JUDGMENT ASHOK BHAN, J. - Aggrieved against the common order passed by the single Judge in W.P. Nos. 15004-05 of 1998 (Reported as Calicut Trading Company v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [1999] 115 STC 46 (Kar).), these appeals have been filed which are being disposed of by a common order. 2. Appellant is an Export House in Mangalore. It is a registered dealer under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (for short, "the Act") and is borne on the file of the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Hampankatte, Mangalore. Appellant filed return of turnover on April 29, 1990 for the assessment year 1989-90 before the assessing authority under section 12(1) of the Act. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, transferred the assessment for the year 1989-90 from the regular assessing authority to the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Intelligence), Mysore. Appellant questioned the legality of this transfer order by filing W.P. Nos. 1946 to 1951 of 1990. At the hearing of the said petitions, the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes withdrew the transfer order dated May 10, 1990 with the result the High Court did not go into the various questions raised. Liberty was reserved with the authority to pass fresh order as may be permissible to it under the law. Subsequently Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Karnataka) vide order dated October 23, 1991 directed the Intelligence Wing Officer, Mangalore, for framing the assessment for the year 1989-90. The officer to whom the case was transferred framed the assessment on February 25, 1995. Separate order of penalty of the same date was also passed. 3. Order of assessment was served on the appellant on March 1, 1995. The time-limit for filing the appeal is 30 days but the appeal was filed on August 25, 1995 with a medical certificate for condonation of delay which was dismissed by the first appellate authority being barred by time. Second appeal was also dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal on October 10, 1995. The appellant filed revision petitions in this Court which were also dismissed by the division Bench on September 15, 1997. The contention that there was sufficient cause for delay was not accepted. Second appeal was also dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal on October 10, 1995. The appellant filed revision petitions in this Court which were also dismissed by the division Bench on September 15, 1997. The contention that there was sufficient cause for delay was not accepted. Thereafter the petitioner filed two writ petitions, one challenging the order framing the assessment, the other the order of penalty, in this Court contending that there was no merger of the order of the assessing authority with the orders passed by the first appellate authority, the Tribunal or the High Court as these courts did not examine the dispute on merits and the appeal and the revision were dismissed as barred by limitation. That the orders passed by the assessing authority were without jurisdiction and therefore the writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India was maintainable. It was averred that the Commercial Tax Officer had acted as prosecutor as well as Judge in framing the assessment. Earlier the file was transferred but the transfer orders were withdrawn when W.P. No. 19519 of 1991 was filed but subsequently on October 23, 1991, the power was conferred on a similar officer to make the assessment at the place of the business of the assessee. The assessment was to be completed within a period of three years otherwise there is deemed assessment under section 12(7) and reassessment could not have been done by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes as he was not the assessing authority. The word "assessment" would not include "reassessment", that the assessing authority has used certain record which had been seized from the assessee without affording due opportunity to the appellant which amounted to violation of principle of natural justice and reasonable opportunity to the appellant. 4. Learned single Judge dismissed the writ petitions holding that the appellant having availed of the remedy of filing the appeal/revision before the authorities provided under the statute and having failed, could not turn around and challenge the original order of assessment by filing a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India. On merits as well the single Judge held that there was no substance in the pleas raised by the appellant. 5. Pleas raised before us are the same which were raised before the single Judge. On merits as well the single Judge held that there was no substance in the pleas raised by the appellant. 5. Pleas raised before us are the same which were raised before the single Judge. Counsel for the appellant at the first instance argued that the Assessing authority passed the order in violation of principles of natural justice and therefore liable to be quashed by the court in exercise of the jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution. That the dismissal of the appeals and revisions filed by the appellant would not be a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under article 226. It was also contended that the availability of alternate remedy does not debar the High Courts to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari. 6. The foremost question which has to be considered is whether the appellant can be permitted to avail of the remedy under article 226 of the Constitution of India to assail the assessment order after having unsuccessfully availed of the remedy of filing the appeal before the first appellate authority, second appeal before the Tribunal and the revision before the High Court. Karnataka Sales Tax Act provides the statutory remedy of filing the appeal within 30 days from the date of service of assessment order. If there is sufficient cause for delay the appellate authority had the jurisdiction to condone the same. If the delay is not condoned then against such an order an appeal lies to the Appellate Tribunal which may also examine the matter whether there are sufficient grounds for condonation of delay. Even the remedy of revision can be availed before the High Court. After availing all these remedies the contention which is now raised is that there is no merger of the order of assessment with the order of the appellate/revisional authorities and therefore remedy under article 226 of the Constitution can be availed of. 7. It is well-settled proposition of law that when an alternative efficacious remedy is available to a litigant, then he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. 