Order.- These are two Revision Petitions, one is directed against the order in M.P. No. 87 of 1966, dated 6th August, 1966, passed by the Sessions Judge, Karimnagar, whereby he directed that the summonses of the defence witnesses may be handed over for service to the representative of the accused on his responsibility. The other is against the charge under section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code, framed by the learned Sessions Judge instead of the charge under section 323 Indian Penal Code for which the accused was committed. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Shanker Pershad Dubey calls in question the legality and propriety of both the orders on the ground that the Sessions Judge had no power to drop the charge framed by the committing Magistrate and frame a fresh charge against the accused immediately after commitment, and that when the accused was entitled to seek the assistance of the Court for calling his witnesses, he could not be denied the process of the Court on the basis that the list of witnesses was not filed earlier; specially so when he had to meet a charge on a fresh count for which he could not name the witnesses earlier. Before 1 proceed to consider the merits in these contentions, I should notice the facts which are in a narrow compass. One Lachi, aged 8, the daughter of the deceased Yennupu Reddi Venkayya took her cattle for grazing to one of the fields in the village. Some of the cattle strayed into the field of the first accused and damaged his crop. A-1 who was present in the field, rebuked the girl and beat her. The girl went and complained to her father, the deceased, who was also grazing cattle in a field nearby. Some time thereafter, at about 11-00 a.m. the deceased along with his daughter, Lachi, went to the house of the first accused who was taking his food inside. His brother, A.-2 was found outside. He sounded him first, and exchange of words followed. Then the quarrel started between the two. A-2 gave a slap to the deceased. Thereupon the deceased tried to pull out a stick from the ‘dadi’ that was there. A-2. at once caught hold of him. His brother, A.-2 was found outside. He sounded him first, and exchange of words followed. Then the quarrel started between the two. A-2 gave a slap to the deceased. Thereupon the deceased tried to pull out a stick from the ‘dadi’ that was there. A-2. at once caught hold of him. Meanwhile A-1 came out Then A-2held fast the deceased and A-1 pulled a meddi koyya from the same ‘dadi’ and aimed it on his head. The deceased at once fell unconscious. He was removed to the Police Station and then to the hospital at Mahadevapur. His condition was serious. He was advisedly removed to the Hanamkonda Hospital. Before he could reach the hospital he breathed his last in the course of journey. The police after investigation filed P.R.C.No. 1 of 1966 before the Munsif-Magistrate, Manthani. Three witnesses were examined including the daughter of the deceased. The learned Munsif-Magistrate committed both the accused to the Sessions Court. He framed a charge against A-1 under section 302, Indian Penal Code for he was of the view that section 34, Indian Penal Code, may not be attracted by the facts and circumstances of the case. On 1st August, 1966, when the matter came up before the Sessions Judge for trial, the accused prayed for a short adjournment. That was allowed one 4th August, 1966. The learned Sessions Judge after going through the evidence already recorded by the Magistrate came to the conclusion that the charge is framed was erroneous, for A-2 should have been charged under section 302 readwith section 34, Indian Penal Code, Accordingly, he framed the. charge and read it out to the accused. Then the trial was started on that very day Altogether 10 witnesses were examined on that and the following day. On 5th August, 1966, in all three petitions were filed on behalf of the accused. In one his applications purporting to be made under section 229 Criminal Procedure Code, A-2 requested the Court that in view of the altered charge, he may be given sufficient opportunity to meet the same. We are not however concerned with this application as no revision is filed against the order passed thereon. Of the two other applications which were respectively filed under section 211(2) and section 540, Criminal Procedure Code, we are concerned only with the first mentioned petition which is M.P. No. 87 of 1966. We are not however concerned with this application as no revision is filed against the order passed thereon. Of the two other applications which were respectively filed under section 211(2) and section 540, Criminal Procedure Code, we are concerned only with the first mentioned petition which is M.P. No. 87 of 1966. The learned Sessions Judge found that section 207 (9) must be the appropriate section under which the application should be deemed to have been filed. He then held that the accused ought to have filed his list of witnesses long ago either in the Court of the committing Magistrate or at any time before the trial had started. He said that the accused were committed six months back and an application was filed for the first time on 5th August, 1966, and that in those circumstances, if at all, any opportunity has to be given to him after such lapse of time it is only at the risk and responsibility of the accused. He directed therefore that the summons of the defence witnesses