Vandana Meena v. State of Rajasthan — 1999 DIGILAW 1537 (RAJ)

Honble KOKJE, J.–The appellant Smt. Vandana was elected to the Zila Parishad, Udaipur in the month of January `95. She was elected Zila Pramukh of the Zila Parishad, Udaipur on 20th January `95. A No Confidence Motion against her was initiated on 2nd February `99. The meeting of the members of the Zila Parishad, Udaipur was requisitioned to be held on 23rd February `99 in the Office of Zila Pari-shad, Udaipur to consider the Motion. After holding the meeting,the Collector, Udaipur, who was presiding over the meting declared that the Motion of No Confidence was carried. Thereafter Smt. Sajjan Katara was alleged to have been nominated as Zila Pramukh on 27.2.99. (2). The appellant-petitioner challenged the proceedings of the meeting in which the No Confidence Motion was declared to be carried out, as also the nomination of Smt. Sajjan Katara, by filing a petition in this Court. Several grounds were raised in the petition including the question of fairness and validity of the procedure adopted at the meeting by the Presiding Officer, as also the alleged nomination of Smt. Sajjan Katara as the Chair Person. (3). The learned Single Judge dismissed the petition on the ground that the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner had misled the Court by making false statements. Certain observations in the nature of strictures were passed against the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and cost of Rs. 10,000/-was imposed on the petitioner and it was directed that the cost shall be deposited with the Regis-trar General of the Court and it shall be used for legal aid purposes by the Registrar General. Against this order of dismissal, the appellant, the original petitioner, has filed this appeal. (4). It is alleged by the appellant, besides challenging the order on merits, that the counsel for the appellant did not make any misstatement before the learned Single Judge. He only stated the position of law, which according to him, was correct. It is further averred that the counsel for the appellant still held the view that the State Government was not competent to nominate any member of the Zila Parishad on the post of Zila Pramukh in the event of vacancy in the post of Chairperson. He only stated the position of law, which according to him, was correct. It is further averred that the counsel for the appellant still held the view that the State Government was not competent to nominate any member of the Zila Parishad on the post of Zila Pramukh in the event of vacancy in the post of Chairperson. According to the learned counsel, the view held by the learned coun-sel which he put before the learned Single Judge, may or may not be correct but that cannot be the ground for inferring that the counsel misled the Court and the petition could not have been dismissed on that ground. (5). The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the petition had no force on merits and even assuming that the learned Single Judge should have decided it on merits and not on the alleged misdemeanor of the learned counsel for the appellant, the appeal does not deserve to be allowed because on merits the appellant had no case. (6). We have heard the learned counsel and perused the record. (7). In order to avoid misquoting of the record, and in all fairness to the learned Single Judge, and the learned counsel for the parties, it would be necessary to reproduce the impugned order in toto and to quote from the memo of appeal in extenso. The impugned order reads as under: ``S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 707/99. 17.3.99 Honble MR. JUSTICE B.J. SHETHANA. Mr. K.L. Jasmatia, for Petitioner Mr. M.S. Singhvi, for Respondent No.4 Mr. Vijay Bishnoi, for Panchayat Deptt. The petitioner who is the Ex-Chairperson of Zila Parishad, Udaipur, respondent No.3 has filed this petition and challenged the meeting held on 23.2.99 to debate the motion of no confidence and the no confidence motion passed against her and it is also prayed that the nomination of Smt. Sajjan Katara, respondent No.4 on the post of Zila Pramukh of Zila Parishad, Udaipur in her place made on 27.2.99 be declared illegal. When this petition had come up for hearing of admission before me on 9.3.99 I was not much impressed by other arguments advanced by learned counsel Shri Jasmatia for the petitio-ner. However, only one argument, which was emphathetically argued by learned counsel Shri Jasmatia appealed to me. It was submitted by learned counsel Shri Jasmatia that the post of Zila Pramukh cannot be filled up by nomination. However, only one argument, which was emphathetically argued by learned counsel Shri Jasmatia appealed to me. It was submitted by learned counsel Shri Jasmatia that the post of Zila Pramukh cannot be filled up by nomination. It can be filled up only by election. In para No.15 of the petition as well as ground (V), this specific contention was raised. Repeatedly, Mr. Jasmatia was asked to be sure about this and Mr. Jasmatia asserted that there is no such provision under the Act. It was only because of this that I ordered to issue notice to the respondents and also passed the interim order restraining the respondent No.4 Smt. Sajjan Katara nominated by the State Government as Zila Pramukh of Zila Parishad, Udaipur from discharging functions as Zila Pramukh. The respondents are duly served of