7. It is well-settled proposition of law that when an alternative efficacious remedy is available to a litigant, then he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. It is also true that the existence of alternate remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ but the existence of an alternate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs. To direct the litigant to avail the alternate remedy available to him and refusing to issue a writ would be sound exercise of discretion unless there are good grounds to interfere with the orders without availing the alternate remedy. The rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ is granted is a rule of prudence, convenience, policy and discretion rather than a rule of law. Per se the existence of other legal remedies is not a bar to issue a writ of certiorari. There are numerous instances where the courts have issued writ of certiorari in spite of availability of adequate alternate legal remedies. 8. On the examination of the case law we find that the courts have exercised their extraordinary jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution in spite of the availability of the alternate remedy in cases where either the vires of the statute are challenged or the order has been passed by an authority lacking the inherent jurisdiction to do so. In certain cases the High Courts have exercised the special jurisdiction to quash the orders which were passed in violation of principles of natural justice but that does not necessarily mean that the High Court has to exercise its special jurisdiction wherever the principles of natural justice have been violated. That would depend upon the facts of each particular case. Facts of individual cases would govern the proper exercise of the discretion of the court. No inflexible rules are laid down or applied with rigidity in every case. In the taxing statutes normally we find that a complete machinery to challenge the order of assessment is provided and the impugned orders of assessment could only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the taxing statutes normally we find that a complete machinery to challenge the order of assessment is provided and the impugned orders of assessment could only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India. Appellant availed of the remedy of filing the appeal which was dismissed being barred by time. Supreme Court of India in A. V. Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani AIR 1961 SC 1506 held where a petitioner is disabled from availing himself of the statutory alternate remedy by his own fault by not filing the appeal within the prescribed time then he certainly cannot be permitted to urge that as a ground for the court dealing with his petition to exercise its discretion in his favour. It was observed as follows : "The question that we have now to consider is has the discretion which undoubtedly vested in the court been so improperly exercised as to call for our interference with that order. We might premise this discussion by expressing our opinion on two matters merely to prevent any misunderstanding. First we entirely agree with Chagla, C.J. that the order of the Assistant Collector of Customs in assessing duty at 78% per cent or of the Collector of Customs in continuing the same, was not void for lack of jurisdiction. The interpretation they put on the relevant items in the tariff schedule might be erroneous, even grossly erroneous, but this error was one committed in the exercise of their jurisdiction and had not the effect of placing the resulting order beyond their jurisdiction. Secondly, as we have already indicated, we must express our dissent from the reasoning by which the learned Judges of the High Court held that the writ petitioner was absolved from the normal obligation to exhaust his statutory remedies before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution. If a petitioner has disabled himself from availing himself of the statutory remedy by his own fault in not doing so within the prescribed time, he cannot certainly be permitted to urge that as a ground for the court dealing with his petition under article 226 to exercise its discretion in his favour." 9. The case of the appellant is at a lower footing than the one which was before the Supreme Court. The case of the appellant is at a lower footing than the one which was before the Supreme Court. In the present case the appellant filed the appeal with an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The delay was not condoned and his appeal was dismissed as barred by time. He was unsuccessful in his effort to get the delay condoned up to the High Court. Now he cannot be allowed to turn around and challenge the original order of assessment under article 226 of the Constitution of India because it would amount to denying entry to the precincts of the High Court by one door and permitting the same from the other. To test the proposition let us examine the same from another angle. If the assessee is unsuccessful in reference before the High Court or up to the Supreme Court of India can he still be permitted to challenge the original order of assessment on the ground that the order passed by the assessing authority was without jurisdiction ? Our answer to this is in the negative. The assessee who has availed of the remedies provided under the Act including the question of jurisdiction of the assessing authority to pass the order cannot permitted to challenge the original order of assessment under article 226 of the Constitution of India. The appellant was disabled from getting the appeal/revision decided on merits because of his own fault as he did not file the appeal within time. After exhausting the remedies provided under the Act to challenge the order of assessment, the appellant cannot be permitted to avail the remedy under article 226 of the Constitution of India to assail the original order of assessment which had attained finality under the Act. Contention that the order of