may be handed over to the accused or the lawyer and the case may be posted two days thereafter on 8th August, 1966. It is this order that the accused make grievance of on the ground that neither the time allowed is sufficient nor the assistance of the Court for enforcing the attendance of the defence witnesses could be thus denied to them. Criminal Revision case No. 785 of 1966 has been filed in this behalf. It the other Revision Petition (Crl. R.C.No. 478 of 1966) A-2 contends that when the committing Magistrate had framed a charge for an offence under section 323 only, the Sessions Judge could not have dropped that charge and framed a fresh charge for an offence under section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code. It is contended that the Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction at all to do so for that is tantamount to indirectly quashing the order of commitment on a particular charge which was exclusively within the competence of the High Court under section 215, Criminal Procedure Code. So far as Criminal Revision Case No. 785 of 1966 is concerned, Mr. Chinnappa Reddi, the learned Public Prosecutor has fairly conceded that the accused ought to have been given full opportunity and assistance of the Court for calling the witnesses for the defence. So far as Criminal Revision Case No. 785 of 1966 is concerned, Mr. Chinnappa Reddi, the learned Public Prosecutor has fairly conceded that the accused ought to have been given full opportunity and assistance of the Court for calling the witnesses for the defence. This was all the more necessary as a new charge had been framed. Then as regards the relevant section under which the order ought to have been made he says it is only section 231, Criminal Procedure Code, and not section 207(9) or section 211(2), Criminal Procedure Code. I agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the accused that the learned Sessions Judge ought to have made available to the accused the due assistance of the Court in enforcing attendance of their witnesses and should not have handed over the summonses to them on their responsibility. The impugned order passed in M.P. No. 87 of 1966 is therefore liable to be set aside, and is hereby set aside. The trial Court is accordingly directed to make the process of the Court available to the accused in calling defence witnesses or enforcing their attendance. Crl.R.C.No. 785 of 1966 is thus allowed. As regards the other case, i.e., Cr.R.C. 478 of 1966, I am clearly of the view that there is no substance in the argument advanced. The contention of the learned Counsel, Mr. Shanker Pershad Dubey is that the Sessions Court has no power to frame a fresh charge which is tantamount to dropping the charge on which committal was ordered. In support of this contention, he relies on the provisions of sections 226, 227, 271 and 215, Criminal Procedure Code, and also the decisions of the Gujarat High Court in Kantilal v. Prabodhchandra1, and Allahabad High Court in Rex v. Alimuddin and others2, and in Kishan Swamp v. Brijendra Singh3. His argument in this regard is two fold. In support of this contention, he relies on the provisions of sections 226, 227, 271 and 215, Criminal Procedure Code, and also the decisions of the Gujarat High Court in Kantilal v. Prabodhchandra1, and Allahabad High Court in Rex v. Alimuddin and others2, and in Kishan Swamp v. Brijendra Singh3. His argument in this regard is two fold. His first contention is that though section 226 permits the Sessions Court to frame a charge when no charge is framed by the committing Court, it is not however open to the Sessions Court under that section to frame one in substitution or amendment of the one that has been already framed by the committing Court for in that case it will be tantamount to dropping the charge framed by the committing Court and thus quashing the committal on that charge which is exclusively within the power of the High Court. Learned Counsel contends that so far as the power of amendment or substitution or alteration of charge is concerned if at all there is any such power conferred by section 226, it can be exercised only under section 227, Criminal Procedure Code, and that is possible only on the evidence recorded in the Sessions Court and not in the committing Court. This he urges because according to him the Sessions Court cannot start the trial without reading out the charge framed by the committing Court to the accused. He further contends that as the learned Sessions Judge did not read out the said charge before he recorded evidence the proceedings are vitiated. In support of this contention, he relies on the observations of a single Judge of the Gujrat High Court in Kantilal v. Prabodhchandra1. It is difficult to agree with the contentions of the learned Counsel. Section 226 and section 227 deal with different stages, the combined effect of both being that the Court is invested with comprehensive powers to remedy the defects in framing and non-framing the charge whether discovered at the inception of the trial or at any subsequent stage prior to judgment or verdict of jury. Section 226 deals with cases where no charge has been framed, or if framed it is imperfect or erroneous. Section 226 deals with cases where no charge has been framed, or if framed it is imperfect or erroneous. It can then frame charge or amend or alter charge on the basis of the material already on record, if it be