the notice of this petition. Notice was to be heard on 5.4.99. However, today this petition is heard on account of separate applications under Article 226(3) of the Constitu-tion of India filed by the respondents No.1 to 3 through their counsel Shri Vijay Bishnoi and Shri Mahendra Singhvi for the respondent No.4. In fact, detail reply is also filed on behalf of the respondents No.1 to 3 and the reply is also filed by the respondent No.4. In the reply as well as the applications made under Article 226(3) of the Constitution it has been specifically contended that the petitioner has mis-led this Court and obtain interim order as there is a clear provision under Sec. 25 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1995. Section 25 of the Act reads as under: ``25. Handing over of charge --(1) Whenever the election of a member or Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution has been declared to be void, or whenever such member or Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson-- (i) ... ... ... (ii) ceases to be so under the provisions of this Act, or (iii) ... ... ... (iv) ... ... ... (v) ... ... ... whenever a motion of no-confidence is passed against the Chairperson or the Deputy Chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution under Sec. 37, or ... ... ... Mr. Jasmatia, learned counsel for the petitioner had no answer to this. Today, he has tried to qualify, his statement by submitting that nomination could have been made only by the competent authority and not the State Government. ... ... Mr. Jasmatia, learned counsel for the petitioner had no answer to this. Today, he has tried to qualify, his statement by submitting that nomination could have been made only by the competent authority and not the State Government. He tried to distinguish the ``Government and the ``Competent Authority by relying upon the definition of ``Competent Authority defined under Sec. 2(vii) and the ``Government under Sec. 2(xii) of the Act. This submission is made half -heartedly and it is without substance. The Officer or the authority duly appointed by the State Government by notification in the official gazette would be the competent authority. But ultimately the State Government is the sovereign. The orders have to be passed by the officers of the Government. Thus, this submission made by Mr. Jasmatia has to be rejected. In view of the above, this petition itself is required to be dismissed on the ground that this Court was mis-led and false statement was made by the petitioner in this petition with a special cost. It is well settled law that if the persons do not come before the Court with clean hands then their petition will have to be dismissed even though there may be some merits in the case. In this case, as stated earlier, there is no substance or merits in this case. Before parting, I must state that this petition was filed by learned counsel Shri Jasmatia, who remained as an Additional Advocate General for last several years till 1998, hence it was not expected at least from him to file such petitions with this type of averments to obtain such ex parte interim order. The duty of the Advocate is not only towards his client but also towards the Court as well as to the other side as well. I am of the humble opinion that the Advocate should not try to identify himself with the litigants. In view of the above, this petition is dismissed with a special cost of Rs. 10,000/-which shall be deposited by the petitioner with the Regis-trar General of this Court within one month from today. The said amount being deposited, the same shall be used for legal aid purpose by the Registrar General. The interim order granted earlier stands vacated, forthwith. In view of the above, this petition is dismissed with a special cost of Rs. 10,000/-which shall be deposited by the petitioner with the Regis-trar General of this Court within one month from today. The said amount being deposited, the same shall be used for legal aid purpose by the Registrar General. The interim order granted earlier stands vacated, forthwith. As the main petition is dismissed and the interim order is vacated, the applications filed under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India by the respective respondents are also disposed of. Sd/- (B.J. SHETHNA, J.) (8). In the memorandum of appeal, it was submitted that on 17.3.99 when the petition was dismissed, the case was listed only on consideration of application under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution of India and arguments were heard on that application. Some of the grounds taken in the memorandum are reproduced hereunder: a. That it is totally incorrect to hold that the counsel for the appellant (petitioner) made a mis-statement before the court that there is no provisions in law empowered the State Government to nominated any member on the post of the Chairperson of the Panchayati Raj Institution. The counsel for the appellant did not make any mis-statement and put the correct position of law has he deems have put be-fore the Honble Single Judge. The counsel for the appellant still helds the view that the State Government is not competent to nominate any members of the Zila Parishad on the post of Chairperson of Panchayati Raj Institution in event of the vacancy of the Chairperson. The vacancy of the Chairperson can only be filled in by fresh elections as provided by