 18. However, even that aspect of the case can be considered by the tribunal which is functioning as per the provisions of the said Act. There is no bar to consider this aspect of the case. So it cannot be said that merely because the petitioner is contending that her fundamental right under Articles 14, 21 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India are violated, the tribunal appointed under the said Act, is not having jurisdiction to consider such matters. If the tribunal comes to the conclusion that the admission given to the respondent No. 18 is legal and proper, then the question of fundamental rights of the petitioner will not arise and if the tribunal comes to the conclusion that the admission given to respondent No. 18 is not legal and proper, then the matter will go back to the Committee to consider as to who should be given admission. It is not that the tribunal must direct the respondents to give admission to the petitioner and petitioner alone. The matter will have to be considered on all merits by the tribunal. It is not that the tribunal must direct the respondents to give admission to the petitioner and petitioner alone. The matter will have to be considered on all merits by the tribunal. So merely because it is being contended that the fundamental rights of the petitioner are violated, the jurisdiction of the tribunal cannot be taken away. 6-A. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that merely because there is an alternative remedy, the High Court should not refrain from exercising its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In this respect, he has pointed out that the petitioner had first moved the tribunal by filing Appeal No. ADM/46/98 but, at that time, the tribunal observed that the appeal was premature and, therefore, it was dismissed. The authorities at that time represented before the tribunal that the question of giving admission to 1997 January Batch for M.S. (Opthalmology) was yet not considered by the authorities and as and when it would be considered, the question would arise of giving admission or not giving admission to the petitioner. So, obviously, as there was no rejection of the admission to the petitioner at that time, the appeal was disposed of by the tribunal as being premature. 7. Thereafter, the present petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 5207 of 1998 wherein the petitioner had sought directions from the Court to the respondent that the question regarding giving admission to the January, 1997 Batch for M.S. (Opthalmology) discipline be considered. A writ of mandamus was sought. Here we would like to point that in the said petition, the petitioner had not asked for admission to the course but, only had asked for directions to the authorities to consider the question of giving admission to that post and therefore, by the order dated 17-12-1998 this Court directed the authorities to take decision before 31-12-1998 and the writ petition was accordingly disposed of. It means that the authorities were compelled to take decision before 31-12-1998 as to whom admission should be given to that course. The learned Counsel contended that the petitioner first approached the tribunal but, she could not get admission to the said course. Then she approached this Court by filing petition. It means that the authorities were compelled to take decision before 31-12-1998 as to whom admission should be given to that course. The learned Counsel contended that the petitioner first approached the tribunal but, she could not get admission to the said course. Then she approached this Court by filing petition. Even then she could not get admission and now, if she is asked to go to the tribunal again, it is nothing but asking her to go from pillar to post. Once this Court had given directions in Writ Petition No. 5207 of 98, automatically the Court has jurisdiction to consider the present petition. 8. We have specifically stated the nature of the previous two petitions and the directions given in the previous two petitions. In those previous petitions, there was no question of giving admission to the petitioner but the question of considering whether admission could be given to anybody to that course and direction was issued by this Court to the authorities to decide that question before 31-12-1998. So in both those petitions, there was no issue which is now in the present petition. The issue in the present petition is whether the admission given to the respondent No. 18 is legal and proper and whether the admission could be given to the petitioner. So not the two previous petitions but, the present petition squarely falls under the provisions of section 66 of the said Act. 9. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a ruling in the matter of (Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India)1, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 872 and specifically to paragraph No. 126 from the said ruling. In this matter, the Supreme Court has laid down under what circumstances High Court can exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. No doubt, the petitioner has alleged that the authorities have not acted bona fide. However, whether the authorities acted bona fide or not, can be considered by the tribunal. It is not necessary for the High Court to go into that question when a duly appointed tribunal is there to consider that question. In the said judgment, the Supreme Court was not considering the question as to when there is efficacious alternative remedy available, even then High Court could interfere by exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. In the said judgment, the Supreme Court was not considering the question as to when there is efficacious alternative remedy available, even then High Court could interfere by exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has further relied on the ruling of the Supreme Court in the matter of (Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai)2, 1999(2) Bom.C.R.(S.C.)70 : A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 22. After considering the case law on the point the Apex Court has observed in paragraph 20: "Much water has since flown beneath the bridge, but there has been no corrosive effect on these decisions which, though old, continue to hold the field with the result that law as to the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, in spite of the alternative statutory remedies, is not affected, specially in a case where the authority against whom the writ is filed is shown to have had no jurisdiction or had purported to usurp jurisdiction without any legal foundation." 