JUDGMENT The order impugned is passed in Misc. Appeal No. 8/94 by the XVth Additional District Judge, Indore, vacating the order of temporary injunction passed on 10.12.93 by Civil Judge, Class-II, Depalpur in Civil suit No. 123-A/92, restraining the defendants-respondents from alienating the suit property, pending decision of the suit. The property in dispute is a house situated at village Kanadiya. The house originally belonged to late Navab Shah, the father of the appellant-plaintiff. Late Navab Shah had another son Smile Shah, who has also since died and is survived by his widow and three sons, the respondents here. The plaintiff claims title to the suit house on the basis of an unregistered will allegedly executed in his favour by late Navab Shah. The respondents-defendants have denied execution of said will and contended that Subhan Shah was separated by Navab Shah in his life time after giving him some other properties. The suit house, according to them, was given to their late father Smile Shah by Navab Shah in his life time. The plaintiff claimed temporary injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with his possession of the suit property and from alienating the property pending decision of the suit. In reply to this application the defendants maintained that they are the owners in possession of the suit property and proposed to sell away the same as the property is in danger of being damaged by some miscreants; The trial Court granted only limited injunction against alienation pendente lite. The appellate Court vacated the injunction on the premise that plaintiff is neither in possession of the property nor has any interest therein. As already pointed out the property originally belonged to Navab Shah and in absence of any bequest by him in favour of one party or the other the property would naturally devolve on plaintiff as also the defendants. It cannot be thus said that prima facie the plaintiff has no right or interest in the suit property. Atleast triable issues have arisen for decision of the Court and that in my opinion is sufficient to hold that the plaintiff has a prima facie case to be tried by the Court. It cannot be thus said that prima facie the plaintiff has no right or interest in the suit property. Atleast triable issues have arisen for decision of the Court and that in my opinion is sufficient to hold that the plaintiff has a prima facie case to be tried by the Court. Clause (a) of Rule I of Order XXXIX CPC clearly demonstrates, that notwithstanding the rule of lis pendens containsed in $ection 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, there can be occasion for grant of injunction restraining pendente transfers in a fit and proper case. In the instant case where triable issues have arisen for consideration of the Court the trial Court was fully justified in granting injunction to restrain alienation pendente lite. Grant of injunction is always discretionary with the trial Court. The mere fact that the appellate Court might have come to a different conclusion was not enough for interference with the exercise of discretion by the trial Court. It is well settled that appellate Court will not interfere and substitute its discretion in the matter unless it is satisfied that the trial Court had not exercised discretion judiciously. In the circumstances of the present case it cannot be said that the trial Court had not acted judiciously in granting injunction against transfer pendente lite particularly when the defendants clearly expressed their desire to make such a transfer. There was just no justification for the appellate Court below to vacate the injunction and the order passed by it, therefore, deserves to be set aside. In the result, this revision succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the appellate Court below is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored. There shall be, however, no order as to costs of this revision.