Section 42 of the Act of 1994. The Section 25 of the Act of 1994 provides for the interim arrangement and in events of the vacancy of the office of the Chairperson and De-puty Chairperson of Panchayati Raj Institution, the competent authority for adhoc arrangement direct the out going Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson to hand-over a charge to member. Even the competent authority cannot nominate any member on the post of Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson for the entire period of the institution. The Honble Single Judge had failed to appreciate this important aspect of the case put forth before him by the counsel for the appellant. b. The State Government and the competent authority are two distinct and separate authority. The Honble Single Judge had failed to appreciate this important aspect of the case put forth before him by the counsel for the appellant. b. The State Government and the competent authority are two distinct and separate authority. The Section 2(vii) of the Act of 1994 defines the competent authority which is reproduced below:- ``2(vii) ``Competent Authority means such officer or authority as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint to perform such functions and exercise such powers of a Competent Authority with respect to such provisions of this Act and in relation to such Panchayati Raj Institutions as are specified in the notification: As per the above definition, competent authority is appointed by a notification in the Gazette and the competent authority enjoys the powers by virtue of the notification in the Official Gazette. It is not the case of the respondent that the State Government was designated as competent authority by publication in the Official Gazette. Further, the function of the competent authority cannot be discharged or usurped by the State Government. When the respondent No. 4 was not directed by the competent authority to take over the charge of the Chairperson of Zila Parishad, Udaipur, her nomination by the State Government is patently illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction. The Honble Single Judge has committed a serious error of law in treating the State Government as the competent authority prescribed by Section 2(vii) of the Act 1994 and was competent to exercise the powers under Section 25 of the Act. c. ... ... ... d. ... ... ... e. That this case came up for hearing before the Honble Single Judge for the hearing of the applications under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India for vacation of the stay order granted on 9.3.99, but the Honble Single Judge in face of the counsel for the appellant, decided the writ petition on the ground of mis-statement with regard to the legal position by the counsel for the appellant. The counsel for the appellant specifically requested the Honble Single Judge that the petitioner wants to file rejoinder to the writ petition and also wants to file an application for a direction to the Zila Collector, Udaipur to produce the Video Cassettes containing the proceedings of the meeting held on 23.2.99. The counsel for the appellant specifically requested the Honble Single Judge that the petitioner wants to file rejoinder to the writ petition and also wants to file an application for a direction to the Zila Collector, Udaipur to produce the Video Cassettes containing the proceedings of the meeting held on 23.2.99. It is pertinent to note that the entire proceedings of the meeting held on 23.2.99 to debate the no-confidence motion against the appellant was Videographed under the orders of the Co-llector, Udaipur and an amount of Rs. 1500/-was paid by the Office of the Collector to the Video studio. Inspite of the request made by the counsel for the petitioner the writ petition was disposed of on 17.3.99 whereas the case was listed only for the arguments on the applications under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India. On this ground also the judgment of the Honble Single Judge is liable to be set aside and opportunity be given to the petitioner to file the rejoinder to the replies submitted by the respondents. The next date of the hearing of this writ petition is 5.4.99 as fixed by the court on 9.3.99. f. The Honble Single Judge also committed a serious error in imposing the exemplary cost of Rs. 10,000/-and directing the petitioner to deposit the same within a period of one month. It is a case of sheer interpretation of the provisions of the Panchayati Raj Institution Act 1994. The counsel for the appellant put forth his interpretation of the provisions of the Act which may not be acceptable to the opposite party and the Honble Court and even which may not be standing in law. Thus the counsel for the petitioner still held the view that the Rajasthan Panchayat Raj Act makes provisions for the nomination of the Chairperson or the Deputy Chairperson by the State Government. The appellant has unduely and unnecessarily burdened with the heavy cost of Rs. 10,000/-. The order imposing the cost of Rs. 10,000/-deserves to be set aside. g. ... ... ... h. ... ... ... i. That the counsel for the appellant has been charged of misleading the court by making mis-statement with regard to the correct legal position regarding the authority of the State Government under Section 25 of the Act in nominating respondent No.4 on the post of Zila Pramukh. 