( 1 ) LEAVE granted. ( 2 ) WE have heard learned counsel for the respective contesting parties and with their consent this appeal is being disposed of finally. ( 3 ) SHORT facts leading to this appeal may be noted at the outset. Respondent 2s deceased husband was serving as Assistant Teacher in Junior high School, Khajuriahat under the control of the President, Zila Parishad, faizabad from 16-7-1949. He worked as such up to 14-11-1965 in that school. Thereafter he was transferred to a new school named Jawahar Lal nehru Memorial High School, Khajuriahat, Faizabad. That school admittedly was under the administrative control of the District Inspector of Schools and also under overall control of the Director of Education, State of Uttar pradesh. Therefore, obviously he remained an employee of the school which was ultimately monitored and controlled by the Director of Education, State of Uttar Pradesh. He retired in 1975 on health grounds and thereafter he expired. Before his death he filed Claim Petition No. 330/i of 1979 in U. P. Public Services Tribunal No. 1, Lucknow. Pending the proceedings, Ram sundar Lal died and Respondent 2 herein continued to pursue the said proceedings. Her claim was to get all retirement benefits available for the services rendered by her deceased husband in the schools concerned. In the said proceedings her deceased husband had joined Zila Parishad, Faizabad as respondent 1; Director Education, U. P. , Lucknow, as Respondent 2; Deputy dios, Faizabad, as Respondent 3; and BSA, through Basic Shiksha Parishad, faizabad, as Respondent 4, which is the appellant before us. The claim petition was allowed by the Tribunal and the following order was passed:"the claim petition filed by late Ram Sundar Lal on 19-6-1979 and later substituted by his wife Smt Raj Pati Devi is allowed. We declare that the services of the petitioners will be deemed to have been regularised and made permanent by the opposite parties and the petitioner will get all consequential pensionary benefits as per rules. The original petitioner is now dead and his wife Smt Raj Pati Devi who is substituted in his place may get the benefits as per the rules. The original petitioner is now dead and his wife Smt Raj Pati Devi who is substituted in his place may get the benefits as per the rules. " ( 4 ) IT is obvious that though this order says that all the opposite parties should give all consequential pensionary benefits to the petitioner, obviously the effect of the order is that the school which was responsible for regularising the services of the deceased shall be the school which will be responsible for paying to the petitioner all pensionary and other consequential benefits. Now it is found that despite this position original respondent 4, the appellant before us, was treated as one of the judgment- debtors and the execution proceedings were levied against the appellant in execution Case No. 34 of 1994. In those proceedings, movable properties of , the appellant were attached which resulted in a writ petition by the appellant before the High Court. The said writ petition was disposed of by a Division bench of the High Court by the impugned order dated 23-2-1998. It was observed by the High Court that the claim petition filed by the deceased husband of Respondent 2 was decreed in the year 1990 against the petitioner, the appellant herein, as well as others and that order had become final against the appellant. Consequently, the writ petition was belated and there was no ground to interfere in the execution proceedings levied against the appellant. ( 5 ) IN our view, the aforesaid decision of the High Court, with respect, proceeds on an apparent misconception. The reason is obvious. There is no dispute between the parties that under the Uttar Pradesh Basic Education Act, 1972 (for short "the Act"), the Basic Education Board was established and it is that Board which took over all the then existing employees of the Zila parishad schools under Section 9 of the Act who were in service of the schools concerned run by the Zila Parishad and who were continued as such on the eve of 25-7-1972. It is obvious that the deceased husband of respondent 2 on 25-7-1972 was not serving in any of the schools run by the zila Parishad. It is obvious that the deceased husband of respondent 2 on 25-7-1972 was not serving in any of the schools run by the zila Parishad. On the contrary, from 1965 to 1975 he was an employee of an entirely different school, that is, Jawahar Lal Nehru Memorial High School which was under the control and supervision of the District Inspector of schools and ultimately monitored by the Director of Education, U. P. Therefore, an employee of that school had no occasion to have any nexus with the Basic Education Board Schools. Thus, that Board was totally a stranger in these proceedings. Still, however, being joined as Respondent 4 before the Tribunal, the aforesaid order was passed by the Tribunal in general terms but in substance that order actually operated against the remaining respondents 2 and 3 before the Tribunal who were the real answerable parties as from their school the deceased husband of Respondent 2 had retired. To recapitulate, Respondent 2 before the Tribunal was the Director of education, U. P. , Lucknow. It was his prime responsibility to make good