11. So, the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation, on going through the entire discussion, would be that High Court may use its discretion in a fit case to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution even if alternative remedy is available. The question whether the jurisdiction should be used or not is linked with the specific facts obtaining in each case. So, it cannot be said that in this ruling the Supreme Court has laid down that the High Court invariably should use its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, even if alternative remedy is available. Such an interpretation cannot be put to the observations made by the Apex Court in the above ruling. The facts of each case will have to be considered and if the circumstances are such that High Court has to use its jurisdiction under Article 226 even when an alternative remedy is available, the High Court can use that jurisdiction. 12. Such an interpretation cannot be put to the observations made by the Apex Court in the above ruling. The facts of each case will have to be considered and if the circumstances are such that High Court has to use its jurisdiction under Article 226 even when an alternative remedy is available, the High Court can use that jurisdiction. 12. The learned Government Pleader Shri Kanade has relied upon the ruling of the Supreme Court in the matter of (L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India)3, 1997(3) Bom.C.R. 449 : A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1125 and specifically to the observations in paragraph No. 93 which read as follows: "We may add that the tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned tribunal." 13. No doubt, in the matter of L. Chandra the Apex Court was considering the jurisdiction of the tribunals formed under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. But, those observations made with respect to those tribunals are equally applicable to other tribunals formed under different Acts either Central or State. These tribunals are the only courts of first instance in respect of the area of law for which they have been constituted. We have already pointed out that section 66 of the said Act lays down the jurisdiction of the University College Tribunal and, therefore, it is the first Court of Law for exercising jurisdiction regarding admission to college affiliated to the University. 14. Here it also has to be noted that the remedy is open to the parties against the decision given by the University or College tribunal by filing appropriate proceedings in the High Court. However, if such a writ petition is entertained by the High Court, by exercising powers under Article 226, then that remedy is lost and the parties will have to go before the Supreme Court against the decision given by the High Court. This practical difficulty before the parties also has to be taken into consideration while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. This practical difficulty before the parties also has to be taken into consideration while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, we hold that when the University and College tribunal for B.A.M.U., Aurangabad was actually functioning on the date on which this writ petition was filed, it should have been and ought to have been filed before that tribunal instead of in the High Court. 15. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that at present the tribunal is not functioning and, therefore, the petitioner cannot seek any relief from that tribunal. The factual position has arisen as the Member of that tribunal has retired w.e.f. 6th February, 1999. The learned Government Pleader Shri Kanade has made a statement that alternative arrangement is being made for hearing the matters before another University and College tribunal arising out of the tribunal which has functioning for B.A.M.U., Aurangabad. It is not that the tribunal is not there. Only thing is that the Presiding Officer of the tribunal at present is not there. The post is vacant but, the State Government is making arrangements for continuation of the work before that tribunal by placing charge with the other tribunal. Further more, this contingency has arisen long time after filing of this petition. On the date when the cause of action arose to the petitioner i.e. on 29-12-1998, the tribunal was working and she could have filed petition before that tribunal. 16. So, considering the facts obtaining in the present case, especially that this petitioner is challenging the admission given to the respondent No. 18 for the M.S. (Opthalmology) course of January, 1997 Batch and further seeking admission to herself for that course, the matter is within the provisions of section 66 of the said Act. So, the petition ought to have been filed before the tribunal. Now, instead of directing the petitioner to file separate petition before the tribunal, we direct that this petition stands transferred to the University and College tribunal for B.A.M.U., Aurangabad. The petitioner may approach that tribunal and may seek appropriate reliefs. The parties, therefore are directed to appear before the tribunal on 8th March, 1999. 17. The learned Counsel for the petitioner Shri Dhorde makes oral request that the interim relief which was granted by this Court on 5-1-1999 should continue at least for fifteen days. The petitioner may approach that tribunal and may seek appropriate reliefs. The parties, therefore are directed to appear before the tribunal on 8th March, 1999. 17. The learned Counsel for the petitioner Shri Dhorde makes oral request that the interim relief which was granted by this Court on 5-1-1999 should continue at least for fifteen days. However, we would like to make it clear that before passing this interim order, respondent No. 18 had already deposited his fees and had secured registration. The only thing remained is that he should not attend the classes of M.S. (Opthalmology) but, attending classes will not in any way create any right in the parties unless the admission itself is declared legal and valid, and therefore, we leave it to the discretion of the tribunal to consider the question of interim relief as prayed in the petition afresh on merits and, therefore, no continuation of ad interim relief is being granted as prayed by Shri Dhorde, learned Counsel for the petitioner. 18. In view of this position, the interim relief granted by this Court stands vacated. There is application for intervention filed by Dr. Hasan Galib s/o Inamul-Haq being Civil Application No. 755 of 1999. The same also stands transferred to the tribunal and the parties to the Civil Application are also directed to appear before the tribunal on 8th March, 1999. In view of the order passed in Writ Petition No. 12 of 99, vacating the interim relief, the Civil Application No. 756/99 stands disposed of.