10,000/-deserves to be set aside. g. ... ... ... h. ... ... ... i. That the counsel for the appellant has been charged of misleading the court by making mis-statement with regard to the correct legal position regarding the authority of the State Government under Section 25 of the Act in nominating respondent No.4 on the post of Zila Pramukh. The expressions made and charge levelled against the cou-nsel for the appellant by Honble Single Judge is unwarranted and un-called for as the counsel for the appellant did not make any mis-statement and on 17.3.99 while putting his case before the court emphatically submitted that ``I still hold a view that State Government in law has no authority to nominate any person on the post of Zila Pramukh in the vent of vacancy o the office of Zila Pramukh and Up Zila Pramukh. The same argument was advanced on 9.3.99 on behalf of the petitioner before the court. Such expressions are required to be expunged by this Honble Court. j. ... ... ... k. That the counsel for the appellant on 17.3.99 requested the Honble Single Judge to deal with and incorporate in the judgment the argument of the counsel for the appellant that the stand of the appellant is very much clear from the very beginning and that counsel for the appellant still holds the view that State Government is not competent in law to nominate any member as Zila Pramukh in the event of vacancy of the office and the other arguments, but the counsel for the appellant was silenced by the Honble Single Judge saying that if the counsel for the appellant will insist for incorporation of all his arguments in the judgment, the Honble Single Judge would make more stricter expersions in the judgment. Thus, all the arguments put forth by the appellant on 17.3.99 have not been dealt with and incorporated in the judgment by the Honble Single Judge. (9). A bare reading of the impugned order would show that the learned Single Judge has refused to enter into the merits of the case and has dismissed it on the ground that the counsel for the appellant misled the Court and false statements were made by the petitioner in the petition. (9). A bare reading of the impugned order would show that the learned Single Judge has refused to enter into the merits of the case and has dismissed it on the ground that the counsel for the appellant misled the Court and false statements were made by the petitioner in the petition. The petitioner has been alleged to have not come before the Court with clean hands and has been charged with making false statements in the petition. The learned Single Judge has not specified as to which averment in the petition is false. Presumably the averments in the petition to the effect that there was no provision in law empowering the State Government to nominate a person to the vacant office of Chairperson has been taken by the learned Single Judge to be a false statement. The representation by the learned counsel for the petitioner before the learned single Judge that the post of Zila Pra-mukh, cannot be filled up by nomination is taken to be a misleading statement and contents of paragraph 15 of the petition and ground No.5 taken therein raising the same contention, was taken to be a false statement. It appears to us that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the difference between a false statement and an incorrect statement or averment. Attributing falsehood to a statement would requi-re some material on record to show that an incorrect statement was made to mislead the Court knowing fully well that the statement was false or incorrect. When a statement is made about facts, it can be proved right or wrong by evidence in support or against. It is very easy to decide whether such a statement is false. An incorrect statement of fact can lead to an easy inference that the incorrect state-ment was deliberately made to hood-wink the Court and such incorrect statement can be branded as false. The same cannot be said about an incorrect statement of law because a lawyer or a litigant may genuinely and bonafide hold a view, which in the eye of the Court may be an incorrect proposition of law and which may ultimately be found to be an erroneous view of law. To canvass a probable point of view before the Court in pleadings or in arguments, should not be discouraged under the threat of inviting the charge of misleading the Court to hood-winking the Court. To canvass a probable point of view before the Court in pleadings or in arguments, should not be discouraged under the threat of inviting the charge of misleading the Court to hood-winking the Court. It would clearly be a sad day for our judicial system when the litigants and the lawyers would have to think twice, if not hundred times, before taking a point in the pleadings which may be probable, though not acceptable to a Judge before whom the lawyer would have ultimately to canvass it. It would be a clog on the freedom of expression guaranteed by the Constitution. The Judges have to deal with arguments which may appear to them to be totally untenable but they have to put up with such arguments. It is an occupational hazard to hear arguments which may appear to the Judge to be wholly absurd, untenable and repulsive to logic and common sense. Shifling arguments on points of law, would certainly hamper the search for truth, which is the goal of a Court of law and the Judge presiding over it. A party can be said to be