the award in the claim petition of the original petitioner before the Tribunal. Therefore, the execution proceedings against the appellant were totally misconceived. Unfortunately, that aspect was missed by the High Court in the impugned order. Only on this short ground this appeal is allowed and the execution proceedings against the appellant are quashed. ( 6 ) MR Pramod Swarup, learned counsel appearing for respondent State of u. P. submitted that from 1949 to November 1965 Respondent 2s deceased husband was serving in a Zila Parishad school and, therefore, the amount payable for that period should be borne by the appellant as the appellant had taken over all the Zila Parishad schools under the Act. Mr Swarup would have been justified in his submission but for the fact that Section 9 of the Act read with the relevant provisos, as already seen, will not be available to support this contention for the simple reason that from 1965 onwards the deceased employee had not remained an employee of the Zila Parishad school and on the cut-off date he was not in that school. This contention, therefore, cannot be accepted. This contention, therefore, cannot be accepted. ( 7 ) WE may mention at this stage that pending these proceedings by order dated 7-9-1998, this Court directed notice to be issued to the authorities concerned calling upon them to show cause as to why if the petitioner is made to pay the amount which is liable to be reimbursed, appropriate orders should not be passed in favour of the petitioner and against the authorities concerned. Thereafter, a further order was passed on 26-10-1998 as under:"impleadment application is allowed. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that according to him the amount, if at all payable by the petitioner, under the orders of the Tribunal to Respondent 2 claimant works up to Rs 67,000 for which a bank draft in favour of Respondent 2 is being handed over to learned counsel for Respondent 2. Learned counsel for Respondent 2 will accept the draft without prejudice to the rights and contentions of Respondent 2. For further directions, the matter is adjourned for two weeks. It is made clear that the above amount will be paid by the petitioner subject to his claim for reimbursement against the other respondents. On the next date of hearing in the cause-list, the name of Mr R. B. Misra, Standing Counsel for the State of U. P. , be shown so as to enable him to appear before this Court. " ( 8 ) IT is not in dispute between the parties that the appellant, pursuant to the said order has already paid Rs 67,600 by way of bank draft to Respondent 2. On this payment, her claim under the award of the Tribunal has remained fully satisfied. Now, therefore, the dispute remains about the claim of the appellant for reimbursement of the aforesaid amount by the respondents concerned. ( 9 ) AS discussed by us earlier, it was Respondent 2 before the Tribunal who should have met the aforesaid claim. ( 10 ) SO far as the appellant is concerned, though it is mentioned as respondent 4 in the award of the Tribunal, as seen earlier, it is clear that the appellant will not be responsible to meet the claim of Respondent 2. ( 10 ) SO far as the appellant is concerned, though it is mentioned as respondent 4 in the award of the Tribunal, as seen earlier, it is clear that the appellant will not be responsible to meet the claim of Respondent 2. Consequently, it has to be held that the amount of Rs 67,600 which the appellant paid to Respondent 2 before us for fully satisfying her claim under the award of the Tribunal was paid on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh, whose officers are original Respondents 2 and 3 before the Tribunal, and for discharging the liability of the judgment-debtors Director of Education, State of U. P. and the Deputy District Inspector of Schools. Consequently, the said amount has to be reimbursed to the appellant by the latter. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The appellants writ petition will stand allowed to the following extent:1. The appellant will not be held liable to make good the claim of respondent 2 before us as decreed by the Tribunal. 2. The amount of Rs 67,600 paid by the appellant pursuant to our order of 26-10-1998 shall be deemed to have been paid by the appellant on behalf of the Director of Education, U. P. and the Deputy District inspector of Schools, who were the real judgment-debtors to meet the claim of Respondent 2 and, therefore, in fairness and in equity the State of U. P. whose employees are the Director of Education and the Deputy district Inspector of Schools shall reimburse the entire amount of rs 67,600 to the appellant Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Faizabad within a period of eight weeks from today. ( 11 ) THE civil appeal and consequently the writ petition filed by the appellant before the High Court will stand allowed to the aforesaid extent, with no order as to costs. ( 12 ) IT is made clear that as these proceedings arise out of the execution proceedings the claim of original award-holder Respondent 2 stands fully satisfied on payment of the aforesaid amount which she has already received pursuant to our order dated 26-10-1998. The execution proceedings taken by her shall stand disposed of in terms of the present order.