assumed that the trial can only start with the reading out the charge framed by the committing Court, compliance with this condition is not possible in cases where no charge is framed. Section 226 does contemplate cases where no charge is framed. In that event the Sessions Court has to necessarily frame the charge and read out the same. Section 226 contemplates also committal with imperfect and erroneous charges. In that case, the Sessions Court has to go through the evidence as adduced in the committal Court and come to the conclusion whether the charge framed is perfect and not erroneous. If it is not perfect in form or otherwise erroneous, it is open to the Court to alter, add to or substitute the charge having regard to the material on record and scope of indictment and read out and explain the said charge to the accused. That is also what has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in In re Shankarappa and others2, Basi Reddy, J. observed thus: “In a sessions case, before the commencement of a trial, a Sessions Judge should scrutinize the preliminary register and the charge framed by the committing Magistrate and satisfy himself whether additions or alterations should be made to the charge, as contemplated by section 226 and then call upon the accused to plead to the charge under section 271, Criminal Procedure Code.” It is significant to note that section 271 in terms does not refer to the charge as framed by the committal Court, when the charge referred to therein is not thus circumscribed the charge as framed, amended or altered by the Sessions Court at the inception is well within the meaning of that provision and the trial can be duly commenced by reading out and explaining such charge. Then the next contention is that the charge as framed amounts to and implies dropping the charge for which the committal was made. It cannot be disputed that charge framed under section 302, Indian Penal Code read with section 34 does include the charge under section 323, Indian Penal Code for it is a lesser offence. Then the next contention is that the charge as framed amounts to and implies dropping the charge for which the committal was made. It cannot be disputed that charge framed under section 302, Indian Penal Code read with section 34 does include the charge under section 323, Indian Penal Code for it is a lesser offence. It is obvious that if such a charge (i.e.), a charge under section 323, Indian Penal Code is not specifically or separately framed a conviction thereunder can still be ordered if the Court comes to the conclusion that the said offence alone is established. That is because such a charge is necessarily implied in the charge framed. There is no scope for argument, therefore, that by framing a charge under section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code, the charge under section 323, has been virtually or by necessary implication dropped. The rulings of the Allahabad High Court which are to the effect that the order of commitment on a charge cannot be quashed by a Sessions Court directly or indirectly can have no application to the facts of the instant case. Perhaps, there could have been some scope for argument if the commitment was for an offence under section 302, Indian Penal Code and that charge had been substituted by section 323, Indian Penal Code. There, it could have been stated that section 302, Indian Penal Code being a larger offence and not covered by section 323 must be deemed to have been dropped. Mr. Chinnappa Reddi, the learned Public Prosecutor has referred me to a case of the Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Bhagwandas1, which is in all fours with the present case. The facts of the case are that A and B, the two accused were committed to the High Court on a charge under sections 323 and 109, Penal Code for voluntarily causing hurt to C and aiding and abetting each other. The Clerk of the Crown, under section 226, Criminal Procedure Code altered the charge into one under sections 302 and 109, Penal Code. It was held that the alteration of the charge was within the powers conferred under section 226, Criminal Procedure Code. The Clerk of the Crown, under section 226, Criminal Procedure Code altered the charge into one under sections 302 and 109, Penal Code. It was held that the alteration of the charge was within the powers conferred under section 226, Criminal Procedure Code. Hassenullah Sheik v. Emperor2, is another case cited before me wherein the accused were committed for the murder of one Moulavi Mahajazal Huq and for hurt caused to one Kaimullah by one of the accused. The Sessions Judge added a charge for the murder of Kaimullah and it was held that he had power to do so. Thus it is clear that under section 226, Criminal Procedure Code the Court has got wide powers not only to frame a charge when there was none framed by the committal Court, but also to amend or alter the charge framed by that Court if it is defective in form or erroneous. Of course, the only limitation is that the Sessions Judge cannot act in a way, whether directly or indirectly, to bypass the provisions of section 215, Criminal Procedure Code, which is wholly within the competence of the High Court. I am clearly of the view that the Sessions Judge has done nothing of the kind in the present case. The revision, therefore, fails and is dismissed. G.S.M. ----- Crl.R.C. 785 of 1966 allowed. Crl.R.C.478 of 1966 dismissed.