misleading a Court on a point of law only when it alleges that a provision in law exists and it is found that no such provision, as set out by the party, is on the statute book. Such a misleading statement is actually a false state-ment of fact and not of law. Whether a provision exists or not would certainly be a question of fact. But whether one interpretation can be put on the existing provision or the other, is certainly a view point and not a point of fact. It is true that no cut and dry formula can be prescribed for deciding as to whether a lawyer or a litigant has misled the Court or not, or made a false statement or not. It will have to be de-cided in each and every case looking to the circumstances of that case as to whether a false statement was made or the Court was misled. (10). In the case before us, the learned counsel for the petitioner before the learned Single Judge had pleaded and argued that the post of Zila Pramukh cannot be filled up by nomination. In paragraph 15 of the petition it was averred as follows: ``15. (10). In the case before us, the learned counsel for the petitioner before the learned Single Judge had pleaded and argued that the post of Zila Pramukh cannot be filled up by nomination. In paragraph 15 of the petition it was averred as follows: ``15. That the State Government nominated Smt. Sajjan Katara, the member of the Zila Parishad, Udaipur, on the post of Zila Pramukh on 27.2.99 and she assumed the charge of Zila Pramukh. The petitioner came to know of it by a news item published in various news papers published from Udaipur. The true and correct photostat copy of news item published in Rajasthan Patrika dated 28.2.99 is placed on record and marked Annexure No.6. The nomination of Smt. Sajjan Katara on the post of Zila Pramukh is illegal and arbitrary and an abuse of power by the State Government, as the law does not provide for the nomination of Zila Pramukh. In view of the provisions contained in Section 42, if the post of Zila Pramukh or Up-Zila Pramukh is elected by the members of the Zila Parishad. The tenure of the Zila Parishad, Udaipur will expire in the month of January 2000. (11). In ground No. 5 in the petition it is again stated that the vacancy in the post of Zila Pramukh can only be filled in by election and not by nomination by the State Government. The order of the State Government nominating Smt. Sajjan Katara on the post of Zila Pramukh is illegal and without jurisdiction and deserves to be quashed and the act of handing over the charge of Zila Pramukh to Smt. Sajjan Katara was not competent in law. Thus, in the petition, it was contended that there was no provision in law for nomination to a vacant post of Zila Pramukh and the State Government cannot nominate a person to fill in the vacancy of Zila Pramukh. This contention, may or may not be correct in law but by no stretch of imagination it can be said that it was a statement misleading the Court or was a false statement. (12). The learned Single Judge has rejected the contention of the learned co-unsel for the petitioner before him, solely on the ground that Section 25 falsifies the stand taken by the learned counsel. (12). The learned Single Judge has rejected the contention of the learned co-unsel for the petitioner before him, solely on the ground that Section 25 falsifies the stand taken by the learned counsel. It is not a provision empowering nomination by the State Government for filling in vacancy in the Office of Chairperson. The provision relates only to handing over of charge to a person to whom the charge is directed to be handed over by the competent authority. It appears that the attention of the learned Single Judge was not attracted to the further provisions in section 25 which read a under:- ``25. Handing over of charge,-(1) ... ... ... ... ... ... Whenever a motion of no-confidence is passed against the Chairperson or the Deputy Chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution under Sec. 37; or Such member or Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson or all or any of them shall forthwith hand over charge in the prescribed manner of his or their office including all papers and properties pertaining to such office in his or their actual possession or occupation- (a) in the case of a member, to the Chairperson of the Panchayati Raj Institution concerned; (b) in the case of a Chairperson, to the Deputy Chairperson of such Panchayati Raj Institution or, where there is no such Deputy Chairperson, to such member of such Panchayati Raj Institution or other person as the competent authority may direct. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (13). Thus, Section 25 does not empower the State Government to nominate or appoint a person in the vacancy in the post of Chairperson but only provides that in case of vacancy in the post of Chairperson, the outgoing Chairperson has to forthwith hand over charge in the prescribed manner to such member of such Panchayati Raj Institution or other person as the competent authority may direct. Therefore, there was nothing wrong in the contention that there is no provision un-der the Panchayati Raj Act to nominate or appoint any other person to be the Chairperson of the Zila Parishad. Section 42 of the Act relates to filling of vacancies and clears any doubt, if at all there could be any such doubt, about the filling up of vacancies in the offices of Panchayati Raj Institution. It provides that such a vacancy can filled in only through an election and not otherwise. Thus, Section 25 provides for a stop-gap arrangement till the vacancy is filled in under Section 42 of the Act but does not empower the State Government or any other authority to nominate a Chairperson to fill in the vacancy. (14). In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find that the conclusion drawn by the learned Single Judge that the petitioner or his counsel had misled the Court or made false statements in the petition cannot be upheld. The petition, therefore, could not have been dismissed on the ground that the learned Single Judge was misled by the petitioner or his counsel or that false statements had been made by the petitioner in the petition. For the same reasons we find that the charge that the petitioner did not come to the Court with clean hands, does not hold good and the petition could not have been dismissed on that ground also. (15). For the same reasons the remarks passed against the learned counsel for the appellant were neither justified nor called for. In State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Mohammed Naim (1), the Supreme Court in paragraph 10 of its judgment observed as follows: ``(10) .................................................. If there is one principle of cardinal importance in the administration of justice, it is this: the proper freedom and independence of Judges and Magistrates must be main-tained and they must be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by anybody, even by this court. At the same time it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions Judges and Magistrates must be guided by considerations of justice, fair-play and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping ge-neralizations defeat the very purpose for which they are made. At the same time it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions Judges and Magistrates must be guided by considerations of justice, fair-play and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping ge-neralizations defeat the very purpose for which they are made. It has been judicially recognized that in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether the party whose conduct is in que-stion is before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks, and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognised that judicial pronounce-ments must be judicial in nature and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve. (16). The aforesaid principle has also been quoted in Niranjan Patnaik vs. Sashibhusan Kar & Anr. (2), wherein it was observed that it was settled law that harsh or disparaging remarks are not to be made against persons and authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before Courts of law unless it is really necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof to animadvert on that conduct. (17). Since we are setting aside the impugned order as a whole, it is not necessary to specifically expunge certain portions from it but we certainly express our disapproval of the remarks made against the learned counsel for the appellant. The learned counsel could not have been punished for canvassing a legal point and the petitioner could not have been charged with having made a false statement in the petition or to have come to the court with unclean hands in the circumstances of the case. (18). Since the petition has not been decided on merits by the learned Single Judge, we could have sent it back for decision on merit by the regular Single Bench. (18). Since the petition has not been decided on merits by the learned Single Judge, we could have sent it back for decision on merit by the regular Single Bench. However, looking to the time lost so far and looking to the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties that the matter be decided on merits by the Division Bench itself, because the term of the Zila Parishad is about to expire and fresh elec-tions are to be held within a couple of a months, we prefer to decide the case on merits and proceed to do so. (19). The appellant petitioner came to the court challenging the proceedings of the meeting of the Zila Parishad conducted by the Collector, Udaipur as its Presiding Officer to consider the no confidence motion against her. We have gone through the record of the meeting produced by the respondents. We cannot enter into the factual dispute as to actually how many people raised their hands in favour or against the motion. We do not find anything basically wrong in the proceedings and, therefore, we are not able to agree with the appellant-petitioner that only 28 members raised their hand in support of the motion of no confidence. From the record, on which signed acknowledgments of as many as 39 members in lieu of having voted in favour of the no confidence motion exists, we have to conclude that there is no reason or material on record to challenge the official version given by the Presiding Officer of the meeting that 39, out of the 44 members present, voted in favour of the no confidence motion. Thus, we hold that the no confidence motion was carried against the appellant-petitioner. (20). The next question is as to whether Smt. Sajjan Katara was nominated or appointed as Chairperson in place of the outgoing Chairperson and if so, whether that was a valid