assessing authority did not merge with the orders passed in appeals or revisions cannot be accepted. Reliance placed on certain judgments in which it was held that the orders passed in revisions under section 115, C.P.C at the interlocutory stage would not debar the aggrieved party to raise that point in appeal on the ground that there was no merger of the orders, would be of no avail to the appellant in the present case. Reliance placed on certain judgments in which it was held that the orders passed in revisions under section 115, C.P.C at the interlocutory stage would not debar the aggrieved party to raise that point in appeal on the ground that there was no merger of the orders, would be of no avail to the appellant in the present case. It cannot be said that the order of assessment did not merge with the orders passed by the appellate authority or that of the High Court in revision. Once the order is passed after hearing the parties, then the original order merges with the order made in appeal and any revision and thereafter the appellant cannot be permitted to challenge or attack the original order by another set of proceedings in High Court under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. In such a case the courts would be well advised not to exercise their extraordinary jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution as it would result in anomalous situation. In a case where an aggrieved party filed the appeal within time or belatedly then during the pendency of the said appeal the writ petition will not be entertained due to the pendency of the appeal. Similarly during the pendency of the second appeal before the Tribunal or the revision/reference before the High Court the writ petition would not be entertained. Thus from the due date of the filing of the appeal till the dismissal or revision/reference by the High Court, writ could not have been entertained. If a further appeal is taken to the Supreme Court writ could not have been entertained. But after the dismissal of the appeal/reference by the High Court or the Supreme Court writ could be entertained on the plea that the order passed was without jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction can also be decided by the appellate authority as well as by the reference court, if such a point is raised successfully before the authorities within the prescribed time or on condonation of delay if the appeal is filed beyond the prescribed time. Having remained unsuccessful up to the High Court in revision, the appellant could not be permitted to file the writ petition to challenge the original order of assessment on the question of jurisdiction. 10. Having remained unsuccessful up to the High Court in revision, the appellant could not be permitted to file the writ petition to challenge the original order of assessment on the question of jurisdiction. 10. We affirm the finding of the learned single Judge and hold that in such a case a petition under article 226/227 of the Constitution of India would not be maintainable. 11. On merits as well we affirm the finding of the learned single Judge. Time for retaining the seized documents is stated to have been extended by the respondent and communicated to the appellant from time to time. Documents which were seized from the possession of the appellant could be relied upon and it is for him to explain the transactions referred to by him. In pursuance to the notice Mr. Arvind Mulji, produced the books of accounts as well as whatever inferences could have been drawn from the seized record and the books of account. Appellant initially prayed for time to file the objections on January 10, 1995 and thereafter through Mr. Vasan Associates, and filed its return and sought time till February 20, 1995. Proper opportunity was thus afforded to the appellant to file the objections and the return. Appellant never asked for the copies of the seized documents. He was not required to produce the records which were seized from him. Appellant if desired could have asked for the photostat copies of the seized documents or make copies of the original documents through inspection. No such opportunity had been asked for. It could not be said that the principles of natural justice had been violated in this case. Moreover all these facts could have been gone into by the appellate/revisional authority and this Court in exercise of article 226 of the Constitution is not required to go into all these questions specially when the appellant was unsuccessful in challenging the original order of assessment on disputed questions because of his own fault. 12. We further do not agree that the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes erred in exercise of jurisdiction in placing the matter before another assessing authority. It is not disputed before us that the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes had the jurisdiction to transfer the case from one assessing authority to another. 12. We further do not agree that the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes erred in exercise of jurisdiction in placing the matter before another assessing authority. It is not disputed before us that the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes had the jurisdiction to transfer the case from one assessing authority to another. Even if it is taken for the sake of argument that the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes exercised his jurisdiction in transferring the assessee's case from one jurisdiction to another erroneously even then this error was one committed in exercise of jurisdiction and would not affect place the resulting order beyond his jurisdiction. We may state that erroneous or even grossly erroneous exercise of jurisdiction does not have the effect of placing the resulting order beyond the jurisdiction of the concerned authority. Such error can only be got corrected by filing appeals/revisions before the appellate or the revisional authority. Erroneous exercise of jurisdiction would not put the order in the category of inherent lack of jurisdiction necessitating the interference by the High Courts in exercise of their jurisdiction under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 13. For the reasons stated above we do not find any merit in these appeals and dismiss the same with no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.