Honble SHARMA, J.–Civil suit instituted by the plaintiff appellant seeking partition and possession of the property in question was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge Alwar on November 11, 1974. Against this decree and judgment that the present action for filing the appeal has been resorted to by the plaintiff. The parties shall be referred hereinafter in the same manner as they were arrayed in the suit. (2). The plaintiff is the nephew of the defendant and Buddhi Lal was their common ancestor. In the first inning of the litigation the plaintiff had filed two suits in 1942, one for recovery of the sum which remained outstanding against the defendant and another for possession of the immovable properties under the terms of the arbitration award dated May 12, 1941. The District Judge Alwar vide its judgment and decree dated May 25, 1955 decreed the suit for recovery of Rs. 5200/-but dismissed the second suit. The regular first appeal preferred by the plaintiff dismissed by the High Court on December 12, 1960. The Division Bench also dismissed the special appeal of the plaintiff on April 27, 1965. Thereafter in the second inning of the litigation the plaintiff instituted the present suit claiming his right on the basis of his title. The plaintiff also claimed the benefit of section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act on the ground that he had been prosecuting his claim with all sincerity and reasonableness in the court of District Judge and the High Court from 1942 to 1965. The defendant submitted written statement and as many as 12 issues were framed by the trial court which have been incorporated in the impugned judgment. (3). Learned trial court decided issues No. 5 and 8 against the plaintiff which led to the dismissal of the suit. It was held that decision of the District Judge Alwar in the original suit and the decision of the High Court in appeal operated as res judicata against the plaintiff and the plaintiff was not entitled to bring a fresh suit on the basis of his title. Issues No. 1,2,3,4,6,7,9,10 and 11 were however decided in favour of the plaintiff. (4). The defendant filed an application before this court praying that he may be permitted to argue all those points which have been decided against him by the trial court. Issues No. 1,2,3,4,6,7,9,10 and 11 were however decided in favour of the plaintiff. (4). The defendant filed an application before this court praying that he may be permitted to argue all those points which have been decided against him by the trial court. This court vide order dated July 21, 1975 allowed the application observing that the defendant has a right to do so and he can argue all those points. (5). I have heard the rival submissions and carefully scanned the material on record as well as the written arguments placed before me on behalf of the plaintiff. (6). The decision of issue No. 7 that relates to applicability of section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act to the suit, goes into the root of the matter therefore I shall discuss this issue first. (7). The learned trial court decided issue No. 7 in favour of the plaintiff with the following observations: ``The court has to decide whether the plaintiff has satisfied all these requirements. The earlier suit was based on the basis of award. It was most reasonable on the part of the plaintiff to file the suit on the basis of the award. When he filed the suit he acted as a reasonable man of ordinary prudence. It cannot be said that the suit which was pending in the court of District Judge was not prosecuted by him with due care and attention. The suit was dismissed on the ground that the award on which it was based was unregistered and thus inadmissible in evidence. One cannot doubt the bonafides of the plaintiff so far as the prosecution of the suit is concerned. The question arises whether the dismissal of the suit on the ground of the award being unregistered is to be covered by the definition of the words ``other cause of like nature. The consensus of judicial opinion is to the effect that these words ``other cause of like nature must be liberally interpreted. When I put this liberal interpretation upon these words I come to the conclusion that the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed as a result of something which could be covered by the definition of the words ``other cause of like nature. (8). It is necessary at this juncture to take stock of the provisions contained in section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. It provides thus: ``14. (8). It is necessary at this juncture to take stock of the provisions contained in section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. It provides thus: ``14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction. (1) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in court of first instance or in a court of appeal, against the defendant, shall be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or in a court of appeal against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (9). It is not in dispute that the plaintiff had filed a suit on the basis of the award on July 25, 1942 in the court of District Judge Alwar. The suit was decided on May 26, 1955. The plaintiff went in appeal which came to an end on December 12, 1950. The plaintiff again went in special appeal which was dismissed in default on April 27, 1965. The plaintiff in the instant case has prayed for the exclusion of the period which he spent in prosecution of the suit and the two appeals from July 25, 1942 to April 27, 1965. Before the plaintiff can be held entitled to the benefits of section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (in short the Act), he has to satisfy the three things. First, that he has been prosecuting the civil suit with due care and attention. Second, the proceedings were not lacking in good faith. Third, that the proceedings proved infructuous on the ground of jurisdiction or some other cause of like nature. (10). First, that he has been prosecuting the civil suit with due care and attention. Second, the proceedings were not lacking in good faith. Third, that the proceedings proved infructuous on the ground of jurisdiction or some other cause of like nature. (10). As already stated the plaintiff earlier instituted two suits, one for recovery of the sum which remained outstanding against the defendant and another for the possession of the immovable properties in terms of the arbitration award dated May 12, 1941. In the second inning of litigation the plaintiff claimed his right in the suit property on the basis of his title. The plaintiff could have claimed this right on the basis of title even in the earlier suit which he did not choose to do so. Order 2 Rule 2 provides thus: ``2. Suit to include the whole claim.-(1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any court. (2) Relinquishment of part of claim.-Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. In the instant case the plaintiff in the earlier suit omitted to sue in respect of his claim based on the title of the property. It can therefore safely be held that the plaintiff was not prosecuting the previous proceedings bonafide, but on the other hand he deliberately omitted to claim the relief based on title and waited for the decision of the suit and appeal for a period of 23 years. Under these circumstances I am unable to agree with the finding of the learned court below. It is not a case where the plaintiff prosecuted the earlier proceedings bonafidely. (11). Under these circumstances I am unable to agree with the finding of the learned court below. It is not a case where the plaintiff prosecuted the earlier proceedings bonafidely. (11). In Rabindra Nath Samuel Dewson vs. Sivakami and others (1), it was indicated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that ``section 14 of the Limitation Act gives benefit to a party who has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding whether in a court of first instance or in a court of first appeal against the defendant, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which from the defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature is unable to entertain it. (12). Under Order 41 Rule 22 CPC, the defendant respondent may also state that the finding against him in the court below in respect of issue No. 7ought to have been in his favour and this court allowed the application of the defendant respondent purportedly to have been made under Order 41 Rule 22 CPC in 1975. (13). Thus conclusion of issue No. 7 arrived at by the learned counsel below is erroneous and finding of issue No. 7 is set aside and issue No. 7 is decided in favour of the defendant respondent. I hold that the benefit of provisions contained in section 14 of the Limitation Act was not available to the plaintiff in the facts and circumstances of this case and the suit instituted by the plaintiff was barred by limitation. (14). It is therefore not necessary for me to discuss other issues, as the decision on issue No. 7 goes in the root of the matter. (15). Resultantly, I do not find any merit in the appeal. It is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.