appointment. As already seen, there is no power either in the State Government or in the `competent authority to appoint or nominate a person in place of the outgoing Chairperson in such circumstances. Section 25 requires that the outgoing Chairperson hands over charge to a person to whom charge is directed to be given by the competent authority. As already seen, there is no power either in the State Government or in the `competent authority to appoint or nominate a person in place of the outgoing Chairperson in such circumstances. Section 25 requires that the outgoing Chairperson hands over charge to a person to whom charge is directed to be given by the competent authority. There is nothing on record of this petition or in the record which is produced for our inspection which shows that the outgoing Chairperson was ever directed to hand over charge to Smt. Sajjan Katara. In the record shown to us there is a letter dated 27.2.99 addressed by the Dy. Legal Remembrancer, Rural Development Department of the Rajasthan Government, to the District Collector, Udaipur directing him to give the charge of the post of Chairperson of the Zila Parishad, Udaipur to Smt. Sajjan Katara. Copy of this letter is not endorsed to the appellant-petitioner, the outgoing Chairperson. Section 25 of the Act obliges the outgoing Chairperson to hand over charge to a person to whom the charge is directed to be given by the competent authority. Since there is no direction given to the outgoing Chairperson, she was not obliged to hand over charge. Moreover, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the State Government was not the `competent authority to give any direction under Section 25 for handling over the charge, has considerable force. ``Competent authority has been defined by Section 2(1)(vii) which reads as under: ``2. Definition,-(1) ................................................................................... (i) ............................................................................................................. (vii) ``Competent Authority means such officer or authority as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint to perform such functions and exercise such powers of a Competent Authority with respect to such provisions of this Act and in relation to such Panchayati Raj Institution as are specified in the notification; (21). By notification No. F.4/7 dated 12.12.94 published in the Rajasthan Gazette Extra Ordinary dated 26.12.94 the State Government appointed Collector as the ``competent authority for the purpose of exercising powers under Section 25(a)(b) of the Act. Thus, for the purpose of Section 25 the Collector was `competent authority and only he could have directed the outgoing Chairperson to hand over charge to a person nominated by him. The provision reserves no power to the State Government to nominate any person to whom the outgoing Chairperson has to hand over charge. Thus, for the purpose of Section 25 the Collector was `competent authority and only he could have directed the outgoing Chairperson to hand over charge to a person nominated by him. The provision reserves no power to the State Government to nominate any person to whom the outgoing Chairperson has to hand over charge. Realising this difficulty, over the above the order passed by the State Government, the District Collector, Udaipur, also is said to have passed an order appointing Smt. Sajjan Katara as the person to whom the charge is to be given. Even this order has not been produced before us but during the hearing a fax copy of an order dated 11.4.99 passed by the District Collector, Udaipur, appointing Shri Chhagan Lal Jain, Member, Zila Parishad, Udaipur as the person to whom the charge of the vacant post of the Dy. Chairperson was directed to be handed over and it was submitted that an order was passed on the same lines, directing charge of the post of Chairperson to be given to Smt. Sajjan Katara. If that is so, it is clear that up to 11.4.99 there was no order by the competent authority as to whom the charge is to be handed over by the outgoing Chairperson. Accepting the statement at the Bar made by the learned counsel for the State Government and the District Collector that an order similar to that which was passed in the case of Dy. Chairperson has been passed in the case of Chairperson also by the Collector, we find that there is nothing on record to show that the appellant who was the outgoing Chairperson, was ever directed by any communication, to hand over charge to Smt. Sajjan Katara or anyone else. A perusal of the copy of the order dated 11.4.99 passed by the District Collector, Udaipur, in respect of the post of Dy. Chairperson, shows that the copy of that order was not endorsed to the outgoing Dy. Chairperson. Thus, it is clear that a copy of the similar order which is said to have been passed in respect of the post of Chairperson was also not endorsed to the outgoing Chairperson and, therefore, the contention of the appellant that she has not been directed till date to hand over charge to any person appears to be correct. Chairperson. Thus, it is clear that a copy of the similar order which is said to have been passed in respect of the post of Chairperson was also not endorsed to the outgoing Chairperson and, therefore, the contention of the appellant that she has not been directed till date to hand over charge to any person appears to be correct. That being so, it is clear that the appellant was not obliged to hand over charge to anyone. (22). We are pained to find that even the Officers of the Indian Administrative Service, from the level of District Collector and above, function in this manner. Sim-ple provisions of law are not understood and carried out by them. Such things give rise to allegations that the Administrative Officers are just handmaids of their political bosses. In this case, the Officers Incharge have made a mess of the no-confidence motion, resulting in a Chairperson against whom a no-confidence motion was passed, technically remaining in office for a long time because of non-exercise of powers under Section 25 of the Act by the competent authority to appoint a person to take charge from the outgoing Chairperson. It is another matter that illegally and in high handed manner charge might have been handed over to Smt. Sajjan Katara by the authorities. In the application under Section 226(3) filed on behalf of respondent No.1 to 3 before the learned Single Judge, the Chief Execu-tive Officer, Zila Parishad, Udaipur has stated in paragraph 4 that under Section 25, the competent authority may hand over the charge of any member of the Panchayati Raj Institution to a person appointed by it. It is also stated that in view of Section 25 of the Act of 1994, there was no illegality on the part of the State Government in handing over the charge to respondent No.4 Smt. Sajjan Katara. This clearly shows that the authorities were under the misconception that the charge was to be handed over by the competent authority to a person appointed by it and there was no need the direct to outgoing Chairperson to hand over the charge to the person so appointed. The contents of the application also show that the authorities made no distinction between the State Government and the competent authority and admitted that it was in fact the State Government which had handed over the charge to Smt. Sajjan Katara. The contents of the application also show that the authorities made no distinction between the State Government and the competent authority and admitted that it was in fact the State Government which had handed over the charge to Smt. Sajjan Katara. Section 25 clearly requires the Chairperson to hand over charge to a person appointed for the purpose by the competent authority. It does not permit taking over of the charge by any one else prior to it is handed over to the person appointed by the competent authority for the purpose. The action of taking over handing over charge in the manner in which it is said to have been done is, therefore, clearly illegal and against the provisions of Section 25 of the Act. (23). We have next to consider the question of imposition of costs by the learned Single Judge. Since we are setting aside the entire order, there is no need to specifically set aside this order as to costs but we express our doubt as to the power of this Court to impose costs by way of punishment on the litigant for something which is said to have been done by his counsel. Moreover, we do not find any justification for directing the cost to be paid to the Registrar General of this Court obliging him to spend the amount for the purposes of legal aid. The costs in a proceeding are primarily meant to compensate a litigant who has been wronged by the other side by unnecessarily dragging him to Court. It is not to be used as a weapon to discipline lawyers or litigants in such a manner. (24). For the aforesaid reasons, we allow this appeal and set aside the impug-ned order. We also allow the petition but in the changed circumstances of the case do not consider it proper to direct charge to be taken afresh from the petitioner appellant and to be given to Smt. Sajjan Katara. (24). For the aforesaid reasons, we allow this appeal and set aside the impug-ned order. We also allow the petition but in the changed circumstances of the case do not consider it proper to direct charge to be taken afresh from the petitioner appellant and to be given to Smt. Sajjan Katara. Beyond expressing our strong disapproval of the procedure adopted by the authorities to hand over charge to Smt. Sajjan Katara, we would not pass any order in favour of the appellant-petitioner be-cause factually she was ousted from the Office, and but for the mess created by the authorities, she would not have remained in charge if the person to take charge was legally nominated immediately after passing of the resolution of no confidence against her. (25). Before parting with the case, we would also like to observe that the situa-tion which arose in this case has arisen because in the zeal for expeditious disposal of cases, enforcing discipline on the litigants and the lawyers, rules of the High Court are given a go by. This was not a case which should have been disposed of without admitting it and without hearing it finally in accordance with the rules. The case was disposed of on a day when an application u/Art. 226(3) of the Constitution of India was to be considered. We are sure, if the case had been heard finally in accordance with the rules, after fixing it on a date for final hearing, the learned Single Judge himself would have reached the same finding, which we have reach-ed, in this appeal. Expediency would never be allowed to rule over quality of justice. (26). There shall be no order as to costs.